In this case the rule was stated by the court, Mr. Justice Brewer delivering the opinion, as follows: "We have given to this case the most careful and anxious atten * ** of the mail by railroad trains, to which I desire to call your attention. Section 3964 of the Revised Statutes provides as follows: The following are established post roads: * All railroads, or parts of railroads, which are now or hereafter may be in operation.' Section 3, Act March 3, 1879 (20 Stat. 358), provides that the postmaster general shall, in all cases, decide upon what trains and in what manner the mails shall be conveyed.' Section 4000 of the Revised Statutes provides that 'every railway company carrying the mail shall carry on any train which may run over its road, and without extra charge therefor, all mailable matter directed to be carried thereon, with the person in charge of the same.' Recurring now to Section 3995 of the Revised Statutes, making it an offense to obstruct and retard the passage of the mails, and you will observe that the statute applies to those persons who 'knowingly and willfully obstruct and retard the passage of the mails, or the carrier carrying the same; that is to say, to those who know that the acts performed, however innocent they may otherwise be, will have the effect of obstructing and retarding the passage of the mail, and they perform the acts with the intention that such shall be their operation. United States v. Kirby, 7 Wall. 485. * * * It would be no defense under this statute,' said an eminent judge in a recent case, that the obstruction was effected by merely quitting employment, where the motive of quitting was to retard the mails, and had nothing to do with the terms of employment.' Thomas v. Railway Co., 62 Fed. Rep. 822. The statute also applies to those persons who, having in view the accomplishment of other purposes, perform unlawful acts, which have the effect of obstructing and retarding the passage of the mails. In such cases, the intention to obstruct and retard the passage of the mails will be imputed to the authors of the unlawful act, although the attainment of other ends may have been their primary object." United States v. Cassidy, 67 Fed. Rep. 698, 703. "The second objection is that the defendants charged with the overt acts of retarding the mail trains are not charged with having known at the time that the trains carried the mails of the United States. It is said that no intent against the mails can be inferred, unless the perpetrators had knowledge that the mails were on board the trains obstructed. I do not concur in this view. The defendants are properly chargeable with an intent to do all the acts that are the reasonable and natural consequence of the acts done. The laws make all the railways post routes of the United States, and it is within every one's knowledge that a large proportion of the passenger trains on these roads carry the mails. There is no stretching either of law or of common sense, to presume that a person obstructing one of these trains contemplates, among other intents, the obstruction of the mails." United States v. Debs, 65 Fed. Rep. 210, 211. tion, for we realize that it touches closely questions of supreme importance to the people of this country. Summing up our conclusions, we hold that the government of the United States is one having jurisdiction over every foot of soil within its territory, and acting directly upon each citizen; that while it is a government of enumerated powers, it has within the limits of those powers all the attributes of sovereignty; that to it is committed power over interstate commerce and the transmission of the mail; that the powers thus conferred upon the national government are not dormant, but have been assumed and put into practical exercise by the legislation of Congress; that in the exercise of those powers it is competent for the nation to remove all obstructions upon highways, natural or artificial, to the passage of interstate commerce or the carrying of the mail; that while it may be competent for the government (through the executive branch and in the use of the entire executive power of the nation) to forcibly remove all such obstructions, it is equally within its competency to appeal to the civil courts for an inquiry and determination as to the existence and character of any alleged obstruction, and if such are found to exist or threaten to occur to invoke the powers of those courts to remove or restrain such obstruction; that the jurisdiction of courts to interfere in such matters by injunction is one recognized from ancient times and by indubitable authority; that such jurisdiction is not ousted by the fact that the obstructions are accompanied by or consist of acts in themselves violations of the criminal law; that the proceeding by injunction is of a civil character, and may be enforced by proceedings in contempt; that such proceedings are not in execution of the criminal laws of the land; that the penalty for a violation of the injunction is no substitute for and no defense to a prosecution for any criminal offenses committed in the course of such violation; that the complaint filed in this case clearly showed an existing obstruction of artificial highways for the passage of interstate commerce and the transmission of the mail,-an obstruction not only temporarily existing, but threatening to continue; that under such complaint the circuit court had power to issue its process of injunction; that it having been issued and served on these defendants, the circuit court had authority to inquire whether its orders had been disobeyed, and when it found that they had been then to proceed, under section 725, Revised Statutes, which grants power to punish by fine or imprisonment by any party dis or other obedience person, to an lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree or command,' and enter the order of punishment complained of; and, finally, that the circuit court, having full jurisdiction in the premises, its finding of the fact of disobedience is not open to review on habeas corpus in this or any other court. We enter into no examination of the Act of July 2d, 1890, upon which the circuit court relied mainly to sustain its jurisdiction. It must not be understood from this that we dissent from the conclusions of that court in reference to the scope of the act, but simply that we prefer to rest our judgment on the broader ground which has been discussed in this opinion, believing it of importance that the principles underlying it should be fully stated and affirmed." § 113. Contracts Between Employers and Trades Unions. There is nothing to forbid employers from entering into a contract with the officers of a trades union in regard to any matter properly appertaining to their relations as employers and employes. The fixing of the terms and conditions of the service to be rendered, so far as it involves nothing illegal, is a proper subject for a contract. But a contract under which an employer undertakes to interfere with the rights of third parties is illegal and void. Two parties may enter into an agreement in regard to their own business relations, but a covenant, the object of which is to control the acts of third parties to their injury, is an unlawful conspiracy, and, as such, in contravention of pub 1 In re Debs, 158 U. S. 565, 599. lic policy. In a leading English case, the rule is stated by Sir William Erle, as follows: "The law is clear that workmen have a right to combine for their own protection, and to obtain such wages as they choose to agree to demand. I say nothing at present as to the legality of other persons, not workmen, combining with them to assist in that purpose. As far as I know, there is no objection in point of law, to it; and it is not necessary to go into that matter: but I consider the law to be clear so far, only, as while the purpose of the combination is to obtain a benefit for the parties who combine; a benefit which by law they can claim. I make that remark because a combination for the purpose of injuring another is a combination of a different nature, directed personally against the party to be injured; and the law allowing them to combine for the purpose of obtaining a lawful benefit to themselves gives no sanction to combinations which have for their immediate purpose the hurt of another. The rights of workmen are conceded: but the exercise of a free will and freedom of action, within the limits of the law, is also secured equally to the masters. The intention of the law is at present to allow either of them to follow the dictates of their own will, with respect to their own actions, and their own property; and either, I believe, has a right to study to promote his own advantage, or to combine with others to promote their mutual advantage.' 1 Reg. v. Rowlands, 17 Ad. & El. (N. S.) 671. 687. See also Com. v. Sheriff, 15 Phila. 393; Master Stevedores' Association v. Walsh, 2 Daly. 1; Springhead Spinning Co. v. Riley, L. R. 6 Eq. 551; Reg. v. Shepherd, 11 Cox C. C. 325; O'Neill v. Longman, 4 B. & S. 376; S. C., 116 E. C. L. 374; O'Neill v. Kruger, 4 B. & S. 389; s. c.. 116 E. C. L. 388; Ex parte Perham, 5 Jur. (N. S.) 1221; Reg. v. Hewitt, 5 Cox Cr. Cas. 162; Skinner v. Kitch, 10 Cox Cr. Cas. 493; Wood v. Bowron, L. R. 2 Q. B. 21: Walsby v. Auley, 7 Jur. (N. S.) 465; Connor v. Kent, L. R. (1891) 2 Q. B. 545; Commonwealth v. Dyer, 128 Mass. 70; Spies v. People, 122 Ill. 1; s. C., 3 Am. St. Rep. 320; Collins v. Hayte, 50 Ill. 337; s. C., 99 Am. Dec. 521; Snow v. Wheeler, 113 Mass. 179; Commonwealth v. Silvers, 11 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 481. The evidence justifies the conclusion that defendants are organized into associations wherein submission to stringent and arbitrary rules is required; that by means approaching dictation they have attempted to control employers in the selection of laborers, This rule is sustained by the American courts. In a recent case in New York, the rule was stated by the court, as follows: "In the general consideration of the subject it must be premised that the organization or the co-operation of and the wages to be paid them, and have discouraged and, as far as they could, prevented those who do not belong to their societies from procuring work; that by force, in one instance, they took complainant's laborers from its mine to their hall, where, upon such laborers refusing to comply with their demands to join them, and abide by their laws, they actually ordered their banishment from the State, and in a manner deserving the most severe condemnation, enforced their lawless decree, and against men who, by reason of their birth, and not through the grace of the government, were entitled to all the rights of American citizenship; that in such numbers, and under such circumstances as were necessary, they have requested non-union men to cease work, and to such have applied in an offensive and threatening manner most opprobious epithets and in other ways have annoyed and vexed laborers who refuse to join their association. I am not unmindful that they meet these charges by alleging in effect that when such things were done it was without their authority and that the meeting referred to was held by citizens; but such defense is too transparent to conceal the truth. Such meeting was held in their hall, was composed largely of miners, and was presided over by defendant who says he was, and now is, the president of the Miners' Union of Burke,' and he also says that the meeting voted that they [the men banished] should be marched up the canyon, upon the ground that if they proceeded down the canyon violence might be apprehended from outsiders. Such explanations cannot be received in exculpation of the wrong done by defendants, but on the contrary they cast a shadow over all their statements." Beatty, J., in Coeur D'Alene Mining Co. v. Miners' Union, 51 Fed. Rep. 260; s. C., 19 L. R. A. 382, 384. "Under our law every workman assumes many risks arising from the incompetency or negligence of his fellow workmen, it would be an anomalous doctrine to hold that after their fellows have concluded that he was not a safe, or even a desirable companion, they must continue to work with him, under the penalty of paying damages, if by their refusal to do so the works are for a time stopped and he thrown out of employment, we cannot believe it to be in accordance with the spirit of our institution or the law of the land to say that a body of workmen must respond in damages because they, without malice or any evil motive, peaceably and quietly quit work, which they are not required to continue, rather than remain at work with one who is for any reason unsatisfactory to them. Το hold so would be subversive of their natural and legal rights, and tend to place them in a condition of involuntary servitude." Gavin, J., in Clemmitt v. Watson, 14 Ind. App. 38, 42; s. C., 42 N. E. Rep. |