by defendants' counsel that the strikers have not the right to assemble in front of a factory in such numbers as to constitute intimidation. Picketing may be done in such numbers as to constitute intimidation. Jeering and shouting at employes by strikers may constitute intimidation. Persuasion or entreaty may be so persistent as to constitute intimidation. Whenever the strikers assume towards the employes an attitude of menace, their persuasion and entreaty, with words however smooth, may constitute intimidation, which will render those who use them liable to the penalties both of the civil and criminal law. There has been no evidence offered in this case as to circumstances surrounding the acts of persuasion and entreaty, so that the court can hold that they were so used as to constitute intimidation, and thus become unlawful. It may be impossible to lay down a general rule as to what surrounding circumstances will characterize persuasion and entreaty as intimidation. Each case must probably depend upon its own surroundings. But where the evidence presents such a case as to convince the court that the employes are being induced to leave the employer by operating upon their fears rather than upon their judgments or their sympathy, the court will be quick to lend its strong arm to his protection. Rights guaranteed by law will be enforced by the courts, whether invoked by employer or employe."1 § 108. Blacklisting.-Blacklisting is a device to which employers resort for the purpose of compelling workmen or other employes to accept their terms of employment, and to which trades unions resort in order to compel their fellow workmen to conform to their rules, or to compel an employer to accede to their demands in regard to wages and other conditions of service. Blacklisting may be defined as the preparing and publication of a list of the names of persons, by employers or by employes, for the purpose of compelling the persons so listed to accept some prescribed terms of service or of employment. On the part of employers, it is an attempt to prevent other employers from 1 Rogers v. Evarts, 17 N. Y. Supl. 264. giving employment to such persons, and on the part of employes it is an effort to interrupt or to destroy the business of an employer, in order to bring him to an acceptance of their terms of labor. It is designed to coerce the persons listed by rendering them odious to employers or to fellow workmen and their supporters and to the public. Such action is a criminal conspiracy; and, where it has resulted in pecuniary injury, it entitles the persons listed to compensatory damages. In the leading case of Crump v. The Commonwealth, before the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, the offense is described and the law stated, as follows: "Not only B Bros. and their employes and their customers, but the hotels, boarding houses, public schools, railroads and steamboats, conducting the business, travel and transportation of the city, were listed and published under the obloquy and denunciation of the 'blacklist.' One or two specimens will suffice: 'Boycott B Bros. and all who patronize them.' 'Watch out for B Bros.' "rats," and find out where they board. It is dangerous for honest men to board in the same house with these creatures. They are so mean that the air becomes contaminated in which they breathe.' 'Boycott B Bros. every day in the week.' 'Boycott B Bros. because they are the enemies of honest labor.' 'Boycott B Bros.'s customers whenever you find them.' 'The Lynchburg boys will begin to play their hand on Messrs. B's boycotted goods in a short time. The battle will not be fought in Richmond only, but in all Virginia and North Carolina will be raised the cry, "away with the goods of this tyrannical firm." Let our friends remember it is the patronage of the Chesapeake & Ohio; Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac; Richmond & Danville, and Richmond & Allegheny railroads that is keeping B Bros. up.' 'We are sorry to see the Exchange Hotel on the black list. There will be two thousand strangers in this city in October, none of whom will patronize a hotel or boarding house whose name appears on that list.' The boycott on B Bros. is working so good that a man cannot buy a single bristol board from the rat firm without having his "The old rat establishment name put upon the black list.' is about to cave in. Let it fall with a crash that will be a warning to all enemies of labor in the future.' The acts alleged and proven in this case are unlawful and incompatible with the prosperity, peace and civilization of the country, and if they can be perpetrated with impunity by combinations and irresponsible cabals or cliques, there will be an end of government, and of society itself. Freedom, individual and associated, is the boon and boasted policy and peculium of our country; but it is liberty regulated by law; and the motto of the law is, 'sic utere tuo, ut alienum non leadas.'"'1 Where employes fail to obtain work on account of a blacklist by a former employer, but are members of a trades union by which they are paid while out of employment, an action for damages will not be sustained. In a recent case in Pennsylvania, four employes of defendants asked for an increase of wages, and, on being refused, left work. Defendants were members of a manufacturer's association, the by-laws of which provided that, when any hands employed by the members should be on strike, either for wages or disagreement, no member should employ them after receiving due notice thereof, and addressed a circular letter to the other members, giving the names of such employes, and requesting that they should not be employed until the trouble was settled. Plaintiff, one of said employes, failed to get work for a month, and brought an action against defendants for damages. It appeared that plaintiff and the other em 1 Crump v. Commonwealth, 84 Va. 927, 945. Where a trades union published a poster headed "T's Blacklist," giving the names of T's non-union workmen: Held, by Kekewich, J., that as on the evidence, the principle motive was to injure T and the non-union men, and as the injury was being inflicted from day to day, T and the non-union men were entitled to an injunction against the trades union and their servants. etc., and against the secretary and other officers who were defendants by name without addition. Affirmed on appeal on the ground that a prima facie case had been established that defendants had gone beyond what they were entitled to do, and had refused to give an undertaking to desist pending the action. Trollope v. London Building Trades Federation (1895), W. N. 95; s. C., C. A. (1895) W. N. 45. ployes were members of a union, and that the union paid them while they were out of employment. It was held that a nonsuit was properly granted.1 1 Bradley v. Pierson, 148 Pa. St. 502; s. c., 24 Atl. Rep. 65. “A list of persons marked out for special avoidance, antagonism or enmity on the part of those who prepare the list, or those among whom it is intended to circulate; as where a trades union 'blacklists' workmen who refuse to conform to its rules, or where a list of insolvent or untrustworthy persons is published by a commercial agency or mercantile association." Black's Law Dictionary, tit. Blacklist. The Constitution of North Dakota, § 212, prohibits the exchange of blacklists between corporations. The statute, § 7042, provides: "Every corporation, officer, agent or employe thereof, and every person of any corporation on behalf of such corporation, who exchanges with or furnishes or delivers to any other corporation or any officer, agent, employe or person thereof, any ‘backlist,' is guilty of a misdemeanor." The Indiana statute governing the offense is as follows: Section 7076. "That if any person, agent, company or corporation, after having discharged any employe from his or its service, shall prevent, or attempt to prevent, by word or writing of any kind, such discharged employe from obtaining employment with any other person, company or corporation, such person, agent or corporation shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall be punished by a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars, nor less than one hundred dollars, and such person, agent, company or corporation shall be liable in penal damages to such discharged person, to be recovered by civil action; but this section shall not be construed as prohibiting any person or agent of any corporation from informing in writing any other person, company or corporation, to whom such discharged person or employe has applied for employment, a truthful statement of the reasons for such discharge. Section 7077. If any railway company, or any other company, or partnership or corporation in this State, shall authorize or allow any of its or their agents to blacklist any discharged employe, or attempt by word or writing, or any other means, whatever, to prevent such discharged employe, or any employe who may have voluntarily left said company's service, from obtaining employment with any other person or company, except as provided for in section 1, of this act, such company or co-partnership shall be liable in treble damages to such employe so prevented from obtaining employment, to be recovered by him by a civil action. Section 7078. It shall be the duty of any person, agent, company or corporation, after having discharged any employe from his or its service, upon demand by such discharged employe, to furnish him in writing a full, succinct and complete statement of the cause or causes of his discharge, and if such person, agent, company or corporation shall refuse so to do within a reasonable time after such demand, it shall ever after be unlawful for such person, agent, company or corporation to furnish any state $109. Obligations of Carriers as Affected by Strikes. -Common carriers are subject to very stringent regulations. They must transport and deliver goods committed to their care without unnecessary delay. The former rule was that unless prevented by an act of God or of a public enemy they were responsible for any delay or non-delivery of goods. This is the English rule at the present time.1 ment of the cause of such discharge to any person or corporation, or in any way to blacklist or to prevent such discharged person from procuring employment elsewhere, subject to the penalties prescribed in section 1, of this act. Provided, that said written cause of discharge, when so made by such person, agent, company or corporation at the request of such discharged employe, shall never be used as the cause for an action for slander or libel, either civil or criminal, against the person, agent, company or corporation so furnishing the same." 1 Forward v. Pittard, 1 T. R. 27; Galena, etc. R. Co. v. Rae, 18 Ill. 488; s. C., 68 Am. Dec. 574. In Blackstock v. New York, etc. R. R. Co., 20 N. Y. 48; s. c., 75 Am. Dec. 372, 373, Denio, J., says: "It has been repeatedly held, and may be taken as settled law, that a carrier is not under the same absolute obligation to carry the goods intrusted to him at the usual time which he is to deliver them ultimately at their destination. Conger v. Hudson River R. R. Co., 6 Duer, 375; Wibert v. New York, etc. R. R. Co., 12 N. Y. 245. But in the absence of a legal excuse, he is answerable for any delay to forward them in the time which is ordinarily required for transportation, by the kind of conveyance which he uses. In the case of Wibert v. New York, etc. R. R. Co., supra, we held that where a railroad was fully equipped with engines and freight carriages, but more property was offered at a particular point than could be sent forward at once, the delay was justifiable, provided no unfair preference was given to other freight over that of the plaintiff. In the present case, the excuse arises wholly out of the misconduct of the defendants' servants who wrongfully refused to perform their duty, and thus deprived the defendants, for the time, of the ability to send forward the property; and the question is, whether the defendants' case can be separated from that of the engineers, so that it can be held that, though the latter were culpable, their employers, the defendants, were without fault, and consequently not responsible to the plaintiff. This involves a consideration of the legal effect of the relations which exist between these several parties. In the first place, there was no privity between the plaintiff and the engineers. The latter owed no duty to the former which the law can recognize. If they had committed a positive tort or trespass upon the property, the owner might pass by the employers and hold them responsible, but for a non-feasance or simple neglect of duty they were only answerable to their employers. The maxim in such cases is respondeat superior. Story on |