A. B. devised his property to his wife, for life; and, after charging same with several legacies, and, amongst others, to T. V., he directed the residue, after his wife's decease, to be divided amongst the legatees in the same proportion as the legacies. The testator also authorized his wife to appoint trustees to carry the trusts of his will into execution. The widow having, by her will, appointed trustees for that purpose, after her death, a suit was instituted to carry the will of A. B. into execution, and a decree for a sale pronounced. Held, that the trustees did not sufficiently represent T. V. to bring the case within the 24th General Order, and in his absence a good title could not be made to a purchaser. The bill in this case was filed to carry the will of Thomas Dawson into execution. It appeared that Thomas Dawson, being seized and possessed of the lands and premises, for the sale of which a decree had been pronounced, died in the mouth of May, 1828, having, by his will, devised to his wife, Anne Dawson, for her natural life, all his real and personal property of every kind; and, after several specific legacies to other parties, he gave to Thomas Vance the sum of £10, and by the residuary devise he directed that all the rest, residue, and remainder of his property-real, freehold, and personal-after the death of his said wife, should go to and amongst, and be divided between the several legatees thereinbefore named, rateably according to their respective legacies; and he thereby authorized his wife, by any deed, or by will, to appoint trustees to carry the trusts of his will into execution. In November, 1841, Anne Dawson died, having made her will and appointed the plaintiff, Aune Ruskell, and the defendant, M. Church, executrix and executor thereof, and she nominated them trustees to carry into execution the trusts of Thomas Dawson's will. A decree having been pronounced, and a sale had, there was a reference to the Master to report as to the title; and by his report, made the 9th of November, 1848, the Master found, "that Thomas Vance was a necessary party to the cause, and as he was not such party, that all proper parties to be bound by the proceedings in this cause were not before the court when a decree for a sale of the said lands and premises was pronounced, and a aood title could not be made to the purchaser." To this report, exceptions were taken, on the ground that the Master should not have found that the said Thomas Vance had any estate or interest in the lands to be sold, or that he was a necessary party to the cause. Mr. Wall, in support of the objections.-By Thomas Dawson's will, the legal estate in the lands was vested in his widow, for a power of mortgaging was given to her, and she was also authorized to nominate trustees of her husband's will. This power having been exercised by her; in order to carry the trusts of the will into execution, it is necessary that the legal estate should be vested in these trustees, who are parties to the suit. Trent v. Hanning, (7 East T. Rep. 96). Hughes, Q.C., and Mr. Maley for the report. The rule only provides for cases in which there is an existing trust for sale; this suit is not by creditors, but is instituted by a legatee to carry out the trusts of Thomas Dawson's will, and not to carry into execution the will of Anne Dawson also, Anne Dawson had only an estate for life, the legal estate in remainder is given to the residuary devisees, and even if the legal estate was in Mrs. Dawson for the purpose of the trust, it did not pass to her devisees, but remains in her heir at law, it does not appear that the will of Anne Dawson was proved. Mr. F. Fitzgerald, in reply.-Upon the true construction of both wills, the legal estate is vested in the trustees, both of whom are before the court, and a decree for a sale has been pronounced, with the court has assumed jurisdiction, part of the a full knowledge of T. Vance's absence, by which in which vested in Anne Dawson, as executrix. property consisted of chattels real, the legal estate This case comes within the 24th general order; and where the rights of a party are incidental to that of parties before the court, a complete decree can be made in his absence. Mit. E. P., 31. Mally v. Whally, (1 Ves. 487.); Rogers v. Linton, (Bunb. 200); Fell v. Brown, (2 B. 1. C. 276). MASTER OF THE ROLLS-My present impression is, that the Master's report is right; but I will consider this question further, it is inconvenient that the court should be called upon to decide a matter which was not before the Master, for the exceptions do not properly raise the question, the first objection is, that the Master found that T. Vance was not a party to the cause; the second, that the Master found T. Vance had an estate in the lands; the third, that he found that T. Vance was a necessary party to the cause, and that all proper parties were not before the court, when the decree for a sale was pronounced. This does not raise the question which has been argued before me, the Master's attention should have been called to the fact, that T. Vance was not a necessary party, for that by the general order of the court, the trustees fully represented the estate of their cestui que trusts. However, I can dispose of this question, though not properly raised before the Master. March 1.-MASTER OF THE ROLLS.-The bill in this case, was filed to carry into execution, the trusts of the will of Thomas Dawson, and a sale was made under the decree in the cause, to pay off the been taken to the title, that a person named legacies given by the will; and an objection has Thomas Vance, was not a party to the suit; and the Master came to the conclusion, that the objection was fatal. By the will there is a bequest to Thomas Vance, and several others of £10 each; so far as that legacy is concerned, I am disposed to think, the objection could be got rid of, by in vesting to the separate credit of Thomas Vance, that sum and interest, and the sum of £5 for costs. That course could be taken if there was nothing more in question; but after giving a life estate to the widow, the testator declared that his will was, "that all the rest residue, &c., of his property, real, freehold and personal, after the death of his said wife, should go to and amongst, and be divided between the several legatees, thereinbefore named, rateably, according to their, and each of their respective bequests and legacies, thereinbefore mentioned." The effect of which is, that Thomas Vance, takes an estate in the residue in the same proportion that his legacy of £10 bears to the other legacies. The objection taken is, that Thomas Vance is not before the court, or bound by the proceedings, and that is sought to be got rid of by the argument, that a power was given by Thomas Dawson to his wife, by her last will, to appoint trustees, to carry the trusts of his will into execution that the widow made her will, appointing trustees for that purpose, and the estate being thus vested in trustees, who are parties to the suit, the 24th general order of the court, applied to this case, in answer to which, the difficulty arises, that the will of Thomas Dawson's widow has not been proved, and I am called on to say, that these trustees are properly appointed; which if I was at liberty to look at the will, I might come to the conclusion, that the legal estate was not vested in them. If this case came within the general order, the trustees may represent the persons where the legacies are given; but it does not make them represent the persons who have the estate in the residue, and Thomas Vance is a necessary party to the suit; not on account of the legacy, but in respect of his interest in the lands; and I do not see how this objection can be got rid of. On the whole, although anxious to come to a different conclusion, I cannot allow the exceptions, and must therefore, overrule them with costs. thereinafter next mentioned, to wit, on the 18th of May, 1847, at Cork, aforesaid, the plaintiff paid and satisfied to the defendants all the moneys receivable or due to them on said judgment, except the sum of £274 Os. 4d.; and that at the respective times of the suing out of the writ of ca. sa., and of the delivery of the same to the sheriff, and of committing the several grievances thereinafter mentioned, the said sum of £274 0s. 4d., together with the sum of £6 15s. 8d. for interest thereon, at, &c., making together the sum of £280 16s., and no more, was due to the defendants on said judg ment; and no further or greater sum than the said sum of £280 16s. was payable by the plaintiff to the defendants, or receivable by the defendants upon or in respect of the said judgment, of all which the defendants, at the respective times of the suing out and delivering of the writ thereinafter mentioned, and of committing the grievances thereinafter mentioned, had due notice, to wit, at Cork, in, &c., aforesaid. Nevertheless, the defendants, well knowing the premises, but wilfully and maliciously intending to oppress, harrass, and injure the plaintiff in that behalf, and cause him to be imprisoned, and extort from him a greater sum than was due on said judgment, afterwards, to wit, on the 16th November, 1847, to wit, at the Queen's Courts, Dublin, under colour of obtaining satisfaction of the said judgment, and execution thereof, and under colour of pretence that the sum of £585 0s. 2d., with interest thereon, at, &c, from, &c., was due thereon to the defendants, wrongfully, maliciously, and unjustly sued and prosecuted out of the said court of, &c., at, &c, upon said judgment, a certain writ of, &c., called a writ of ca. sa., directed to the Sheriff of the county of the city of Cork, whereby our said lady the Queen commanded, &c. And the defendants contriving and intending as aforesaid, afterwards, and before QUEEN'S BENCH.-HILARY TERM. the return of said writ, to wit, on the said 16th of CARMICHAEL v. WATERFORD AND LIMERICK November, 1847, to wit, at the Queen's Courts RAILWAY COMPANY.-Jan. 25. aforesaid, falsely, maliciously, and injuriously, Action on the Case. -Arrest. Malice-Gross caused and procured the said writ to be marked at foot with the sum of £585 0s. 2d., as the sum Neglect-New Trial-Misdirection. due to the defendants by the plaintiff on foot of In case for maliciously and injuriously over-mark- said judgment, and for which, with interest thereon ing a writ of ca. sa., and causing the plaintiff to as aforesaid, the sheriff was to take and arrest the be arrested thereon, the judge having stated, that, plaintiff, although, in truth and in fact, the said in his opinion, proof of actual malice in fact sum of £585 0s. 2d. was not due to the defendants was not necessary, but that malice might be on foot of, or in respect of said judgment, and no inferred from gross neglect, told the jury, that if, further or greater sum than said sum of £280 16s. in their opinion, the injury done to the plaintiff was then due or payable by the plaintiff to the was occasioned by the gross neglect of the de- defendants, or receivable or recoverable by the fendants, they were at liberty to infer malice-defendants from the plaintiff on foot of, or in Held, a misdirection. The declaration contained four counts. The first count stated, that before committing the grievances thereinafter mentioned, to wit, in Easter Term, in the tenth year of the reign of our lady the now Queen, in, &c., before, &c., the Waterford and Limerick Railway Company, &c., recovered against the plaintiff a certain debt of £1160, as also the sum of £11 1s. 3d. for, &c., by said court adjudged to said Waterford and Limerick Railway Company, and whereof the now plaintiff was convicted, as, &c. That after the recovery of said judgment, and before the suing out of the writ respect of, said judgment. And the plaintiff further saith, that the defendants, further contriving and intending as aforesaid, afterwards, and before the return of said writ, to wit, on the day and year last aforesaid, wrongfully, maliciously, and unjustly delivered the said writ so marked as aforesaid, to the sheriff, to be executed in due form of law. And the plaintiff further saith, that the defendants, further contriving and intending as aforesaid, wrongfully, maliciously, and unjustly caused and procured the said sheriff afterwards, and before the return of said writ, on the 17th of December, 1847, to wit, at Cork, in, &c., by virtue of the said writ, to take and arrest the plaintiff by his body, and keep and detain him in his custody under the said writ, to satisfy the said sum of £585 Os. 2d., marked at foot of said writ as aforesaid, with interest thereon, at, &c., to wit, at, &c., and caused and procured the said sheriff to detain and keep in prison the now plaintiff, for a long time, to wit, for the space of three hours then next following, under and by virtue of said writ, and until the now plaintiff, in order to procure his release and discharge from the said imprisonment, was forced and obliged to, and did then pay to the sheriff the said sum of £585 0s. 2d. so marked, &c., and the sum of £12 10s. for interest thereon, and also the further sum of £17 83. 11d., as and for fees and poundage of the sheriff upon the said writ; said three sums, making together the sum of £614 18s. 11d., although, in fact and in truth, the said sum of £280 16s., and no more, was then due and receivable upon or in respect of said judgment, whereby the plaintiff hath not only been injured in his credit, and reputation, and circumstances, and put to great pain of mind, but also that the plaintiff hath lost and been deprived of the sum of £334 2s. 11d., being the difference between the said sum of £614 18s. 11d. aforesaid, and £280 168., the sum really due on foot of said judgment. The second count only differed from the first in the statement of the amount paid by the plaintiff on the judgment, and the third and fourth counts omitted the words willfully and maliciously, and substituted the words wrongfully and injuriously. Damages were laid at £2,000. The defendants pleaded the general issue, and paid into court a sum of money, composed of over-levy and interest, and £50. At the trial before Moore, J., at the last Summer Assizes for Cork, it appeared that the action was brought against the company for arresting the plaintiff, under the following circumstances. In Easter Term, 1847, the company recovered a judgment against the plaintiff for £585, and on the 18th May in the same year, the plaintiff paid on account of this judgment, into the bank at Cork, to the credit of the company, a sum of £311 15s. 6d., leaving a balance of £273 4s. 6d. still due. The secretary of the company knew of this payment having been made, and communicated the fact to Mr. Tandy, the solicitor of the company. Mr. Tandy resided in Waterford; and, when informed upon the subject, wrote to Dublin to his partner, Mr. Newman, to advise him of the payment, but this letter miscarried. On the 16th of November following, Mr. Newman issued a writ of ca. sa. for the entire sum of £585, and on the 17th of December the plaintiff was arrested in Cork, and, after being detained in custody for about two hours, was discharged, upon paying the entire amount marked on the writ, besides interest and sheriff's poundage. Mr. Newman was examined on behalf of the company, and deposed to the fact of his not having received the letter written by his partner in Waterford, and stated that the over-marking the writ was purely accidental, and arose solely from his not having heard of the payment having been made by the plaintiff. The learned judge was of opinion that proof of actual malice in fact was not neces | sary, but that it might be inferred from gross neglect; and he told the jury, that if, in their opinion, the company had been guilty of gross neglect, in not communicating to their agent the fact of the payment having been made, they were at liberty to infer malice. Verdict for the plaintiff with £500 damages. A conditional rule having been obtained, in Michaelmas Term last, for a new trial on the ground of misdirection, Henn, Q.C., and Martley, Q.C., were now heard in support of the rule.-Malice cannot be inferred from mere neglect, however gross. To support this action at common law, it should have been alleged in the declaration, and proved, that the party acted maliciously, and without probable cause. De Medina v. Grove (10 Q. B. Rep. 152); affirmed on error (ibid. 172). These counts can only be maintained under the statute (6 Anne, Ir. c. 7), and proof of actual malice is necessary when proceeding under that statute, Mills v. Nerney (C. & Al. 81). The jury were told that proof of actual malice was not necessary, but that it might be inferred from gross neglect, whereas the true question for the jury was, whether the defendants were influenced by actual malice. When the learned judge told the jury there was no proof of express malice, he ought to have directed a verdict for the defendant. [Moore, J.-There being no proof of actual malice, the question is, whether legal malice can be inferred.] [Blackburne, C.J.The act here being lawful, malice must be shewn.] Scheibel v. Fairham, (1 Bos. & P. 388); Gibson v. Chaters, (2 Bos. & P. 129); Goslin v. Wilcock, (3 Wils. 202); Moore v. Gardner, (16 M. & W. 595); Hounsfield v. Drury (11 Ad. & El. 98; 1 Saund. 130, note) were cited and commented on. Bennett, Q. C, and J. D. Fitzgerald, Q. C., contra-It is not necessary, in point of law, to prove express malice, but a jury may infer it from neglect. [Blackburne, C. J.-The word means actual malice. Have you any case where a jury were told to presume malice from mere neglect alone, without proof of want of probable cause?] The declaration states in terms, that there was not probable cause; and this distinguishes the case now before the court from those which have been cited at the other side. Want of probable cause, is a question for the jury; and from the absence of probable cause, the law allows a jury to infer actual malice. When once you shew the absence of probable cause, as was done in this case, it may be left to the jury to say if there was malice in fact. [Perrin, J.-What is the evidence of gross neglect which was left to the jury? Tell me the facts which shew that there was malice,] The secretary of the company had promised the plaintiff that no proceedings should be taken on the judgment without giving him previous notice. [Blackburne, C. J.-The company is bound by the act of its officer in this transaction; but there must exist, in the mind of some one, a criminal intention, and where is the evidence from which you draw this intention?] We rely on the promise that no execution should issue without notice. The main objection relied on below was, that malice could not be inferred in a corporation. There are no counts on the 6th Anne, Ir. c. 7; we did not intend to proceed under that statute. They cited Crozer v. Pilling (4 B. & C. 26; S. C., 6 Dowl. & Ry. 12); Ravenga v. MIntosh (2 B. & C. 693); Sinclair v. Eldred (4 Taunt. 7); Austin v. Debnam, (3 B. & C. 139); Hardwick v. Heslop, (26 Law Jour. 313). PER CURIAM. We are all of opinion, that this action was maintainable only on the ground of proof of actual malice in fact-malice being the gist of the action. We cannot, therefore, regard the present verdict as a satisfactory one, and think the rule for a new trial ought to be made absolute, upon payment of the costs of the former one. No costs upon this motion. Rule accordingly.* COMMISSION OF OYER AND TERMINER. QUEEN v. DUFFY.-Feb. 7 to 21. CORAM BALL, J., AND LEFROY, B.t Practice-Proceeding on Second Indictment Pleading-Challenge to the Array-Evidence. Where separate indictments have been found, the court has no jurisdiction to restrain proceedings on one until the other be disposed of, unless there be some allegation of illegality or injustice, or violation of duty on the part of the prosecutor. Held, that the borough boundaries, as defined by the 3rd & 4th Vic. c. 108, are extended for the purposes as well of criminal as of civil jurisdiction. Held, that publications were overt acts, and that the word "publication," as laid in the indictment, might be taken to mean a compassing on one day, and the expression of it on subsequent days. Held, on a challenge to the array, that the disproportion of members of different religious persuasions was not admissible in evidence to the triers. Held, that parting with the control of printings or writings, so that they might be read, was a publi cation. Held, that speeches delivered prior to the commission of the offence charged, might be given in evidence, for the purpose of explaining the meaning of the publications alleged to be felonious. Bills of indictment in this case having been found by the grand jury at this Commission, when the prisoner was about to be arraigned, his counsel moved, "That no proceeding be taken on this indictment until either a trial be had on the indictment preferred and found at the preceding Commission, or that it be otherwise disposed of." soner. There is a discretionary power in the court, (2 Hawk. c. 25, s. 15; Rex v. Bowman 6 Car. & P. 101). These proceedings are vexatious and harrassing to the prisoner. The law does not permit an amendment of the record, and by the adjournment of the trial, the crown has had an opportunity of doing that they could not have otherwise done; and, secondly, we are not to be deprived of the opportunity of objecting to the course the Attorney-General may take. enters a nolle prosequi, we contend it will operate as a release of all charges, upon the record, against the prisoner. The question now is not, whether that point be a good one or otherwise, but whether we shall be deprived of the benefit of raising it. [The following cases were referred to, and commented on:-King v. Webb (3 Burr. 1468, S. C 19 St. Tr. 1174); King v. Frith (1 Leach Cr. C. 10; 2 Hal. P. C. 95).] If he The Attorney-General (with him J. Perrin contra. It is contended, that the court should not deprive the prisoner of the right he has of raising any question he may be advised, as to the effect of a nolle prosequi; but the court will not now be ancillary to any course that will deprive the crown of a trial upon the merits. The erown has been guilty of no delay. [They referred to Queen v. Goddard (2 L. Ray. 922); Rex v. Dr. Wynn (2 East. 226).] BALL, J.-This is professedly an application to the discretion of the court. Treating it so, our opinion has been fully disclosed during the progress of the argument. The court is called upon by reason of the many delays, as well as other causes, to say that because the case has been disposed of by the grand jury on four different occasions, that the Attorney-General, on behalf of the crown, is not to proceed to have a trial upon the merits. Is the court to forget, that if the prisoner has his rights, the court has its duty to the public to perform? Are the rights of the crown to be put an end to without any grounds being laid for the exercise of the discretion of the court? There is no statement that the Attorney-General, on the part of the crown, has done anything unjustifiable. That hardships will sometimes occur to a prisoner, is an incident necessary to all prosecutions; but unless the Attorney-General does something illegal, unjust, or in violation of his duty, the court cannot interfere. The AttorneyGeneral is of opinion, that it is not safe or prudent to go to trial on the former indictment, and is the court to say, he shall not exercise that discretion? I have come to the conclusion, that the court ought not to acquiesce in this part of the application. With respect to the other portion, that the court should not deprive the prisoner of an objection depending on the contingency of a nolle prosequi being entered by the Attorney-General, which, it is said, may afford him an opportunity of setting aside the whole proceeding. Was any court ever seriously called upon to stop the crown in an undoubtedly legal course, on the ground of a pos Butt, Q. C., (with whom was Sir Colman O'Loghlen) for the motion. We fully admit that the prisoner is bound to answer, if arraigned, Sir W. Withipole's case (Cro. Car. 147); Rex v. Swan and Jefferys (Fost. Cr. L. 106; 18 St. Tr. 1198); Queen v. Mitchel (1 Ir. Jur. 5). The court has clearly the power of suspending the arraignment of the prisoner, if a proper case be made. It is the court, and not the crown, that arraigns the pri-sibility? What is the right claimed? It is to See Gibbons v. Allison (3 C. B. Rep. 181). Reported by J. Blackham, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. raise a technical objection to defeat a trial. The court has been shewn nothing to warrant it in acceding to such an application. LEFROY, B.-I have arrived at the same conclusion with my brother Ball, and for the same reasons. My observations are not made because I can add anything, but to corroborate what he has stated to be our line of duty, and that which has been acted upon in other cases of the highest authority. Rex v. Swan and Jefferys (Fost. C. C. 106) is a clear authority on this question. Every hardship urged in that case, as injurious to the prisoner, is applicable to the present; the language of that case is precisely similar to that of my brother Ball. If we were trenching in the remotest degree on the rights of the prisoner, we would yield. Are we subjecting the accused party to two trials? We could not do so. But it is an equally constitutional principle, that no man can evade answering the demands of justice. It is not suggested that there is any intention to subject the accused to two trials; we are guarding him against such, and we will protect him against any undue use of the law. I have no doubt on the authority of the cases referred to, that the prisoner is bound to plead to this indictment, and that we have, in this case, no discretion. The authorities pressed upon us do not apply, and it is our duty to the crown and to the public that justice shall not be defeated. The prisoner then pleaded in abatement, that Mr. Majoribanks, one of the grand jury, at the time of his being sworn on the grand jury, and of their finding the bills, did not reside within the county of the city of Dublin, though he did reside within the present borough boundaries. Feb. 10.-The Attorney-General, for the crown, handed in a replication, to which the prisoner demurred. J. O'Hagan, for the demurrer, contended that the residence of the grand juror was not, for the purposes of this court, within the county of the city of Dublin. That the 3 & 4 Vic. c. 108, s. 21, had not altered the borough boundaries in this respect; that the 22nd sec., in connection with the previous one, must be taken to mean courts belonging to the - borough, and not courts sitting within it. That this was not a borough court, but a Court of Commission for the county of the city of Dublin, the jurisdiction of which, by the proviso to the 21st section, remained as it existed before the act. The title of the 3 & 4 Vic. c. 109, relates only to adding certain portions of counties to cities; and the first section enacted these portions should be a barony of itself till provision be otherwise made, and be a portion of the adjoining county for criminal purposes, but the boundaries were not to be altered for purposes of parliamentary representation. That the construction of these two statutes shewed clearly that the residence of the juror was in the county for criminal, and in the city for borough purposes. [He cited, on the exposition of statutes in general, Powlter's case (11 Rep. 34, a); King v. Burrell (12 Ad. & El. 468); Queen v. Silversides (3 Q. B. 410); and, on these statutes, Delahunt's case (Arm. & Mac. 257); Reg. v. Inhabitants of Parish of St. George (8 Ir. L. Rep. 23); Barber v. Evans (10 Ir. L. Rep. 480).] The Attorney-General, contra, relied on the in convenience that would accrue if this construction were adopted that, though the construction of the 3 & 4 Vic. c. 108, might admit of the construction contended for, that, taken in connection with the 3 & 4 Vic. c. 109, it was clear the exclusion was for parliamentary purposes alone, and that the cases of Barber v. Evans and Reg. v. Inhabitants of St. George were not distinguishable, and ruled this case. The court called on Butt, Q.C., who contended, in addition to the arguments of Mr. O'Hagan, that the court was sitting under a commission of 1 Vic., that there was no commission of adjunct, it being directed to the Lord Mayor and judges for the time being-that a juror residing in the place where this juror resided, could not have been then allowed to be sworn upon the jury, and that the 3 & 4 Vic. c. 108, and the subsequent act, had not altered the boundaries with respect to the commission. [Ball, J.-This objection is not open to you upon the record; the plea does not advert to it. Lefroy, B.-The plea merely states, that at the time of swearing, and of finding the bills, the juror did not reside in the county of the city.] BALL, J.-The court feels no difficulty upon this question. The law is clearly settled in the cases of Reg. v. Inhabitants of St. George and Barber v. Evans, and it would require strong authority to satisfy me that the court was wrong in that decision. LEFROY, B.-The decisions referred to are decided on the plain and settled rules of construction. Even if there was any doubt, it would be quite too much to set up our judgment against that of two other courts. The demurrer being overruled, the prisoner's counsel then handed in a plea, by which he pleaded not guilty to the first overt act of each count, and to the charge of writing the letter to W. S. O'Brien, and demurred to the remainder, concluding that the part demurred to might be quashed. The Attorney-General objected to the reception of this plea, for being bad in form. The prisoner's counsel contended that a party might demur to part of an indictment, Queen v. Parker (Car. & Mar. 629). That if the demurrer was too large, it would be overruled, Hinde v. Gray (1 Man. & Gr. 201); Briscoe v. Hill, (10 M. & W. 735; 2 W. Saund. 285). We admit a portion of this indictment to be good. It was decided by Perrin, J., on the argument of the demurrer to the former indictment, that the demurrer was divisible, and the prisoner could be called upon to answer only the good parts (1 Ir. Jur. 102); and the judgment of Richards, B., (ib. 106). The court declined to receive the plea. The prisoner then demurred generally to each count. The first count of the indictment stated, that Charles Gavan Duffy, &c., did, on the third day of June, in the eleventh year of the reign, &c., feloniously compass, imagine, invent, devise, and intend to deprive and depose our said lady the Queen, &c., and the said felonious compassing, imagination, invention, device, and intention, he, the said Charles Gavan Duffy, then and there feloniously did ex |