will render the sale voidable by a purchaser influenced by such bidding, whether that bidding was upon the lot purchased by him or upon lots previously offered, even though such bidding was instigated by the auctioneer without the seller's knowledge; but if it appears that he was not so influenced the sale is valid.1 In a case in Illinois, the rule in regard to bids by sealed proposals is stated by the court, as follows: "There is never to be found in the terms of an auction sale a clause prohibiting the bidders from combining together to prevent competition, still it is none the less unlawful for them to do so. The law implies everything which good faith and fair dealing require, and none the less so in the case of sales by sealed proposals than by open bids. In both cases effects and consequences are to be considered, in determining what fair dealing and the true intent of the transaction required. This principle has long been applied to sales by open bids, and we cannot doubt that it ought to be applied where the bids are by sealed proposals.”2 $ 85. Combination to Destroy Competition.-In ordinary business affairs one person may refuse to buy or to sell to another, or in anywise to transact business with him. And what one person may do in this direction, two or more persons may unite in doing. A combination to refuse to buy of a particular individual, or to sell to him, is not a conspiracy or an offense. But a combination to induce a third person to refuse to sell to another, is a conspiracy, and a ground for a civil action. In a recent case it was held that no action for conspiracy will lie by a butcher against several dealers in beef cattle because they have combined to refuse to sell him beeves; but where the petition further alleges that defendants also induced a certain dealer in slaughtered meat likewise to refuse to sell him, such interference with his business is a cause of action, and it is error to sustain a demurrer to the petition. In the opinion 187. Curtis v. Aspinwall, 114 Mass. Webster v. French, 11 Ill. 254, 3 3 Delz v. Winfree, 80 Tex. 400; S. C., 16 S. W. Rep. 111. "It cannot be held that defendants had the right to prevent plaintiffs from in this case the court said: "Plaintiff's petition goes further than to charge that each of the defendants refused to sell to him. It charges that they not only did that, but that they induced a third person to refuse to sell to him. It does not appear from the petition that their interference with the business of plaintiff was done to serve some legitimate purpose of their own, but that it was done wantonly selling to consumers, or that such interference by them (defendants) was serving a legitimate purpose connected with their own business. To break plaintiffs down as competitors for the consumers trade might, it is true, result in benefit to defendants; but such a benefit, obtained in such manner, could not be deemed a legitimate purpose, within the meaning of the opinion quoted. Delz v. Winfree, 80 Tex. 400; s. c., 16 S. W. Rep. 111; Morris Run Coal Co. v. Barclay Coal Co., 68 Pa. St. 173. Plaintiffs had the right to sell at wholesale or retail, or both, to the retail dealer and the actual consumer; and defendants had the same right, as well as the right to solicit and secure trade from plaintiffs' customers by underselling them. This would be legitimate. They could do this, and would not be responsible for the injurious consequences to plaintiffs' business; but they could not, without some legal purpose directly serving their own business, maliciously induce third persons not to trade with plaintiffs, and so injure them. Plaintiffs cannot recover for any injury, except such as results from the wanton and unlawful interference with plaintiffs' business in influencing third persons not to trade with them, and only for the injury that has occurred." Olive v. Van Patten (1894), 7 Tex. Civ. App. 630; s. c., 25 S. W. Rep. 428. "The plaintiff's action is for an injury resulting from the doing of a lawful act in a lawful manner. Α person, with or without reason, may refuse to trade with another, so may ten or fifty persons refuse. An individual may advise his neighbor or friend not to trade with another neighbor; he may even command, when the command amounts only to earnest advice. ** * It is not an unlawful interference with the trade of another to advise people to deal with his competitor, or to decline to do business with him. Nor is it now unlawful to combine to raise the rate of wages. More v. Bennett, 41 Ill. App. 164; Heywood v. Tilson, 75 Me. 231; Payne v. Western Ry. 81 Tenn. 507; Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, L. R. 21 Q. B. Div. 544; s. C., 23 Q. B. Div. 598; L. R. (1892) App. Cas. 25; Bohn Mfg. Co. v. Hollis, 54 Minn. 223; s. c., 55 N. W. Rep. 1119; Carew v. Rutherford, 106 Mass. 1. The fact that such advice is given with a bad or malicious motive, does not render it unlawful or actionable. The law does not ordinarily consider the motive by which people are actuated to lawful acts, while motive plays a very important part when unlawful proceedings are under consideration." Waterman, J., in Ulery v. Chicago Live Stock Exchange, 54 Ill. App. 233, 240. * and maliciously, and that it caused, as they intended it should, pecuniary loss to him. We think the petition stated a cause of action, and that the demurrer should have been overruled."1 But in a recent case it was held that where the contract between a railroad company and the proprietor of one of its eating houses does not require it to stop its trains at his hotel in order that passengers may take their meals there, it does not constitute an actionable conspiracy, on the part of the company, against such proprietor, for it to induce another to start an eating house a short distance from him by agreeing to stop its trains there for meals. In the opinion in this case the court said: "We see nothing in the petition which charges an actionable conspiracy. Defendant had a right to run its trains as it saw fit, and also had the right to supply meals to its passengers at any place it desired. The lease made between plaintiff and defendant did not obligate defendant to stop its trains for meals at his house. In doing what is charged against it, defendant was neither doing an unlawful act nor a lawful act in an unlawful manner. The motive with which one Delz v. Winfree, 80 Tex. 400; not to enter into new contracts S. C., 16 S. W. Rep. 111. 2 Kelly v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 93 Iowa, 436; s. c., 61 N. W. Rep. 957. "In Bowen v. Hall (6 Q. B. Div. 333; 50 L. J. Q. B. 305; 44 L. T. 75; 29 W. R. 367), the broad principle is laid down that if a man induces one of two parties to a contract to break that contract, with the intent to injure the other party or to do himself a benefit, he thereby commits an actionable wrong. In this case the jury, in answer to the first question put to them, found that the defendants did maliciously induce persons who had entered into contracts with the plaintiff to break those contracts. I think there was abundant evidence to support that finding. The second question in the case is as to inducing persons with the plaintiff. The jury were asked whether the defendants maliciously conspired to induce persons not to enter into such contracts with the plaintiff, and whether such persons were thereby induced not to enter into such contracts; and they answered in the affirmative. Does that answer amount to a finding of an actionable wrong? I think it does. The law appears to me to be that a combination by two or more persons to induce others not to deal with a particular individual or to enter into contracts with him, if it is done with an intent to injure that individual, and if he is thereby injured, is an actionable wrong." Temperton v. Russell, 4 Rep. (English) 376, 383. does an act furnishes no cause of action unless there be some legal wrong, and not then if it relates to a breach of contract."1 § 86. Conspiracy for Severing the Relation of a Minister to his Congregation. The call of a minister to the pastoral charge of a congregation is a free act. There is no law, civil or ecclesiastical, that requires any congregation to call a particular minister. And where the pastoral or ministeral relation has been established and has proved unsatisfactory to the congregation, such proper and orderly steps as are provided for by the constitution of the church may be taken for the severing of such relation. But, while the pastor is amenable to authority, civil and ecclesiastical, he has certain rights, not only as a citizen, but also as a pastor, which the courts will enforce. The contract of a church or congregation is not less binding than that of an individual, and any attempt to break up the pastoral relation that assumes the form of a conspiracy will be held to be an actionable offense. In a recent case in Wisconsin, it was held that a complaint, reciting plaintiff's employment as minister by church officers, and charging defendants with "unlawfully, maliciously and without just cause conspiring, conniving and contriving to injure the plaintiff, and break up his relations with the congregation as their minister, and to drive him. from his position as minister, and to deprive him of the support of said congregation," followed by a recital of many acts done by defendants in pursuance of "the purpose aforesaid," is sufficiently definite and certain, and states but one cause of action (unlawful conspiracy), though it also recites that part of the defendants were trustees of the church, who employed plaintiff as minister.2 1 Kelly v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. (1895), 93 Iowa, 436; s. C., 61 N. W. Rep. 957, 962. 2 Fisher v. Schuri, 73 Wis. 370; S. C., 41 N. W. Rep. 527. "If the defendants had a legal right to rescind their contract on the ground of anterior immorality on his part (a point which need not be decided now), yet we are of opinion that they could not do so by vote without stating that as the reason for rescission, and reciting it in their vote. They gave him no notice of the reason for their vote, and ought not to be permitted § 87. Indictment for Conspiracy.-An indictment for conspiracy, in order to be valid, must definitely charge the particular offense, stating its peculiar character and setting forth the particular circumstances under which it was committed. It must definitely aver either the criminality of the act, or, if the act is lawful, the criminality of the means employed in accomplishing it. In a leading case in Iowa, an indictment for conspiracy, under the statutes, charged the offense in the following words: "The said J B F and S D P, late of, etc., on etc., at etc., unlawfully and feloniously, did conspire and confederate together, with the fraudulent intent to do an illegal act, injurious to the administration of public justice, to-wit: did conspire and confederate together to show now for the first time what that reason was." Whitmore v. Fourth Cong. Soc., 2 Gray, 306. The trustees of a Methodist Episcopal church closed the church building against the duly appointed preacher, on the ground that it was not for the interest of the church that he should be its pastor, and that he was appointed against the wish of the majority of the members. Held, that they had no right to do so, and after answer a mandatory injunction was issued, requiring them to open the building to the preacher and the church. Whitecar v. Michenor, 37 N. J. Eq. 6. A minister of the gospel, or preacher, who is employed for a given time by his congregation, is entitled to be retained as the minister of the church, unless he loses that right by some fault of his own, and for good cause he may be dismissed by the parish, but they cannot do so arbitrarily, as there is no legal distinction between a contract with a minister and his congregation, and any other civil contract for personal service. Congregation of Israel v. Peres, 2 Cold. 620. Where some of the charges made against a minister and laid before a council furnish ground for a compulsory dissolution of his contract with his society, and others do not, and the result of the council states that several of the charges were proved, but without specifying which, their recommendation of a dissolution of a contract can have no effect. Parol evidence is not admissible to show which charges the council considered to be proved. An ex parte council should be composed of men who are presumed to be impartial, and who have not prejudged the case: -so that where some of the members of a council, called by the society alone, had been members of a previous council, which had decided against the minister upon the same charges, a similar result of the ex parte council was held to be of no validity. Thompson v. Catholic Cong. Soc., 7 Pick. 160. A priest may be removed from his congregation at the pleasure of the bishop without trial. He cannot, however, be suspended from his priestly functions without specific accusation and trial. Stack v. O'Hara, 98 Pa. St. 213. |