[Pickett's Heirs v. Legerwood et al.] extends, it might, perhaps, be beneficially resorted to as the means of submitting a litigated fact to the decision of a jury; an end which, under the mode of proceeding by motion, might otherwise require a feigned issue, or impose upon a judge the alternative of deciding a controverted point upon affidavit, or opening a judgment, perhaps to the material prejudice of the plaintiff, in order to let in a plea. But in general, and in the practice of most of the states, this remedy is nearly exploded, or at least superseded by that of amending on motion. The cases in which it is held to be the appropriate remedy will show that it will work no failure of justice, if we decide that it is not one of those remedies over which the supervising power of this court is given by law. The cases for error coram vobis, are enumerated without any material variation in all the books of practice, and rest on the authority of the sages and fathers of the law. I will refer to the pages of Archbold for the following enumeration. (1st Vol. 234, 276, 277, 278, 279.) "Error in the process, or through default of the clerk; error in fact, as where the defendant being under age sued by attorney, in any other action but ejectment; that either plaintiff or defendant was a married woman at the commencement of the suit; or died before verdict or interlocutory judgment, and the like." But all the books concur in quoting the language of Roll's Abridgement, p. 749, "that if the error be in the judgment itself, and not in the process, a writ of error does not lie in the same court, but must be brought in another and superior court." The writ of error in this case was but a substitute for a motion to the court below, to correct an error of its own, in granting improvidently a motior. for leave to amend. Many years had elapsed since entering a judgment in ejectment; the term declared on had long since expired; the terre tenant was changed; only one of the original defendants survived, and he had removed to a great distance from the premises recovered; on him alone notice of the motion was served; and the court, unaware of these facts, granted leave to amend the declaration in the original suit by extending the term more than twenty years, so as to enable the plaintiffs to sue out a writ of possession. This writ of error was sued out to enable the court [Pickett's Heirs v. Legerwood et al.] below to correct that error; they have ordered that it shall be corrected; and from that order to set aside their former order and quash the writ of possession, is the appeal now made to the reversing power of this court. We think the case comes precisely within the rule laid down by this court in the case of Waldon v. Craig, 9 Wheat. 576; with this difference, that the latter was a case in which the court thought so favourably of the claim of the plaintiff in error, that they would have sustained the suit if it had been possible. The court there express themselves thus. "There is peculiar reason in this case, where the cause has been protracted, and the plaintiff kept out of possession beyond the term laid in the declaration, by the excessive delays practised by the opposite party. But the course of this court has not been in favour of the idea that a writ of error will lie to the opinion of a circuit court granting or refusing a motion like this. No judgment in the cause is brought up by the writ, but merely a decision on a collateral motion, which may be renewed." In that case, as in this, the motion was to extend a term in ejectment, after judgment; but where the plaintiff's delay in proceeding with his writ of possession, was not attributable to his own laches. He had been arrested in his course by successive injunctions sued out by the defendants. This court did there recognize the case of delay by injunction as one in which, in that action, the court might exercise the power to enlarge the term even after judgment, and the particular case as one which merited that exercise of discretion; but dismissed the writ of error because it was a case proper for the exercise of that discretion, and not coming within the description of an error in the principal judgment. On consideration of the motion made to dismiss this writ of error to the circuit court of the United State for the district of Kentucky, it is now here ordered and adjudged by this court, that this writ of error to the said circuit court be, and the same is hereby dismissed with costs. THE UNITED STATES V. GEORGE WILSON. The defendant was indicted for robbing the mail of the United States, and putting the life of the driver in jeopardy, and the conviction and judgment pronounced upon it extended to both offences. After this judg ment no prosecution could be maintained for the same offence, or for any part of it, provided the former conviction was pleaded. The power of pardon in criminal cases had been exercised from time immemorial by the executive of that nation whose language is our language; and to whose judicial institutions, ours bear a close resemblance. We adopt their principles respecting the operation and effect of a pardon; and look into their books for the rules prescribing the manner in which it is to be used by the person who would avail himself of it. A pardon is an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution of the laws, which exempts the individual on whom it is bestowed from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed. It is the private, though official act of the executive magistrate, delivered to the individual for whose bene.it it is intended, and not communicated officially to the court. It is a constituent part of the judicial system, that the judge sees only with judicial eyes, and knows nothing respecting any particular case of which he is not informed judicially. A private deed, not communicated to him, whatever may be its character, whether a pardon or release, is totally unknown, and cannot be acted upon. The looseness which would be introduced into judicial proceedings would prove fatal to the great principles of justice, if the judge might notice and act upon facts not brought regularly into the cause. Such a proceeding, in ordinary cases, would subvert the best established principles, and would overturn those rules which have been settled by the wisdom of ages. There is nothing peculiar in a pardon which ought to distinguish it in this respect from other facts: no legal principle known to the court will sustain such a distinction. A pardon is a deed, to the validity of which delivery is essential; and delivery is not complete without acceptance. It may then be rejected by the person to whom it is tendered; and if it be rejected, we have discovered no power in a court to force it on him. It may be supposed that no being condemned to death would reject a pardon, but the rule must be the same in capital cases and in misdemeanours. A pardon may be conditional, and the condition may be more objectionable than the punishment inflicted by the judgment. The pardon may possibly apply to a different person or a different crime. It may be absolute or conditional. It may be controverted by the prosecutor, and must be expounded by the court. These circumstances [United States v. Wilson.] combine to show that this, like any other deed, ought to be brought "judicially before the court, by plea, motion or otherwise." The reason why a court must, ex officio, take notice of a pardon by act of parliament, is, that it is considered as a public law, having the same effect on the case as if the general law punishing the offence had been repealed or annuiled. THIS case came before the court on a certificate of division of opinion from the judges of the circuit court of the United States for the eastern district of Pennsylvania. At the April sessions 1830 of that court, six indictments were presented to and found by the grand jury against James Porter and George Wilson: one for obstructing the mail of the United States from Philadelphia to Kimberton on the 26th day of November 1829; one for obstructing the mail from Philadelphia to Reading on the 6th day of December 1829; one for the robbery of the Kimberton mail, and putting the life of the carrier in jeopardy, on the same day in November 1829; one for robbery of the Reading mail, and putting the life of the carrier in jeopardy, on the same 6th day of December 1829; one for robbery of the Kimberton mail also on the 26th of November 1829; and one for robbery of the Reading mail also on the 6th of December 1829. At the same sessions two other indictments were presented to the grand jury against the same defendants, in which they were severally charged with robbery of the Reading and Kimberton mail, and wounding the carrier, which were returned to the court as "true bills, except as to wounding the carrier." Upon the indictment for robbery of the Kimberton mail, and putting the life of the carrier in jeopardy, and also in the two last mentioned indictments, a nolle prosequi was afterwards entered by the district attorney of the United States. On the 26th day of April 1830 the defendants James Porter and George Wilson pleaded not guilty to the several bills upon which they were arraigned: and on the 1st of May a verdict of guilty was rendered against them upon the indictment for robbery of the Reading mail, and putting the life of the carrier in jeopardy. The circuit court, on the 27th of May 1830, sentenced the defendants to suffer death on the 2d July following; and James Porter was executed in pursuance of this sentence. Upon the 27th of May 1830 George Wilson withdrew the [United States v. Wilson.] pleas of not guilty in all the indictments against him, except those on which a nolle prosequi was afterwards entered, and pleaded guilty to the same. The indictment for robbery of the Reading mail, and putting the life of the driver in jeopardy, upon which James Porter and George Wilson were tried and convicted, was in the following terms: "Eastern district of Pennsylvania, to wit: "The grand inquest of the United States of America inquiring for the eastern district of Pennsylvania, upon their oaths and affirmations, respectively do present, that James Porter, otherwise called James May, late of the eastern district aforesaid, yeoman, and George Wilson, late of the eastern district aforesaid, yeoman, on the 6th day of December in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and twenty-nine, at the eastern district aforesaid, and within the jurisdiction of this court, with force and arms in and upon one Samuel M'Crea, in the peace of God and of the United States of America then and there being, and then and there being a carrier of the mail of the United States, and then and there entrusted therewith, and then and there proceeding with the said mail from the city of Philadelphia to the borough of Reading, feloniously did make an assault, and him the said Samuel M'Crea in bodily fear and danger then and there feloniously did put, and the said mail of the United States from him the said Samuel M'Crea then and there, feloniously, violently and against his will, did steal, take and carry away, contrary to the form of the act of congress in such case made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the United States of America. "And the inquest aforesaid, upon their oaths and affirmations aforesaid, do further present, that the said James Porter, otherwise called James May, and the said George Wilson, afterwards, to wit, on the same day and year aforesaid, at the eastern district aforesaid and within the jurisdiction of this court, with force and arms in and upon the said Samuel M'Crea, then and there being a carrier of the mail of the United States, and then and there entrusted therewith, feloniously did make an assault, and him the said carrier of the said mail then and there feloniously, violently, and against his will, did rob, contrary to the form of the act of congress in such case |