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[Owings and others v. Andrew Kincannon.]

same rules, regulations and restrictions as are prescribed by law in cases of writs of error."

Previous to the passage of this act, the aecree under consideration could have been brought into this court only by writ of error, in which writ all the defendants must have joined. The language of the act which gives the appeal, appears to us to require that it should be prosecuted by the same parties who would have been necessary in a writ of error. We think also that the same principle would be applicable, from the general usage of chancery, to make one final decree binding on all the parties united in interest.

The appeal must be dismissed, having been brought up irregularly.

On consideration of the motion made in this cause on a prior day of the present term of this court, to wit, on Thursday the 17th day of January, by Mr Bibb, of counsel for the appellee, to dismiss this appeal, on the ground that only two of the parties, represented by their heirs, have joined in this appeal, the decree of the said circuit court being a joint decree against six persons, and of the arguments of counsel thereupon had: It is considered by the court that this appeal be dismissed, because only a part of those against whom the decree was made have joined in the appeal. Whereupon, it is ordered, adjudged and decreed by this court that this appeal be, and the same is hereby dismissed, it having been brought up irregularly. And it is further ordered, adjudged and decreed by this court that said appeal be, and the same is hereby dismissed with costs.

JOSEPH BARLOW, CLAIMANT OF EIGHTY-FIVE HOGSHEADS OF SUGAR, APPELLANT V. THE UNITED STATES.

Construction of the acts of congress relative to drawback on refined sugar. The legislature did not in the enactments in reference to drawback intend to supersede the common principle of the criminal as well as the civil jurisprudence of the country, that ignorance of the law will not exempt its violation.

ON appeal from the circuit court of the United States for the southern district of New York.

In the district court of the United States for the southern district of New York, a libel was filed by the United States, for the forfeiture of eighty-five hogsheads of sugar, alleging them to have been entered for the benefit of drawback under a false denomination; viz, as refined sugars, with intent to defraud the

revenue.

The answer of the claimant, Joseph Barlow, denied that the sugars were entered by a false denomination, or with intent to defraud the revenue; and insisted they were refined sugars within the meaning of the act of congress. Testimony was taken in the district court by the parties to the proceedings, and that court decreed as follows:

"The sugars mentioned in the pleadings in this cause is not refined sugar within the meaning of the act of congress of January 21, 1829, and that entry was made of the said sugar in the office of the collector of the port of New York for exportation by a false denomination, the same being entered by the owner for the benefit of drawback or bounty, under the denomination of refined sugar. But it is further considered and decreed, that it has been made to appear, to the satisfaction of this court, that such false denomination happened by the mistake of the claimant, the owner, in believing bastard sugar to be refined sugar, entitled to the drawback provided by the said act of congress. And it is further considered and decreed by this court, that the forfeiture of the said sugar so entered has not been incurred by the owner. It is further ordered and decreed

[Barlow v. The United States.]

by this court, that the said claimant pay the taxable costs of the libellants and of the officers of this court in this cause; and that, therefore, the libel filed in this cause be dismissed, and that the said sugar be delivered up on demand, at reasonable times, to the said claimant; and it is further ordered, that a certificate of probable cause of seizure be given to the collector or officer of the customs, by whom the seizure of the said sugar may have been made."

From this decree both parties appealed to the circuit court for the southern district of New York. On the 4th January 1831, the circuit court made the following decree.

This cause having been brought to a hearing upon the pleadings and proofs therein, and counsel having been heard upon the appeal by the United States of America, as well as upon the appeal by Joseph Barlow, the claimant of the sugars mentioned in the pleadings in the cause, and the court having taken time to advise as to its decision, due deliberation being had, it is now ordered, adjudged, and decreed by the court, and his honour, Smith Thompson, judge of this court, doth order, adjudge, and decree, that the appeal of the said Joseph Barlow, claimant as aforesaid, be dismissed, with costs.

And it is further, in like manner, ordered, adjudged, and decreed, that the decree of the district court of the United States for the southern district of New York, so far as the same acquits the said sugars from forfeiture, for the causes in the libel in this cause mentioned, be reversed, with costs.

And it is further, in like manner, ordered, adjudged and decreed, that the said sugars are not refined sugars, entitled to the benefit of drawback or bounty, within the meaning of the act of congress of the 21st of January, anno domini eighteen hundred and twenty-nine, and that the same were entered in the office of the collector for the port of New York, for the benefit of drawback or bounty, under a false denomination, and with intent to defraud the revenue of the United States.

And it is accordingly, in like manner, further ordered, adjudged, and decreed, that the said sugars be, and the same are condemned, as forfeited to the use of the United States, and that the said United States do recover their costs of suit,

[Barlow v. The United States.]

to be taxed against the said Joseph Barlow, claimant as aforesaid.

The claimant appealed to this court.

The case was argued by Mr Morton and Mr Ogden for the appellant, and by Mr Taney, attorney-general, for the United States.

Mr Justice STORY delivered the opinion of the Court.

This is a libel of seizure instituted in the district court for the southern district of New York, which comes before this court upon an appeal from a decree of the circuit court of that district, condemning the property, viz. eighty-five hogsheads of sugar, as forfeited to the United States.

The charge in the libel is, that the sugars were entered in the office of the collector of the customs for the district of New York for the benefit of drawback or bounty upon the exportation thereof, by a false denomination, with an intent to defraud the revenue. The claimant in his claim admits that he made the entry for the benefit of the drawback on the exportation; bu' he denies that the entry was made by a false denomination; and he asserts, that the sugars are truly refined sugars, as they are denominated in the entry.

The eighty-fourth section of the duty collection act of 1799, ch. 128, upon which the libel is founded, provides, that if any goods, wares, or merchandize, of which entry shall have been made in the office of a collector for the benefit of drawback or bounty upon exportation, shall be entered by a false denomination, or erroneously as to the time when, and the vessel in which they were imported, or shall be found to disagree with the packages, quantities, or qualities, as they were at the time of the original importation, &c. &c., all such goods, wares, and merchandizes, &c., shall be forfeited; provided, that the said forfeiture shall not be incurred, if it shall be made appear to the satisfaction of the collector, &c., or of the court, in which a prosecution for the forfeiture shall be had, that such false denomination, error, or disagreement, happened by mistake or accident, and not from any intention to defraud the revenue.

[Barlow v. The United States.]

The language of this section is certainly sufficient to include the case at bar, if all the material facts are established. The sugars were entered for the benefit of drawback, or bounty, in the office of the collector; and if the entry was by a false denomination, the forfeiture is incurred; unless the claimant can avail himself of the proviso, or some other matter in defence.

It has, however, been contended at the bar, that in the case of refined sugars exported for the benefit of drawback and -bounty, no entry is required by law to be made at the office of the collector; but that a system of regulations has been specially provided for such exportations, which supersedes or controls those of the eighty-fourth section. And in support of this argument it has been urged, that the eighty-fourth section applies only to articles which have been previously imported and subjected to duties.

It appears to us upon full consideration, that this argument is not well founded. Sugars have been made subject to duties upon their importation from the first establishment of the government down to the present time in every tariff law; and it is notorious, that until after the acquisition of Louisiana in 1803, no sugars were grown in the United States; and, consequently, all which were used or refined within the United States must have been of foreign growth and importation. So, that if an entry under the eighty-fourth section were required only upon the exportation of dutiable articles which had been imported, all sugars, whether refined or not, might have been within the provisions of that section. This is rendered still more obvious by the terms of the act of the 5th of June 1794, ch. 51, which first gave a drawback upon refined sugars. That act laid a duty of two cents per pound upon all sugar which should be refined in the United States; and declared, that the duties thereby laid upon such sugar, should and might be drawn back upon such sugar refined within the United States after the 30th of September then next, which after that day should be exported from the United States to any foreign port or power; "and adding to the drawback upon sugar so exported three cents per pound on account of duties paid upon the importation of raw sugar." This act was continued in force until March 1801; and then was permitted to

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