general tendency of such agreements; and it closes the door to temptation by refusing them recognition in any of the courts in the country. Greenhood on Public Policy, p. 5, thus lays down the rule: The question of the validity of the contract does not depend upon the circumstance whether it can be shown that the public has in fact suffered any detriment, but whether the contract is in its nature such as might be injurious to the public. It matters not that any particular contract is free from any taint of actual fraud, oppression or corruption. The law looks to the general tendency of such contracts.' The evil tendency of the contract in suit is clearly apparent. The mere statement of it shocks the sense of justice and fair play. By held that the consideration was illegal and that both note and mortgage could be avoided. Henderson v. Palmer, 71 Ill. 579. An employe of a railroad company may, by contract, waive his right to sue for injuries not arising from criminal negligence on the part of the company, or its other employes; but any negligence, either of omission or commission, on the part of other employes of the road, in connection with their business, from which serious injury results, constitutes criminal negligence, and a contract waiving the right to sue for injuries resulting therefrom is contrary to public policy and void. Cook v. Western & Atlantic R. R., 72 Ga. 48. An agreement to procure witnesses to testify to a certain state of facts, is immoral and against public policy. Patterson v. Donner, 48 Cal, 369. generally as to agreements for shifting criminal prosecutions: Gorham v. Keyes, 137 Mass. 583; Lindsay v. Smith, 78 N. Car. 328; Baker v. Farris, 61 Mo. 389; Shaw v. Spooner, 9 N. H. 198; Chandler v. Johnson, 39 Ga. 85; Goodwin v. Crowell, 56 Ga. 566; Snider v. See Willey, 33 Mich. 483; Summer v. Summer. 54 Mo. 340; Wright v. Rindskopf, 43 Wis. 344; Roll v. Raguet, 4 Ohio, 400; Ricketts v. Harvey, 106 Ind. 564; Peed v. McKee, 42 Iowa, 689; McMahon v. Smith, 47 Conn. 221; Pearce v. Wilson, 111 Pa. St. 14; s. c., 56 Am. Rep. 243; Wheaton v. Ansley. 71 Ga. 35; Ormerod v. Dearman, 100 Pa. St. 561; Rhodes v. Neal, 64 Ga. 704; Averbeck v. Hall, 14 Bush, 505; Baehr v. Wolff, 59 Ill. 470; Dunkin v. Hodge, 46 Ala. 523; Merrill v. Carr, 60 N. H. 114; Buck v. Bank, 27 Mich. 293; Bowen v. Buck, 28 Vt. 308. As to collusion in divorce cases see Stoutenburgh v. Lybrand, 13 Ohio St. 228; Kilborn v. Field, 78 Pa. St. 194; Sayles v. Sayles, 21 N. H. 312; Cross v. Cross, 58 N. H. 373; Goodwin v. Goodwin, 4 Day, 343; Stilson v. Stilson, 46 Conn. 15; Belden v. Munger, 5 Minn. 211; Adams v. Adams, 25 Minn. 72; Everhart v. Puckett. 73 Ind. 409; Phillips v. Thorp, 10 Ore. 494; Hope v. Hope, 8 De G., M. & G. 731; Weeks v. Hill, 38 N. H. 199; Brown v. Brine, L. R. 1 Excheq. D. 5. virtue of the contract appellant assumed a position where selfish motives might have impelled him to sacrifice the public good for private gain; for there is no greater public good than the right of every person charged with the commission of a crime to have a fair and impartial hearing; and there is no higher security for that right than the preservation of the courts free from corrupting influences."' In a recent case it was held that a contract whereby a justice of the peace agrees to charge smaller fees in suits to be brought before him by a certain corporation than prescribed by statute, and that such fees shall not be collected unless paid over by the defendants to the corporation, is contrary to public policy and void. In a case in Michigan, a justice of the peace agreed with an attorney to charge no fees in certain suits brought before him unless the judgments rendered therein were collected. It was held a palpable violation of judicial duty and void as against public policy; and that the justice could not recover from the plaintiff for services actually rendered, the whole transaction being beyond the protection of courts of justice. In a recent case in California, it was held that a contract between the 1 Brown v. First Nat'l Bank, 137 valid, and it follows, necessarily, Ind. 655, 668. that a promise to compensate a witness for his attendance cannot be enforced, which, if known. would have excluded him from being a witness; as it would be a fraud upon the administration of justice. Such contracts are against sound policy, because their inevitable tendency would be if not to invite to perjury, at least to sway the mind of the witness by giving him the interest of a party to the cause and thus contaminate the stream of justice at its source. It can neither admit of doubt or question, that both morality and sound policy forbid the toleration of such contracts as this." Eddings v. Long, 10 Ala. 203, 208. 3 Willemin v. Bateson, 63 Mich. 2 Hawkeye Ins. Co. v. Brainard, 72 Iowa, 130; s. c., 33 N. W. Rep. 603. Here the amount of compensation was to depend upon the success of the party to the suit, in whose favor the witness was to testify, and although there may have been no agreement, or expectation, that the witness would give false testimony, the inevitable tendency of the contract was to give him a bias in favor of the party calling him as a witness, as the promised reward was to be reduced one-half, if the party in whose favor he was to testify was not successful in the suit. This created such an interest in the event of the suit, as would have prevented him 'rom testifying if the contract was 309. purchaser at a partition sale and one of the parties to the partition suit, who was about to contest the confirmation of the sale for inadequacy of the price bid, to the effect that said party, in consideration of a specified sum to be paid in addition for her interest in the property, would refrain from contesting said confirmation, is a contract for the concealment of a material fact from the court and the other parties to the partition suit, which it was the duty of the contracting party to make known, and is void as against public policy, and neither party should receive the aid of the courts to enforce it. In a case in Missouri, it was held that it is unlawful for a candidate for public office to make offers to the voters to perform the duties of the office, if elected, for less than the legal fees. An election secured by means of such offers is void.? In Kansas it has been held that an agreement to withdraw the plea of usury is against public policy and cannot be sustained. In his opinion in this case, Mr. Justice Brewer said: "The agreement to withdraw the plea of usury cannot be sustained. It is no better than an agreement not to plead it, and surely if such an agreement could be sustained a usurious loan would always be accompanied by an agreement not to plead the usury, a very simple if not effectual way of evading the law."4 3 § 33. For Changing the Officers of Corporations.— The appointment and removal of the directors and officers of a corporation cannot be made a matter of bargain and sale. Persons occupying these positions sustain, towards 1 Tappan v. Albany Brewing Co., 80 Cal. 570. An agreement to withdraw an offer or bid for property of the State offered for sale, to enable one of the parties thereto, by the removal of competition, to buy it cheaper than he otherwise could, is against public policy, and not enforceable, and it is immaterial whether property is offered at public auction or by inviting bids or proposals for its purchase at private sale. Boyle v. Adams 50 Minn. 255; s. C., 52 N. W. Rep. 860. 2 Attorney-General v. Collin, 72 Mo. 13. See also Alvord v. Collin, 20 Pick. 428; Tucker v. Aiken, 7 N. H. 140; State v. Purdy, 36 Wis. 213; s. c., 17 Am. Rep. 485. 3 Clark v. Spencer, 14 Kan. 399. Clark v. Spencer, 14 Kan. 399, 404. the stockholders, the relation of trust and confidence, and they are bound to act with supreme reference to the interests of those whom they represent. Any agreement into which they may enter, the object of which is to advance their own interests, either at the expense of the stockholders, or irrespective of their interests, is a breach of trust, and will not be enforced in equity. In a case in Massachusetts, it was held that a contract, by which a shareholder in a corporation, in consideration of the purchase of a part of his stock at a price named, agrees to secure to the purchaser the office of treasurer of the corporation, with a fixed salary, and in case of his removal to repurchase the stock at par, is void as against public policy and as a fraud on the other members of the corporation, in the absence of evidence that the transaction was not for the private benefit of the shareholder, or that it was consented to by the other members of the corporation. In the opinion in this case the court said: "It was the purpose and effect of the contract to influence the defendant in the decision of a question affecting the private rights of others by considerations foreign to those rights. The promisee was placed under direct inducement to disregard his duties to other members of the corporation, who had a right to demand his disinterested action in the selection of suitable officers. He was in a relation of trust and confidence which required him to look only to the best interests of the whole, uninfluenced by private gain. The contract operated as a fraud upon his associates." In California it has been held that an agreement of a trustee of a corporation for a pecuniary recompense to resign his trust, is contra bonos mores, and a contract based, either wholly or in part, on such an agreement as a consideration, is void." In a case in Kansas N 1 Guernsey v. Cook, 120 Mass. 501. See also Fuller v. Dame, 18 Pick. 472; Case v. Gerrish, 15 Pick. 49; Smith v. Townsend, 109 Mass. 500; Phippen v. Stickney, 3 Met. 384; Gibbs v. Smith, 115 Mass. 592; Curtis v. Aspinwall, 114 Mass. 187; Waldo v. Martin, 4 Barn. & C. 319; Marshall v. Baltimore & 2 Guernsey v. Cook, 120 Mass. 501, 502. S Forbes v. McDonald, 54 Cal. 98. entered into a verbal contract with D, a director and the president of a national bank, to buy of the latter one hundred and fourteen shares of stock in the bank, at $140 per share, upon the condition that he should be made cashier of the bank. Subsequently D notified N that he could not and would not fulfill the contract. Thereupon N brought an action for damages for the breach thereof. It was held that the consideration of the contract being against public policy the contract was void, and that N was not entitled to recover damages.1 § 34. For Renouncing an Executorship.-A covenant under which an executor engages to retire from his executorship for a consideration, is in contravention of public policy and void. An executor cannot make use of his relations to the trust property to promote his personal interests. In an English case a testator appointed two trustees 1 Noel v. Drake, 28 Kan. 265. See further Guernsey v. Cook, 120 Mass. 501; Noyes v. Marsh. 123 Mass. 286; Merchants' Nat'l Bank v. State Bank, 10 Wall. 604, 650; Railroad Co. v. Ryan, 11 Kan. 602; Haas v. Fenlon, 8 Kan. 601; Tool Co. v. Norris, 2 Wall. 45. "In the relation of trust and confidence which Drake occupied as a director and president of the bank, which required him to look only to the best interests of the bank and its stockholders, it was improper for him to be influenced by agreements with, or considerations from, a stranger to the association in the selection of a cashier, or in the discharge of any of his other official duties. The appointment of officers by the directors of a national bank ought not to be made a matter of bargain and sale between applicants and members of the board." Noel v. Drake, supra. The defendants made an agreement with the plaintiff, by which they stipulated that on the payment by him of $200,000 for a certain number of shares of the capital stock of a railway company, then belonging to then, new directors to be nominated by the plaintiff and his co-purchaser, H, should be substituted in the place of all the other directors, except the plaintiff and H, who were directors at the time. Held, that the contract was an attempt improperly to interfere with the rights of others, and was clearly contrary to public policy. And that if the subject-matter of the contract was of that species which would authorize a court of equity to interpose and decree a specific performance, the object and nature of it would forbid any such interposition. Fremont v. Stone, 42 Barb. 169. 2 Ellicott v. Chamberlain, 38 N. J. Eq. 604; McCaw v. Blewit, 2 McCord Ch. 90; Bate v. Bate, 11 Bush, 639; Bowers v. Bowers, 26 Pa. St. 74; Owings v. Owings, 1 |