act said court shall render a judgment, and order a revocation of the charter, corporate rights and franchises of said corporation as a penalty for the violation or violations of which the said corporation shall be found guilty, and the secretary of state shall thereupon make publication of such revocation in four newspapers in general circulation in four of the largest cities of the State. § 10. In case any person or persons shall do, cause to be done or permit to be done any act, matter or thing in this act, prohibited or declared to be unlawful, such person or persons shall be liable to the person or persons injured thereby for treble the amount of damages sustained in consequence of any such violation of the provisions of this act. § 11. The words "person" or "persons," wherever used in this act, shall be deemed to include corporations, companies and associations existing under or authorized by the laws of either the United States or any of the territories, any State or any foreign country. § 214. Washington Law Forbidding Trusts and Monopolies.-Section 22d, of article XII., of the constitution of the State of Washington, provides that monopolies and trusts shall never be allowed in this State, and no incorporated company, co-partnership or association of persons in this State shall, directly or indirectly, combine or make any contract with any other incorporated company, foreign or domestic, through their stockholders or the trustees or assignees of such stockholders, or with any co-partnership or association of persons, or in any manner whatever, for the purpose of fixing the price or limiting the production or regulating the transportation of any product or commodity. The legislature shall pass laws for the enforcement of this section by adequate penalties, and, in case of incorporated companies, if necessary for that purpose, may declare a forfeiture of their charter. The legislation for the enforcement of this provision is included in a statute, entitled, "An act to regulate the sale of farm, dairy, orchard or garden produce on commission." This act was approved March 21st, 1895, and is, as follows: The section here given is the section of chapter CXLVIII. of the Session Laws of Washington for 1885: § 5. It shall be unlawful for persons engaged in the business of commission merchants to enter into any combination, conspiracy or pool for the purpose of artificially raising or depressing the market prices of any farm, dairy, orchard or garden produce, or of excluding from the market the produce of any particular locality,-grown or manufactured by any person. § 215. Wisconsin Statute Prohibiting Trusts and Combinations in Restraint of Trade. The law of Wisconsin on this subject is entitled, "An act to prevent corporations organized under the laws of this State from entering into any combination, conspiracy, trust, agreement or contract intended to operate in restraint of any lawful trade or commerce carried on in this State." This act was approved April 27th, 1897, and is, as follows: The people of the State of Wisconsin, represented in senate and assembly, do enact, as follows: § 1. Corporations organized under the laws of this State are prohibited from entering into any combination, conspiracy, trust, pool, agreement or contract intended to restrain or prevent competition in the supply or price of any article or commodity in general use in this State, or constituting a subject of trade or commerce therein, or to control the price of any such article or commodity, to regulate or fix the price thereof, to limit or fix the amount or quantity thereof to be manufactured, mined, produced or sold in this State, or to fix any standard or figure by which its price to the public shall be in any manner controlled or established. § 2. Whenever the attorneygeneral of this State shall be notified or shall have reason to believe that any corporation, organized under the laws of this State, has violated any provision of section one of this act, it shall be his duty forthwith to address to any such corporation, or to any director or officer thereof, such inquiries as he may deem necessary for the purpose of determining whether or not such corporation has violated any provisions of section one of this act, and it shall be the duty of such corporation, director or officer thereof, so addressed, to promptly and fully answer in writing, under oath, such inquiries, and in case such corporation, or director or officer thereof, shall fail or neglect to do so within sixty days from the receipt of such inquiries, unless such time is extended in writing by the attorney-general, it shall be the duty of the attorney-general to proceed against such corporation, as hereinafter provided. § 3. In case of the failure or neglect of any corporation, organized under the laws of this State, or of any director or officer of such corporation, to answer such inquiries, as hereinbefore provided, such failure or neglect is hereby declared to be a forfeiture of the charter of such corporation, and it is hereby made the duty of the attorney-general on leave granted by the supreme court of this State, upon cause shown, to bring an action for the purpose of vacating the charter and annulling the existence of such corporation. § 4. No person shall be excused from answering any of the inquiries herein provided for, nor excused from attending and testifying, nor from producing any books, papers, contracts, agreements or documents in obedience to a subpœna issued by any lawful authority in any case or proceeding based upon or growing out of any alleged violation of any of the provisions of this chapter, or of any law of this State in regard to trusts, monopolies or illegal combinations, on the ground of or for the reason that the answer, testimony, evidence, documentary or otherwise, required of him, may tend to criminate him, or subject him to a penalty or forfeiture, but no person shall be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, matter or thing concerning which he may answer, testify or produce evidence, documentary or otherwise, in obedience to any request under this chapter, or any subpœna, or either of them, in any case or proceeding, except that the charter of any corporation may be vacated and its corporate existence annulled, as herein before provided, and except further, that no person testifying in any case or proceeding aforesaid shall be exempt from prosecution and punishment for perjury committed in so testifying. § 5. This act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage and publication. § 216. Introductory.—From the preceding chapter it will be seen that constitutional and statutory remedies against monopolies and illegal combinations have been provided by the Federal government and by more than twothirds of the States. In other States the courts have granted relief of an extraordinary character by quo warranto and injunction. Though certain phases of the law remain in a degree unsettled, some progress has been made during recent years, and the present trend is in the direction of granting full and adequate relief in this manner. The object of this chapter is to present some illustrations of the remedies of this character. § 217. The Writ of Quo Warranto.—The origin of the writ of quo warranto is traceable to a very early period of English jurisprudence. The earliest case that has been cited is that of Darley v. The Queen, in A. D. 1198.1 During the centuries which followed it came into frequent 1 Darlay v. The Queen, 12 Cl. & Fin. 520. use, and was sometimes used to strengthen the power of the crown at the expense of the barons. But where these encroachments had been in a degree restrained by statute, ambitious princes resorted to the original writ of quo warranto. Both the original writ and the information in the nature of the writ were remedies of the crown, and though they were not infrequently abused they have always been recognized as the proper remedies for the abuse or for the usurpation of franchises. This writ is defined by "In times of feudal barbarity which accompanied and followed, for many years, the overgrown power of the nobles, there was constant occasion to apply the corrective of the quo warranto. It was the only effectual remedy, even if it could be called a remedy in itself; for monopolies had become so numerous, and so fortified by interest and power, that the application of the writ depended in greater measure on the personal character of the prince, than moral submission to the law. This was especially so, when the writ was brought to bear upon manorial claims residing in the hands of the barons or lords, either temporal or spiritual. Looking at Keilwey's report of cases in Eyre, in time of the memorable king. Richard the Third, fol. 137 to 152, one would be led to believe that a good deal of his reign was devoted to this sort of judicial contest with his nobles. Indeed, his predecessor, Edward the First, had found single writs too slow; and caused a statute to be passed under which his noblemen were called by proclamation and obliged to come by squadrons before his immediate court or his justices in Eyre, when ever they entered the county. 2 Reeves' Hist. 220. Dubl. ed. 1787; Com. Dig. Quo Warranto (C. 2); Crabb's History of the Engl. Law, 174, 175. This bearing too much the appearance of plunder, another statute was passed somewhat moderating the proceeding, and bringing it back to about the common law course. 2 Reeves' Hist. ed., before cited, 221; Crabb, ut supra. This is the statute on which Sir Edward Coke has furnished us with a labored commentary in his 2 Inst. 294. Still, as appears from the history of the times, the writ continued to be a very common resort, and to have been almost avowedly used to strengthen the crown at the expense of the barons. It was sometimes extended even to lands, though Coke shows that its proper office respected franchises only. Pursued in such a spirit, it may be true that the consequences claimed were occasionally severe and disproportioned to the offenses alleged. The pursuit being also sometimes more stringent, and sometimes more lax, when the case of the city of London came to be argued, it is not surprising that authorities should be found conflicting on the question whether you could go merely for correcting some particular abuse, or claim a forfeiture of the whole franchise on that ground. Several distinct franchises, though in the same hand, might be sev |