bill to have had notice of all the dealings between Crofts and Lane, and the clause in the deed, appointing a receiver, extends to all incumbrances; this shews that Lane has an interest in the mortgage deed, and the bill also charges that the three deeds were obtained for the purpose of having Lane paid his claims. It is unnecessary to cite authorities in support of the first proposition. The second proposition is supported by (Story, Eq. P. 271,) (Mitford, 211, note,) Campbell v. Mackey, (1 M. & Cr. 614); Attorney-General v. Cradock, (3 M. & Cr. 95); Attorney-General v. Parr, (8 C. & F. 433); Lund v. Blanchard, (4 Hare, 9); Lewis v. Morgan, (5 Price, 42). It is the object of this court to prevent multiplicity of suits. As to the objection of the relief prayed being inconsistent, the bill does not pray that the mortgage should be set aside altogether, but only so far as the plaintiff is concerned, and merely is alternative in the relief it seeks.

Green, Q.C, same side. The prayer of the bill is not the only criterion of multifariousness, you must also look to the statements in the bill, and see whether they make a consistent case against all the parties, and give a unity of case against all. The pleader is often involved in a dilemma between multiplicity and defectiveness. [He cited Brown v. Douglas, (11 Sim. 283); Addison v. Walker, (4 Y. & C. 442).] The accounts between Lane and Crofts are charged by the bill to have been mixed up with the mortgage accounts, and he contended that those accounts were so mixed up, that, under the authorities, the case was inseparable.

28th of February, 1844, may be declared fraudulent and void, and set aside, so far as it seeks to charge the sum of £2,550 on the estate in remainder of the plaintiff, the plaintiff foregoing any advantage which he might derive under the disentailing deed. The second part prays that if the court should not think fit to set aside the deed of mortgage, that the three policies of insurance for £1,000, £1,200, and £350, might be kept up for the benefit of the plaintiff, out of the rents and profits of the real estates, to indemnify him against the said charge of £2,550. The third part prays that it might be declared that the said Richard Lane, George James Allman, and Elizabeth Lane, being in receipt of the rents, were bound to keep down the head rents and interest of charges affecting the inheritance, and were bound to pay same before payment of any part thereof to the said George Crofts, and that they are bound to account for all rents received by them, and may be decreed to pay all arrears of head rent and interest upon the charges. The fourth part prays that an account might be taken of the sum due to James Lane, as a collateral security for which the judgment of the 23rd November, 1846, was obtained, and that the bills of costs of said James Lane, mentioned in the accounts, might be taxed. It is to be observed that no direct relief is prayed against James Lane, unless what is stated in the fourth part. To this bill a demurrer has been taken by the defendant, James Lane-first, that it does not appear that he is interested in the matters contained in the original bill, and is not a necessary party to any cross bill filed thereto; secondly, for multifariousness; thirdly, want of priority. A demurrer has also been taken by the other defendants-first, for multifariousness; secondly, that J. Lane appears to be a material witness; thirdly, that the present bill is not a proper subject for a cross bill. I shall, with respect to J. Lane, in the first place, consider the demurrer on the ground of multifariousness. From the statements in the bill, it appears that upon the marriage of George Crofts a settlement was executed, bearing date the 1st of April, 1815, by which the estate was limited in tail, or quasi tail, upon the first and other sons of the marriage, subject to certain charges, and a power was given to George Crofts to appoint the estates to any one or more younger sons. The plaintiff was the eldest son. That in the year 1842 James Lane, who was solicitor for George Crofts, entered into an agreement that certain moneys which were to be procured by James Lane were to be charged upon the estate in remainder of the plaintiff that J. Lane applied to G. J. Allman, R. Lane, and E. Lane for the

Lane, Q.C. in reply.-There is no relief prayed against Lane in respect of the case made against the mortgage, and it is necessary to pray relief against a party who is brought before the court, and even costs are not prayed against Lane. Le Texier v. Margravine of Anspach, (15 Ves. 164); Beadle v. Burch, (10 Sim. 338); Roddy v. Wil liams (3 Jones & La. 1); Fenwick v. Read, (1 Merivale, 114). There is no case of cestui que trust made against Lane, he is called agent and solicitor through the whole bill. The case as to the mortgagees is somewhat different, the bill is objectionable as to them, in seeking to keep them before the court while accounts are being taken between Lane and Crofts as to their dealings relative to transactions in which the mortgagees are in no way interested. Benson v. Hadfield, (5 Bev. 554); Pearse v. Hewitt, (7 Sim. 471. As to its not being a proper subject for a cross bill, (Story, E. P. s. 401). As to inconsistent relief, Mole v. Smith, (1 Jacob, 490); Howe v. Best, (5 Mad. 19). Suppose Lane were to join the mortgagees in a bill to raise the amount of the mortgage, could there be a doubt that the bill would be demur-money-that any sums advanced by these parties rable?

was with full notice of this agreement-that the Jan. 12 MASTER of the Rolls.-The original plaintiff was under age when this agreement was bill was filed on the 27th of September, 1847, by entered into, and attained age only three months George James Allman and others, against Christo- before the deed of mortgage was executed-that pher Crofts, George Crofts, and others, and prays he was unacquainted with his rights-that J. Lane for a foreclosure and sale of certain lands contained furnished accounts to G. Crofts, shewing sums due in a mortgage of the year 1844. The second bill to himself that J. Lane was solicitor for Allman was in chief part a cross bill filed by Christopher in all these matters-that there was no other soliCrofts; its prayer may be divided into four parts-citor-that the deeds were not read by plaintiff the first prays that the deed of mortgage of the and that the sums raised were charged exclusively on

the estate of plaintiff, which was not in any way liable thereto. The bill then sets out the disentailing deed, and the deed of mortgage of 1844, which contained a covenant that J. Lane was to be receiver over the lands, and was to have £5 per cent. poundage fees; it also provides for the appointment of a new receiver, in case of necessity, and the rents were to be applied in payment of head rents, interest on the mortgage money, and the residue of the payment of fees and expenses was to be paid to George Crofts for life, and after his death to the plaintiff; it also provided that the costs of all necessary proceedings were to be paid out of the rents, and that George Crofts should be liable to pay the interest only of the sum advanced. The third deed is then set out, which related to the policies of insurance. The bill then charges that the three deeds were procured by the said J. Lane for the purpose of securing payment of £2,550 that they were never read to plaintiff, and that he was unaware the disentailing deed contained a clause releasing the power of appointment in favour of younger children, and contains a statement that the rents were mismanaged by J. Lane. It was contended by the plaintiff that the plaintiffs in the original cause are, in fact, trustees for James Lane, and that the money advanced was his altogether, or chiefly so. But I consider there is no foundation for this argument. By the third account, J. Lane debited himself with the entire amount of the mortgage, and it does not appear that he advanced any part of the consideration for the mortgage; it is not once positively so stated in the whole cross bill. It is contended, further, that the entire transaction is fraudulent, but no relief, not even to make him liable to costs, is prayed against J. Lane, Beadles v. Burch (10 Sim. 332); Roddy v. Williams (3 Jon. & Lat.; Mitford Pleading, 4th ed. 189); and there is no provision in the deeds entitling him to any provision out of the inheritance. Therefore, in this bill, which relates to the inheritance, he is not properly made a defendant, nor is his interest as agent sufficient to render him a necessary party, Finder v. Stephens (2 Phil. 147). I am of opinion, therefore, that the bill is multifarious, J. Lane being brought as defendant upon a record, with a great part of which he is not connected. Campbell v. Mackay is decided on the principle that there is a common interest in all the plaintiffs, and all the defendants were interested in all the questions raised, and were accounting parties. It is not necessary for me to give any opinion upon the other grounds of demurrer, but a serious question arises, whether the bill is not objectionable on the ground of misjoinder, but it is not necessary to decide that question. As to the other demurrer, I am of opinion that it also should be allowed. The defendants, the mortgagees, had no concern with a great part of the bill; Attorney-General v. Poole. I shall allow the demurrer with costs. Allow the demurrer with costs, and let the bill stand dismissed as against the defendants, James Lane, George James Allman, Richard Lane, and Elizabeth Lane, with costs.-Lib. 20, fol. 59.

BRABAZON V. LORD LUCAN. Ecclesiastical Lease-Perpetuity-PurchaseRenewal Leases-Interest.

The immediate lessee of an ecclesiastical lease pur-
chasing the perpetuity under the 3 & 4 Wm. 4,
c. 37, is entitled to interest on the renewal fines
payable by the sub-tenant.

In this case-
-the facts of which will be found fally
reported in 9 I. E. R. 441-Lord Lucan, being
possessed of certain lands under a lease from the
see of Tuam, demised same to Sir Wm. Brabazon,
with a toties quoties covenant for renewal; on the
28th of September, 1837, Lord Lucan having ob-
tained a conveyance of the fee under the Church
Temporalities Acts, by order, bearing date the
30th day of June, 1846, it was referred to the
Master to inquire and report what sum was due,
by the representatives of Sir Wm. Brabazon, for
interest, upon their proportion of the purchase
money; and, also, what was due for rent and
arrears, and fines and fees for renewal, and if
interest was customarily paid and payable on such
fines for renewal, and also what was due and pay-
able for such interest and such fines, and to settle a
proper deed of conveyance. Upon appeal before
the Lord Chancellor, on the 23rd of December,
1846, this order was varied, so far as it directed a
reference to ascertain the interest due upon the
purchase money. On the 24th of June, 1848, the
Master made his report, and thereby found that
there was due, for rent and arrears of rent, by the
petitioners to the respondent, £793 16s. 10d. for
fines for renewal, £2,269 11s. 104d. The report
then proceeded as follows:-" And having regard
to that part of said order of reference by which I
am directed to inquire and report whether interest
had been customarily paid upon such renewal fines,
no evidence has been offered to me by either party;
but, being under the impression that in all similar
cases it has been the habit of Courts of Equity in
Ireland to allow such interest, I have made my cal
culation on the supposition that, in the absence of
express evidence of any local custom, interest
ought to be paid upon fines for renewal of leases
of the lands and premises." To this report the
petitioner excepted that the Master ought not to
have found that there was due to the respondent
the sum of £770 10s. 4d. for interest on the renewal
fines, because interest was not payable upon same,
nor was the Master authorised by the order of
reference to compute or allow interest thereon,
unless he should find that interest had been cus-
tomarily paid on such fines; and it appeared by
the report there was not any evidence laid before
the said Master to shew or prove that interest had
been customarily paid on such fines.

Sergeant O'Brien for the exceptions.-There was no evidence given before the Master that it was customary to pay interest on the renewal fines, and to renew is silent upon that point, and there is no he ought not to have so found. Also the covenant specific time limited within which the renewals must be taken out. This is not the case where the tenant is obliged to come into a Court of Equity for relief, but the statute 6 & 7 Wm. 4, c. 90, sec. 1, enables him to obtain a renewal upon terms

which do not include payment of interest on the fines.

that these statutes are to be considered as one act; and by the first section of the latter statute, an inferior tenant may apply to his immediate landlord for a conveyance of the perpetuity, "provided that such tenant shall previously have paid or tendered to such landlord, &c., such sum as shall be payable for contribution for the purchase money, &c., together with all rent, and fines, and fees for renewal, and all arrears thereof, then due and payable by such tenant, by virtue of such lease or contract." All these statutes are to be considered as one act, and no person is to be entitled to a conveyance unless all fines and arrears of rent are

Nov. 29.-Attorney-General and S. B. Millar for the report. Independently of the act, Sir W. Brabazon, the tenant, upon the renewal of his lease, is bound to pay the renewal fines and interest; and if a bill was filed in a Court of Equity, a renewal would not be decreed unless upon payment of fines and interest. In the case reported in 9 I. E. Rep. 540, the Lord Chancellor was coerced by the Act of Parliament, and did not give interest on the purchase money, which was a new thing created by statute; but by the 141 sec. of the 3 & 4 Wm. 4, cap. 37, before obtaining a convey-paid. On the part of Sir W. Brabazon, it is conance of the perpetuity, a tenant must renew his lease, and all rent and arrears of rent must be paid. Maley, in reply, cited Swanton v. Biggs (Beatty, 240); Revell v. Hussy (2 Ball & B. 280).

Jan. 14.-MASTER OF THE ROLLS.-On the 30th of June, 1846, an order was made in this case, that it be referred to the Master to inquire and report what sum was due by the representatives of Sir W. Brabazon for interest upon the purchase money and rent, and whether interest was customarily paid on the renewal fines contained in the lease of the 13th day of June, 1832, and on the 23rd December, 1846, that order was varied so far as it directed the Master to ascertain the amount of interest payable on the purchase money. The Master, having made his report, finds that there is due, for rent and arrears, £793 16s. 10d.; he then proceeds, that no evidence was brought before him of interest being customarily paid upon renewal fines, but that his impression is, that interest has been allowed in all similar cases by Courts of Equity, and finds accordingly. To this report, exceptions have been taken by James O'Dowd, the surviving trustee of Sir W. Brabazon's representatives, because the Master found that interest was payable on fines, while the Master was not authorised to do so.

The renewal of 1832

recites a payment made by Sir W. Brabazon of renewal fines and interest previously to its execution by the Earl of Lucan, and therefore supplies some evidence, at least, that interest was customarily paid upon the renewal fines. There is no covenant to pay interest upon the renewal fines; for, from the nature of the toties quoties covenant, the renewal was to take place as soon as the lease was obtained, and it became the duty of the inferior tenant to pay his proportion immediately; also, upon looking to the statute 3 & 4 Wm. 4, c. 37, sec. 141, I find it is there directed that "no tenant or lessee, as aforesaid, shall be entitled to have any such conveyance of the fee simple and inheritance, &c., of whose lease if holding by lease for the term of 21 years, 20 years shall not be then unexpired; or for the term of 40 years, 39 years shall not be unexpired; or if holding for 21 years or three lives, or for three lives, and all the lives shall not then be in being, unless he or she shall, previous to the execution of such deed of conveyance, pay all the renewal fines payable for the renewal of such lease, &c., or unless all rent and arrears of rent shall have been fully paid and satisfied." The 30th section of the 4 & 5 Wm. 4, cap. 90, does not contain this provision, but the 6 & 7 Wm. 4, c. 99, sec. 35, enacts

tended that in the case reported in 9 I. E. Rep. the Lord Chancellor decided that interest was not payable on the purchase money, however long payment was delayed. I am of opinion that Sir Wm. Brabazon ought to pay the entire fines with interest, and the statute ought to be construed with reference to what was the practice of Courts of Equity previous to the passing of it; for nothing could be more unjust than that a tenant should, after a considerable time, be at liberty to pay up the fines without any interest. I would not have any difficulty in the present case, were it not for the Lord Chancellor's opinion expressed upon the former case. However, without acting against that decision, I think that interest upon these renewal fines was customarily payable.

Overrule the exceptions with costs, and declare

Lord Lucan entitled to the costs of the reference under the order dated the 30th day of June, 1846, and the costs of this hearing against the surviving petitioner James O'Dowd, and let the deposit be paid over to Lord Lucan, in part payment of said costs, and refer it to one of the Taxing Masters of this court to tax Lib. 20, fo. 52.

same.

This was a bill filed by judgment creditors. The dendant Ware demurred for want of parties, and the plaintiff not having set down the demurrer for argument, it was allowed under the 64th General Order. On the 10th of January, 1848, the plaintiff served notice of motion for liberty to amend the bill by adding parties, and on the 20th of January that motion was refused. The plaintiff afterwards amended the bill on the 9th of May, and served subpoena on the defendant Ware, having first paid him the costs of the demurrer. Ware appeared, but served a notice on the plaintiff that his appearance should not waive the irregularity of the amendment of the bill.

Lawson now moved to take the bill pro confesso against Ware.

R. Longfield, contra.-Under the 64th General | len, in May, 1842, there was an application that Order, the amendment of the bill is irregular, a parliamentary appearance should be set aside, Lautour v. Holcombe (11 Sim. 71; 10 Bea. 256); and it was ordered that the appearance entered on Assignee Cornwall v. Speering, decided in this court, 7th May, 1842.

the 19th of March should be set aside, the defendants not being parties to the suit subsequent to an order of February previous by which the plaintiff's bill had been dismissed for want of prosecution, but the plaintiffs were allowed to amend the bill by bringing these parties on the record. So that where a bill was dismissed for want of prosecution—which is not distinguishable from the case of a demurrer allowed-the parties were afterwards permitted to amend the bill, and enter a parliamentary appearment regular. The effect of this decision is, MASTER OF THE ROLLS. In this case the de- that a bill being dismissed against any defendant fendant, T. Ware, having demurred to the bill, the for want of prosecution, you may bring him again demurrer, not being set down for argument, was on the record by amendment, and may subpoena allowed. In January, 1848, the plaintiff moved against him. I concur with the rule that order for liberty to amend the bill, upon payment of made. There is no difference in principle between costs. That motion was refused. On the 20th of that and the present case, and I will make the May, the plaintiff, notwithstanding, having amended order that the bill be taken pro confesso. his bill, served a subpoena upon the defendant" Declare that plaintiff is entitled to take said bill Ware, who, upon the 2nd of September, 1848, entered an appearance, and no notice has been served of any application to set aside the subpoena. The defendant served notice of the irregularity, but that was not the proper course; he should have moved to set aside the service of subpœna. The time for answering having expired, the plaintiff now moves to take the bill pro confesso. According to the argument of Mr. Ware's counsel, if there were a great number of defendants, and one demurred, if the demurrer be not set down for argument, the plaintiff would be obliged to dismiss the bill as against the rest, although they had all answered. In the case of Cornwall v. Speering,* (which is not reported) decided by Sir. M. O'Logh

Lawson, in reply.-In this case the costs of the suit have been paid, and that distinguishes it from Lautour v. Holcombe. The amendment makes a new record; it is a new bill quoad this defendant; even if the amendment had been irregular, the irregularity has been waived by appearing; for Denny v. O'Connell (1 S. & Sc. 111) shews that it was not necessary to appear, and the notice served by the defendant does not alter the effect of ap-ance, and Sir M. O'Loghlin considered the amendpearing.

In this case Mr. Sergeant Warren moved that the parliamentary appearance entered by the plaintiffs on the 19th day of March, might be set aside, and that all costs incurred by Andrew Speering, Charles Sugrue, and Robert Delacour, since the order of the 10th of February, (by which the bill has been dismissed for want of prosecution) might be paid to the plaintiffs, and it was ordered that the parliamentary appearance entered by the plaintiffs be set aside. "The said defendants not having been made parties to this suit by any proceeding subsequent to the pronouncing of the order of the 10th of February last, by which the bill in this case was dismissed as against them, and it being admitted on the part of the said defendants, that the costs awarded to them by the said order hath been paid, and counsel for the plaintiffs' informing the court that said defendants are decreed to be necessary parties to this suit, it is further ordered that the said plaintiffs be at liberty at any time within 10 days from the date of this order to amend the bill in this cause, by again introducing the names of the said A. Speering, C. Sugrue, and R. Delacour, as defendants, and the said A. Speering, C. Sugrue, and R. Delacour, having appeared on this motion, by J. H. Garde, as their solicitor, it is further ordered that they do, within eight days after service on the said J. H. Garde, their solicitor, of a notice stating that such amendment has been made, and of copies of subpoena to answer said bill, cause appearances to be entered to such subpoena, and that in default of their so doing, the plaintiffs be at liberty to enter appearances

pro confesso as against defendant, Thomas Ware, and counsel for said defendant, Thomas Ware, having applied for time to answer, let the said defendant have three weeks' time to answer; and let him pay plaintiff £5 costs of this motion, and in default of his answer being filed within said period, let the bill be taken pro confesso against him without further order."

QUEEN'S BENCH.-HILARY TERM.

HOLT v. KELLY.-Jan. 15.

In an issue under the Interpleader Act (9 & 10 Vic, c. 64), to try whether a certain deed of assign ment was fraudulent or not, the simple question as to whether it was intended to defeat or delay particular creditors is not a sufficient test of its bona fides. Semble, that it is enough for the party impeaching the deed to shew that it is within section 10 of Car. 1, sess. 2, c. 3, Irish, so as to enable him to make out a prima facie case; and that it then rests with the other party to prove that he is exempted from the operation thereof, and protected by the 14th section of the

same statute.

This was an issue under the Interpleader Act (9 & 10 Vic. c. 64), to try the validity of a certain deed of assignment of stock in trade and other property, and bearing date the 18th of December, 1847, and purporting to be made between Michael Creagh Mangan of the first part, the plaintiff Holt of the second part, and the other creditors of Mangan of the third part. The assignment purported to be for the behoof of such creditors as should execute the deed, or otherwise assent thereto, on or before the 1st of February, 1848. The defendant Kelly was a creditor of Mangan, but never executed or assented to the deed in question. for them pursuant to the statute." The order then directed An agent, named Lees, was sent by Holt to Limepayment by the plaintiff of the costs incurred by defend-rick, ostensibly on behalf of some English creditors, ants subsequent to the order of the 10th February.-Lib. to take possession of the goods, which he accordingly did, employing Mangan in the winding up of

330, fo. 343.

the business. The shop was closed on the 24th of Body (5 Ad. & El. 28) also bears on the present December; subsequently, but prior to the 1st of case, as appears by the trusts of the deed. February, 1848, the goods in question were seized (Moore, J.-The 10th section of the 10 Car. I by the Sheriff of the city of Limerick, by virtue of appears to render void deeds executed under cera fi. fa. issued at the suit of the defendant, and on tain circumstances, and the 14th section to qualify the 27th of January the order to interplead was the general words of the former. Thus he who obtained. The cause was tried at the Limerick | desires to have the protection of section 14, ought Spring Assizes, 1848, before Ball, J., and on that to shew his case to be within it.) (Crampton, J.— occasion the learned Judge told the jury that "if The charge in this case seems to rest on section 10, they believed that the deed was executed to hinder, and the objections to be founded on section 14.) delay, or defeat creditors, they should find for the It was impossible to bring the deed in question defendant." Counsel, at the trial, objected to this within section 14. In any event, the direction charge, and called upon his lordship merely to which was called for was wrong in part, being leave with the jury the question whether the deed based on the 14th section alone, exclusive of the was executed bona fide, and for valuable considera- 10th, which the former was only intended to quation. The jury having found for the defendant, a lify; and the court ought to allow the verdict to conditional order was obtained in last Easter Term stand, unless satisfied that the charge which the to set aside the verdict, on the ground of misdirec- plaintiff called upon the Judge to give was the tion of the learned Judge; and this day

Coppinger moved, that the said order be made absolute. The charge was wrong, as the only matters for the jury to consider were those relating to the valuable consideration and bona fides of the transfer; and it is quite beside the question to inquire whether the deed was executed in fraud of certain creditors. The case rests on the construction of the statutes 13 Eliz. c. 5, English, and 10 Car. 1, sess. 2, c. 3, Irish, Pickstock v. Lyster, (3 Maule & Sel. 371); Holbird v. Anderson (5 T. R. 235); Wood v. Dixie (7 Q. B. 892, per Lord Denman, C. J.)

J. D. Fitzgerald, Q.C., and Sir C. O'Loghlen, contra. The deed in question belongs to the class adverted to by Dampier, J., in his judgment in Pickstock v. Lyster, who there says, that if it could have been shewn "that the whole transaction was fallacious, that the trustee was, in effect, only a trustee for some particular creditors, and not, as he is stated, for all, the case would have been different; that might have given it a fraudulent complexion." It is also laid down that no creditor can take advantage of a deed if they be not parties to it, and have not executed it, Garrard v. Lauderdale (3 Sim. 1); Simmonds v. Pallas (2 Jones & Lat. 494). Here no creditor had executed the deed before the 1st of February; no notice of the execution of the deed was published in the Gazette, as is usual in such cases. Judging of the intentions of parties by their acts, it is quite evident that Holt got up the deed for his own purposes, and not bona fide for the benefit of the creditors in general. By the terms of the deed, Holt was not bound to give notice to a single creditor. There were only the representatives of three creditors present when the arrangement was agreed on. (Moore, J.-If any creditor had assented to this deed, would it not suffice?) It does not appear from the evidence that there was any express assent thereto from any party but the plaintiff. It is contended that although the deed was ostensibly for the general body of the creditors, it was in reality but for a few. (Perrin, J.-Is a deed frandulent where some creditors are excluded ?) A creditor at common law may prefer particular creditors, but here the deed is exclusively for the benefit of one. How could a deed intending to defeat a class of creditors be bona fide? The case of Owen v.

correct one.

Thomas Graydon, in reply.-The 14th section of the statute does not warrant the position that the mere circumstance of an assignment, having for its object the defeating of a particular creditor, would avoid it, Wood v. Dixie (7 Q. B. 892). Here the goods were seized by the defendant but a few days after the deed was executed. The case of Owen v. Body, relied on by the other side, has no application whatever to the present one. Five creditors intimated their intention to accept a benefit under the present deed.

BLACKBURNE, C.J. (after briefly stating the case)The question depends upon the effect of a certain deed, by which Mangan assigned all his property to the plaintiff Holt, in trust, for the benefit of his creditors. The transaction may possibly

have been a fraudulent one, but nevertheless we think that the jury may have been misled by having had their attention so pointedly directed to the question, whether the deed was executed for the purpose of delaying or defeating creditors, on the assumption that such was the proper test of its validity. On the other hand, we think that the direction called for by the plaintiff was too large. The verdict in this case, therefore, is not satisfactory, and there must be a new trial, on payment by plaintiff of costs of former trial.

COMMON PLEAS.

Order absolute.

Allingham v. WALKER.—Jan. 17, 20, 24. Pleading-Special Demurrer-False Plea─Plea in Discharge of Action-Replication de injuriâ. Where the plea denies the cause of action instead of being in confession and avoidance, the replication de injuriâ is bad, and a demurrer must be allowed, although the plea is itself specially demurrable as amounting to the general issue. A demurrer to a replication putting in issue a false plea, will be set down for immediate argument. Signing the name on a blank bill of exchange stamp, with an express agreement to draw it for a specified amount, is not a contract to pay any sum which may afterwards be inserted in the bill as between parties having notice of the agreement.