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respects, which secures that restraint. Indeed, it seems well settled by authority that a personal obligation so insisted upon by a grantor, and assumed by a grantee, which is a restriction as to the use of the land, may be enforced in equity against the grantee and subsequent purchasers with notice."1

§ 50. The Subject Continued.-A familiar example of the application of this rule, as set forth in the preceding section, is that of a restriction upon the right of the grantor to make use of the land conveyed for the sale of intoxicating liquors. Restrictions of this character are upheld upon two grounds. It is well established that in the disposal of property the grantor has the right to restrain the grantee from such a use of the land conveyed as would diminish the value of what remained, or conflict with its sale or use for other purposes. But in addition to this right it is the policy of the law to restrain the sale of intoxicating drinks. The evil of the traffic, both in itself and in its influence, is recognized by the courts. The theory of the law is that it is to be tolerated only; never to be encouraged. In consequence, it is well established that a covenant in a conveyance restricting the right of a grantor to use the property conveyed for the sale of intoxicants will be held valid. In a case in Michigan, it was held that the right of a grantor to convey land on condition that the grantee shall not sell liquor upon the premises, coupled with a provision that in case of such sale the land shall revert to the

1 Hodge v. Sloan, 107 N. Y. 244. 251. See also Burbank v. Pills bury, 48 N. H. 475; Morland v. Cook, L. R. 6 Eq. 252; Brown v. Great Eastern R. Co., L. R. 2 Q. B. Div. 406; London, etc. Ry. Co. v. Comrs., L. R. 20 Ch. D. 562, 576. Where an agent procures a sale of land by promising, without authority, that the vendor will not sell adjoining lots at a less price, the mere fact that the vendee takes possession of the land, and has the

benefit of such unauthorized promise for nearly a year, will not prevent him from rescinding the sale for non-performance of the promise.

An agreement by a vendor not to sell other lots in the same plat at a less price than that paid by the vendee for his lot, will be construed as limited to a reasonable time, and as such is not against public policy. Rackeman v. Riverbank Imp. Co. (1896), 167 Mass. 1; S. C., 44 N. E. Rep. 990.

grantor, who shall at once take possession thereof, cannot be denied, and is within the public policy of this State, but courts will not enforce such condition if inserted for a dishonest purpose, and to enable the grantor to obtain a monopoly of the prohibited business. In Jenks v. Pawlowski, it was held that restrictions in a deed upon the right of the grantee to sell intoxicating liquors on the premises are sustained upon the theory that a party has the right in disposing of his property to prevent such a use by the grantee as might diminish the value of remaining land, or impair its eligibility for other uses.2 In a case where a deed contained the clause "no intoxicating liquors are to be sold on said premises in less quantities than five gallons," it was held that the restriction was not such a restraint on trade as to make it invalid."

1 Chippewa Falls Lumber Co. v. Tremper, 75 Mich. 36. Liquor is not a necessity, like bread, and is generally regarded as of damage to the general community; but I know of no good reason why a person should be permitted to have a monopoly in selling poison to a community any more than food, unless it can be that no other person can be found fit to handle and dispense it. I do not believe, however, that any man or company should be permitted by the law, and aided by the courts, to create a monopoly in himself either in the sale of bread or whisky. The right to insert such a condition as the one in this case for an honest and beneficial purpose cannot be denied, and is within the public policy of this State. Smith v. Barrie, 56 Mich. 314; s. C., 22 N. W. Rep. 816; Watrous v. Allen, 57 Mich. 362; s. C.. 24 N. W. Rep. 104. But courts will not enforce such a condition inserted for a dishonest purpose. and to the end that the grantor may thereby obtain a monopoly in any business, and all

others restrained therefrom; and there can be no difference in this regard whether the business so sought to be centered in one person in a community is one acknowledged by every one to be of great benefit to mankind, or one regarded by many good people of detriment to the community, provided both are lawful; and certainly one cannot ask a court of justice to enforce such a condition as this against a person selling liquor otherwise lawfully, that he may reap the benefit of unlawful sales. Courts will not enforce forfeitures of estates for any such purposes." Ibid., p. 41. A covenant in restraint of trade is not necessarily invalid. so far as the covenantee has in his own business an interest in enforcing it; and where the business is the selling of liquor, such a condition is not, in Michigan at least, opposed to public policy. Watrous v. Allen, 57 Mich. 362.

2 Jenks v. Pawlowski, 98 Mich. 110; s. c., 56 N. W. Rep. 1105.

3 Sutton v. Head (Ky.), 5 S. W. Rep. 410. A provision in a deed

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§ 51. The Grantor Restrained by the Terms of the Conveyance. Where a grantor, by the conditions of the sale and conveyance of land, is restricted in the pursuit of his business, the covenant will be upheld, and if violated will be enforced by injunction. In the city of Brooklyn, G obtained a contract for the purchase of a lot situated in a section of the city occupied by residences of people of wealth and social standing, and in which there were no tenement houses. On his announcement of his intention to erect a seven-story flat in close proximity to plaintiff's residence, plaintiff bought his contract and obtained possession of the lot. One of the conditions of the purchase was that G should not "construct or erect any flats in plaintiff's immediate neighborhood." Soon after the sale G commenced the erection of a flat opposite the lot sold, but before the completion of the work sold the lot to his wife, who had knowledge of the contract with plaintiff, for about one-third of its value, and continued the building of the flat as her agent. It was held that the erection of the flat would be enjoined, inasmuch as the wife bought the land subject to the plaintiff's equities, which attached as soon as he acquired title to the same. In the opinion in this case, the court said: "It is true and should be noted, that in

that the premises conveyed "are not to be used for saloon or dramshop purposes," merely prevents the use of a particular piece of property in a certain way, and is not void as in restraint of trade. Star Brewery Co. v. Primas, 163 Ill. 652; s. C., 45 N. E. Rep. 145.

1 Lewis v. Gollner, 129 N. Y. 227; S. C., 29 N. E. Rep. 81. "If the contract remains technically a personal one, I think the reasonable and settled doctrine is that the contract equity is so attached to the use of the land, which is the subject-matter, as to follow the land itself into the hands of a purchaser with a full knowledge of all the facts, who buys with his eyes open

to the existing equity, and more especially when he buys for the express purpose of defeating and evading that equity. It has been held that the equity resulting from a valid agreement, although the latter was not a covenant running with the land, or a legal exception or reservation out of it, but stood solely upon the ground of a personal contract, dictating the mode of a user, would, nevertheless, go with the land into the hands of a purchaser, with notice, and who did not buy innocently or in good faith." Ibid., p. 236. See also Whitney v. Union Ry. Co., 11 Gray, 363.

these cases the restrictions followed the line of title and were imposed by the original owners and vendors of the land, while here they were not so imposed, but came from one never an owner of the land, but deriving his right from a contract with one who did become such owner. But why should that difference change the result? The original owner's right rests upon one consideration and that of the stranger to the title upon another, but each are equally good and worthy of equitable regard. In Parker v. Nightingale,1 it is declared not to be in the least material that the restrictive stipulations should be binding at law, or that any privity of estate should subsist between parties in order to render them obligatory and to warrant equitable relief in case of their infraction. I think that doctrine is sound and just. The source of the restriction would seem to be immaterial if itself binding and founded upon sufficient consideration, and a breach is no greater wrong to a privy in estate than to a stranger validly contracting about its use. Nor can the vendee in bad faith stand upon such a difference. Equity has no compassion for a fraud, and he who buys in aid of one with full knowledge of what is right, but with purpose to defeat it, should not escape the hand of equity by a criticism upon the origin of the restriction violated.""

§ 52. Contracts Relating to Trade Secrets.—It is a well established principle of public policy that useful and valuable discoveries and inventions are to be encouraged. They are afforded all necessary protection by the law on the ground that the discoverer or inventor is entitled to a proper recompense for the labor and expense incurred in bringing his discovery or invention to perfection, and for the farther reason that it is for the public interest that work of this character should be done. In other words, the protection afforded is a matter of justice and for the promotion of the public welfare. A valuable discovery, before it is divulged, is the property of the discoverer. It

1 Parker v. Nightingale, 6 Allen, 344.

2 Lewis v. Gollner, 129 N. Y. 227, 236.

is his privilege to keep his secret and to avail himself, as far as practicable, of its benefits; or, if that promises a larger measure of profit, to dispose of it. Since the sale of the secret is, presumptively, not in restraint of trade but for its extension, it is not in contravention of public policy, and any contract relating to it will be enforced. In a recent leading case before the Supreme Court of the United States, relating to a proprietary medicine, the court said: "Relating as these contracts did to a compound involving a secret in its preparation; based as they were upon a valuable consideration, and limited as to the space within which, though unlimited as to the time for which, the restraint was to operate, we are unable to perceive how they could be regarded as so unreasonable as to justify the court in declining to enforce them. The vendors were entitled to sell to the best advantage, and in so doing to exercise the right to preclude themselves from entering into competition with those who purchased, and to prevent competition between purchasers; and the purchasers were entitled to such protection as was reasonably necessary for their benefit. W had and transferred property in the secret process of manufacturing the article he had discovered, and he and his grantees could claim relief as against breaches of trust in respect to it. The policy of the law is to encourage useful discoveries by securing their fruits to those who make them. If the public found the balsam efficacious, they were interested in not being deprived of its use, but by whom it was sold was unimportant."" In a recent case

1 Fowle v. Parke, 131 U. S. 88, 97. See also Bryson v. Whitehead, 1 Sim. & St. 74, and cases cited; Leather Cloth Co. v. Lorsont, L. R. 9 Eq. 345; s. C., 39 L. J. Ch. 82; 21 L. T. 661; 18 W. R. 572; Alcock v. Giberton, 5 Duer, 76; Gillis v. Hall, 2 Brewst. 341; Bowling v. Taylor, 40 Fed. Rep. 404; Benwell v. Inns, 24 Beav. 307; Harms v. Parsons, 32 Beav. 328; Rannie v. Irvine, 7 Man. & G. 969;

Allsopp v. Wheatcroft, L. R. 15 Eq. 59. Under a bond to convey to the obligee the obligor's chocolate mill, "together with his exclusive right and art or secret manner of making chocolate and all information pertaining to his said manner of making chocolate," it is incumbent on the obligor, to convey such exclusive right, with a covenant that he will communicate all the information

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