workingmen is not against any public policy. Indeed, it must be regarded as having the sanction of law when it is for such legitimate purposes as that of obtaining an advance in the rate of wages or compensation, or of maintaining such rate. It is proper and praiseworthy, and, perhaps, falls within that general view of human society which perceives an underlying law, that men should unite to achieve that which each by himself cannot achieve, or can achieve less readily, but the social principle which justifies such organizations is departed from when they are so extended in their operation as either to intend or to accomplish injury to others. Public policy and the interests of society favor the utmost freedom in the citizen to pursue his lawful trade or calling, and if the purpose of an organization or combination of workingmen be to hamper or restrict that freedom, and through contracts or arrangements with employers, to coerce other working men to become members of the organization and to come under its rules and conditions, under the penalty of the loss of their positions and of deprivation of employment, then that purpose seems clearly unlawful, and militates against the spirit of our government and nature of our institutions. The effectuation of such a purpose would conflict with that principle of public policy which prohibits monopolies and exclusive privileges. It would tend to deprive the public of the services of men in useful employments and capacities." It would, to use the language of Mr. Justice Barrett, in People v. Smith, "impoverish and crush a citizen for no reason connected in the slightest degree with the advancement of wages or the maintenance of the rate.'

367. A business firm sued a trade union for losses charged to a malicious conspiracy to injure plaintiff's business. Held, that an attempt to injure the business as a coercive measure to regulate the employment of workmen constituted an unlawful and actionable conspiracy; and that plaintiffs might show declarations made by

2

their customers at the time they withdrew their trade, as to their reason for its withdrawal. Moores v. Bricklayers' Union No. 1, 7 Ry. & Corp. Law J. 108; s. C., 23 Wkly. Law Bull. 48.

1 People v. Smith, 5 N. Y. Cr. R. 513.

2 Curran v. Galen (1897), 152 N. Y. 33; s. c., 46 N. E. Rep. 297,

§ 114. Remedy by Civil Action.-An attempt on the part of a combination or of an individual to compel employes to abandon the service of their employer by violence or by intimidation of any sort is unlawful, and constitutes a ground for a civil action for any damage that may be caused by such acts. In the leading English case of Bowen v. Hall, it was held that an action lies against a third person, who maliciously induces another to break his contract of exclusive personal service with an employer, which thereby would naturally cause, and did in fact cause, an injury to such employer, although the relation of master and servant may not strictly exist between the employer and employed. Where, in such an action, the employed was also a defendant, but as against him the plaintiff claimed only an injunction and not damages, it was held that damages might, in the discretion of the court, be given under Lord Cairns' Act, and that the jury, therefore, should be directed by the judge, in the event of the verdict for the plaintiff, to find such damages as should be awarded: first, if the court should think it a proper case both for injunction and damages; and secondly, if the court should think it a proper case for damages only, and not also for an injunction. This doctrine is fully upheld by the

298. All combinations and associations designed to coerce workmen to become members of such combinations or associations, or to obstruct or annoy them in working, or in obtaining work, because they are not members, or in order to induce them to become members, or designed to prevent employers from making a just discrimination in the rate of wages, or to interfere with the perfect freedom of employers in the proper management and control of their lawful business, or to dictate in any particular the terms upon which their business shall be conducted, by means of threats of injury or loss, by interference with their property or

traffic, or with their lawful employment of other persons, are pro tanto illegal combinations or associations, and all acts done in furtherance of such intention by such means and accompanied by damage are actionable. Old Dominion Steamship Co. v. McKenna, 30 Fed. Rep. 48.

1 Bowen v. Hall, L. R. 6 Q. B. Div. 333. See also People v. Fisher, 14 Wend. 1; s. c., 28 Am. Dec. 501; State v. Donaldson, 32 N. J. L. 151; s. C.. 90 Am. Dec. 649; Johnston Harvester Co. v. Meinhardt, 9 Abb. N. Cas. 393; s. c.. 60 How. Pr. 168; Bixby v. Dunlap, 56 N. H. 456; s. C., 22 Am. Rep. 475; Haskins v. Royster, 70 N.

American courts. In a case before the United States Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York, it was held that all combinations and associations designed to coerce workmen to become members of such combinations or associations, or to interfere with, obstruct, vex or annoy

Car. 603; s. c., 16 Am. Rep. 780; fendant. If before the child, apPeople v. Wilzig, 4 N. Y. Crim. prentice or servant, had ever met Rep. 423; Carew v. Rutherford, or communicated with the defend106 Mass. 1; s. c., 6 Am. Rep. 287; ant, there had been an abandonHart v. Aldridge, 1 Cowp. 54; ment of the services, it cannot be Gunter v. Astor, 4 Moore. 12; maintained that there was an enBoston Glass Manufactory v. Bin- ticement therefrom by the defendney, 4 Pick. 425; Walker v. Cronin, ant. Butterfield v. Ashley, 6 Cush. 107 Mass. 555; Salter v. Howard, 249. The solicitation to leave must 43 Ga. 601; Jones v. Blocker, 43 be shown. Stuart v. Simpson, 1 Ga. 331; Dickson v. Dickson, 33 Wend. 376, 379; Blake v. Layton, La. Ann. 1261; Mapstrick v. Ramge, 6 T. R. 221. And there must be 9 Neb. 390; s. c., 31 Am. Rep. 415; an actual state of service then subOld Dominion Steamship Co. v. sisting. Butterfield v. Ashley, 2 McKenna, 30 Fed. Rep. 48; Gray, 254." In Carew v. RutherSlaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. ford, 106 Mass. 1, 13, Chapman, C. 36; Kimball v. Harman, 34 Md. J., says: "We have no doubt that 407; Buffalo Lubricating Oil Co. a conspiracy against a mechanic, v. Everest, 30 Hun, 586; Payne v. who is under the necessity of emWestern, etc. R. Co., 13 Lea, 509; ploying workmen in order to carry Lumley v. Gye, 2 El. & Bl. 216; on his business, to obtain a sum of Butterfield v. Ashley, 2 Gray, 254; money from him, which he is unCampbell v. Cooper, 34 N. H. 49; der no legal liability to pay, by Evans v. Walton, L. R. 2 C. P.615; inducing his workmen to leave Lee v. West, 47 Ga. 311; Hudson him, and by deterring others from v. State, 46 Ga. 624; Blake v. entering into his employment, or Lanyon, 6 T. R. 221; Milburn v. by threatening to do this, so that Byrne, 1 Cranch C. C. 239; Wins- he is induced to pay the money more v. Greenbank, Willes, 577. In demanded, under a reasonable apCaughey v. Smith, 47 N. Y. 244, prehension that he cannot carry Folger, J., said: "The complaint on his business without yielding to in this action is for enticing from the illegal demand, is an illegal, if the service of the plaintiff, his not a criminal conspiracy; that minor son, who still owed service the acts done under it are illegal, to him. But to maintain an action and that the money thus obtained for enticement from service, it may be recovered back, and, if the must appear that the child, ap- parties succeed in injuring his prentice or servant, was at the business, they are liable to pay all time in the actual service of the the damage thus done to him. It parent or master, and that the is a species of annoyance and exmoving cause of desertion was the tortion which the common law has inducement held out by the de- never tolerated." In Walker v.

them in working, or in obtaining work, because they are not members, or in order to induce them to become members, or designed to prevent employers from making a just discrimination in the rate of wages paid to the skillful and the unskillful; to the diligent and to the lazy; to the efficient and to the inefficient; and all associations designed to interfere with the perfect freedom of employers in the proper management and control of their lawful business, or to dictate in any particular the terms upon which their business shall be conducted, by means of threats of injury or loss, by interference with their property or traffic, or

with their lawful employment of other persons, or designed to abridge any of these rights, are pro tanto illegal combinations or associations, and all acts done in furtherance of such intention by such means and accompanied by damage are actionable. The rule, as above stated, is held applicable also where the offense is committed by an individual instead of a combination. In Georgia it has been held that where one man employed a laborer to work on his farm, and another man, knowing of such contract of employment, entices, hires or persuades the laborer to leave the service of his employer during the time for which he was so employed, the law gives to the party injured a right of action to recover damages. In a case in Massachusetts, the rule was stated by Mr. Justice Wells, as follows: "It is a familiar and well established doctrine of the law upon the relation of master and servant, that one who entices away a servant or induces him to leave his master, may be held liable in damages therefor, provided there exists a valid contract for continued service, known to the defendant. It has sometimes been supposed that this doctrine sprang from the English statute of laborers, and was confined to menial service. But we are satisfied that it is founded upon the legal right derived from the contract, and not merely upon the relation of master and servant; and that it applies to all contracts of employment, if not to contracts of every description."3

1 Old Dominion S. S. Co. v. McKenna, 30 Fed. Rep. 48.

2 Jones v. Blocker, 43 Ga. 331.

3 Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass. 555. The measure of damage for enticing away the servant of another, who is hired by the year, is the direct loss suffered, and the average net profits that were made by men of fair business capacity, out of the labor of such servant during the year for which the enticed servant was hired. Lee v. v. West, 47 Ga. 311. If the common carrier company against whom

a combination to induce the officers of a common carrier corporation subject to the provisions of the interstate commerce act, and its locomotive engineers, to refuse to receive, handle and haul interstate freight from another like common carrier is directed, is injured by acts done in furtherance of it, has a cause of action against all of those engaged in the conspiracy. Toledo, A. A. & N. M. Ry. Co. v. Pennsylvania Co., 54 Fed. Rep. 730.