of an association to combine for the purpose of securing the control of the work connected with their trade, and to endeavor to effect such purpose by peaceable means, and equity will not enjoin such acts on the ground that they may be detrimental to trade or injurious to individual business.1 1 Mayer v. Journeymen Stone Cutters' Association, 47 N. J. Eq. 519; S. C., 20 Atl. Rep. 492. 24 United States Statutes at Large, chap. 567, provides that the term 'National Trade Union,' in the meaning of this act, shall signify any association of working people having two or more branches in the States or territories of the United States for the purpose of aiding its members to become more skillful and efficient workers, the promotion of their general intelligence, the elevation of their character, the regulation of their wages and their hours and conditions of labor, and the protection of their individual rights in the prosecution of their trade or trades, the raising of funds for the benefit of sick, disabled, or unemployed members, or the families of deceased members, or for such other object or objects for which working people may lawfully combine, having in view their mutual protection or benefit." Chap. 114, Illinois Statutes. ¶ 128, provides: "If any locomotive engineer, in furtherance of any combination or agreement, shall willfully and maliciously abandon his locomotive upon any railroad at any other point than the regular schedule destination of such locomotive, he shall be fined not less than $20, nor more than $100. and confined in the county jail not less than twenty days. nor more than ninety days." ¶ 130: "If two or more persons shall willfully and maliciously combine or conspire together to obstruct or impede by any act, or by means of intimidation, the regular operation and conduct of the business of any railroad company, or any other corporation, firm or individual in this State, or to impede, hinder or obstruct, except by due process of law, the regular running of any locomotive engine, freight or passenger train on any railroad, or the labor or business of any such corporation, firm or individual, such persons shall, on conviction thereof, be punished by fine, not less than $20, nor more than $200, and confined in the county jail not less than twenty days, nor more than ninety days." ¶ 131: "This act shall not be construed to apply to cases of persons voluntarily quitting the employment of any railroad company, or such other corporation, firm or individual, whether by concert of action or otherwise, except as provided in section 1 [¶ 128, supra] of this act." Laws 1892, chap. 602, which creates a board for the examination of plumbers, and which forbids any person to exercise the calling of a master plumber without passing an examination before said board, is a valid exercise of the police power, since the work of plumbing is essential to the comfort and health of the inhabitants of cities. People v. Warden, 144 N. Y. 529; S. C., 39 N. E. Rep. 686. In Pennsylvania there is a statute which provides: "In all cases where any dwelling house, or other building or property, real or personal, has been or shall be destroyed within the county of Philadelphia, in consequence of any mob or not, it shall be lawful for the person or persons interested in and owning such property to bring suit against the said county where such property was situated, and being for the recovery of such damages as he or they sustained by reason of the destruction thereof, and the amount which shall be recovered in said action shall be paid out of the county treasury on warrants drawn by the commissioners thereof, who are hereby required to draw the same as soon as said damages are finally fixed and ascertained." The act was afterwards extended to Allegheny county. The validity of the act has been upheld. In re Pennsylvania Hall, 5 Pa. St. 204; County of Allegheny v. Gibson, 90 Pa. St. 397; s. c., 7 W. N. C. 441; 11 L. Bar. 81; Donoghue v. The County, 2 Pa. St. 230; Hermits of St. Augustine v. County, Bright. N. P. 116; St. Michael's Church v. County. Bright. N. P. 121; s. c., 7 Pa. L. J. 181; Kensington v. Philadelphia, 13 Pa. St. 76; Curtis v. Allegheny, 1 Phila. 237. The State of Illinois has a general statute covering the same ground. ¶¶ 406412, chap. 38. Act 1893, p. 260, protecting unions of workingmen in labels adopted by them to show that goods manufactured by persons employing only members of the union were made by such members, does not violate constitution, art. 4, § 53, which prohibits the legislature from granting to any corporation or association any special right, privilege or immunity. State v. Bishop, 128 Mo. 373; s. C., 31 S. W. Rep. 9. § 117. Introductory.—The original idea of a monopoly was that of an exclusive privilege of trade in a particular article or articles within a designated district and for a specified time. It was granted by the king and, ordinarily, without pecuniary consideration, and as an expression of the royal favor. It is defined by Blackstone as "a license or privilege allowed by the king, for the sole buying and selling, making, working or using of anything whatsoever, whereby the subject in general is restrained from that liberty of manufacturing or trading which he had before.' Lord Coke defines a monopoly as "an institution by the king, by his grant, commission or otherwise, to any persons or corporations, of or for the sole buying, selling, making, working or using of everything, whereby any persons or corporations are sought to be restrained of any freedom or 14 Blackstone's Commentaries, 159. liberty that they had before, or hindered in their lawful trade."1 It is to be borne in mind in defining a monopoly that, as originally granted and as defined by the early authorities, it was an exclusive privilege of trade, etc., in some branch of business which was not limited to an individual or to a few individuals, but was carried on by a considerable class. It had reference to a branch of business in which all had a right to engage and in which, as a matter of fact, many had previously been engaged. An exclusive privilege is not, necessarily, a monopoly, inasmuch as it does not in all cases relate to a privilege which others had previously enjoyed. The right to operate a ferry, to construct a bridge, or to supply a city with water or gas, is an exclusive privilege, but not a monopoly in the sense of depriving a class of persons of a privilege of which they had previously been in possession. The grant of such a privilege is a contract, and the presumption is that the primary object of the authorities in making it is not to confer a special favor upon the party to whom the grant is made, but to promote the public interest. One of the conditions of the grant is that of rendering to the public a special service, and a failure to render such service invalidates the contract. Such grants of exclusive privileges are not void at common law as monopolies, and they are not in contravention of public policy.2 In The Commonwealth v. Bacon, 13 Coke Inst. 181. 2 New Orleans Water Works Co. v. Riners, 115 U. S. 674; Louisville Gas Co. v. Citizens' Gas Co., 115 U. S. 683. "Permission to keep a tavern or a ferry, to erect a toll bridge over a stream where it is crossed by a public highway, to build a mill dam across a navigable stream, and the like, are special privileges, and being matters in which the public have an interest, may be granted by the legislature to individuals or corporations; but the grantee, upon accepting the grant at once becomes bound to render that service, to secure which the grant was made; and such obligation, on the part of the grantee, is just as necessary to the validity of a legislative grant of an exclusive privilege, as a consideration, either good or valuable, is to the validity of an ordinary contract. Whenever by accepting such privilege, the grantee becomes bound by an express or implied undertaking, to render service to the public, such undertaking will uphold the grant, no matter how inadequate it may be; for, the legislature being vested with power to make grants of that character, when the public convenience demands it, the legislative judgment is conclusive both as to the necessity for making the grant and the amount of service to be rendered in consideration therefor, and the courts have no power to interfere, however inadequate the consideration or unreasonable the grant may appear to them to be. But when they can see that the grantee of an exclusive privilege has come under no obligation whatever to serve the public in any matter in any way connected with the enjoyment of the grant, it is their duty to pronounce the grant void, as contravening that provision of the bill of rights which prohibits the granting of exclusive privileges, except in consideration of public service." Gordon v. Winchester, 12 Bush, 110, 114. These [the foregoing] observations were made in a case where it was held that a statute giving a building association the right to receive a greater rate of interest than was allowed by the general law was unconstitutional, in that it conferred exclusive privileges not in consideration of any public services to be performed." Louisville Gas Co. v. Citizens' Gas Co., 115 U. S. 683, 694. See also Commonwealth v. Phipps, 80 Ky. 269; Commonwealth v. Bacon, 13 Bush. 210; Boston & Lowell R. R. Co. v. Salem & Lowell R. R. Co., 2 Gray, 1; Boston Water Power Co. v. Boston & Worcester R. R., 23 Pick. 360; Richmond, etc. R. R. Co. v. Louisa R. R. Co., 13 How. 71. "In the same manner as Congress may reward the discoverer of a new invention or mode of constructing roads, by an exclusive privilege, the legislature may reward those who employ their capital and industry in doubtful enterprises, for the construction of a railway between two points, which may be of great utility to the public, though the success of the enterprise may be precarious.” Pontchartrain R. R. Co. v. New Orleans Ry. Co., 11 La. Ann. 253. See also Asylum v. New Orleans, 105 U. S. 362; New Jersey v. Wilson, 7 Cranch, 164; Humphrey v. Pegues, 16 Wall. 244. The precise question is, had the city of Kansas the power to grant for a term of years the exclusive right to occupy its streets with street railroads? The question must be answered in the negative. Let me in the outset formulate two or three unquestioned propositions: (1) The legislature has, as a general representative of the public, the power, subject to specific constitutional limitations, to grant special privileges; (2) it may, with similar limitations, grant the like power to municipal corporations, as to all matters of purely municipal nature; but (3) as the possession by one individual of a privilege not open to acquisition by others apparently conflicts with that equality of rights which is the underlying principle of social organization and popular government, he who claims such exclusive privilege must show clear warrant of title, if not also probable corresponding benefit to the public. Hence the familiar rule that charters, grants of franchises, privileges, etc., are to be construed in favor of the government. Doubts as to what is granted are resolved in favor of a grantor, or, as often epigrammatically said, a doubt destroys a grant. Now, coming close to the question, the legislature has not in terms given to the city the power of granting an ex |