and eligibility, so as to influence the choice of the voter. No public policy forbids the making of compensation, under agreement or otherwise, for printing or distributing announcements, or for the employment of any proper agency which may bring the fact of a person's candidacy more prominently before the public eye. The information thus disseminated is essential to the intelligent determination of the voter's choice. But it becomes a very different thing when money is paid or promised for efforts to control the voter's free agency in selecting the object of his suffrage. In the present case, the promise or agreement shown in the testimony and remarked upon in the instruction belongs to the last mentioned class. The defendant was to 'work for' the plaintiff's nomination; not as an advertiser only, but as an advocate. We think that the circuit court committed no error in holding that the agreement was void, as against public policy."'1 § 24. For Withdrawal of Opposing Candidate.— Where two persons are applicants to the president, to a governor, or to any other constitutional appointing power for an office, and they enter into an agreement by which one is to withdraw and to aid the other in securing the appointment, the covenant is not enforceable. In a leading case it was held that: Where two persons apply to the governor of the State to be appointed to the same office, 1 Keating v. Hyde, 23 Mo. App. 555, 560. A promise, in consideration of the governor being prevailed on by the promisee to appoint the promisor to the office, is not binding. Fawrie v. Morin's Syndics, 4 Mart. (La.) (O. S.) 39, at page 49, the court says: "From the instrument itself, it is manifest that the only consideration on which it rests is the illegal condition on which it is stated that the office was obtained. This condition is contrary to sound policy. Offices are to be granted absolutely without any condition. It is not in the power of the grantor to lessen the emoluments which the law has affixed to the discharge of official duties; it matters not to what use the share of the emolument thus carried out is applied. The public will be ill served, if the circle, within which an officer is to be selected, is narrowed by a reduction of the legal emoluments. If these are withdrawn from the incumbent he may be placed under the temptation of compensating himself by speculation, extortion and fraud.” and it is agreed that one of them shall withdraw his application and aid the other in procuring the appointment, in consideration of which the fees and emoluments of the office are to be divided between them, such contract is illegal and void. Such an agreement, it seems, is not within the statute respecting the sale of offices, but is void by the common law. In the opinion in this case the court said: 1 Gray v. Hook, 4 Comst. 449. A promise by a candidate to perform the duties of the office for less than the legal salary will avoid the election. State v. Purdy, 36 Wis. 213; State v. Collier, 72 Mo. 13; Carrothers v. Russell, 53 Iowa, 350; Nichols v. Mudgett, 32 Vt. 546; Cook v. Shipman, 24 Ill. 614; Tucker v. Aikin, 7 N. H. 113; State V. Olin, 23 Wis. 309. The doctrine which we think is established by the foregoing authorities and which we believe to be sound in principle, is, that a vote given for a candidate for a public office in consideration of his promise, in case he shall be elected, to donate a sum of money or other valuable thing to a third party, whether such party be an individual, a county or any other corporation, is void. The power to reject such vote is not vested in the election canvassers, but is vested in the court which is called upon to determine judicially the result of the election. The grounds upon which this doctrine is based are SO clearly and fully stated in the above authorities that it seems unnecessary to repeat them. Indeed, every intelligent person knows that free, unbiased and (in the language of some of the books) indifferent elections are absolutely essential to the existence of free institutions. * Promises made to the people by candidates * for public office that, if elected, they will practice a rigid economy in the expenditures of their several departments, are unobjectionable; and if the successful candidate fulfills his pledges in that behalf he is entitled to commendation. In such case, the candidate only promises to perform a legal and moral duty. For example, should a candidate for governor promise that, if elected, he would discharge all persons employed by the State whose services are not needed, or that he would prevent all unnecessary expenditures of public funds, so far as he may have power to do so, this is only a promise that, if elected, he will, in those respects, faithfully perform the duties of his office. In other words, it is a promise that he will not violate his official oath. But should such candidate propose to the voters and tax payers of the estate, that if they will elect him to the office of governor he will serve the State there in gratuitously or for one-half of the salary allowed by the constitution, and pay the rent of an executive office, and the expenses of fuel, stationery and other incidentals pertaining thereto, out of his own pocket, his proposition has an entirely different aspect. In the one case, the candidate promises that if he is elected he will regard his official duty, while in the other case he proposes to "I think that this contract was void because it stipulated that I should have a pecuniary compensation for withdrawing his application by which he had probably driven off competition, and contributed to reduce the number of applicants to himself and G. I have no doubt that it is void, because it stipulated that I should have a pecuniary compensation for aiding G to obtain the appointment. And I have no doubt that any agreement between two citizens, by which one stipulates to pay the other a proportion of the fees and emoluments of a public office which he is seeking, in consideration that that other will aid him in obtaining it, is void." In a case in Pennsylvania where plaintiff and defendant being applicants for appointment as United States assessor, plaintiff agreed to withdraw, defendant agreeing if he should be appointed to divide the receipts, it was held that the contract was against public policy and the plaintiff could not recover for services rendered. An alleged agreement after the appointment on the same terms held to be void as being in pursuance of the original contract, which could not be ratified.2 buy the office with promises to pay therefor in personal services, or money, or both. The one tends to economy and true reform, but the tendency of the other is to introduce into elections a mischievous element very nearly allied to bribery; an element which never has been tolerated (and never can be with safety) by any free government." State v. Purdy, 36 Wis. 213, 222. "In the closing and degenerate days of Rome's august empire, preceding its immediate downfall, the imperial purple was sold at public auction to the highest bidder. Equally base and equally significant of pre-ent decay and impending downfall would be the toleration of the private purchase of electorial votes. That which is wrong when done directly is equally wrong when done indirectly. Salaries are paid by tax ation, and when a candidate offers to take less than the stated salary, he offers to reduce pro tanto the amount of taxes which each individual must pay. If the candidate went to each elector and offered to pay one dollar of his taxes, that clearly would be direct bribery; and when he offers to take such a salary as will reduce the tax upon each tax payer one dollar, he is indirectly making the same offer of pecuniary gain to the voter, so that those cases rest upon the simple proposition that the election of a candidate for office cannot be secured by personal bribery offered either directly or indirectly to the voter." Brewer, J., in State v. Elting, 29 Kan. 397, 401. 1 Gray v. Hook, 4 Comst. 449, 457. 2 Hunter v. Nolf, 71 Pa. St. 282. § 25. For Services in Procuring a Pardon.-An agreement to pay for labor expended, or for expense incurred in procuring a pardon for a person convicted of a criminal offense, by procuring signatures to a petition or otherwise, falls under the rule as discussed in the preceding sections. The tendency of such an act is to encourage crime and disobedience of law, and as such is immoral and in contravention of public policy. In the leading case of Hatzfield v. Gulden, before the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, the court said: "The power to pardon is a constitutional power, to alleviate or remit punishment where perhaps there is doubt of guilt, or where the offense was committed under circumstances extenuating the crime, etc. The general and spontaneous expression of opinion has had, and ought to have, weight with the governor. But if undue means are used to obtain petitioners, it may be a great imposition on the governor. The power to pardon may be considered as a part of the penal code of the State; it operates after trial to be sure, generally, but may be exercised before. It is as important that it should be free from bias, or prejudice, or crime, as that the trial should No man would say that if it were possible to procure a pardon by direct payment to a governor it would be lawful to give one. To bribe others to deceive and impose on him only differs in degree." In a case in England a be so. power from abuse through the intervention of designing persons, and, although, in the particular instance no improper influences may have been resorted to, the public interest in such questions requires that the principle should be enforced in all cases. It may, sometimes, as between the parties, be unjust to a claimant who has rendered valuable services for another in his distress, but rules of law, founded on public policy and the safety of society, will not be 1 Hatzfeld v. Gulden, 7 Watts, 152, 155. See also Haines v. Lewis, 54 Iowa, 301. "Courts of justice are generally open to suitors for the recovery of just claims, but considerations of public policy are often deemed paramount to private rights, and where they are opposed the latter must yield. There is no doctrine better settled than that agreements to obtain executive clemency, by means of pardons or writs of nolle prosequi, cannot be enforced. The reasons are obvious. They are designed set aside to sustain such individual to protect the exercise of this demand." Wildey v. Collier, 7 bequest for purchasing the discharge of poachers, "committed to prison for non-payment of fines, fees or expenses under the game laws," was held void as encouraging Md. 273, 278. A contract conditioned for the execution and deposit of certain promissory notes by one under sentence for the commission of a crime, to be delivered to the prosecuting witness upon certain conditions, one of which was that the maker should receive a pardon or be acquitted on retrial, was held illegal and void as against public policy. Haines v. Lewis, 54 Iowa, 301. Contra: Bird v. Breedlove, 24 Ga. 623. An agreement to procure a pardon from the governor, for a convict in the penitentiary, by the proper use of all legitimate means, is neither immoral nor against the public policy. Formby v. Pryor, 15 Ga. 258. Agreements to procure a pardon tend to obstruct a correct administration of government, and are calculated to induce persons to use their influence in such manner as to defeat public justice. But, otherwise, where an attorney undertook, by the use of his personal influence with the military commander, to save from impending danger of threatened execution, or unauthorized and illegal imprisonment a prisoner who had been convicted by a military court which was unauthorized by law, "such an act cannot be regarded as an agreement to obstruct the proper administration of justice nor to defeat the ends of public justice." Thompson v. Wharton, 70 Ky. 563. It is not at once apparent that it is not lawful and proper for a party who is suffering the punishment of crime, to apply to the pardoning power for a remission of his sentence; and, so far as we are aware, no censure has been regarded as attaching to such an application, either in law or morals. It seems to us equally reasonable for any other person, who believes it his duty to make such application in behalf of another, to present the case to the executive, with such petitions, memorials, statements of facts and evidence as are suitable to satisfy the pardoning power of the propriety of the relief desired, and we think no censure can be justly attached to any person for his exertions in such a case, if the measures adopted are consistent with the facts of the case, and with the truth and honesty of all parties concerned, while any effort to obtain such pardon by falsehood, and misrepresentation, or by any species of fraudulent contrivance, or by prostituting the influence resulting from official station or from personal relation to the pardoning power, is entirely forbidden by law. A person in prison can do little to aid himself in bringing his case to the consideration of the executive. For everything that must be done without the walls of the prison the convict is compelled to rely on the assistance of those who have their liberty. Such assistance may be afforded from motives of charity and compassion, or the motive may be in part kindness and in part an expectation that the party relieved will be ready to afford a suitable compensation for the services and expenses; or the party in prison may employ another to do such acts as may be rightfully and properly done for his relief, and contract to |