to make it, and as if the legislature had made it in the most direct and explicit words. By a clause in the charter of the defendant company the legislature reserved the power to recall the franchise at its pleasure. It was held that this provision did not authorize the legislature to set aside or impair the contract which the city had entered into for the exclusive use of its streets by the defendant company so long as it should supply the city with water, and which the charter had recognized and confirmed.1 A similar view has been upheld in New Hampshire. In a case before the Supreme Court of that State, it was held that this court has jurisdiction in chancery of a complaint by the grantees of an exclusive right of building and maintaining a bridge, setting forth that others are attempting to infringe their rights by the erection of another bridge to their prejudice; and if the right is clear, may, by injunction, restrain the party from proceeding to erect such bridge. The existence of a ferry does not render void an act of the legislature granting an exclusive right to erect a bridge within certain limits which include the place where the ferry is situated; and the extinguishment of the ferry, afterwards, does not give to the legislature a right to grant another bridge within such limits. The legislature have power to grant an exclusive right to erect and maintain a bridge within certain limits, and to take tolls. The giant in such case gives to the grantee a franchise; and the legislature cannot authorize the erection of another bridge within those limits without provision for a compensation to the first grantee. But such franchise is property, and another grant to build a bridge within those limits may afterwards be made if compensation is provided. It is not sufficient, however, to authorize the erection of such other bridge, that the first grantee may obtain compensation, by action, for the wrong done in erecting it; no provision for compensation having been made in the second grant. In a recent leading case before the Supreme Court 1 Citizens' Water Co. v. Bridgeport Hydraulic Co., 55 Conn. 1. 2 Piscataqua Bridge V. New Hampshire Bridge, 7 N. H. 35. "If Furbur had had the grant of a ferry, generally, we should pause of Iowa, it was held that an ordinance which grants a street railroad company the right to lay and operate tracks in a city, and provides that "the right herein granted to said company to operate said railway shall be exclusive for before holding that the legislature could not grant a bridge, or even another ferry, so near as to be consequently injurious to him. Upon this subject different opinions have been entertained; and it may well be questioned whether the grantee of a ferry, or of a right to erect and maintain a bridge at a particular place, without any terms of exclusion in the grant, can set up that right in avoidance of any other grant which is not directly injurious in its operation, but injurious merely in its remote consequences by diverting travel and tolls. It would seem to have been the understanding, in this State at least, that if the party intended to secure himself from competition of this character, he must obtain a provision to that effect in his grant; and if no such provision is found, it may well be held that the grant was taken with a reliance on the wisdom and discretion of the legislature to protect the grantee from injurious competition by refusing to authorize any other enterprise of a similar character in the immediate vicinity, unless required by an imperious necessity, and with an assent, on the part of the grantee, that whenever the legislature should deem it expedient, they might make other grants remotely affecting the former, so long as the right and privilege conferred by the terms of the grant were not infringed. * * The grant contains no covenant in terms that the State will never grant another bridge within those limits, nor do we think that any such covenant is to be implied, and, of course, no obligation to that effect is imposed. Sturgis v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 197; Jackson v. Lamphire, 3 Pet. 289. The terms and object of the grant are satisfied without any such stipulation. The grantees have all the State professed to grant,-the exclusive right. They have a property in this, and no part of it can be taken from them, except for public use, and upon adequate compensation being made. If a grant of franchises is like other grants of property, why should a covenant be implied extending the right of property in a franchise of this character beyond the rights of the holders of other property, and enabling the grantees to resist all public improvements, and deny all public wants entirely, or until such compensation as they please to demand shall be made to them? When the legislature shall have granted land, with a covenant that no highway, canal or railroad shall ever be made through it, or a bridge with a stipulation that no other bridge shall ever be erected within a certain distance, it may deserve inquiry whether such contract is within the scope of its constitutional power, whether the right to provide for the public necessities, and to take property for public use whenever those necessities require it, making therefor an adequate compensation, are not inherent rights of sovereignty which no legislature can part with or control by any stipulation, so as thirty years, and that no privilege shall be granted to other persons persons which which may impair the privilege herein granted," operates as an exclusive grant of street railway privileges to such corporation, and not merely to secure the corporation the sole use of the tracks it should lay. Under Code, Iowa, § 464, which empowers cities "to authorize or forbid" the laying down of a street railroad track, a city council may make provision by contract for present and future street railroad service, and may secure the company contracted with against the impairment of its profits for a term of thirty years, and against interference with its extension during that time by the grant of exclusive privileges, if by such contract a better service can be obtained. Under an ordinance which grants the exclusive right to operate street railways in a city to a certain corporation for a term of years, such corporation has the right to prevent the operation of a competing line, not only on the streets already occupied by its own lines, but on any street. The constitution of the State of Iowa, § 12, art. 8, providing that "no exclusive privileges, except as in this article provided, shall ever be granted," has no application to the case of an exclusive grant to a corporation, where the grant is of such rights as might properly be acquired by an individual by contract.1 to bind the people. by it, and in consequence of all this, that the revenues of the first company were so far lessened that it could observe its charter no better than it did. If a State injure one incorporated company by the unlawful grant of a charter to another and rival one, the remedy of the first company is by proper proceedings to restrain the second from getting into operation, and not by neglecting its own duties. Turnpike Company v. State, 3 Wall. 210. 1 Des Moines St. R. Co. v. Des Moines Broad Gauge St. Ry. Co., 73 Iowa, 513; s. c., 33 N. W. Rep. 610. "In the case at bar, the time limited was thirty years, which § 121. How Regarded in Equity. In the abstract monopolies and special privileges are not favored in equity. It is a very common occurrence, if not the rule, that in controversies between the people and corporations enjoying monopolies or special privileges the right is with the people. So, generally, is this true that the interests of the people will be favored by the courts. But while corporations will not be favored and nothing will be presumed in their inter does not seem to be unreasonable, with against the impairment of its and especially in view of the fact that the lines were operated at a loss for fourteen years. Possibly thirty years, or any shorter time, should be deemed too long in any case, if the contract were such that the street railroad company could not be required to meet the public wants as the same should arise. In the case at bar, two miles only of track were specifically stipulated for, but it is not denied by the plaintiff that the acceptance of the ordinance, which allowed its assignor to lay a track upon all the streets, raised an implied contract upon the part of its assignor to lay so much track as reasonably might be demanded by the public. At the time of the commencement of this controversy, the plaintiff and its assignor had in fact laid ten miles of track, and was contemplating the laying of still more. may be that neither the plaintiff nor its assignor did all that it should; but such a question is not before us. The ordinance appears to us to be reasonable, and our holding is that, under our statute, which empowers cities to authorize or forbid the laying down of a street railroad track, a city council may make a reasonable provision by contract for the present and future street railroad service, and may secure the company contracted It profits for a limited time, and against interference with its extension during the time, if a larger and better, or more immediate service can be thus obtained. This question has never before been determined by this court; but the ruling in Burlington & Henderson County Ferry Co. v. Davis, 48 Iowa, 133, goes far towards supporting the views which we have expressed. See also, as having a slight bearing on the case, City of Davenport v. Kelly, 7 Iowa, 102; City of Dubuque v. Stout, 32 Iowa, 80; City of Burlington v. Burlington St. Ry. Co., 49 Iowa, 144. In New Orleans Gas Light Co. v. Louisiana Light Co., 115 U. S. 650; s. c., 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 252, and in Boston & L. R. Corp. v. Salem & L. R. Co., 2 Gray, 1, cited by plaintiff, the question was essentially different; but there is much said in the course of the opinion, showing the view which those courts took in regard to the importance, sometimes, of securing a service to the public by contract, even though the contract should, for a limited time, grant an exclusive right. Other courts have held somewhat different views, supported by more or less weight of reasoning. Some of the reasoning, however, we think, cannot be allowed much weight as applied to the condition and policy of Iowa." ests, it is the province of equity to protect corporations no less than individuals. Where the right is with the corporation it will be sustained against any usurpation of its franchise, and against any effort to put an end to its corporate existence. Public prejudice is not a rule to a court of chancery. In the case of The Jersey City Gas Co. v. Dwight, the court said: "The foundation of the present suit is the invasion of a private right created by statute, and that, I have always understood, it is the undoubted province of a court of equity to protect, whether the injury be committed by an individual or a corporation."2 § 122. Monopoly in Street Railways.-It is well established that municipal authorities have no power virtute offiicio to grant any exclusive privilege to a street railway corporation. Such power may be conferred by the legislature, but it must be in direct and express terms. Nothing 1 Jersey City Gas Co. v. Dwight, 29 N. J. Eq. 242; Atty.-Gen. v. Stevens, 1 N. J. Eq. 369; Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. National Ry. Co., 23 N. J. Eq. 441; Atty.-Gen. v. Utica Ins. Co., 2 Johns. Ch. 371; Atty.-Gen. v. Bank of Niagara, Hopkins, 354; City of Newport v. Newport Light Co., 84 Ky. 166, 183; Atty.-Gen. v. Tudor Ice Co., 104 Mass. 239; Delaware & R. Canal Co. v. Raritan & Delaware Bay Co., 16 N. J. Eq. 321, 378. "The only question is as to the remedy, and this appears to me to be equally certain. It is settled that an injunction is the proper remedy to secure to a party the enjoyment of a statute privilege, of which he is in the actual possession, and when his legal title is not put in doubt. The English books are full of cases arising under this head of equity jurisdiction. (Bush v. Western, Prec. in Chan. 530; Whitchurch v. Hide, 2 Atk. 391.) But I need not enter into this discussion, for the point has been recently settled in this State in the case of Livingston and Fulton v. Van Ingen and others (9 Johns. Rep. 507), and I shall rest upon the authority of that case, and upon the application of the principles on which it was decided. The equity jurisdiction in such a case is extremely benign and salutary. Without it the party would be exposed to constant and ruinous litigation, as well as to have his right excessively impaired by frauds and evasion. Croton Turnpike Co. v. Ryder, 1 Johns. Ch. 611, 615. Legislative acts granting franchises are to be construed strictly according to their terms, and the grantees in such acts take nothing by implication, either as against the power making the grant, or against other corporations or individuals. Auburn & Cato Plank Road v. Douglass, 9 N. Y. 444. 2 Jersey City Gas Co. v. Dwight, 29 N. J. Eq. 242. |