in June-an advanced period of the session; and whilst the Receiver Committee was sitting, it adopted the ideas, and carried out the views of the witnesses from whom we have quoted. Thus judgments were to be no longer assignable, no longer a charge upon land from the time of entry, only from the time of taking it in execution. This was a bold change, and coming from the law officer of the Crown, indorsed with his name, that of Lord John Russell, and Sir William Somerville, should have been a well advised one. The very day before its introduction-if we remember rightly-Sir Edward Sugden gave his evidence before the Receiver Committee; it was very masterly evidence, and much attention was naturally directed to it. Though fully alive to the evils, connected with the law of judgments, his knowledge of their magnitude made him cautious as to the remedy. He is asked "You have said that, whether wisely or not, we have gone too far in establishing the effect of judgments in both countries to recede. Having given that answer generally, what would you say to a revision of the law in Ireland, especially with respect to judgments being made assignable, and the effect of Sir Michael O'Loghlen's act more particularly?—I think it would not be advisable to take away the power of assigning judgments, though it may be open to abuse, because now judgments have become almost as universal as bills of exchange. I can imagine now a small tradesman getting a judgment for a mere household debt, and then assigning it to another person in order to avoid the odium of getting a receiver over his customer's property. I think that not at all desirable, but that is the custom of the country generally. It is very desirable, in my opinion, that the law of Ireland should be altered in this respect; it might, perhaps, be considered a strong measure to take away receivers upon petitions altogether; but I should have no hesitation, if I had the power, in very much limiting the operation of the Sheriffs' act, and the subsequent acts, and in placing judgments in Ireland more upon the footing on which they stand in England; for example, if I had the power, I should not hesitate to limit the amount of money for which a judgment should bind the property, so as to give a right to a receiver under those acts; that is, I would take some reasonable sum as a proper subject for a judgment and receiver, considering the expense attending such a proceeding; but as regards smaller sums, I would leave the creditor to his common law remedies, and to that credit upon which he no doubt relied when he furnished the matters in his trade. If that line were drawn, and another provision introduced into the law, that no judgment creditor should have a receiver until after a certain period from the time of his obtaining a judgment, I think the evil would be very much struck at, without alarming, which one would be very unwilling to do, the people in Ireland at the change in a law which they seem to be very much attached to." These were Sir Edward Sugden's suggestions; he coincided also in the expediency of allowing the costs of appointing or extending a receiver, to be paid in the priority of the judgment, and not to be the first charge on the fund. The Master of the Rolls was examined on the 28th of June, and he is asked-" Would you prefer the government measure, which provides that judg ments shall not be assignable, and that after the 31st December next, no judgment creditor shall be entitled to apply to the court for a receiver, or would you prefer Sir E. Sugden's proposition, that judg ments should continue assignable, but that no judgment creditor should apply for a receiver until 12 months elapsed, and that a line should be drawn with reference to the amount; and that no receiver should be appointed for property under a certain amount, but that the law should remain unchanged with respect to all judgments above that amount?-It is a difficult question to answer what would be the comparative effect of the two plans; but if I were at liberty to give an indirect answer to the question, I would say that I should like to have a compound of both. I should be disposed to repeal the Act which authorises the assigning of judgments, and try for the present the modified remedy that is proposed by Sir Edward Sugden, of preventing any person from obtaining a receiver unless the judgment exceeded a certain amount." The Solicitor-general must have thought this a most happy suggestion-a safe middle course; it enabled him to retain one of the original features of his bill, and retaining that he could afford to alter the rest, so as to harmonise with the views of Sir Edward Sugden. Edward Sugden. And, accordingly, on the 13th of July, he brought in an amended bill without a word of explanation; it adopted the £150 range, and he ultimately introduced the clause which gave the year of grace, and placed the costs of appointing a receiver in the same priority as the debt. Thus at the fag-end of the session the bill was entirely changed, and sent up to the House of Lords where it had not time to be discussed; and so it passed. That this is the true history of the measure, is obvious, and surely this hasty and feeble spirit of legislation by an English lawyer on an essentially Irish subject is not the spirit or the manner in which legislation should be conducted. However, the Irish Bar deserve that it should be so, when the practice is allowed to exist of entrusting Irish Government legislation to English Law-officers. Of the measure itself we shall at present write but little; all the changes that we advocated have been effected, and but one that we opposed has been made-we preferred the former law to that which prohibits the legal assignment of judgments. With this exception its main features represent our views, but we asked for a little delay, that the measure might be duly considered, that it might accompany a change in the system of receivers, and that its blemishes-the necessary result of precipitancy might be removed. We regret for the sake of the country that delay was not granted. With a little more care the Act could have been rendered more explicit. In point of phraseology nothing can be more awkward than the second section. The judgments to which the Act is applicable is nowhere defined, and are left to implication except the following can be considered a definition: "And the judgments to which under this Act the provisions of the said Acts of the 6th of Wm. 4, and 4th of her Majesty, shall not extend or be applicable, are hereinafter referred to as judgments, subject to the provisions of this Act." Must it ever be that our glorious language becomes confused and inexplicit when applied to the wording of Acts of Parliament ? HOUSE OF COMMONS. RECEIVER COMMITTEE, 1250. And to be binding upon the purchaser or upou any other party?—Yes, because it would be open to the owner, if the Master chooses to let it at an under value, to come to the Court, and complain of the letting. 1251. You have pointed out already that it is not a fixed term of seven years, or during lis pendens, but that it is terminable whenever the estate is sold ? -Yes; in consequence of that, questions have arisen in court, as to the right to what are called emblements. At common law, if a person holds for a term uncertain, determinable by the act of God, he is entitled to the crop. I remember arguing the case, and succeeding in establishing that that principle ought to be applied to a lease for seven years, pending the cause; and that if the purchaser went in when there was a crop standing, he ought to give the tenant the crop; and that has been acted upon. 1252. Would it be necessary by legislation to give the Court the power, or is it within the jurisdiction of the Court to grant longer leases?—I think it should be done by legislation. It is very difficult to draw the line, as to the power of the Lord Chancellor in making general orders; but when there is a complete change in the system, I think the Lord Chancellor has a right to the sanction of Parliament, and ought not to be subject to observations as to his introducing novelties never heard of before. 1254. Did not Sir Edward Sugden's new Rule of 1254. Did not Sir Edward Sugden's new Rule of Court give the power of distress to the receiver upon five months, arrear of rent?—Yes, there is a general order upon that point. 1255. Has that order worked well or ill?--I do not see any objection to the order; it is the general custom in Ireland that the tenantry should pay their rent one half year within the other, and the object of fixing five months was a sort of recognition of that. A receiver cannot distrain until five months have elapsed, without the order of the Master; but the general order expressly provides that if he applies to the Master and shows any particular circumstances which will make it appear that he ought to distrain immediately, he may obtain power to distrain. 1256. We have been told that the five months' grace has allowed time for the midnight flight of the tenant? If the receiver was to do his duty properly and was resident, he could give some hint to the Master, which would lead the Master to order an immediate distress. 1257. You would not recommend any alteration in the order in that respect?—No, I think it is sufficient as it stands. 1258. Mr. R. B. Osborne.] The receiver communicates with the attorney and he makes a state. ment of facts?—Yes, that is one of the objections of the present system; and if there were a Master of Receivers, one of the advantages to be derived from that would be, that the costs would be enormously decreased. If you had such an officer in Dublin, the business ought not to be done by attorneys, but by local receivers communicating with the head officer in Dublin; and if you had the intervention of attorneys it would be desirable to place them on salaries, by which you might diminish the expense thousands of pounds. 1259. Sir. J. Graham.] An objection has been urged against the law in Ireland with respect to not distraining growing crops; have you formed an opinion upon that subject?-I formed an opinion at the time the Bill was prepared. 1260. How has it worked?-I am against the system of distraining growing crops; I cannot say how it has worked, but at times there were very oppressive uses inade of that power. It was very much the custom to place keepers on properties when the crop was getting ripe, and oppressive use was made of the power of distraining; upon the whole, I am disposed to think that the law was rightly altered. all law proceedings should be taken in the name of 1261. Chairman.] Do you think it desirable that the receiver, in order to get rid of all the difficulties about demises; in fact, that he should represent all parties in legal proceedings?—Yes, I see no objec tion to that. 1262. A great deal of difficulty now arises from that cause?—Yes. William Tighe Hamilton, Esq.-June 29, 1849. 1263. Chairman.] What office do you hold in the Court of Exchequer in Ireland?—The office of Second Remembrancer. 1267. The Chief and Second Remembrancers discharge analagous duties on the equity side of the Exchequer to what the Masters do in the Court of Chancery?-Precisely; with this difference, that certain heads of business are done by the one and certain heads by the other, and not a certain quantity of all the different kinds by one, and a certain quantity of all the different kinds by the other, as in the Court of Chancery. What I mean is this, that the Chief Remembrancer disposes of all references in causes, and the Second Remembrancer disposes of all references in petition matters, audits the receivers' accounts, and taxes all costs; so that I have three heads of duties, and he has one; but of course the one head of business which he discharges is a far more important one than the three heads which I discharge. 1268. In your position of Second Remembrancer system of the management of estates under receivers ? have you had ample opportunities of judging of the I have; for I have audited all the receivers accounts for the last five years, and done all acts necessary with respect to the management of the es tates. 1269. The estates under the Court of Exchequer are all cases of creditors' receivers ?-All cases of creditors, except where a minor happens to be incidentally interested. There are some instances in which a minor is proceeded against where he has a joint interest with some one else. 1271. Can you give the Committee any idea of the whole amount of property with reference to the rental under the Court of Exchequer?-The only way in which I can arrive at that is by the Parliamentary Return made, I think, in 1847, of the amount in the Courts of Exchequer and Chancery. 1272. You can give nothing but what appears upon the Return ?-Nothing more, except by esti mate and my own observation of what goes on. 1273. Can you say about what the amount is ?— I think by the return it was about £160,000. But there is a great number of accounts both in the Exchequer and in Chancery, more I think in the Ex. chequer than in Chancery, which have not hitherto been passed annually, and with regard to some of which there has been a very long lapse of time; for instance, I have within the last month passed several accounts which have been standing over for several years, and one which never had been audited for nine years. 1274. Receivers' accounts?-Receivers' accounts. The consequence of that is that the Parliamentary Return must be to a certain extent defective; but by the nearest estimate I can make out, allowing for that, I should say there was perhaps £180,000 a year in the Exchequer; and by a similar process of reasoning, founded upon the same Parliamentary Return, I think the quantity in Chancery is about £640,000. 1275. But you find it very difficult to ascertain the amount from those returns?-Very difficult; because some of the returns are very inaccurate. BAYLEY ON BILLS OF EXCHANGE. SUMMARY of the Law of Bills of Exchange, Cash Bills, COMMENTARIES on the Law of SURETYSHIP, and STANFIELD'S PRECEDENTS IN CONVEYANCING, A COLLECTION of Copyhold PRECEDENTS IN CONVEYANCING, arranged for general and ordinary use, to gether with Introductory Treatises upon the various transactions, and occurrences incident to Estates of customary tenure, &c. By JOHN F. STANFIELD, Esq. 1 vol. 8vo. 12s, UESTIONS FOR LAW STUDENTS on the Second QUEdition of Mr. Serjeant Stephen's New Commentaries on the tand of England. By JAMES STEPHEN, Esq. of the Middle Temple, Bar. rister-at-Law. I vol. 8vo. cloth boards, price 10s. 6d. CONCISE FORMS OF WILLS, with Practical Notes. By W. HAYES and T. JARMAN. 4th Edition, cloth bds, 15. THE LAW OF HUSBAND AND WIFE. A Treatise on the Law of Husband and Wife as respects Property, partly founded upon Roper's Treatise, and comprising Jacobs' Notes and Additions thereto, By J. E. WRIGHT, Esq. of the Inner Temple, Barrister-at-Law. 2 vols, royal 8vo. £2 10s boards. 1276. They only give those estates where the receiver has accounted?—Yes; those two together A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF LEGACIES. By will make a total amount in the two courts of £800,000. Then from the enormous rate at which receivers have been latterly appointed and none discharged, I should say that it would be a very fair estimate to say, that the amount now under the two courts is a million. 1277. That is creditors' receivers ?-That is creditors' receivers, as distinguished from lunatics and minors. 1279. Has the amount been increasing very rapidly of late?-It has. As an instance of that I may mention that it appears by the books that we keep in the Chief Remembrancer's office and in my office, that for the last five years, the average number of receivers appointed by the Chief Remembrancer in causes from the 1st of January to the 1st of June was 8; this year it has been 32. Then in matters which are in my department, I find that whereas I used for the last five years to appoint an average of 12, I have this year appointed 31. 1280. That is in judgment matters ?—In judg ment matters. 1282. Are they generally judgments above £100 or under?—I should say decidedly the average are under £100. 1283. Is there any means, in appointing receivers in those small cases, of testing the fitness of the person to be a receiver?-Very little. It appears to the late R. S. DONNISON ROPER, Esq., Barrister-at-Law, of Gray's.inn; and by H. H. WHITE, Esq., Barrister-at-Law, of the Mid. dle Temple. Fourth Edition. 2 vols, royal 8vo. £3 3s, boards. A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, as administered in England and Ireland; with Illustrations from the American and other Foreign Laws. By JOHN PITI TAYLOR, Eq. of the Middle Temple, Barrister.at.Law. 2 vols, royal 8vo. £210, A SELECTION OF LEADING CASES IN Various Branches of the Law, with Notes. By JOHN WILLIAM SMITH, Esq.. of the Inner Temple, Barrister-at-Law. Third Edition. Ry HS KEATING. Esq, and JAMES S. WILLES, Esq., of the Inner Temple Barristers at-Law. 2 vols., royal 8vo. £2 12s. 6d. A 12mo, price 2s. 6d.-by Post, 38. TREATISE ON THE LAW OF INTERPLEADER, containing all the Reported Cases in this Country and in England; with an Appendix, containing the Act 9 & 10 Vic. c. 64, with Forms of Affidavits, Rules, Orders, and the Record on a Feigned Issue. By Jour BLACKHAM, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. EDWARD J. MILLIKEN, LAW BOOKSELLER AND All communications for the IRISH JURIST are to be left, addressed to the Editor, with the Publisher, E. J. MILLIKEN, 15, COLLEGE GREEN. Correspondents will please give the Name and Address, as the columns of the paper cannot be occupied with answers to Anonymous Communications nor will the Editor be accountable for the return of Manuscripts, &c. Orders for the IRISH JURIST left with E. J. MILLIKEN, 15, COL LEGE GREEN, or by letter (post.paid), will ensure its punctual delivery in Dublin, or its being forwarded to the Country, by Post, on the day of publication. TERMS OF SUBSCRIPTION-(payable in advance): Yearly, 30s. Half-yearly, 17s. Quarterly, 98. Printed by THOMAS ISAAC WHITE, at his Printing Office, No. 45, FLEET STREET, in the Parish of St. Andrew, and published at 15 COLLEGE GREEN, in same Parish, by EDWARD JOHNSTON MILLIKEN, residing at the same place, all being in the County of the City of Dublin. Saturday, September 8, 1849. Erish Jurist No. 46.-VOL. I. SEPTEMBER 15, 1849. (Per Annum, £1 10s. PRICE [Single Number, 9d. The Names of the Gentlemen who favour THE IRISH JURIST with Reports in the several Courts of Law and Equity in Ireland, are as follows: OUR columns of last week and this contain the first parts of a Digest of all the cases reported in our Irish Courts of Law since the commencement of the Irish Law Reports. It has been a work of very considerable labour, but, being so very desirable, we trust that it will prove acceptable to our professional brethren. The multiplication of cases, without any attempt at their classification, is a source of great labour to the industrious lawyer, and not calculated to be useful, except they be susceptible of arrangement. One circumstance that has much impeded our progress, has arisen from the difficulty of finding a proper heading under which to place cases of very difficult definition. We have, however, we hope, reduced chaos into order; and will present to the Irish Bar a work, which has not been attempted since Mr. Archer's Digest. Next year we shall give a Digest of all our reported cases in Courts of Equity; and thus, having brought down our compilation to the period of publication, each volume will contain the Digest of the cases reported in Ireland during the then current year; and we shall then have more than redeemed the promise which we made to our readers, in our first number, of presenting them with an Index of the cases of each year. We cannot refuse admission to the following letter -We are by no means so enamoured of our jury system as our correspondent appears to suppose; we should, however, suggest to him, that he should study a little more minutely the details of the Exchequer of Pleas, in- ( CHAS. H. HEMPHILL, Esq., and cluding Manor Court risters-at-Law. and Registry Appeals. WILLIAM HICKSON, Esq., BarCommon Pleas ........HAMNEY, Esq. Barristers-at-law. ROBERT GRIFFIN, Esq. and W. G. ROBERT GRIFFIN, Esq. and W.G. Admiralty Court......CHAMNEY, Esq. Barristers-at-law. French and Scotch systems before he pronounces so unhesitatingly in their favour. It is a singular feature in our criminal jurisprudence, that in all questions of fact, the verdict of a jury is irreversible, though the right to the possession of a single acre of land may be untested frequently; but, when once the verdict of guilty has been recorded, there is no appeal. Does not this circumstance afford a powerful argument against any change in our present system and prove that the evidence should be so clear, as to convince even the most obtuse, of the guilt of the accused? The individual sufferings which our correspondent has endured, we regret for his sake, and we quite agree with him that it is a barbarous notion to starve a jury into a verdict on this point, a change is very desirable. The instances of misconduct in English juries, to which he refers, he is probably not aware are punishable. Juries should not be starved; and they should, if guilty of misconduct, be punished. So long as the great bulk of the people of England acquiesce in requiring unanimity, we think the existing law should be suffered to remain. SIR, To the Editor of the Irish Jurist. Though I am no lawyer,-your courtesy will, perhaps, allow me the privilege of occupying a page or two in the Irish Jurist, when I inform you that I have had no little experience in some of the details of law, and more especially in the working of our jury system. It has been my misfortune to have been locked up in cold winter nights, on three or four occasions, and to have been frequently associated with men whose avowed partizanship, or obstinacy in unintentional error, has baffled the ends of justice, and occasioned extreme annoyance to those of the jury who have formed contrary judgments. Assuming, Sir, that you will permit one of your of a lock-up, or the fancied discredit of an absolute lay readers to address to you a few observations on a point which involves no legal technicalities, or intricate embarrassments, and only relates to a matter which unprofessional men like myself may be supposed to understand, and in which they have a personal concern, I shall, as briefly as possible, state my point. It is this: Does the English law, which requires the entire unanimity of juries in giving verdicts, effect the objects of justice so surely as the jury laws of Scotland or of France? I think, Sir, that it does not. Perhaps it may not be superfluous for me to assume in limine that I am not an advocate for hazardous or crotchetty innovations; our judicial system has worked admirably in its grand movements; the main pivots upon which it revolves are perfect, and the aphorism-Nolumus leges Anglia mutari-is revered by me, but with qualification as to details; these in innumerable instances, require remodification. Prejudice alone can blind thinking men, so that they cannot perceive that the ever progressive state of society requires continued modification of the laws which are to regulate its concordant movements. Dare I hint to you, Sir, the heretical in sinuation as you may indignantly deem it-that the working of that great fundamental law of the British constitution, trial by jury, is not perfect in its organization; that it wants a little oiling, and a little screwing, to make it move more effectively? What! you will possibly exclaim, Touch the palladium under which we have maintained our liberty for nine centuries. disagreement. I can vouch for the fact that verdicts in England have been returned by a jury who have allowed them to be decided by the toss-up of a shil ling. I would put it to the calm deliberation of any person familiar with the management of juries in cases of a party nature, whether the grand conside ration be not, "Who are on the jury?" "A. B.C. are good men and true, but D. would rather chew the leather of his boots for luncheon, dinner, and supper during a week than find the traverser guilty." Now, Sir, I respectfully urge that no ground should be left for such observations; and I say farther that society ought not to be satisfied with a system which involves at least the possibility of maneuvering in order to select the individuals who are to compose a jury. Such manoeuvering arises from the law which requires unanimity; where there is manoeuvering the fountain of justice is corrupted. No society ought to be content with the results of trial by jury unless all men who are legally and morally eligible to act as jurors be called to dis charge their function according to the exact order of their names on the lists, without any selection whatever, but subject to challenge. At present, even the most upright and impartial sheriff will be an object of confidence to one party, and of suspicion to the other, where the issue of the trial materially affects the interests, or agitates the passions of the antagonist sides. But why, it may be said, should a change be necessary now in the jury system, when we have, in the classes from which jurors are usually chosen, Bear with me a moment. I am still smarting in more independence of mind than was to be found imagination from the long wearisome sittings I have in former times, when our forefathers were satisfied undergone in jury rooms; craving from the hunger with the system? I might, perhaps reply, that the I have endured; suffering-sympathetically-from modern spirit of independence has become, in many the nausea, the misery of sleeplessness, the cold, instances, egotistical obstinacy, or an independence noise, senseless babbling, and angry disputation of the opinion of judge or brother jurors. A juror I have suffered during an imprisonment of twenty-feels that no judge can compel him to agree with four hours, and all this without the satisfaction of his fellows in a verdict; there is now no Jefferies recording an honest verdict, though eleven out of twelve of the jury were decidedly agreed in opinion! This is not an extreme case. The records of Irish trials furnish several instances in which justice has been frustrated by the determination of one jurorunencumbered by conscience, or, it may be, with out understanding-who will not permit a just verdict to be returned. There have been jurors without regard for the moral obligation of an oath, and there will be such. nor Scroggs to imprison him for contumacy, or to gratify his rancour or malignity, or subserve the purposes of an arbitrary sovereign; there is no rod in terrorem over him-he is free to think and act as he chooses; he enjoys real liberty, and though he cannot stifle the expression of public opinion if he be known wilfully to frustrate the ends of justice by his perverseness, or want of honesty or of courage, he may snap his fingers at the judge's charge, his fellow-jurors, and the public, and say It may be said, that though cases occur in Ireland sic volo with sovereign contempt for them all. But in which jurors occasionally forswear themselves, does this independence exist in fact? Are jurors or delude themselves through some quackery of con- never slaves to influence on the one hand, nor to science, and illegitimate compromise between a cor- fear on the other? Have the terms pig-headed, rect judgment on the one side and the tendencies of perverse, obstinate, boot-eater, become obsolete? party on the other, no such abuse of the jury system Are our jurors so far advanced in intellect, that a occurs in England. This I deny to be fact. I know modification of the jury laws, which might have that the trial by jury is not unfrequently nullified in been desirable in more uneducated and arbitrary England by the pig-headedness of a single juror-ages is not essential now? Methinks they order rarely indeed from political or sectarian influences, but from that deficiency of intellect and obliquity of moral perception by which jurymen, like other men, are sometimes distinguished. I know that a minority of three or four out of twelve have persuaded the majority to concur in a verdict contrary to their own opinions, in order to avoid the tedium these things better in France and in Scotland. In neither country is unanimity required. The assassin, murderer, or slanderer, does not there evade the penalty of his crime because a dissentient voice may cry out in his favour, even though his guilt may be clear as the noon day. I have not the life of Sir Samuel Romilly within |