entering a suggestion on the the roll, it may be asked whether he can do so afterwards, before judgment? There seems to be no good reason why he should not, because the object and intent of the statute is as much answered as if the suggestion had been entered before the verdict; and the principle of the above cited case of Ethersey v. Jackson, seems to warrant the entering of a suggestion at any time before judgment." That note has been before the profession for a number of years, and has frequently been cited, without having ever been found fault with. But further, even if we were irregular, we have obtained a verdict which is perfectly good; and the irregularity is no ground for setting it aside. With respect to the second objection, namely, that viceguardians had been appointed, and that, consequently, the action being brought in the name of the Guardians of the Poor of the Castlerea Union," must fail. There are two answers to that objection :-First, the only issue here is non est factum; and evidence of their being paid guardians was not to the issue, and, therefore, inadmissible. But, supposing the evidence to have been admissible, we still contend that the action is maintainable under the provisions of the Poor-law Act, 1 and 2 Vic. c. 56. The 25th and 26th sections provide for the appointment of vice-guardians to act as guardians in certain cases; and then the 27th section enacts, that the Board of Guardians for every union, "including all persons herein-before empowered to act as guardians" shall be authorized to sue and be sued in the name of "The Guardians of the Poor of the- -Union." This, we conceive to be a conclusive authority, enabling those paid officers to sue, as here. [Jackson, J.It would have been a great omission if the act had not contained a provision of that nature.] Mr. Francis Meagher, with whom was Mr. Joseph Burke, contra.-There is a very material difference between the English and Irish acts. The objection is one of importance; for it is certainly made in aid of the objects of the act, and to guard the defendant against oppressive damages. The convenience of the case is clearly with the defendant. [Jackson J.-No doubt it would have been more convenient to assign breaches; but the question is, was it necessary to do so. Ball, J.However, the inconvenience is one resulting to the plaintiff himself; it creates a difficulty in his way, as pointed out by Sergeant Williams in his note.] In D'Aranda v. Houston, already referred to, Baron Alderson expresses very serious doubts; and that was upon the construction of the English Act, while the Irish is much stronger. There are two classes of cases contemplated by both acts: 1st. where the defendant pleads an issuable plea, and secondly, where there is judginent by default, or on confession; but the Irish act (9 Wm. 3, c. 10, s. 8), after providing for the case of an issuable plea, goes on in these words," and if it shall happen that such defendant or defendants shall not plead to the issue, but judgment shall be given against him or them, for such plaintiff or plaintiffs upon demurrer or by nihil dicit, &c.; then, and in such case, it shall be lawful to, and for such plaintiff or plaintiffs to suggest upon the roll, &c." The English act merely says, " And if judgment shall be given for the plaintiff on a demurrer, or by confession, or ni hil dicit &c.," it does not contain the words, if the defendant shall not plead to the issue. Now unless your Lordships will strike a pen across these words, it is impossible to suggest breaches in Ireland, after the parties have pleaded to the issue. [Ball, J Are not these words necessarily understood in the English Act? There can be no plea of nil dicit where the party has pleaded to the issue; there can be no judgment on confession where the defendant pleads an issuable plea. The words of the two acts amount to the same thing. Jackson,J— Both the acts profess to be conversant with two classes of cases, namely, where the parties have pleaded, and where they have not. You must shew that there is some substantial difference between the two acts.] [Ball, J.-There is nothing negative in the section in either act. The English act gives authority to suggest breaches in certain cases; and yet we have high authority in England that there are other cases in which the same thing may be done. If that be the law in England, it is just the same in Ireland.] There is no case in England on this subject; and no authority except that of Sergeant Williams; and, when it is considered how frequently the dicta of even the most eminent judges are erroneous, the Court will have no difficulty in now giving this act such a liberal construction as will protect the defendant, and not such an interpretation as will saddle him with the costs of two trials, where the damages assessed against him may not be forty shillings. [Jackson, J.-Suppose we went the full length with you, that Mr. Sergeant Williams' note is no authority, you have still this difficulty to contend with, that you are trying to set aside a verdict already had. I do not think you will find any case in which a verdict had been disturbed. We do not decide that this proceeding was regular; we only refuse to set aside the finding of a jury.] The first moment we saw the bond at the trial, and had knowledge that this was the bond sued upon, we objected, and called for a non-suit; and, the Judge having refused, we now come here still relying upon the same objection. [Ball, J.-The case of Ethersey v. Jackson appears to be a distinct authority for entering a suggestion on the roll at any time before judgment; and, therefore, an authority for what the plaintiff here proposes to do, namely, to hold his verdict, to proceed to enter a suggestion of breaches, and to have judgment afterwards. That course removes any difficulty which may appear in this matter; for we do not add another case to those mentioned in the statute, which all refer to suggestions after judgment, whereas the present case is before judgment.] The first part of the section is that which applies to cases before judgment; and in Ethersey v. Jackson, the plaintiff was in a condition to comply with the clause contained in that first part, that "thereupon it shall and may be lawful for the jury, not only to assess such damages, &c., but also to give damages for such of the said breaches," &c. There the plaintiff entered a suggestion before the trial, and, That is to consequently, there was but one jury and one ver- Upon the second question, counsel for the defendant contended, that the words of the 27th section of the Poor Law Act, "All persons hereinbefore empowered to act as guardians," did not apply to vice-guardians, whose duties are to be defined by the commissioners. PER CURIAM-We think the words of the section clearly include vice-guardians. Allow the cause shewn, but without costs, inasmuch as the case is one of some doubt, and the plaintiff might have set the breaches out in his declaration, which would have been a very desirable course.* EXCHEQUER OF PLEAS. EASTER TERM. CRONIN v. MURPHY.-Apil 18, 20. Pleading-Scire Facias by Administrator. An administrator cum test. annexo may maintain a scire facias upon a judgment obtained by an administrator durante minore ætate; and the scire facias is sufficient in form, though it does not aver that the defendant was summoned to shew cause why the plaintiff, as such administrator, should not have execution, &c. Scire facias by an administrator, upon a judgment acknowledged to an administratrix durante minore aetate. The scire facias ran thus:-"Victoria, &c., to the Sheriff, &c.-Whereas Catherine Moriarty, administratrix with the will annexed of Daniel D. Cronin, late of, &c., our debtor, &c., upon the confession and acknowledgment of Thadee William Murphy, of, &c., and by consideration of the same court, recovered against the said defendant, T. W. M., as well a certain debt of £1,000, as also £2.3s., which in said court was adjudged to the said plaintiff for his damages occasioned by detaining that debt whereof the said defendant was convicted, as by the records of said court fully appears; and whereas, at the time of the obtaining the said judgment, in form aforesaid, the said Catherine Moriarty was administratrix of the said Daniel D. Cronin, pending the minority of Henry M. Cronin, who has since obtained his full age of twenty-one years, whereupon administration with the will of the said Daniel D. Cronin annexed, was, in due form of law, granted forth of, &c., unto the said H. M. Cronin," &c., in the common form, and concludes with profert of the letters of adminis Daniel D. Cronin, and because the said Thadee Wm. Murphy was summoned to shew cause wherefore the said H. M. Cronin ought not to have execution against him, &c., instead of being summoned to shew cause wherefore the said H. M. Cronin, as such administrator, ought not to have execution, &c. General demurrer, on ground that scire facias on such a judgment was not maintainable. Mr. Joseph Reeves (with him Mr. Leahy, for demurrer. First, it does not appear that the judgment was obtained by Catherine Moriarty, in her representative capacity. A scire facies requires the same particularity of averment as a declaration, and is open to the same objections on demurrer. Several cases decide, that in declarations by an executor, the omission of the term "as" is fatal. Next objection turns on the construction of the statute 7 Wm. 3, c. 6, Ir. Unless the present case is provided for by the statute, the scire facias cannot be maintained at common law. An administrator de bonis non could not have a scire facias upon a judgment obtained by the original executors or administrators, for he comes in paramount to the title, and is no party thereto, Snape v Norgate, (Cro. Car. 167, S. C. 1 Roll, abridgment, 890, pl. 3; Sir Wm. Jones, Rep. 214; 1, Williams on Executors, 767, (last edition), if an executor brings a sci fa, on a judgment, and subsequently dies intestate, the administrator de bonis non must bring a Scire facias, on the original judgment, (2, Lord Raymond, 1049), Brandling v. Barrington, (6 B. & C. 476.) The English analagous statute has, likewise, a casus omissus, for it applies only to judgments after verdict. Counsel also cited Dwarris on Statutes p. 614. Sir Colman O'Loghlen and Mr. Berkeley, contra. As to the objections to the form of Scire facias, it was held sufficient, in Hanyngton v. Cairnes, (5, Ir. L. Rep. 333); Vance and another, v. Brassington, (1, Ir. Jur. p. 8.) [Pigot, C. B.-As to that point, we must treat it as "res judicata." Next, as to the objection in point of substance, this Scire facias may be maintained independantly of the statute 7 Wm. 3, c 6. The positions of an administrator de bonis non is not analagous to that of administrator cum testamento annexo on judgment obtained, by an administrator pendente minore ætate, as here. The former comes in by title paramount, derived from the ordinary, while the latter is the mere bailee, and acts in the name of the infant administrator. [Lefroy, B.-It is like the case of an infant suing by guardian, when he attains his age he can carry on the suit in his own name.] Counsel also cited Williams on Exors., 401; Panton v. Truelock, (2, Keble, 6, 11, 30;) Croft, (1, Lord Raymond, 265; Headley v. Kelly, (2, H. and B. 591; Moyles Entries, 125.) V. The Court directed the case to stand, that a search for precedents might be made in the office. v. April 20-Sir Colman O'Loghlen stated, that after a diligent search, only two precedents, Administratrix of Dowling v. Smith, 1812; Henry V. Phillips, Mich. 1826, had been found of a Scire facias by an administrator, upon a judgment obtained by administrator, durante minore ætate, and the form of them coincided with the one under consideration of the Court. Pennefather, B.-The question in this case is decided by reference to the course of precedents, and those are in favour of the scire facias, in its present form. If it were a declaration, the averment would not be sufficient, but, both in this country and England, the scire facias is only for the purpose of having execution on a judgment already received; and the intendment must be here, that the judgment on which the scire facias is brought was recovered by the conuzee in her representative capacity. As to the present case not coming within the statute of 7 W. 3, c. 6, it has been held that an administration durante minore œtate is not a general administration; but such an administrator is a person to whom administration may be granted, as bailee in usum and commodum of an infant executor; and there is authority for holding, that an executor coming of age may sue on a judgment obtained by the administrator durante min. ætate. Now, there is no substantial difference between an administrator and executor in this respect; they come within the same reason and the same rule. There is such a privity between the parties, as will enable the subsequent executor or administrator to have execution on a judgment recovered during the limited administration. It is not going too far to hold, that this distinction was present to the mind of the legislature at the time of the passing of 7 W. 3, and may account for their not having provided for such a case as the present. Judgment for Plaintiff. This was an action on the money counts, and on an account stated between the plaintiff and defendant, as executors of a person named Cornelius Hartnett, deceased, and had been tried at the Summer Assizes at Tralee, in 1848, before Mr. Justice Moore. The plaintiff sought to recover on the count for money paid for the use of the intestate Cornelius Harnett, under the following circumstances. The plaintiff and intestate-the former as surety-made their joint and several promissory note, at three months, dated the 11th September, 1846, and delivered it to the Messrs. Wyse, who carried on the trade of distillers, at Cork, for goods supplied by them to the intestate. This note not being paid, the plaintiff, jointly with his son, passed a note to the Messrs. Wyse, on which occasion the first note was given up to the plaintiff. The second note was not paid till after the filing of the plaintiff's declaration about a month before the trial. On this evidence, defendant's counsel objected, that the proof of payment of money before the trial, but after the filing of the plaintiff's bill, and of the service of the plaintiff's bill of particulars, in which the action was expressly stated to have been brought for money paid for the use of the intestate, did not support this action. The learned Judge refused to non-suit, but reserved leave for the defendant to move for a non-suit, or a verdict to be entered in their favour. There was a verdict for the plaintiff. Mr. Bennett, Q.C. (with him Mr. Leahy), now moved to set aside the conditional order obtained by O'Hea last Michaelmas Term, pursuant to the leave received. They contended that the bill in this case had clearly been treated as money; and relied upon Barclay v. Gooch (2 Esp. 571), recog nised and acted on by Pollock, C.B., in Rogers v. Maw (15 Mee. & W. 444; Judgment, 449). The following cases were also cited:-Fairlie v. Denton (8 B. & C. 395); Cuxon v. Chadley (3 B. & C.591). Mr.J.D. Fitzgerald, Q C. (with him Mr. O'Hea) contra.-Relied on Taylor v. Higgins (3 East. 169) and Maxwell v. Jameson (2 B. & Ald. 51), as being inconsistent with, and overruling Barclay v. Gooch. And even supposing that the second note had been taken as a substituted security, there was no evidence that at the time when this action was brought that it would have been ever paid, or even payment demanded. PENNEFATHER, B.*-The question left by the learned Judge was, whether the second note was taken in substitution of the first. If so, on the authority of Lord Kenyon in Barclay v. Gooch, and the observations of Pollock, C. B. in Rogers v. Maw, it must be now considered as settled law, that if the second note was so taken in substitu tion, it was a satisfaction of the original debt. My brother Lefroy and I are of opinion, that that question was found by the jury, and that there was evidence to warrant that finding. The Messrs. Wyse had both the plaintiff and the testator for their security on the first note; that not being paid, the plaintiff asks for time, and gives the second note, getting up the first. The Messrs. Wyse, instead of giving up that note, might have kept it for the purpose, if necessary, of enforcing pay ment against the intestate. RICHARDS, B.-I think, in point of justice, the decision of my brethren the correct one. The only doubt on my mind is, whether the question of the second note being taken in satisfaction of the first, was left to the jury. Cause allowed without costs. WALKER V. COLLINS.-May, 5. The prescribed form of the common affidavit, for changing the venue at the instance of the defend ant, must be strictly preserved. Mr. Chatterton moved on behalf of the defend. ant to change the venue from Dublin to Cork, on an affidavit "that the plaintiff's cause of action, (if any,) in this cause, arose in the County of Cork, and not in the County of Dublin or elsewhere." Mr. Colles, contra.- The affidavit is insufficient, according to the established rule of the Court. It should have proceeded, "or elsewhere out of the County of Cork." The rule of the Court is unequivocal.t ROLLS COURT. KELLY v. Jackson.—Jan. 18. and April 17. Pleading-Discovery-Professional privilege. Where a bill charges that a defendant is connected with the preparation and execution of certain fraudulent leases, and seeks a discovery of the matters alleged to be fraudulent, the defendant cannot, by plea of professional confidence, protect himself from the discovery. The bill in this cause was filed the 29th of August, 1848, and stated that by lease of the 30th of Nov. 1811, the premises called Montpelier House, in the County of Dublin, were demised to J. Fyans at the yearly rent of £150 for three lives with a covenant for perpetual renewal, that all the estate of Fyans became vested in J. D. Duckett, who, by indenture of the 4th of March, 1841, in consideration of £1500, assigned said premises to William Trocke, one of the defendants, for the term of three lives, and a covenant for perpetual renewal, subject to the annual rent of £125, to which the original rent had been reduced. The bill then stated that in the year 1842, plaintiff was employed in making certain buildings and improvements on said premises, and not having been paid therefor by the defendant, commenced an action, and on the 12th of February, 1848, obtained a verdict, and on the 26th of April 1848, entered judgment in the Court of Queen's Bench for the sum of 576 28. 10d. That plaintiff then issued a writ of elegit, and was about to extend the interest of said Trocke in the said premises when he discovered that since he obtained said verdict, on the 21st of February, 1848, said William Trocke caused two leases to be registered which appear to bear date respectively on the 1st of February 1848, being the same day for which notice of trial was served, and which leases appear to be made between said William Trocke, and Robert Jackson, one of the defendants, and stepfather of the said William Trocke. That by one of said leases the said premises of Montpelier House were demised for two lives at the rent of £120, and by the other lease in consideration of £280, and the yearly rent of £14; the remaining part of said premises, called Montpelier Cottage, were also demised to the said R. Jackson for two lives. That at the time when said two leases purport to bear date, said W. Trocke was indebted to various persons, and resident at Brussels in order to avoid his creditors, where he remained up to and after the 12th of Feb. 1848. That it appeared by the memorials of said leases that they were respectively witnessed by the defendant, John Graham, as to the execution thereof by the defendant, W. Trocke, and they were registered on the affidavit of the said J. Graham, who was attorney of the said W. Trocke in the said action, and who was resident in Dublin on the said 1st of Feb. 1848, the day when said leases are made to bear date, and said J. Graham so continued resident in this country until the 12th of February, when plaintiff obtained said verdict, and therefore it was impossible that said J. Graham could have been a witness to the execution of said leases by the said W. Trocke on said 1st of February, but same were really executed after plaintiff's verdict, in order to defeat his demand. That said leases were prepared by the said J. Graham, and at his suggestion, to defeat plaintiff's rights, and prevent him from recovering the said premises for payment of his judg. ment, and said J. Graham was privy to and cogniof said leases, he caused a case to be prepared, and zant of the fraud, and that previous to the execution submitted to counsel to be advised if said leases would protect the premises from plaintiff's demand. That said leases were at a gross undervalue, and the consideration was never paid, and were really inade in trust for said defendant, W. Trocke, and the bill prayed that the said leases might be declared fraudulent and void as against plaintiff, and that same might be set aside, and that the costs incurred by plaintiff by reason thereof might be paid by the defendants, and particularly by J. Graham, and that an injunction might be granted to prevent Robert Jackson or Wm. Trocke from interfering with said premises. The defendant, Graham, pleaded to so much of the bill as regarded a discovery concerning said leases and opinion. That for a long time previous and down to the time of the preparation and execution of said leases defendant was, and continued to be, and then was the attorney and solicitor of the defendant, W. Trocke, and he had not any knowledge of, nor was he concerned in said matters, save and except only in his capacity as such attorney and solicitor. That he had not and never had in his possession, power or custody any case, or opinion, or document relating to said matters, save such cases, and opinions, and writing, &c., as caine to, and were in his possession solely as attorney and solicitor to the said Wm. Trocke, and prayed judgment whether he ought to make any further answer. By his answer, the defendant Graham stated that said leases were executed by said Wm. Tròcke, at Artane, in the County of Dublin, early in February, 1848, and admitted that same were prepared by him, but stated they were made in pursuance of contracts previously entered into; the answer then denied all fraud, and submitted that the defendant was not bound to answer the 7th interrogatory as being likely to subject him to penalties, and as the plaintiff had not waived same said bill was demurrable, and defendant craved the same benefit as if the objection was taken by demurrer. Mr. Hughes, Q.C., and Mr. Close, in support of plea, relied on (1 Dan. C. P. 527;) Vent v. Pacey, (4 Russ. 193;) Greenough v. Gaskell, (1 M. & K. 93;) Lord Walsingham v. Goodricke, (3 Hare, 122;) Desborough v. Rawlins, (3 M. & L. 515;) Sawyer v. Bichmore, (3 M. & K. 578; Herring v. Cloberry, (1 Ph. 91;) Jones v. Pugh, (ibid. 96 ;) Woods v. Woods, (4 Hare, 83;) Blenkinsop v. Blenkinsop, (10 Beav. 277, S.C. 2 Ph. 607.) Mr. Christian, Q.C., and Mr. Burroughs, contra, contended that the plea was bad in form, not having been verified by affidavit. (Dan. C. P. 652-6.) Counsel also cited Desborough v. Rawlins, (3 My. & Cr. 515;) Foley v. Hill, (3. My. & Cr. 475;) Knight v. Gale, (Finch, 259 ;) Greenough v. Gaskell, (1 M. & K. 105;) Harris v. Harris, (3 Hare, 450;) Wall v. Stubbs, (2 V. & B. 354 ) April, 17.-In this case, after stating the facts as above, his Honour adverted to the form of the plea, which covered the greater part of the 7th interrogatory, and prayed judgment whether the defendant should answer, and stated he had no knowledge of the matters save in his character as attorney, and submitted he was not bound to answer, and by his answer he made the same objection, on different grounds. Upon this point, he referred to the 46th General Order of 1843, which corresponds to the 38th English and Mit. E. P. 5th Ed. 381; (8 Beav. 40, 2 Atkyn. 284;) where it is laid down, that although a party may demur to one matter and plead to another, he cannot plead and demur to the same matter; and in Stephens on Pleading, 327, it appeared that a similar rule prevails at law. His Honour then referred to the 66th General Order, which provides "that no demurrer or plea shall be held bad and overruled on argument, only because the answer of the defendant may extend to some part of the same matter as may be covered by such demurrer or plea," and was of opinion that the object of that order was to get rid of technical objections, and in Dan. C. P. 761, it is laid down, that in all cases not coming strictly within the terms of the Order, the principles stated by Lord Redesdale, that all the different defences must refer to separate and distinct parts of the bill, still apply; and consequently he considered the case before him within the rule stated by Lord Redesdale. He was of opinion also that the plea was bad in substance, and referred to the cases of Bowles v. Stewart, (1 Sch. & Lef. 227;) Birch v. Beadles, (10 Sim. 332;) Ruddy v. Williams, (3 Jon. & Lat. 1, Mit. 350; Beames on Pleading, 23; Mitf. 282, 285; Beames on Plead. 38; Mitf. Pl. 3 Ed. 199, Note; also the case of Desborough v. Rawlins, (3 My. & Cr. 515,) in which Lord Cottenham, page 521, speaking of the privilege of a solicitor, says, "Both Bramwell v. Lucas and Greenough v. Gaskell, shew that the privilege only applies to cases in which the client makes a communication to his solicitor, with a view to obtaining his legal advice; this is undoubtedly the same ground upon which I held, in Sawyer v. Bichmore, that a solicitor, when examined as a witness, was bound to produce letters communicated to him from collateral quarters, and to answer questions, seeking information as to matters of fact, as distinguished from confidential communications." "In Sawyer v. Bichmore, the question arose as to a solicitor being bound to disclose the circumstances of certain transactions in which he had been concerned as solicitor. I was of opinion, that the facts were not sufficiently brought before me to shew that they were privileged, and finding it laid down by the Court of King's Bench, that communications are not privileged if coming from any other quarter, but that they would be if they came from the client, I found that a case might exist in which many papers in a solicitor's hands would not be privileged." And (in page 524,) he says "The Court of King's Bench said, that the privilege was restricted to communications, whether oral or written, from the client to his attorney, and could not extend to adverse proceedings communicated to him, as attorney in the cause, from the opposite party, in the disclosure of which there could be no breach of confidence." His Honour also referred to Peake, N. P., 508, and to Greenough v. Gaskell, (1 M. & K. 103,) where Lord Cottenham says, "Thus the witness, or the defendant treated as such and called so to discover, must have learned the matter in question only as solicitor or counsel, and in no other way; if, therefore, he were a party, and especially to a fraud-(and the case may be put, of his becoming informer after being engaged in a conspiracy) that is, if he were acting for himself, though he might also be employed for another, he would not be protected," &c. In Stanhope v. Nott (2 Sw, 221, pote a demurrer, on the ground that all the defendant's knowledge was acquired as counsel, was overruled, and the defendant was ordered to answer, for the trust of a counsel did not extend to the suppression of deeds or wills; and Spencer v. Luttrel (ibid.;) His Honour, after referring to Mitf. Pl. 224, and Beames on Pleading, 33, said he was of opinion that the plea must be overruled. POWELL v. POWELL-April 21, Injunction-Civil Bill Decree. Where a decree to account has been pronounced in an administration suit, the court will restrain creditors from proceeding on foot of civil bill decrees obtained against the administratriz w far as relates to the assets of the intestate, but, the decree being in the nature of a judgment de bonis propriis of the superior courts, the creditors will not be prevented from proceeding against the administrator personally. Before the decree to account, several parties having proceeded against Catherine Powell, the adminis tratrix of Thomas Powell, deceased, in actions at law, both in the superior and Civil Bill Courts, the administratrix applied to this court for an injunetion to restrain those parties from further proceedings at law, and to order them to come in and prove their demands, together with such costs at law as were properly incurred in the said proceedings at law, up to the time at which the several parties had notice that the decree in this cause had been pronounced. The Assistant-Barrister had pronounced several decrees, and Catherine Powell having appealed therefrom, om the hearing of the appeals, Judge Ball made the following order :"Reverse the decree, without prejudice to the plaintiff proceeding to a new trial before the Assistant-Barrister, upon the civil bill already served in this cause, on the terms of the defendant being at liberty to establish credits as against the plaintiff on the trial of such civil bills, in the same way as she might have done upon the trial already had before the Barrister on the 18th of October, 1848, but not any credits which would not have been properly chargeable against the said plaintiff on the taking of the account at the said trial; and in the event of the terms of this order not being complied with, the decree to stand affirmed, without costs, and the defendant to be at liberty to appeal therefrom, as if this order had not been pronounced." Judge Ball had a ffirmed the decrees, in pursuance of the above order, before this appli cation was made. The defendant had served the plaintiffs with the copy of the decree in this cause, and with a notice cautioning them not to proceed |