the fund, and he has, after deducting them, three weeks to invest the balance appearing on his account. By the time the creditor applies for that balance if he be in a position to do so-by having a decree, or an undisputed priority, we are under the mark in fixing a year and nine months from the period of filing the bill until he touches a shilling of interest, the arrears of which have thus swelled to two years and nine months. This, we say, is the ordinary practice of the court. We are quite aware that the present Master of the Rolls, to mitigate this evil, in cases where the right is clear, makes prospective orders on receivers to pay moneys as they come to their hands, but in the majority of cases, such orders are not made, or capable of being made; and if made, in some degree may be baffled by the receiver, as it cannot be tested that he has money in his hands until his account be passed. of Chancery does not do for the creditor one-half that it might. It may, after much delay, give him back his talent, but it has not made anything of it during the time it has been retained in pledge. It has never been stated with sufficient prominence, that no person, or class of persons, is benefitted by the present system of judicial estate management, except, it may be, the few solicitors who are concerned for receivers. Not the creditor, at least not to the extent he might be for it is not enough for him that the court should be a judicial pound to keep property safe, it should also improve or enhance its value during the period of its custody. An estate is taken from a proprietor by a creditor, and transferred for safe keeping to a locum tenens, which should be omnipotent, and yet is impotent. Admitting that there may be required for the creditor an auxiliary for the recovery of his debt, safe and sure; but in guarding his interests, those of others must not be sacrificed, and, above all, not sacrificed without benefitting him. Law expenses entailed by the present mode of management, and a deteriorated ference to the owner. Neither of these things are beneficial to the creditor; they are, on the contrary, detrimental, as they diminish the value of his security; and thus, without enriching him, the owner is made poor indeed. These are the consequences which the creditor never anticipated— never wished for when he sought the assistance of the court, and are equally prejudicial to him as to every one else. Now, we pause here to re-state our proposition, that the creditor is not benefitted as he might be by the jurisdiction of the court, which, let it be observed, has been set in motion by and for him; he receives his money slowly, expensively, and unsatis-estate, are the consequences of Chancery interfactorily, one year and nine months from the time he sought the aid of the court. During this long interval he gets no interest upon interest; he is out of his money, he can turn to no profitable purpose that fund which he might have made reproductive for himself, and with benefit to the country, and which the court does not render fructifying either for him or any one else, except it may be the receiver, who is precisely the only person for whose interest no responsibility devolves upon it. Thus the creditor and the country suffer alike. We have restricted our observations to the economic view of the question, but the social ills, the family sufferings which are entailed by postponed payments are incalculable and grievous. "Bis dat qui cito dat," has never been the motto of a Court of Equity. Now we have shewn a mischief which is obviously capable of amendment-so far as the preliminary steps necessary to place the property under the control of the court are concerned, the acceleration of them may be accomplished without the interference of the legislature, by new general orders which the Chancellor and Master of the Rolls have power, from time to time, to make; but for the due management of the property now under its care, the assistance of the legislature is requisite. There is no difficulty in having officers of the court to receive the rents, and have them invested so as to fructify from the moment of their collection. We refrain, at present, from entering into further detail on this branch of the subject, not from the inability or difficulty of doing so, but because we do not think it right to forestall a carefully organized plan which has been prepared by a competent hand, and which will be laid before a committee of the House of Commons, so soon as it has been appointed to examine into the whole system of Chancery estate management. Our readers must concur with us, that even so far as the creditor is concerned, our premise and our conclusion were correct, when we stated that the Court We have already pointed out the evil effects of the system on owner, occupier, and country, but we shall again return to the subject, and state further facts. FEW questions, in practice, have led to so many nice and subtle distinctions as those relative to the production of documents on interlocutory applications. We have been led to the consideration of the subject, both by the number of the cases and the conflict of authority; some judges leaning to dis. covery, and others to privilege and protection. The number of cases occurring in England is almost amazing, occasioned, in some degree, by the non-existence of a general registry, discovery is more difficult, and accordingly more pressed for by the plaintiff, and more surely resisted by the defendant than in this country. It was the observation of a celebrated popular writer, that half the miseries of the world spring from foolish mysteries; and the remark holds with as much truth in the legal as in any other world. The unnecessary desire for concealment, the studied disingenuousness of legal documents, are productive of much litigation. For our own part, we are much more disposed to acquiesce in the soundness of the views of Lord Langdale, than in those of any of his brethren who dissent from him. He considers the object of a Court of Equity to be, to enforce discovery by the confession of the defendant, on his oath, and therefore believing the plaintiff entitled to the fullest information, he will not allow it to be withheld by an answer, which, half confessing, half denied, (to use his own language) he considers the answer "should lay naked the heart of the defendant." A difference of opinion exists between the Irish Chancellor and Master of the Rolls on one branch of this subject. Whether a party having a sole present right to the possession of title deeds, and admitting, by his answer, their possession, materiality, and relevancy, can yet refuse to produce them, on the ground of absent parties having an interest in them, the object of the suit affecting those absent parties. The case to which we allude is that of Dundas v. Blake (9 I. E. R. 640; 10 ib. 260), where however, the point was made at the argument, and not raised by the defendants in the pleadings. The material facts are short. The bill was filed to carry into execution the trusts of a will, and to raise the amount of a mortgage and judgment, which were barred by the Statute of Limitations, and only existed under the trust. (It has been since held, that they were not saved from the operation of the statute, ante, p. 121). One of the defendants derived under the will, the property having been appointed to him under a power, and on his marriage it was settled on him for life, remainder to his children, as he should appoint; and, in default, to all the children of the marriage, as tenants in tail in common. The eldest son, who was a minor, was made a defendant, the plaintiffs alleging he was sole tenant in tail, and the bill charged that the deed of appointment and marriage settlement were made subject to the trusts of the will. The defendants, husband and wife, admitted the possession of both deeds, partly set them out in the answer, introducing particulars in which they varied from the statements in the bill, stating the interest of the other minors under the settlement, and referred to them for greater certainty; and, in short, made no stand whatever upon the interrogatory, either on the ground of the minor defendants being absent parties, or for any other reason. His honour ordered the production of the deed of appointment, considering that to be the sole title of the father, but refused to compel production of the marriage settlement, the minors not being parties to the suit, and having an interest in it. The defendants appealed, and the plaintiff's cross appealed, and the Chancellor ordered the production of both deeds. It is observable that many elements contributed to assist the plaintiffs, unqualified admissions, relevancy, materiality, ownership, possession, and the power to produce. His Honour, however, thought that a door might be opened to fraud, if a fishing bill could be put on the file, and holes picked in the title of absent parties. But it was urged with considerable force, and relied on by the Chancellor in his judgment, that the very suggestion of there being absent parties, arose from the defendant's statement of the deed, that might be true, or it might be false; the deed itself could alone test the fact, it was referred to for the truth of that statement, by the defend ant's, and so long as Hardman and Ellames* continued law, that reference incorporated it with the answer, and made its production compulsory. As to opening the door for fraud, it might be, and we believe was observed, that it would be a reproach to the efficiency of a Court of Equity, to allow a tenant for life to have the uncontrolled dominion over the title-deeds of his property, to bring them into the market, for the purpose of borrowing money, to make every imaginable use of them, if he pleased, to post them on the walls of the court; and yet be enabled to screen himself from discovery, on the allegation of an absent party having an interest in them, he would then be allowed to use them for self-interest and withhold them for his own, and not the purposes of justice. That whether the suit affected the inheritance or not was immaterial, the injury would be the same to the remainderman, if it only affected the lifeestate, and production was enforced, the information once obtained, could be used ever after. The argument might be put thus. If you limit the relief you seek, to the person before the court, the plaintiff is either entitled to discovery from that person, or he is not. If he be, as he unquestionably must be from the admission in the answer, if the defendant alone be considered; is a Court of Equity to throw her shield over that defendant to the prejudice of the plaintiff, to guard against what may be but an imaginary danger; and if she does not throw that shield the discovery once obtained, the mischief is done so far as remaindermen are concerned, and it is wholly immaterial what the object of the suit be, if the distinction be drawn; that in suits affecting the interest of the tenant for life, merely production will be enforced, where there is an admission in the answer, or the other elements exist, on which Courts of Equity act; but that such production will not be enforced when the suit affects both the interest of the tenant for life and remaindermen, the latter class not being before the court. How easy evasion is the rule. What can be more facile, than to draw the bill against the tenant for life in the first instance, obtain discovery from him, and then amend the bill, and virtually affect the inheritance? the rule would be as idle, as the one which renders a bill of discovery demurrable, if it pray relief. In practice, the latter rule, leads to no other result than this, that when discovery is obtained, the bill is changed into a bill for relief, it has lost indeed, its primary name, but it has answered its purpose. If, however, the rule be, that even where relief be sought only against the tenant for life, the plaintiff is not entitled to discovery of the title deeds, because the interests of remainder-men may be re In a very recent case, M'Intosh v. The Great Western Railway (13 Jur. 179), Lord Cottenham restated the ground of his judgment in Hardman v. Ellames. "If a party refers then refers to it, he cannot afterwards tell the plaintiff that to a document, and sets out a part of the document, and he shall not see the document, because you are not bound to take the defendant's representation of the document. If he uses it for any purpose, he must enable the plaintiff to see that he uses it for a proper purpose, or whether it is not more beneficial to the plaintiff, than the defendant thinks proper to admit." motely affected thereby, the result will be, that in no case can discovery, or its consequence, relief, be obtained from a tenant for life, as he can always shelter himself from production under the plea of absent parties, even though the information has no reference whatever to the inheritance-the ground of refusal being, that the disclosures in the deeds, though admittedly material to the plaintiff, may, on some other occasion, be used prejudicially to the rights of others. You may have justice on your side now, but in aiding you I may by possibility disclose to you a secret by which you may commit a fraud hereafter. justice, and to be in accordance with several Jet The point will probably be not considered quite settled, and the question will be more fairly raised when the defendant takes his stand upon the interrogatory, and relies upon the absence of minors as a ground of defence. This was not done in Dundas v. Blake, and unquestionably, in some degree, the decision of the Chancellor turned upon that ground, but we believe, also, on the broader view which we have endeavoured to put On which side, then, would the balance of in-forward. convenience lie? Obviously, in our judgment, in refusing production. In the affairs of mankind, a priori it must be assumed that plaintiffs come into a court of equity for legitimate ends, for its assistance in enforcing just demands-that was one of the designs of its institution-one of the purposes for which it was established. The refusal of discovery goes on the opposite supposition, as it assumes that plaintiff's come for improper purposes, and aid is denied them, because they may by possibility use it differ. ently from what they profess to do; in other words, they may abuse it. But so may mankind deal with every object of nature or of art, every institution human or divine; it is plain this argument is untenable. And be. sides, it is much more probable that the defendant, who desires concealment, has some sinister motive for secresy, than the plaintiff who would do away with foolish mysteries. The rule of enforcing production is a salutary one; to be extensively useful it should be clear, and explicit, and capable of easy and general ap. plication; the fewer distinctions that hover round it the better for justice. In the case before us, the refusal of the deed of settlement was a question of time; by amending the bill and bringing the minors before the court, we apprehend the objection of his honour would have been removed; and if production could have been enforced then, and if the deed must have been produced at the hearing, cui bono to the minors in postponing production? The case also was clearly distinguishable from those where trustees hold possession of deeds for others, or where there was a joint present possession, the joint owner not being before the court; though in these later cases, such as Taylor v. Rundell (1 Cr. & Ph. 104,) and Murray v. Walter, (ib. 111), the distinctions are rather too fine, and in every case where possession is coupled with the power of production, the safer rule would, we think, be to enforce it, always assuming there to be materiality and relevancy in the document, an admission in the answer, and that it is not protected from the circumstance of its being privileged as a professional confidential communication, relating to the subject matter of dispute. In the case of Murphy v. Balfe, which came before his honour at the sittings after last Term, and is not yet reported, he expressed himself as still adhering to the view which he entertained in the case of Dundas v. Blake, which he believed to have been decided on the plainest principles of (Continued from p. 160.) An act for further regulating the money order department [31st August, 1848.] of the Post-office. Sec. 1. 2. No money orders granted under recited act to conti uue in force longer than twelve months; and lia bility of Postmaster General to pay such orders to cease, except in certain cases, with consent of trea sury. Treasury may, by warrant, alter period fixed for payment of money orders, Power to Postmaster General to make regulations relating to money orders. master Generai to cease. 3. Power to Postmaster General to refund amount of money orders. After repayment liabilities of Post Penalty on officers of Post-office issuing money orders with fraudulent intent. 4. 5. In indictments it shall be sufficient to name "Her Majesty's Postmaster General." 6. As to warrants of the Treasury. 7. Printed copies of the London Gazette to be evidence. 8. Act to be deemed a Post-office act. 9. Act may be amended, &c. Whereas by the 3 & 4 Vict. c. 96, it is enacted, that 'the mode of transmitting small sums of money through 'the Post-office, might have continuance so long as the 'commissioners of Her Majesty's treasury should see fit: and whereas it is expedient to make further provisions as to money orders granted or issued by the Post-office: be it enacted, that no money orders heretofore by virtue of the said regulations, or of the said act, shall continue in force for a longer period than twelve months from the pass. ing of this act; and that after the expiration of that period all liability to pay such orders by the postmaster general, provided, that the postmaster general may pay any such or of any officer of the Post-office, shall cease and determine: money orders in special cases after such period shall have expired: provided, that the commissioners of Her Majesty's treasury, at any time or times hereafter, may alter the period hereby fixed for the payment of money orders, and may fix any other period for the payment of the same, such alteration not to commence or be in force until after the expiration of three calendar months after due notice of the proposed alteration shall have been given in the London Gazette. 2. That the postmaster general, may make any regulations relating to money orders, and to the payment thereof, and to the persons by or to whom the same shall be paid, and to the times at which and the mode in which the same shall be paid, as the said postmaster general, shall see fit, and from time to time, to alter or repeal any such regulations or restrictions, and make and establish any new or other regu lations; and that all such regulations shall be binding, as well upon the persons to whom such money orders have been or shall be granted, and the payees thereof, and all persons claiming under them, and all other persons, as upon all officers of the Post-office; and all such regulations shall have the same force as if the same had been and were contained int his act; and that no action, or suit, at law or in equity shall be instituted, in any court or before any judge or justice, against the postmaster general or against any officer of the post office, or against any other person in consequence of the making of any such regulations, or of any compliance therewith, or otherwise in relation to any such regulations, or in consequence of the payment of any such money orders being refused or delayed by or on account of any accidental neglect, omission, or mistake by or on the part of any officer of the Post-office, or for any other cause, without fraud or wilful misbehaviour on the part of any such officer of the Post-office, any law, statute, or usage to the contrary in anywise notwithstanding. 3. That the postmaster general at any time hereafter may refund the amount of any money orders either heretofore granted or issued or to be hereafter granted or issued to the person or persons to whom the same have been or shall or may be so granted or issued, or his, her, or their executors or administrators, whether such money orders shall remain or be in the possession of such person or persons or not; and after any such repayment or refunding as aforesaid all liability by or on the part of the postmaster general, or of any officer of the Post-office or of the Post-office revenue, for or in sespect of such money orders or of the granting or issuing of the same, or of the repayment or refunding the amount thereof, shall, as against the payees of such money orders and the holders thereof, and all other persons cease and determine. 4. That every officer of the Post-office who shall grant or issue any money order with a fraudulent intent shall in England and Ireland be guilty of felony, and in Scotland of a high crime and offence, and shall, either be transported beyond the seas for the term of seven years or be imprisoned for any term not exceeding three years. 5. And for the more effectual prosecution of offenders be it enacted, that in any indictment for any felony or misdeameanor committed or attempted to be committed in, upon, or with respect to the Post-office or the Post-office revenue, or in, upon, or with respect to any property, monies, money orders, goods, chattels, or effects under the management or control of the postmaster general, or where any act, matter, or thing shall have been done by any person with or for any malicious, or fraudulent design, relating to or concerning the Post-office or the Post-office! revenue, or any such property, monies, money orders, goods, chattels, or effects as aforesaid, or the postmaster general, it shall be sufficient to lay any such property in, and to state or allege the same to belong to, and to state or allege any such act, matter, or thing to have been done or committed with intent to injure or defraud "Her Majesty's postmaster general;" and in all indictments relating to or in any wise concerning the department of the Post-office it shall be sufficient to name and describe the postmaster general as "Her Majesty's postmaster general," without any further or other name, or addition. 6. That whenever the warrant of the commissioners of Her Majesty's treasury is required by this act, such warrant may be under the hands of the commissioners of Her Majesty's treasury, or any three of them; and that whenever the order, consent, authority, or direction of the commissioners of Her Majesty's treasury is prescribed by this act, such order, consent, authority, or direction (not being by warrant) may be signified either under the hands of the commissioners of Her Majesty's treasury, or any three of them, or under the hand of one of their secretaries or assistant secretaries. 7. That any copy of the London Gazette, printed and published by the person or persons having authority to print and publish the same, shall be admitted as evidence by all courts, judges, justices, and others in any part of Her Majesty's dominions of any treasury warrant and of any regulations or restrictions which shall be issued under this act, and contained in any such gazette, and of the due issuing thereof, and of the contents of any such warrant regulations, or restrictions. Vict. c. 96, so far as they are inconsistent with the con text. 9. That this act may be amended or repealed by any act Au act to continue for two years, and to the end of the then Sec. 1. 2. Constables with warrant may enter and search houses, and seize papers and arms, &c. 3. Duration of act. 'Whereas acts were passed in the 50 Geo. 3, c. 102, 4 'Geo. 4, c. 87, 2 & 3 Vict. c. 74, 7 & 8 Vict. c. 78, 8 & '9 Vict. c. 55, and it is expedient that the act of the 2 & 3 Vict. c. 74, should be continued and amended as hereinafter provided,' be it therefore enacted in this present parliament assembled that the last-mentioned act shall be and continue in full force and effect from the passing of this act for the further period of two years. · 2. That if information upon oath shall be given to any justice of the peace in Ireland, that there is cause for believing that any society or societies within the meaning of the said acts or any of them is or are held, or is or are about to be held, or that any persons are met or assembled, or are about to meet or assemble, for treasonable or seditious purposes, or for the discussion of treasonable or seditious purposes, in any house, building, or any other place, such justice may issue his warrant to any county-inspector, sub-inspector, or head constable, empowering him to enter any such house, building, or other place, and to remain in such house, building, or other place, for so long a time as he may think fit, and to seize all books, papers, and writings which shall appear to afford evidence of the holding or of the existence of any such society or societies, or of any treasonable or seditious purposes and objects, and all arms and ammunition of every description, that may be found in such house, building, or other place, and to search all parts of such house, building, or other place, for the purpose of discovering the same; and such county-inspector, sub-inspector, or head constable, with such constables and other persons as he shall deem necessary for that purpose, may enter such house, building, or other place, and, if need be, to use force, whether by breaking open doors or otherwise, and to remain with such constables and other persons in such house building or other place for so long a time as he shall think fit, and to seize all such books, papers, and writings, and all arms and ammunition of every description whatsoever, that may be found in such house, room, building, or other place, and to search all parts of such house, building, or other place for the purpose of discovering the same. 3. That this act shall continue in force from the passing thereof for two years, and until the end of the then next session of parliament. CAP. XC. An act to regulate the times of payment of rates and taxes by parliamentary electors. [31st August, 1848.] CAP. XCI. An act to make provision for the payment of parish debts the audit of parochial and union accounts, and the allowance of certain charges therein, [31st August, 1848.] CAP. XCII. An act for the protection and improvement of the salmon, 8. That this act shall be deemed and taken to be a Post- in this act shall be construed according to the respective interpretations contained in the said act passed in the 3 & 4 missioners for the purposes of this act. acts and this act construed as one act. Recited 2. Two existing inspectors of fisheries to be inspecting 3. Commissioners for executing this act to divide Ireland 6. Owners of several fisheries of a certain value to be 8. All engines, nets, &c. for salmon and trout fishing, &c. to be licensed and pay an annual duty. 9. Persons who have paid licence duty entitled to vote 11. First meetings of persons paying licence duty for the 13. Power to board of conservators, after the year 1819, 14. Board of conservators, when constituted, to fix times and places of meetings. 15. In case of failure of any electoral divisions to elect, the conservators of other divisions shall act for the district. 16. On failure of election of any conservators, the former board to act. 17. Quorum of board of conservators. Chairman to have a casting vote. 18. How meetings of board of conservators are to be called. 19. Board of conservators at the annual meetings to nominate treasurer, clerk, inspectors, and water bailiffs. 20. Conservators may apply funds of district towards providing passes for fish through natural and artificial obstructions. 21. For engines, nets, &c. not enumerated in schedule, licences, before the formation of the boards, to be fixed by commissioners, afterwards by the board of conservators. Saving as to rods not used for salmon. 22. Penalty on using engines, nets, &c. without licence. Forfeitures to be applied to the funds of the district. Recovery of forfeitures and penalties. 23. All several fisheries to be subject to an annual rate according to valuation. 24. Last-mentioned rate recoverable before justices as 25. Valuation of such fisheries. 29. Penalty on persons using or having engines, nets, &c. 30. Licences how sold. 39. Defining powers of commissioners to alter close seasons. In case commissioners alter close seasons, notice to be given of the same. 40. Alteration of close season in certain rivers above tideways. 41. Penalty for killing or taking fish in or from several 42. Minimum of penalties in certain cases. Whereas an act was passed in the 5 & 6 Vict. c. 106, of fisheries appointed under the provisions of the said acts 2. That after the passing of this act the two inspectors shall be denominated and shall, during the pleasure of the commissioners of Her Majesty's treasury, be inspecting commissioners of fisheries, and shall be associated with the commissioners of public works in Ireland, and with them be commissioners for the execution of the said acts and this act; and in the case of any vacancy in the office of the said inspecting commissioners, or either of them, by death, resignation, or dismissal, the commissioners of Her Ma jesty's treasury from time to time to appoint in the room of each such inspecting commissioners so dying, resigning, or being dismissed, another inspecting commissioner of fisheries, who shall be associated with the said commissioners of public works in like manner; and the said commissioners of Her Majesty's treasury shall be empowered to fix such salaries for any such inspecting commissioners as they shall think fit; and such inspecting commissioners of fisheries shall and may, for the purposes of the said recited acts and this act, have, use, and exercise all and every the like powers and authorities and have like privileges as are by the said recited acts or any of them vested in or given to the said commissioners of public works, and all and every the powers and authorities in and by the said recited acts and this act given to or vested in the said commissioners of public works, or which under this act may be used by or be vested in such inspecting commissioners of other-fisheries, may be exercised by the said commissioners of public works, or by such inspecting commissioners of fisheries, or by any one or more of them. 31. Licences to be sold to all persons demanding to pur- 36. Appointment of officers not subject to stamp duty. conservators. 3. That the said commissioners shall, before the end of this present year, or at any time afterwards, as they may find it expedient, divide Ireland and the sea-coast and islands thereof into districts, and shall cause the said districts to be defined and described by suitable notices and maps for that purpose; and each such district shall embrace one or more river or rivers, or lake or lakes, with the tributaries thereof, which are frequented by salmon, trout, or pollen, or fish of the salmon kind, or eels, together with such portions of the sea-coast and islands adjacent thereto as shall be described by such maps; and the said commis |