not overrate his capacity; I concede that he ran a distinguished career in the London University, that his mathematical abilities are of a very high order, and that his reputation at the Bar is that of an able and rising man; my objection will not, I hope, be imagined to arise from any other than public and professional grounds-personal, I have none. Mr. Hargreave was called to the English Bar in the year 1844; he has not yet, consequently, completed his fifth year of practice. Of a standing which, in this country, is insufficient by law to justify an appointment to the office of Assistant Barrister, and to a jurisdiction in civil actions where the debts do not exceed the paltry sum of twenty pounds; this young gentleman who never yet spoke in a court of justice is sent over to Ireland as a judge in a court invested with more arbitrary powers than were ever yet conferred upon any court of judicature in this or the sister country. He is sent, armed with a casting voice in decisions which may affect millions of property! sent to preside in a court clothed with greater powers than the Court of Chancery, in a court whose decision is final and irreversible except its own members think fit to allow an appeal from their decisions! Let me assume that the other two members of the court may differ; that the one judge may incline to decide according to the rights of creditors and owners as now existing in courts of Equity; the other-impressed with the idea that he holds his office more for a political than a judicial purpose, and that the great object of the Legislature and of the Act was to effect sales and a transfer of property-may be disposed to deal more summarily with those rights, and that the junior commissioner gives his judgment, (I care not on which side,) I ask, will that judgment be calculated to carry with it weight to satisfy the public, or be one in which the professions will be disposed to acquiesce? abilities may be, was but little known in his own, and absolutely unknown in this country. There should have been a prestige about the name of each judge which would have carried with it the favorable testimony of the public. Mr. Hargreave is an English conveyancer. His brother commissioner, Dr. Longfield, was examined not very long since before a Committee of the House of Commons, (the Poor Law Committee,) he was asked, "Can you suggest any remedy for the present uncertainty of title in Ireland?" "I do not think there is any considerable uncertainty of title in Ireland. I think a purchaser in Ireland can be as certain of his title as a purchaser can be in England, there is an expense in making out a title, owing to the number of incumbrancers, but there is no uncertainty of title." "Mr. Bright.] Do you know whether that is the opinion of English conveyancers, with regard to Irish titles?—I do not; but I am sure that the English conveyancers do not understand the matter; they do not know the law in Ireland, and I do not think they are competent to give an opinion upon the point." It is one of this class who is sent over to administer the law of titles in Ireland!!! For my own part, I rather think the witness judged the English lawyers harshly, and I am satisfied, in Mr. Hargreave's instance, that he is too conscientious to accept an appointment, if he had not a knowledge of his profession; but in this I can agree with Dr. Longfield, that the English practice differs in some respects from ours, and that there are questions of daily occurrence, particularly with reference to searches and judgments, with which they are by no means familiar, and that an English conveyancer will have much to learn before he can make himself familiar with the titles and practice of this country as connected with them. Now the junior Commissioner Nay, without speaking of his judgments will his should have been precisely the one most familiar appointment be calculated to inspire that public with both; on him will devolve very probably the confidence which is so desirable to invite incum-reference to take accounts, and ascertain priorities; brancers and owners to make trial of a new and untried tribunal, where the claims of the one, and the rights of both may be dealt with in a manner they know not of, and according to the unlimited discretion of the commissioners? Lord John Russell was frequently asked to state the names of the proposed commissioners, and he postponed his answer until Parliament rose. His Government passed a measure constituting a court which can override the established tribunals of the country-even the Court of Chancery itself—a circumstance never previously known in legislation in which is vested the determination of questions that may affect half the properties of this country, and the adjudication of rights of the utmost magnitude and the most extreme importance. Was it too much to expect that the Crown should have chosen judiciously, should have chosen men calculated from professional reputation to create confidence in their decisions? Most assuredly the Government should not have so outrageously shocked professional and public opinion by the selection of an English conveyancer of five years standing, who, however respectable his and the preliminary training of an Equity lawyer would have been an important advantage, if not an essential, in the future Commissioner. His legal education should not be completed at the expense of the public; his ephemeral existence should have been one marked with the fulness of life, and with nothing of the incipient stage. A court of a limited existence, which will commence proceedings at once should at least possess Heads intimately acquainted with the people and the country, of whose properties they were to take the disposal; a knowledge of the charac ter of the solicitors who were to practise before them would have been desirable; and the junior Commissioner, who will be the auctioneer of his brethren, should of the three be precisely the one best acquainted with the mode of transacting business in this country. Never, in the history of judicial appointments, was there a graver error, on public grounds; never on professional, a deeper insult to the Irish Bar. It is true that there used to exist a practice of appointing an English lawyer to be an Irish Chancellor. These appointments were-inasmuch as there was no reciprocity-unjust towards a bar composed of as distinguished lawyers as ever adorned Westminster Hall. They were felt to be unjust by the Whig government, and the appointment of the present Chancellor was looked upon as an earnest that the practice would never again be repeated. It had, however, as an apology, though not an excuse, this argument, that the judges sent here were men who had been long before the public, whose fame had built itself secure upon the discriminating judgment of the profession before whom they practised, and who could best test their merits; they were men who stood out prominently, and who deserved judicial elevation, and I, for one, should never desire an absolute rule of exclusion. If there were a fair interchange of judges between the two countries, I should rejoice at the introduction of reciprocal appointments; but there was no reciprocity in the case. Your readers will remember that when one of the greatest lawyers of the Irish Bar, one of the most eloquent members of the British senate, whose name sheds a lustre on our profession -when Lord Plunket was nominated to the high office of the Master of the Rolls in England, the Bar of that country were so strong as to procure the withdrawal of that appointment. That bar rejected Lord Plunket-we need not say how great a man they rejected-and are we, members of the Irish Bar, so degraded, that we must accept every gentleman of the English Bar that the government may choose to nominate to our offices? Members of the Irish Bar, this should not be. The Bar of the richer country has not only appointments at home, which she altogether monopolizes, but ap pointments in every quarter of the habitable globe, which she almost monopolizes, to your exclusion; within her own metropolis she has courts of justice, which give to her members occupation much more extensive and varied than you can ever hope to have, and rewards infinitely more dazzling than you can ever realize in your more restricted sphere; and yet, not content with her monopoly, she would now rob you of the poor prize which is justly yours! I advocate a principle-I will not depreciate an individual; had Mr. Hargreave actually attained the reputation which I feel satisfied he will yet acquire, (though I should prefer its attainment in his own arena), I should still state my objections, on public grounds, to his appointment. I, at least, feel that I have done my duty in my endeavour to evoke somewhat of professional, but much more of national feeling. If we have not the spirit to assert our rights, we deserve our degradation. Members of the Irish Bar, you should be up and stirring; it is time to put a stop to this system of things-it is time, high time, that you should be insulted no longer, at least that you should not submit to this insult tamely. The English Bar would not have "our foremost man"-will you have one who, without disparagement, cannot be as competent as hundreds of yourselves? A. HOUSE OF COMMONS. RECEIVER COommittee. Right Hon. T. B. C. Smith.-June 28. 1003. That bill goes the whole length of abol ishing, after the 31st of December next, the right of judgment creditors applying for receivers?—Yes, no doubt you will thereby remedy the existing evil; but the question is, whether you do not leave the tenant open to an evil which is not quite so great, but which I have endeavoured to explain, namely, of proceedings by elegit creditors one after the other; you might have half a dozen judgment creditors, the one proceeding against the other, rendering it impossible for the tenant to know to whom he was to pay his rent. By Mr. Pigot's act, the party is enabled to take the whole of the land instead of the moiety. 1004. In what court would that elegit process be instituted ?-In a court of common law; and I have to make this observation that it may not be misunderstood; the effect of repealing or modifying to a certain extent, or altogether, Sir Michael O'Loghlen's act, and Mr. Pigot's act so far as it amends it, would be to diminish the number of cases in which proceedings would be taken against land; and therefore benefit would be gained by the modification of Sir Michael O'Loghlen's act. 1007. Supposing receivers to remain the same, would you not think that there should be a limit in point of time, before which no judgment creditor should be entitled to apply for a receiver ?—I have no doubt that that would be an important alteration. 1008. Would a year be a fair time to fix ?I would not allow a party the day after he had obtained judgment to apply for a receiver, without giving his debtor proper time to realise a fund with a view to pay him off; I should say a year, by analogy to proceedings in a plenary suit, would be a fair time. 1009. We have had Sir Edward Sugden before us, and he has expressed an opinion that, considering the extent to which the law regulating judg ments has been carried both in England and in Ireland, it would be inexpedient now to go back and to entirely abolish the effect of judgments in Ireland as the common assurance, or materially to interfere with the present practice, both as respects the appointment of receivers and the operation of judg ments in affecting the property to its full extent as it now affects it; but he has suggested that instead of going the whole length of the government bill, which has lately been introduced, a line of demarcation should be drawn with respect to the amount, and that no judgment creditor prospectively, for a debt under £100, should be entitled, under any circumstances, or at any time, to apply for a receiver ?--I should entertain a very strong opinion, that to that extent, at all events, it would be desirable to go. 1010. Mr. R. B. Osborne.] Do you think £100 is high enough?--I should say not; I would rather go higher than that. 1011. Sir J. Graham.] Supposing the principle were admitted that there should be a line of demarcation between smaller debts and larger debts, as you fixed your minimum high, you would restrict the operation of judgments quoad receivers ? -I certainly consider that the Legislature has a right to qualify the rights of creditors, to the extent to which those rights are detrimental to the public at large; and I consider that one of the greatest grievances existing in Ireland, is the extent to which property is now under the Court of Chan cery. 1012. Do you think that the shock to public opinion, by going the length of the proposal by government, and entailing the consequences of throwing partjes back upon their common law remedies, would be great?-I believe the government propose to prevent judgments being assignable in future. I confess I am disposed to agree in that, and for this reason, I think it is rather desirable to make judgments cease to be a common assurance in Ireland. I know there is this advantage arising out of their being a common assurance, that you can purchase upon a sheet of paper a printed form of bond and warrant of attorney, which almost any one can fill up without the help of a barrister or an attorney at all, and so far there is a benefit in it. But on the other hand, the very facility of obtaining that security works injuriously. The man who signs his name to that document, very rarely knows the extent to which he involves himself; and I think he would very often pause before he would execute a mortgage, when he would have very little difficulty in signing his name to the document. 1013. As relates to the limit in point of time, you would agree with Sir Edward Sugden, that the period of a year should be fixed by act of Parliament, before a receiver should be applied for ?I think it would be reasonable that if a person proceeded within a year, he should be left to his common law remedy. 1014. Would you prefer the government measure, which provides that judgments shall not be assignable, and that after the 31st of December next, no judgment creditor shall be entitled to apply to the court for a receiver, or would you prefer Sir Edward Sugden's proposition, that judgments should continue assignable, but that no judgment creditor should apply for a receiver until 12 months elapsed, and that a line should be drawn with reference to the amount; and that no receiver should be appointed for property under a certain amount, but that the law should remain unchanged with respect to all judgments above that amount ?—It is a difficult question to answer what would be the comparative effect of the two plans; but if I were at liberty to give an indirect answer to the question, I would say that I should like to have a compound of both. I should be disposed to repeal the Act which authorises the assigning of judgments, and try for the present the modified remedy that is proposed by Sir Edward Sugden, of preventing any person from obtaining a receiver unless the judgment exceeded a certain amount. 1015. And you would fix that certain amount somewhat higher than £100?—I think I should. 1016. You think the state of credit, and the feeling of the public mind in Ireland, would bear such an alteration of the law as that?—It is difficult to say that, but one of the reasons why I object to assigning judgments is, that it is made one of the means of accumulating costs. If the Committee were to call upon me to prove what I am now about to state, I could not at the moment give evidence of it, but matters occur before me constantly which lead me to suspect the existence of facts which I could not positively prove; my belief is that attornies themselves get judgments assigned to some friend, and then issue a scire facias to revive the judgment at the suit of this assignee, and costs are accumulated to the extent of that assignment; and even if the same attorney happened to have the beneficial interest in three or four judgments, if he were inclined to make costs, the course which he would adopt would be this; he would get one of his judgments assigned to A., he would get another judgment assigned to B., a third judgment assigned to C., and a fourth judgment assigned to D.; and he would present a petition to appoint a receiver at the suit of the first party, he would present another petitition to extend the receiver at the suit of the second, a third petition to extend the receiver at the suit of the third, and a fourth petition to extend the receiver at the suit of the fourth; and the decision of the court is given in ignorance and doubt whether those assignments are bonâ fide, or whether they are not made merely for the purpose of accumulating costs. 1020. What would be the effect of making the law of assigment in Ireland identical with the law of assignment limited as it is in England?—It would be calculated to check the course which is adopted of making judgments a common assurance. At present it is a most usual thing in Ireland to assign a judgment upon marriage; and parties assign judgments just as they assign mortgages in England; in England judgments are considered as securities which are not to remain outstanding, but in Ireland it is quite the contrary; they are considered as securities which are to remain outstanding. 1021. Considering how long that practice has obtained under the sanction of the law in Ireland, and the delicate state of credit in that country, would you be afraid of altering the law of assigning judgments in that country?-There is no doubt that the proceeding ought to be taken cautiously. I am rather stating my opinion in the abstract, than with reference to the exact time at which the measure should be adopted. 1022. What Sir Edward Sugden has stated is, that with regard to his limited plan restricting the appointment of receivers to judgments of a certain specified amount, and to allowing a year of grace, this is the particular moment when the change should be made; do you concur in that opinion?—The opinion I entertain is this, if the measures now in contemplation should be effectual to get property out of Chancery, I think it is most desirable if possible to prevent property getting back again into Chancery; and of course any measure that diminishes the number of applications for receivers will be a beneficial measure. 1023. And it will be wise to make the change at this moment? That is a difficult question to answer. 1084. Chairman.] You observe that the Government Bill abolishes the operation of judgments prospectively? Yes. 1085. Do not you apprehend that there would be some confusion as to the point at which the new law would come into operation, from the system of continuing judgments by means of revivors ?-There is no doubt it would be inconvenient to have a class of judgments before a certain date assignable, and a class of judgments after a certain date unassignable; but I think that the law would be shortly understood; and the fact is this, that there is only at this moment a certain class of judgments assignable; you cannot assign every judgment; that point was brought under the consideration of an English court in the case of O'Callaghan v. Marchioness Thomond, (in 3rd Taunton's Reports.) The assignee of an Irish judgment sued in the Common Pleas in England upon the judgment, and the question was raised before the Judges in that Court, as to whether the Act of Parliament authorised the assignment of judgments generally, or only the assignment of a particular class of judgments; and it was decided, and the reasons for that appear very satisfactory, that it did not authorise the assigment of judgments generally, but that the Act applied only to the case of a conusor and conusee, not to the case of recoveror and recoveree; that a judgment was assignable where it was a common assurance, but that an ordinary judgment recovered in an adverse suit is not assignable. Therefore there are at present two classes of judgments as to which the law varies, and I do not know that it would be productive of any great inconvenience. 1086. A law drawing a distinction between different classes of judgments, would not in your opinion embarrass the proceedings or be productive of inconvenience?—It might; but I think the object to be attained is to prevent judgments being continued as the common assurance; I should drive a party to have a mortgage; I think he will hesitate before he signs a mortgage, but he will not hesitate before he signs a warrant of attorney. Court of Chancery?-It has so happened. But I 1090. Might not the equitable jurisdiction of the Court of Exchequer be abolished, and would not that diminish expense ?- Considering the quantity of business in the Master's Office, and that I make at present 1,700 more orders in the year than were made 10 years ago, if you were to give the Lord Chancellor and myself the whole of the equity busi ness, I much doubt whether the business would not get into arrear. 1096. What, according to your knowledge, is the present class of receivers ?—I cannot perhaps answer that question positively; but I must say, from the cases which have come before myself, that I do not think that proper persons have been ap pointed; I have found, for example, in different cases that have come before me, that solicitors have been appointed receivers, and I highly disapprove of solicitors being appointed receivers. 1087. You think it would be wise to make the security of judgments unpopular?—Yes; I should like to have a judgment in Ireland a security that was sought to be recovered as quickly as one could, and not a security to remain outstanding for ever. I may mention a case which has occurred within the last twelve months in the Court of Chancery, and at the Rolls Court, which will exemplify the inconvenience of judgments remaining outstanding. A party has obtained a decision of bad title in his favour which I was obliged to pronounce, and which the Lord Chancellor has confirmed, in consequence 1098. Sir Edward Sugden stated to the Com of the existence of a judgment of the year 1738, mittee that there was an absolute rule of court prowhich has remained outstanding on the estate ever hibiting the appointment of solicitors as receivers? since; that is 110 years ago, and upon which in--Sir Edward Sugden was under a misapprehension terest has been paid. 1088. Mr. R. Osborne.] You stated that there were cases where two receivers were placed over different parts of a debtor's estate, the one appointed by the Court of Exchequer, and the other by the upon that point. It has been decided that a solici tor, if he be a party in the cause, cannot be ap pointed receiver, but a solicitor unconnected with the cause may be appointed receiver, as far as any order or rule of court is concerned. I have stated D my opinion often, that a solicitor ought not to be appointed receiver; but I think it right to state that my opinion has not had much effect, because one of the Masters has pronounced a very elaborate judgment in favour of appointing solicitors receivers, and it is a common practice to appoint a solicitor to be a receiver. 1099. Mr. R. B. Osborne.] Then the rule governing the Court is not the same in all cases?No. Some of the Masters do not think it a disqualification. 1101. Then there is no order against an attorney being appointed a receiver?-None that I am aware of. I may observe that the Court of Exchequer, after Sir Edward Sugden's order, adopted an order very nearly in the words of this order; the present Lord Chancellor having been Lord Chief Baron at the time; but they had inserted the additional words: "no solicitor for any party in the cause;" and impliedly it was to be inferred from that, that a solicitor who was not solicitor for a party in the cause, was not a disqualified person. 1105. Sir J. Graham.] Is there anything wanting in that order of Sir Edward Sugden with respect to receivers if it were only made quite clear that no solicitor should be appointed a receiver? -I think there is nothing whatever; it might be worth while for the Members of the Committee to read the judgment of Sir E. Sugden which arose on that very order in the case in re Stokes, in 1st Jones and Latouche's Reports, p. 175; so anxious were the solicitors to put a narrow construction upon this order, that one of the solicitors got the clerk of an attorney, who was not his own clerk, appointed receiver, and there being an application to Sir Edward Sugden to set aside the appointment of this clerk, there were actually three counsel employed before Sir Edward Sugden, one of whom happens to be a member of this Committee, Mr. Keogh, Serjeant Warren, and some other gentleman, to insist that this order disqualified only the clerk of the particular solicitor; but Sir Edward Sugden had no difficulty in expressing an opinion, and he pronounced an excellent judgment, as all his judgments are, pointing out the evil that this order was intended to remedy, and that it applied to the system which had existed of trafficking in receiverships and actually selling the office; and this general order he held to apply to the clerks of all receivers. 1106. I asked you if the addition of the prohibition of attorneys would make that order perfect, and you, as I understood you, said it would not; what is the other addition?—I do not think any addition will make it absolutely perfect; there will always be a determination to evade it. 1107. Then you would say that the appointment of receivers was an incurable evil?-I do not see that that necessarily follows; but so long as you leave the appointment of receivers to the nomination of any solicitor in the cause, you will, I think, have a bad class of receivers appointed. 1108. If receivers are to be appointed under any circumstances by judgment creditors, what is the plan which you think, with your experience, would be less open to abuse; you being of opinion that that order is imperfect, and that the prohibition of 1110. Are you aware that Sir Edward Sugden's order, prohibiting the appointment of clerks of solicitors as receivers, has been evaded?—I have not heard of it since 1844; but I should not have the slightest hesitation, if a case of that kind came before me, in punishing the solicitor severely by fixing the costs upon him personally; and I think it singular if it has occurred. 1111 When you say that there has been a system of trafficking in receivers, what do you mean by that? That system existed at the time Sir Edward Sugden made this order, as appears by the judgment I have just referred to, and I think the practice continues, as a case occurred before me in which it came to light, that when the receiver was appointed by the solicitor in the cause, there was an agreement that the solicitor should not only have his own costs of the application for the receiver and the further costs in the matter, but should pocket a certain portion of the poundage, and in point of fact he did pocket a certain portion of the poundage. I made an order that he should disgorge the whole of that and pay it into court, with six per cent. interest; but though no other cases of that kind occurred before me, I have reason to believe that such cases exist. 1115. You would not say, from your experience, that an attorney was a person qualified to manage landed property?-I should say most decidedly not. That is not merely my own opinion, but I can refer to a high authority in a case reported in 15th Vesey, junior. An application was made to Lord Eldon that a person who was appointed a receiver, he being a practising barrister and a Member of the House of Commons, should be removed. The power of the Court in making the master review his report in respect to the appointment of a receiver, is very slowly exercised. But Lord Eldon expressed a strong opinion that the duties of a Member of Parliament and a practising barrister were inconsistent with his devoting proper time, independently of anything else, to the management of an estate; and without deciding that a Member of Parliament or a practising barrister was necessarily disqualified, he made an order directing the Master to reconsider his report. 1116. In your opinion ought not the receiver to reside upon the estate, if it is of any magnitude?— I have no doubt that he ought to reside upon the estate, and to be in the habit of seeing every property upon the estate every week of his life. 1120. Sir J. Graham.] Sir Edward Sugden was asked two questions, which I will read to you (Nos. 495 and 496): "But for property which, after you shall have abated the quantity of it by your legislative interference," (that was according to the plan which he had sketched to the Committee)," shall still be under the managment of the Court, you do not think that anything can be done, with respect to the appointment of receivers?" Sir Edward's answer was, "Not by legislation; I think the head |