which, in their operation, extend to interstate commerce. Some questions on points of this character have recently come before the Federal courts, and it has been the contention of the advocates of the rights of the great corporations that the modern English rule must be upheld by the American courts. The following extract from a leading law review illustrates this contention: "If some of the modern opinions of judges in trust cases are to be followed, we are relegated at once, by the statutes referred to, to the dark ages, when business was necessarily carried on in defiance of law. For instance, in the Sugar Trust Case in the General Term (6 R. & C. L. J. 142), the court, by Judge Daniels, re-asserted the old doctrines of the common law to their fullest extent. The combination was held to be illegal for the reason, among others, that it was intended to bring about and secure ulterior advantages in the way of advanced profits to the associates.' Its affairs 'were to be so managed and carried on as to promote the profit and gain of the associates,' and 'it is no more than just to infer that the control is to be used to avoid competition and enhance prices, and in that manner, as it is the ordinary expedient to that end, promote the interest and profit of the associates." This is a repetition of the mistake of centuries ago, that business men may not adopt methods which promote their interests and profits, because their desire for profit may cause them to use those methods improperly, and because their advantages may tend to the disadvantage of others. There are four centuries of experience and wisdom between that idea and the language of the judges in Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, to-wit: that ‘the instinct of self-advancement and self-protection is the very incentive to all trade;' that 'to say that a man is to trade fairly, but that he is to stop short at any act which is calculated to harm other tradesmen, would be a strange and impossible counsel of perfection;' that it is perfectly legiti

of sugar, this result would have been obtained without an increase of the capitalization of the prop

erties of the constituent corporations."

mate to combine capital for all the mere purposes of trade for which capital may, apart from combination, be legiti mately used in trade;' that 'to limit combination of capital when used for purposes of competition, would be only another method of attempting to set boundaries to the tides;' that 'the object of acquisition of gain is lawful and commendable,' and that as 'competition exists when two or more persons seek to possess or to enjoy the same thing it follows that the success of one must be the failure of another.'"'1

§ 12. Labor Organizations.-Combinations of workmen for increasing or maintaining wages belong to the subject of this work. Though of comparatively recent origin they have already become extended and powerful organizations, and numerous cases involving the rights of such combinations have reached the higher courts. The following extract from the opinion in a leading case of this character is of interest as an indication of the attitude of the courts at the present time: "The right of any laborer or any number of laborers to quit work was not challenged. The scope and purpose of the bill was only to restrain forcible obstructions of the highways along which interstate commerce travels and the mails are carried, and the facts set forth at length are only those facts which tended to show that the defendants were engaged in such obstructions. A most earnest and eloquent appeal was made to us in eulogy of the heroic spirit of those who threw up their employment, and gave up their means of earning a livelihood, not in defense of their own rights, but in sympathy for and to assist others whom they believed to be wronged. We yield to none in our admiration of any act of heroism or self-sacrifice, but we may be permitted to add that it is a lesson which cannot be learned too soon or too thoroughly, that under this government of and by the people the means

its purview, makes it embrace every peaceable organization or combination of the laborer to benefit his condition, either by obtaining an increase of wages or dimininution of the hours of labor. Combinations among labor for this purpose were treated as illegal under the construction of the law which-included reasonable contracts within the doctrine of the invalidity of contracts or combinations in restraint of trade, and they were only held not to be embraced within that doctrine, either by statutory exemption therefrom, or by the progress which made reason the controlling factor on the subject.

It follows that the construction which reads the rule of reason out of the statute, embraces within its inhibition every contract or combination by which workingmen seek to peaceably better their condition. It is, therefore, as I see it, absolutely true to say that the construction now adopted, which works out such results, not only frustrates the plain purpose intended to be accomplished by Congress, but also makes the statute tend to an end never contemplated, and against the accomplishment of which its provisions were enacted."

of redress of all wrongs are through the courts and at the ballot box, and that no wrong, real or fancied, carries with it legal warrant to invite as a means of redress the co-operation of a mob with its accompanying acts of violence."1

§ 13. Popular Sentiment and Public Policy.—From the foregoing it is apparent that the "trust," as a conspiracy or combination for the purpose of creating a monopoly in restraint of trade, for the suppression of competition, for the limitation of production, or for the increase or for the maintaining of prices, or of wages, is in contravention of public policy and illegal. Though the courts of this country are not in full accord with those of England, and though the decisions of the State courts are in a degree

1 In re Debs, 158 U. S. 564; S. c., 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 900, 911. "It matters little what are the means adopted by combinations formed to intimidate employers, or to coerce other journey men, if the design or the effect of them is to interfere with the rights or to control the free action of others. No one has a right to be, hedged in and protected from competition in business; but he has a right to be free from wanton. malicious and insolent interference, disturbance or annoyance. Every man has the right to work for whom he pleases, and for any price he can obtain; and he has the right to deal with and associate with whom he chooses; or, to let severely alone, arbitrarily and contemptuously, if he will, anybody and everybody upon earth. But this freedom of uncontrolled and unchallenged self-will does not give or imply a right. either by himself or in combination with others, to disturb, injure or obstruct another, either directly or indirectly, in his lawful business or occupation, or in his peace and

security of life. Every attempt by force, threat or intimidation, to deter or control an employer in the determination of whom he will employ, or what wages he will pay, is an act of wrong and oppression; and any and every combination for such a purpose is an unlawful conspiracy. The law will protect the victim and punish the movers of any such combination. In law the offense is the combination for the unlawful purpose, and no overt act is necessary to constitute it. * * * A wantoa, unprovoked interference by a combination of many with the business of another for the purpose of constraining that other to discharge faithful and long tried servants, or to employ whom he does not wish or will to employ (an interference intended to produce, and likely to produce, annoyance and loss to that business), will be restrained and punished by the criminal law as oppressive to the individual, injurious to the prosperity of the community, and subversive of the peace and good order of society." Crump v. Commonwealth, 84 Va. 927, 941.

divergent, yet on the whole there is a good degree of unanimity in holding that the "trust" is an unlawful organization, and as such void. Moreover, the decisions of the courts have been followed by vigorous and positive statutory enactments. Notwithstanding these facts, however, the "trust" continues to live and prosper. Hitherto it has proved to be stronger than the legislature and the courts. By means of one device or another it has managed to elude the penalties of the law. It has been able to escape the forfeiture of its corporate privileges and the confiscation of its estates. This is due, however, not more to the great strength of these organizations than to the indifference and inertia of the public. When the people of this country are aroused they are stronger than any individual; stronger than any and all business combinations. This is not a prophecy in regard to the future of "trusts," or a discussion of their merits. This work has to do with the law to which these organizations are subject. It will appear in the progress of the discussion that the law is adequate to the control of the "trust," as well as of the individual, and that the remedy for any and all existing evils of this nature, at least, in most of the States, is in an unbiased and faithful administration of the law.