an article of commerce any contract creating a monopoly therein is against public policy and void." State v. Nebraska Distilling Co., 29 Neb. 700, 718. "The supplying of illuminating gas is a business of a public nature to meet a public necessity. It is not a business like that of an ordinary corporation engaged in the manufacture of articles that may be furnished by individual effort. New Orleans Gas Co. v. Louisiana Light Co., 115 U. S. 683; Shepard v. Milwaukee Gas Co., 6 Wis. 539; Chicago Gas Light & Coke Co. v. People's Gas Light & Coke Co., 121 Ill. 530; St. Louis v. St. Louis Gas Light Co., 70 Mo. 69. Hence, while it is justly urged that those rules which say that a given contract is against public policy should not be arbitrarily extended so as to interfere with the freedom of contract (Printing, etc. Registering Co. v. Sampson, L. R. 19 Eq. 462), yet in the instance of business of such character that it presumably cannot be restrained to any extent whatever without prejudice to the public interest, courts decline to enforce or sustain contracts imposing such restraint, however partial, because in contravention of public policy. This subject is much considered and the authorities cited in West Virginia Transportation Co. v. Ohio River Pipe Line Co., 22 W. Va. 600; Chicago, etc. Gas Co. v. People's Gas Co., 121 Ill. 530; Western Union Tel. Co. v. American Union Tel. Co., 65 Ga. 160." Gibbs v. Baltimore Gas Co., 130 U. S. 396, 408. The following are held not to be articles of necessity: Sewing machines, Bi-Spool Sewing Machine Co. v. Acme Mfg. Co., 15 Mass. 404; washing machines, Dolph v. Troy Laundry Machine Co., 28 Fed. Rep. 553; curtain fixtures, Central Shade Roller Co. v. Cushman, 143 Mass. 353. An agreement between two manufacturers of glue from fish skins under a supposed valid patent, the object of which is to avoid competition between themselves and secure to each a reasonable profit, is not against public policy, the article in question not being one of prime necessity, nor a a staple commodity ordinarily bought and sold in the market. Gloucester Isinglass & Glue Co. v. Russia Cement Co., 154 Mass. 92; S. C., 27 N. E. Rep. 1005. § 167. Introduction. CHAPTER XII. TRUST COMBINATIONS. 168. The Purpose and Scope of 169. The Subject Continued. § 176. The Voting Trust. 182. Rights of Parties under § 167. Introductory.—The decisions and legislation adverse to the "trust" proper, as examined in the preceding chapter, has led to a variety of combinations which are of the nature of a trust, but are designed to conform to the requirements of the law. The design of these combinations is to secure the ends answered by the trust, while avoiding the methods which have rendered the trust illegal as in contravention of public policy and void. But the numerous schemes of this character have not been largely successful. As the ends sought are essentially illegal, condemnation is not escaped by a change of methods. These combinations have appeared under a variety of forms. But whatever phase they may assume the object is to suppress competition, or to regulate the production and sale of some article of necessity or of some commodity that is in general use. But this is a problem which, in view of recent decisions, presents some very grave difficulties, and the result has been that very many of these combinations have been found illegal and void. § 168. The Purpose and Scope of Federal Legislation.-Federal statutes, prohibiting trust combinations, are limited, of course, to contracts relating either directly or indirectly to interstate commerce. But while Federal legislation is, necessarily, limited in this direction, the object, as in the case of State legislation of this character, is to suppress combinations designed to create a monopoly in restraint of trade. The most important statute on this subject is the Act of July 2d, 1890, entitled: "An Act to Protect Trade and Commerce against Unlawful Restraints and Monopolies." The design and scope of this act appears from section 1, which provides that "every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce, among the several States or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any such contract, or engage in any such combination, or conspiracy, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by a fine, not exceeding $5,000, or by imprisonment, not exceeding one year, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the courts." In the recent leading case of The United States v. The Trans-Missouri Freight Association, we have a construction of this act by the Supreme Court of the United States. In that case it was held that, under this act, all combinations in restraint of trade or commerce are prohibited by the Act of Congress of July 2d, 1890, whether they are in the form of trusts or in any other form whatever. The words, "unlawful restraints and monopolies," in the title of the Act of Congress of July 2d, 1890, do not show that the purpose of the act was to include only contracts which were unlawful at common law, but refer to and include those restraints and monopolies which are made unlawful in the body of the act. The term "contract in restraint of trade," as used in the Act of Congress of July 2d, 1890, does not refer only to contracts which were invalid at common law, but includes every contract in restraint of trade, and is not limited to that kind of 1 Federal Anti-Trust Act, § 1. a contract which is in unreasonable restraint of trade. The public policy of the government is to be found in its statutes, and where they have not directly spoken, then, in the decisions of the court and the constant practice of the government officials; but where the law-making power speaks on a particular subject over which it has constitutional power to legislate, public policy in such a case is what the statute enacts. A contract or combination made in violation of a law is void, whatever may have been theretofore decided by the courts to have been the public policy of the country on the subject.1 1 United States v. Trans-Missouri of "monopolizing, or attempting to Freight Association, 166 U. S. 290. monopolize," trade or commerce 20 Stat. 209, declaring illegal among the States, within the mean"every contract or combination in ing Act July 2, 1890, § 2, it is necthe form of trust, or otherwise in essary to acquire, or attempt to restraint of trade or commerce acquire, an exclusive right in such among the several States or with commerce by means which will foreign nations," applies to com- prevent others from engaging binations of laborers as well as of therein. In re Greene, 52 Fed. capitalists. In order to sustain the Rep. 104. The act "to protect allegations of a bill for an injunc- trade and commerce against untion against a combination in re- lawful restraints and monopolies" straint of interstate commerce, confers no right upon a private complainant may offer in evidence, individual to sue in equity for the as matter of history, the official restraint of the acts forbidden by proclamation of the various govern- such statute, an action at law for ment officers and also newspapers damages being the only remedy reports supported by affidavits provided for private persons, and containing manifestoes and decla- the right to bring suits in equity rations of respondents. United being vested in the district-attorStates v. Workingmens' Amalga- neys of the United States. Pidcock mated Council, 54 Fed. Rep. 994. v. Harrington, 64 Fed. Rep. 821. A contract between manufacturers, An action in a Federal Circuit whereby the first party agrees in Court for New York, charging consideration of a percentage on numerous business competitors of the sales made by the second party, complainants in various States with not to use his plant for the produc- forming a combination and attion of strap and T hinges for five tempting to create a monopoly in years, the contract to be void in 1887, but charging that after the case the second party increases his Act of July 2, 1890, defendants facilities for production of such ratified and renewed their previous hinges, is void as against public combinations, and demanding policy. Oliver v. Gilmore, 52 Fed. treble damages "under and by Rep. 562. To constitute the offense virtue of the statute," held to be § 169. The Subject Continued. In the opinion in the case of The United States v. The Trans-Missouri Freight Association, we have a farther construction of the purpose and scope of the Federal Anti-Trust Act. In delivering the opinion, Mr. Justice Peckham said: "Coming to the merits of the suit, there are two important questions which demand our examination: They are, first, whether the above-cited an action founded on the 1890 Act. In an action by a manufacturer of watch cases against numerous other manufacturers thereof in various States to recover treble damages under Act Congress July 2, 1890, prohibiting unlawful restraints and monopolies of interstate commerce, the complaint alleged that plaintiff operated an extensive factory; that previous to Nov. 16, 1887, it sold its goods to a great number of dealers throughout the United States and Canada;" that prior to that date defendants had agreed with each other to maintain arbitrary and fixed prices for their watch cases; that for the purpose of compelling plaintiff to join with them therein, defendants on said date mutually agreed that they would not thereafter sell any goods to persons who bought or sold goods manufactured by plaintiff; that they caused notice thereof to be served on many dealers in such goods throughout the United States and Canada, who had formerly dealt in plaintiff's goods, whereupon many of such dealers withdrew their patronage from plaintiff; that after the passage of the Act of 1890, defendants ratified, renewed and confirmed their previous agreements, and served notice of such ratification on all said dealers in plaintiff's goods, whereby said dealers were compelled to refuse to purchase plaintiff's watch cases. Held, that the complaint failed to state a cause of action under the statute. Dueber Watch Case Mfg. Co. v. E. Howard Watch & Clock Co., 66 Fed. Rep. 637; s. C., 14 C. C. A. 14. A corporation organized to procure assignments of all patents relating to spring tooth harrows, to grant licenses for the use of the same, to regulate the price at which such harrows shall be sold and prosecute all infringements, is an illegal combination, contrary to public policy, whose purposes equity should not aid by entertaining infringement suits. National Harrow Co. v. Quick, 67 Fed. Rep. 130. The purchase of stock of sugar refineries, for the purpose of acquiring control over the business of refining sugar for sale in the United States, does not involve a monopoly or combination in restraint of commerce among the States within the prohibition of Act July 2, 1890. United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U. S. 1; s. c., 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 249. Where both plaintiff and defendant, in an action for goods sold, were corporations of the State in which the sale was made, the sale was not a transaction within Act July 2, 1890, relating to restraint of trade and commerce between the several States. National Distilling Co. v. Cream City Importing Co., 86 Wis. 352; s. C., 56 N. W. Rep. 864. A lease by one corporation to another, engaged in the same business, of |