& Augusta Railroad Company v. Gibbes, the rule was stated by Mr. Justice Field, in delivering the opinion of the court, as follows: "The duties of the railroad commissioners, when properly discharged, must be in the highest I. & St. L. R. R. v. Rogers, 62 Ill. 346; C. & A. R. R. Co. v. Clampit, 63 Ill. 95; C. & A. R. R. Co. v. Quaintance, 58 Ill. 389. Acts making tax deeds prima facie evidence of the regularity of proceedings antecedent to the deed have been held valid. 2 Rice on Evidence. page 607; Hand v. Ballou, 12 N. Y. 541; Delaplaine v. Cook, 7 Wis. 54; Allen v. Armstrong, 16 Iowa, 508; Wright v. Dunham, 13 Mich. 414; Gage v. Caraher, 125 Ill. 451. See also Williams v. German Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 68 111. 387. Cases referred to by counsel, which in volve the validity of acts providing for references to auditors or referees and making the findings of the facts by them in their reports prima facie evidence of facts in trials before juries, will be found to be clearly distinguishable from the case at bar. The Supreme Court of Iowa has decided, that a provision making the schedule of the commission prima facie evidence of the reasonableness of the rates of charges, as contained in a statute of that State similar to said Act of 1873, was not obnoxious to the objections here urged against it, saying: "The provision of the statute, that the rates fixed by the commissioners shall be regarded as reasonable, is not of an unusual character, and was enacted in the exercise of the undoubted power of the State to prescribe rules of evidence in all proceedings under the laws of the State. The law presumes the acts of officers of the State to be rightly done, and gives them faith accordingly. This rule is not unlike the provision of the statute complained of by the plaintiff.' B., C. R. & N. Ry. Co. v. Dey, 82 Iowa, 312. See also C. & A. R. R. Co. v. People, 67 Ill. 11." "Under section 8, of the statute, which the Supreme Court of Minnesota says is the only one which relates to the matter of the fixing by the commission of general schedules of rates, and which section, it says, fully and exclusively provides for that subject, and is complete in itself, all that the commission is required to do is, on the filing with it by a railroad company of copies of its schedules of charges to 'find' that any part thereof is in any respect unequal or unreasonable, and then it is authorized and directed to compel the company to change the same and adopt such charge as the commission 'shall declare to be equal and reasonable,' and to that end, it is required to inform the company in writing in what respect its charges are unequal and unreasonable. No hearing is provided for, no summons or notice to the company before the commission has found what it is to find, and declared what it is to declare, no opportunity provided for the company to introduce witnesses before the commission, in fact nothing which has the semblance of due process of law; and, although in the present case, it appears that, prior to the decision of the commision, the company appeared before it by its agent, and degree beneficial to the public, securing faithful service on the part of the railroad companies, and safety, convenience and comfort in the operation of their roads. That the State has the power to prescribe the regulations mentioned there can be no question. Though railroad corporations are private corporations, as distinguished from those created for municipal and governmental purposes, their uses are public. They are formed for the convenience of the public in the transportation of persons and merchandise, and are invested for that purpose with special privileges. They are allowed to exercise the State's right of eminent domain that they may appropriate for their uses the necessary property of others upon paying just compensation therefor, a right which can only be exercised for public purposes And they assume, by the acceptance of their charters, the obligations to transport all persons and merchandise upon like conditions and at reasonable rates; and they are authorized to charge reasonable compensation for the the commission investigated the rates charged by the company for transporting milk, yet it does not appear what the character of the investigation was or how the result was arrived at. By the second section of the statute in question, it is provided that all charges made by a common carrier for the transportation of passengers or property shall be equal and reasonable. Under this provision the carrier has a right to make equal and reasonable charges for such transportation. In the present case, the return alleged that the rate of charge fixed by the commission was not equal or unreasonable, and the supreme court held that statute deprived the company of the right to show that judicially. The question of the reasonableness of a rate of charge for transportation by a railroad company, involving as it does the element of reasonableness, both as regards the company and as regards the public, is eminently a question for judicial investigation, requiring due process of law for its determination. If the company is deprived of the power of charging reasonable rates for the use of its property, and such deprivation takes place in the absence of an investigation by judicial machinery, it is deprived of the lawful use of its property, and thus, in substance and effect, of the property itself, without due process of law, and in violation of the Constitution of the United States; and in so far as it is thus deprived, while other persons are permitted to receive reasonable profits upon their invested capital, the company is deprived of the equal protection of the laws." Chicago, etc. Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U. S. 418, 458. services they thus perform. Being the recipients of special privileges from the State, to be exercised in the interest of the public, and assuming the obligations thus mentioned, their business is deemed affected with a public use and to the extent of that use is subject to legislative regulation. That regulation may extend to all measures deemed essential not merely to secure the safety of passengers and freight, but to promote the convenience of the public in the transaction of business with them, and to prevent abuses by extortionate charges and unjust discrimination. It may embrace a general supervision of the operation of their roads, which may be exercised by direct legislation, commanding or forbidding, under severe penalties, the doing or omission of particular acts, or it may be exercised through commissioners specially appointed for that purpose. The mode or manner of regulation is a matter of legislative discretion. When exercised through commissioners, their services are for the benefit of the railroad corporations as well as of the public. Both are served by the required supervision over the roads and means of transportation, and there would seem to be no sound reason why the compensation of the commissioners in such case should not be met by the corporations, the operation of whose roads and the exercise of whose franchises are supervised." § 137. The Power to Assess Damages.-It has been held that where a railway company neglects to erect or to maintain suitable fences, cattle guards, etc., as required by law, and, in consequence, an injury is inflicted upon cattle, horses or other domestic animals, the company shall be held liable for damages to double the sum of the injury occasioned by such neglect. The legislature has power to hold a railway corporation responsible for the gross negligence of its officers or agents. Fines and penalties may be assessed and enforced in addition to a proper satisfaction for the damage actually done. In the case of the Missouri Pacific Railway Company v. Humes, it was held by the Charlotte, etc. Co. v. Gibbes, 142 U. S. 386, 393. Supreme Court of the United States, that a statute for a State, requiring every railroad corporation in the State to erect and maintain fences and cattle guards on the sides of its road, and, if it does not, making it liable in double the amount of damages occasioned thereby and done by its agents, cars or engines, to cattle or other animals on its road, does not deprive a railroad corporation, against which such double damages are recovered, of its property without due process of law, or deny it the equal protection of the laws, in violation of the fourteenth article of amendment of the Constitution of the United States. The legislature of a State may fix the amount of damages beyond compensation to be awarded to a party injured by the gross negligence of a railroad company to provide suitable fences and guards of its road, or prescribe the limit within which the jury, in assessing such damages, may exercise their discretion. The additional damages are by way of punishment to the company for its negligence; and it is not a valid objection that the sufferer instead of the State receives them. The mode in which fines and penalties shall be enforced, whether at the suit of a private party or at the suit of the public, and what disposition shall be made of the amounts collected, are matters of legislative discretion.1 V. 1 Missouri Pacific Ry Co. Humes, 115 U. S. 512. See also Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Crider, 91 Tenn. 489; s. c.. 56 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 157; Jacksonville, etc. R. Co. v. Prior, 34 Fla. 271; Wortman v. Kleinschmidt, 12 Mont. 316; Burlington, etc. R. R. Co. v. Dey, 82 Iowa, 312; s. C., 45 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 391; Gulf, etc. R. Co. v. Ellis, 87 Tex. 19; s. c., 61 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 357; Peoria, etc. R. Co. v. Duggan, 109 Ill. 537; s. C., 20 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 489; Perkins v. St. Louis, etc. Ry. Co., 103 Mo. 52; Dow v. Beidleman, 49 Ark. 455; s. C., 31 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 14. "Again it is said that that portion of section 2 giving to the stock owner the right to recover attorney fees is unconstitutional. The proposition is thus stated by the learned counsel for plaintiff in error. Our State Constitution (Bill of Rights, §§ 1, 18), guarantees to all equity of rights, and remedies for injury by due course of law,. We contend that a law which gives a successful plaintiff in a civil action his attorney's fees, and denies them to defendant, is a most gross violation of these constitutional provisions.' We do not think the contention of counsel can be sustained. While the law may be harsh and rigorous (and yet its rigor may have seemed to the legislature as essential to its $138. Power to Regulate Public Warehouses and Warehousing.-The right of a State to regulate its domestic affairs is not affected by the limitation of the powers of Congress by the Constitution of the United States. And notwithstanding that warehouses are used by persons engaged in interstate commerce, the State legislature may prescribe and enforce regulations as a matter of State concern. In the leading case of Munn v. Illinois, it was held by the Supreme Court of the United States that where wharehouses are situated and their business is carried on exclusively within a State she may, as a matter of domestic concern, prescribe regulations for them, notwithstanding they are used as instruments by those engaged in value, for, if a claimant for stock killed was compelled to pay his attorney's fees, it might well happen that in all cases the amount of his claim-such amounts, being uniformly small-would be consumed by attorney's fees, and so leave the claimant in no better condition than before), we see no reason to hold it beyond the power of the legislature. It is no uncommon thing for legislatures to provide, in cases where a failure to pay seems to imply more than ordinary wrong, that such failure should carry with it something in the nature of a penalty. Sometimes double or treble damages are given. The Iowa stock law gave double damages. Our trespass act provides for both double and treble damages. Ten per cent. may sometimes be added in the discretion of the court. Other illustrations might be suggested." Kansas Pacific Ry. Co. v. Mower, 16 Kan. 573, 582. Contra: See Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. Moss, 60 Miss. 641; South., etc. R. Co. v. Morris, 65 Ala. 193; Wilder v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 70 Mich. 382; Schut v. Chicago, etc. R. R. Co., 70 Mich. 433; Ziegler v. South., etc. R. R. Co., 58 Ala. 594; Smith v. Louisville, etc. R. Co., 75 Ala. 449; State v. Divine, 98 N. Car. 778; Indiana, etc. R. Co. v. Gapen, 10 Ind. 292; Madison, etc. R. Co. v. Whiteneck, 8 Ind. 217; St. Louis, etc. R. R. Co. v. Williams, 49 Ark. 492. The rights of every individual must stand or fall by the same general law that governs every member of the body politic in the land, under similar circumstances, therefore a partial law which proposes to affect or destroy the rights of particular persons, or a particular class of persons, is not the law of the land. That part of the statute of June 22, 1867, which gives to the owner of live stock "double the value" of his property accidentally injured or destroyed on a railroad track is void. Atchison & Neb. R. R. Co. v. Baty, 6 Neb. 37. See generally: Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 388; Bull v. Conroe, 13 Wis. 233, 244; Wally v. Kennedy, 2 Yerg. 554; Gordon v. Winchester, 12 Bush, 110; Durkee v. City of Janesville, 28 Wis. 464; Janes v. Reynolds, 2 Tex. 250; Van Zant v. Waddel. 2 Yerg. 260. |