from patronizing a former employer. It is a combination among disaffected workmen or other persons under which they agree to discontinue all business relations with the person or persons against whom their efforts are directed, and to unite in an effort to induce the public to sustain the movement. The object is to compel such person or persons to accede to some demand of the organization. The effort is to interrupt the business thus assailed to such an extent as to force the proprietor to submission. This may be done in a quiet and orderly manner, and in the use only of a . moral force, or there may be an effort at intimidation and the threat of physical coercion. In some instances the boycott, practically, extends to the entire community, as many persons as refuse to comply with the demand of the organization are threatened with a withdrawal of patronage and given to understand that a failure to support the movement will mean a serious injury to their own business. The boycott is a comparatively modern device for the coercion of an employer, and the case in which the term had its origin has become historic and famous. An historical notice, as quoted in a recent leading case before the Supreme Court of Connecticut, is here copied. In the opinion, the court said: "We will also notice that it is alleged that the conspiracy contemplated boycotting as a means to the end sought. That word is not easily defined. It is frequently spoken of as passive merely,-a let alone policy,―a withdrawal of all business relations, intercourse and fellowship. If that is its only meaning it will be difficult to find in it anything criminal. We may, however, gather some idea of its real meaning by a reference to the circumstances in which the word originated. Those circumstances are thus narrated by Mr. Justin McCarthy, an Irish gentleman of learning and ability, who will be recognized as good authority. In his work, entitled 'England under Gladstone,' he says: The strike was supported by a form of action, or rather inaction, which soon became historical. Captain Boycott was an Englishman, an agent of Lord Earne, and a farmer of Lough In Mark, in the wild and beautiful district of Connemara. his capacity as agent he had served notice upon Lord Earne's tenants, and the tenantry suddenly retaliated in a most unexpected way by, in the language of schools and society, sending Captain Boycott to Coventry in a very thorough manner. The population of the region for miles. around resolved not to have anything to do with him, and, as far as they could prevent it, not to allow anyone else to have anything to do with him. His life appeared to be in danger; he had to claim police protection. His servants fled from him as servants flee from their masters in some plague stricken Italian city. The awful sentence of excommunication could hardly have rendered him more helplessly alone for a time. No one would work for him; no one would supply him with food. He and his wife had to work in their own fields themselves, in most unpleasant imitation of Theocritan shepherd and shepherdesses, and play out their grim eclogue in their deserted fields with the shadows of the armed constabulary ever at their heels. The Orangemen of the north heard of Captain Boycott and his sufferings, and the way in which he was holding his ground, and they organized assistance and sent him down armed laborers from Ulster. To prevent civil war the authorities. had to send a force of soldiers and police to Lough Mark, and Captain Boycott's harvests were brought in and his potatoes dug by the armed Ulster laborers, guarded always by the little army.'" 1 State v. Glidden, 55 Conn. 46, 77. The question with which we have to deal is whether this case falls within the rule. That the defendant, the typographical union, set on foot a boycott against the complainant, as stated in the bill, and in the affidavits on file, is not denied. That this boycott was to be enforced by threatening loss of business to those who, having no connection with the union, should continue to advertise with, or in any way patronize, the complain ant, is clearly shown. True, it is claimed that no threats were used; but the language of the circulars has no doubtful meaning. The affidavits on file show that it was perfectly understood by those who received them; and the circumstances indicate that it was intended that it should be so understood. In Brace v. Evans, 3 Ry. & Corp. L. J. 561, it was held that the word boycott is in itself a threat. In popular acceptation, it is an organized effort to exclude a person § 106. The Nature of the Offense.-A combination of two or more persons, the object of which is to destroy, to break up or to interrupt the business of any person, is a from business relations with others by persuasion, intimidation, and other acts which tend to violence, and thereby coerce him, through fear of resulting injury, to submit to dictation in the management of his affairs.' But it is insisted for the defendants that every representation of fact contained in their handbills and circulars is true; that is to say, that the complainant bad, in 1888, broken with the typographical union, discharged all union employes, and had since that date employed only those who were not members of the union; and that after repeatedly promising to unionize his office, he had finally, in September, 1890, refused to do so, and declared that he would not employ any person who was connected with the union. All these are conceded facts. Therefore, argue counsel for the defendants, this is only a case of lawful competition. The complainant having declared that he would not employ any member of the union, the union had a right to say that its members would not patronize the complainant. Nobody disputes that proposition. If that were all that is involved in this case, there would be nothing for the court to act upon. But it is not all by any means. Instead of 'fair, although sharp and bitter competition,' as is contended by counsel, it was an attempt by coercion to destroy all competition affecting the union. It was an organized conspiracy to force the complainant to yield his right to select his own workmen, and submit himself to the control of the union, and allow it to regu late prices for him, and to determine whom be should employ and whom discharge. In other words, it was, and is, an organized effort to force printers to come into the union or be driven from their calling for want of employment, and to make the destruction of the complainant's business the penalty for his refusing to surrender to the union. Whatever moral obligation may have been incurred by complainant by reason of his promises to unionize his office, they were wholly without consideration, and they amount to nothing whatever in law or in equity. No case has been cited where, upon a proper showing of facts, an unsuccessful appeal has been made to a court of chancery to restrain a boycott. The authorities are all the other way. At common law, an agreement to control the will of employers by improper molestation is an illegal conspiracy. In New York, it has been held that the boycott' is a conspiracy in restraint of trade. People v. Wilzig, 4 N. Y. Crim. R. 403; People v. Kostka, 4 N. Y. Crim. R. 429. So also in Virginia. Commonwealth v. Shelton, 11 Va. Law J. 324. And in Connecticut. State v. Glidden, 55 Conn. 46; S. C., 3 Atl. Rep. 890. And in England. Reg. v. Barrett, 18 L. J. 430." Casey v. Cincinnati Typographical Union No. 3, 45 Fed. Rep. 135, 143. The Century Dictionary defines the word as follows: "Boycott. [From the name of the first prominent victim of the system, Captain Boycott, a farmer at Lough Mark, Connemara, and the agent of Lord criminal conspiracy. In a recent English case, Lord Fitzgerald, in his opinion, said: "If the judgment of the learned judge is correct, and I do not mean to intimate the To Earne, an Irish landlord.] combine in refusing to work for, buy from, sell to, give assistance to, and in preventing others from working for, buying from, selling to, assisting, or having any kind of dealing with (a person or company), on account of political or other differences, or of disagreements in business matters, as a means of inflicting punishment, or of coercing or intimidating. The word was introduced in Ireland in 1880, and soon became (like the practice) common throughout the English speaking world, and was adopted by the newspapers in nearly every European language." Black's Law Dictionary defines the word, as follows: "A conspiracy formed and intended directly to prevent the carrying on of any lawful business, or to injure the business of anyone by wrongfully preventing those who would be customers from buying anything from, or employing the representatives of said business, by threats, intimidation or other forcible means." If this is a correct picture, the thing we call a boycott originally signified violence, if not murder. If the defendants, in their handbills and circulars, used the word in its original sense in its application to the Carrington Publishing Company, there can be no doubt of their criminal intent. We prefer, however, to believe that they used it in a modified sense. As an importation from a foreign country, we may presume that they intended it in a milder sense,—in a sense adapted to the laws, institutions and temper of our people. In that sense it may not have been criminal. But even here if it means, as some high in the confidence of the trades union assert, absolute ruin to the business of the person boycotted, unless he yields, then it is criminal. Instances are not wanting in our own country where the boycott has been attended with more or less violence; and it cannot be denied that the natural tendency is, especially when applied by the ignorant and vicious, to attempt to make it successful by force. It too often leads to serious disturbances of the peace, and even murder. We are loth, however, to assume that these defendants intended any such consequences. Nevertheless it is a dangerous instrumentality to use; and if those instigating and resorting to it do not, of their own accord, take notice of its peril and voluntarily abandon its use, as we sincerely hope they will, the courts at no distant day will be called upon to recognize its dangerous tendency, and treat it accordingly." State v. Glidden, supra, at p. 74. But the combination was unlawful without respect to the contract feature. It was a boycott. The employes of the railway companies had no grievance against their employes. Handling and hauling Pullman cars did not render their services any more burdensome. They had no complaint against the use of Pullman cars as cars. They came into no natural relation with Pullman in handling the cars. He paid them no wages. He did not regulate their hours, or in any way slightest doubt as to its correctness,-that a conspiracy to do a thing which has been called by the name of 'boycotting,'-is unlawful, and an indictable offense, and, if so, determine their services. Simply to injure him in his business, they were incited and encouraged to compel the railway companies to withdraw custom from him by threats of quitting their service. This inflicted an injury on the companies that was very great, and it was unlawful because it was without lawful excuse. All the employes had the right to quit their employment, but they had no right to combine to quit in order thereby to compel their employer to withdraw from a mutually profitable relation with a third person for the purpose of injuring that third person, when the relation thus sought to be broken had no effect whatever on the character or reward of their service. It is the motive for quitting, and the end sought thereby, that make the injury inflicted unlawful, and the combination by which it is effected an unlawful conspiracy. The distinction between an ordinary lawful and peaceable strike, entered upon to obtain concessions in the terms of the strikers' employment. and a boycott, is not a fanciful one, or one which needs the power of fine distinctions to determine which is which. Every laboring man recognizes the one or the other as quickly as the lawyer or the judge." Thomas v. Cin., N. O. & T. P. Ry. Co., 62 Fed. Rep. 803, 818. "The term boycott has acquired a significance in our vocabulary, and in the literature of the law. The resolution of the defendant associations says, unless complainant discontinue the use of said machines on and after January 15, 1896, that Coopers' Union No. 18 would cause a boycott to be placed on all packages hooped by said machines. Just what action would be taken, the resolution does not state. It does not say the defendants could not purchase the packages, or the goods packed in them, but simply says a boycott' would issue. That term implies that a general proscription of all articles so manufactured, and the goods packed in them, would be inaugurated and maintained by the power of these assemblies wherever they could reach. It is fair to presume, from the resolution and other testimony, that the defendants were determined to use all means, short of violence, to make the proscription effective. That has been the history of such proceedings in the past, and such is the meaning imputed to the use of the word 'boycott.' It has become a word carrying with it a threat and a menace, and was evidently so intended by this resolution. In Thomas v. Railway Co., 62 Fed. Rep. 818, 821, the court says: But the combination was unlawful, without respect to the contract future. It was a boycott.' Again, the court says: The combination under discussion was a boycott. It was so termed by Debs, Phelan, and all engaged in it. Boycotts, although unaccompanied by violence, have been pronounced unlawful in every State of the United States where the question has arisen, unless it be in Minnesota, and they are held to be unlawful in England.`` Oxley Stave Co. v. Coopers' International Union, 72 Fed. Rep. 695, 699. |