an exercise of their powers, by writ of injunction and otherwise, to accomplish the same result. In Stamford v. Stamford Horse Railroad Co.,1 an injunction was asked by the borough to restrain the company from laying down its track in a street of the borough. The right of the borough to forcibly remove the track was insisted upon as a ground for questioning the jurisdiction of a court of equity, but the court sustained the injunction, adding: And none the less so because of its right to remove the track by force. As a rule, injunctions are denied to those who have adequate remedy at law, where the choice is between the ordinary and the extraordinary processes of law, and the former are sufficient, the rule will not permit the use of the latter. In some cases of nuisance, and in some cases of trespass, the law permits an individual to abate the one and prevent the other by force, because such permission is necessary to the complete protection of property and person. When the choice is between redress or prevention of injury by force and by peaceful process, the law is well pleased if the individual will consent to waive his right to the use of force and await its action. Therefore, as between force and the extraordinary writ of injunction, the rule will permit the latter.' ''2 the injunction be reserved until final hearing? The authorities upon this subject are numerous. The following, among them, appear to me to best exhibit the contrariety of opinion that I have stated: Green's Brice's Ultra Vires (2d ed.), 708; AttorneyGeneral v. Shrewsbury Bridge Co., L. R. 21 Ch. D. 752; AttorneyGeneral v. Cockermough Local Board, L. R. 18 Eq. Cas. 172; Attorney-General v. Gt. Eastern Ry. Co., L. R. 11 Ch. D. 449; Attorney-General v. Gt. Northern Ry. Co., 1 Drew. & S. 184; s. C., 6 Jur. (N. S.) 1006; AttorneyGeneral v. Railroads, 35 Wis. 525. The last cited case collects almost all the authority upon this subject." Stockton v. Central R. R. Co., 50 N. J. Eq. 52. 78. See also Cincinnati, New Orleans, etc. Ry. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 162 U. S. 184; Texas & Pacific Ry. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 162 U. S. 197. Stamford v. Stamford Horse Railroad Co., 56 Conn. 381. 2 In re Debs, 158 U. S. 564, 582. See also Attorney-General v. Johnson, 2 Wils. Ch. 87; AttorneyGeneral v. Forbes, 2 Myl. & Cr. 123; Attorney-General v. Terry, L. R. 9 Ch. App. 423; AttorneyGeneral v. Birmingham, 4 Kay & J. 528; People v. Miner, 2 Lans. 396; People v. Ferry Co., 68 N. § 226. The Subject Continued. The right to bring a suit for an injunction under the Federal Anti-Trust Act of July 2d, 1890, is limited to the government. It is conferred by the act only on the government, and it has been held that it cannot be exercised in private suits. In the case of Greer, Mills & Co. v. Stoller,' before the Circuit Court for Y. 71; Davis v. Mayor, etc., 14 N. Y. 526; People v. Vanderbilt, 28 N. Y. 396; s. c., 26 N. Y. 287; Attorney-General v. Hunter, 1 Dev. Eq. 12; State v. Dayton & S. E. R. Co., 36 Ohio St. 434; People v. St. Louis, 5 Gilman, 351; Gilbert v. Canal, etc. Co., 8 N. J. Eq. 495. 1 Greer, Mills & Co. v. Stoller, 77 Fed. Rep. 1. The statute against unlawful restraints and monopolies (Act 1890, 26 St. p. 209) does not authorize the bringing of injunction suits or suits in equity by any parties except the government. Blindell v. Hagan, 54 Fed. Rep. 40. "The demurrer challenges the jurisdiction of this court to maintain, under the act in question, a bill in equity filed by a private individual and his solicitor. It is clear that the right to maintain such a suit is not expressly conferred by the act. Indeed, such right is, by implication, denied,first, because a private person is given (section 7) the right to maintain an action at law; and, second, the district attorneys of the United States under the direction of the attorney-general (section 4) are charged with the duty of commencing suits in equity. If it were the intention of the law makers to vest in every irresponsible individual, who may deem himself aggrieved, the right to invoke the drastic and far reaching remedies conferred by the act, is it not reasonable to suppose that they would have said so in unambiguous terms? The first three sections are penal statutes. They give no civil remedy. Section 4, vests the right to institute proceedings in equity in the district-attorneys of the United States, and, together with section 5, prescribes the procedure in such suits. Section 6, provides for the seizure and forfeiture to the United States of property illegally owned under the provisions of the act. So far, then, the act is a public act providing no private remedy. If it ended with section 6 there would probably be no pretense that it sanctioned a suit like the one at bar. What follows, however, in no way strengthens the complainant's position. The only section which gives a private remedy is the seventh, which is, as follows: Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by any other person or corporation by reason of any thing forbidden or declared to be unlawful by this act, may sue therefor in any circuit court of the United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover three fold the damages by him sustained, and the costs of suit including a reasonable attorneys fee.' But for this section no private person would have any standing in court, and as the only right conferred by it is the right to the Western District of Missouri, it was held that a bill by members of a business exchange to enjoin the board of directors from enforcing against them certain by-laws of the association, on the ground that the same are illegal as being in restraint of trade and commerce, cannot be based upon the "anti-trust law" of July 2d, 1890 (26 Stat. 209); for the right given by section four thereof, to bring suits for injunction, is limited to suits instituted on behalf of the government. Therefore, the authority given by section five, to bring in non-residents of the district, cannot be availed of in private suits, and the court can acquire no jurisdiction over them. § 227. Punishment for Contempt.-The violation of an injunction is a contempt of court, and may be punished as such. Where the court has authority to issue an injunction it has power to enforce its decree by an appropriate penalty. In the case In re Debs, the rule is stated by the court, as follows: "The power of a court to make an order carries with it the equal power to punish for a disobedience of that order, and the inquiry as to the question of disobedience has been from time immemorial the special function of the court. And this is no technical rule. In order that a court may compel obedience to its orders it must have the right to inquire whether there has been any disobedience thereof. To submit the question of disobedience to another tribunal, be it a jury or another court, would operate to deprive the proceeding of half its efficiency. In the case of Yates, Chancellor Kent, then Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, said: 'In the case of The Earl of Shaftesbury, who was imprisoned by the House of Lords for "high contempts committed against it," and brought into the King's Bench, the court sue for damages in a court of law, it follows that the point presented by the demurrer is well founded." Pidcock v. Harrington, 64 Fed. Rep. 821, 822. 2 1 In the case of J. V. N. Yates, 4 Johns. 314. 369. 2 In the case of the Earl of Shaftesbury, 2 St. Trials, 615; s. C., 1 Mod. 144. held that they had no authority to judge of the contempt, and remanded the prisoner. The court in that case seem to have laid down a principle from which they never have departed, and which is essential to the due administration of justice. This principle that every court, at least of the superior kind, in which great confidence is placed, must be the sole judge, in the last resort, of contempts arising therein, is more explicitly defined and more emphatically enforced in the two subsequent cases of The Queen v. Paty and others,1 and of The King v. Crosby." And again, on page 371, 'Mr. Justice Blackstone pursued the same train of observation, and declared that all courts, by which he meant to include the two houses of Parliament, and the courts of Westminister Hall, could have no control in matters of contempt. That the sole adjudication of contempts, and the punishment thereof, belonged exclusively, and without interfering, to each respective court.' In Watson v. Williams, it was said: The power to fine and imprison for contempt, from the earliest history of jurisprudence, has been regarded as a necessary incident and attribute of a court, without which it would no more exist than without a judge. It is a power inherent in all courts of record and co-existing with them by the wise provisions of the common law. A court without the power effectually to protect itself against the assaults of the lawless, or to enforce its orders, judgments or decrees against the recusant parties before it, would be a disgrace to the legislation, and a stigma upon the age which invented it.' In Cartwright's Case, we find this language: The summary power to commit and punish for contempt tending to obstruct or degrade the administration of justice is inherent in courts of chancery and other superior courts, as essential to the execution. of their powers, and to the maintenance of their authority, 3 1 Queen v. Paty, 2 Ld. Raym. 1105. 2 King v. Crosby, 3 Wils. 188; S. C., 2 Bl. Rep. 754. 3 Watson v. Williams, 36 Miss. 331, 341. 4 Cartwright's Case, 114 Mass. 230, 238. and is part of the law of the land, within the meaning of Magna Charter and of the twelfth article of our Declaration of Rights."""1 1 In re Debs. 158 U. S. 564, 594. "The contention of these parties is, that they were entitled to a trial by jury on the question as to whether they were guilty or not of the contempt charged upon them, and because they did not have this trial by jury they say that they were deprived of their liberty without due process of law within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. If it has ever been understood that proceedings according to the common law for contempt of court have been subject to the right of trial by jury, we have been unable to find any instance of it. It has always been one of the attributes,― one of the powers necessarily incident to a court of justice,that it should have this power of vindicating its dignity, of enforcing its orders, of protecting itself from insult without the necessity of calling upon a jury to assist it in the exercise of this power." Eilenbecker v. Plymouth County, 134 U. S. 31, 36. See also United States v. Hudson, 7 Cranch, 32; Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204; Ex parte Robinson, 19 Wall. 505; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, 672; Ex parte Terry, 128 U. S. 289; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brunson, 154 U. S. 447, 488. |