MASTER OF THE ROLLS.-By the 62nd general order, an injunction obtained before answer, is dissolved without further order, unless within 14 days from the filing of the answer, the plaintiff serves notice of a motion to continue it. In the present case there has been a breach of the order of the By court.

May 23.-MASTER OF THE ROLLS.-In this case the defendant has been rated for poor rate as immediate lessor, and judgment was obtained for the This motion has been resisted on the ground, that this judgment having been obtained, the nature of the demand has been changed. the 6 & 7 Vic. c. 92, sec. 2, any rate payable by an immediate lessor can be recovered by action or suit" in the superior courts, or by civil bill; and by the 3rd section it is provided that if the rate is not paid by the immediate lessor within four calendar months after the making thereof, it shall be lawful for the guardian to give notice in writing to the occupier to pay the rate due, and after the expiration of one

tion stood dissolved under the 62nd general order. And it appearing to the court, that there is not sufficient Equity confessed on the answer for the renewal of said injunction, refuse this motion with costs, to be paid by plaintiff to defendant when taxed, &c."

Lib. 285, fo. 392.

June 9th.-MASTER OF THE ROLLS-The whole question depends on the construction of the will of Mr. Corker, by which he bequeaths this annuity to Anna V. Corker for her life, provided she does not marry again. The question has been decided in a very recent case before Lord Cottenham, Webb v Grace, (2 Ph. 701,) there was a covenant in these terms, "That J. Webb, shall pay to E. Castle, for and during the term of her natural life, subject to the proviso hereinafter contained, an annuity of £40, Condition in restraint of marriage. provided always, and it is hereby agreed and deBequest of an annuity of £50 to A. V. C., a widow, clared by and between the parties hereto, and it is for her life provided she did not marry again. the true intent and meaning of these presents, that Held that the annuity determined on the second in case the said Eliza Castle shall at any time heremarriage of A. V. C., and the proviso that she after happen to marry, then from and immediately should not marry again was not a condition sub-after her marriage the said annuity of £40 shall be sequent so as to be void as in restraint of marriage. The petition in this case stated that Chambre Corker, late of Cor Castle, the father of the petitioner, made his last will and testament, dated the 16th of July, 1841, and after several specific bequests he gave an annuity of £50 per annum to his daughter-in-law, Anna Victoria Corker, the widow of his son Chambre Corker for her life, provided she did not marry again, or sell or in any way dispose of same; that in the year 1848 said Anna V. Corker intermarried with Henry Ainslie, and that said annuity was thereby determined, and the peti-gument. If then this grant is a grant of £40 per tion prayed that the rents of the lands charged with said annuity might be paid to the parties entitled, except said A. V. Corker.

IN RE CORKERS, MINORS.-May 26th and June 9th.

Mr. Jones for the petitioners.-This is a condition precedent. Luxford v. Cheek, (3 Lev. 125;) Sheffield v. Lord Orrery, (3 Atk. 282; 1 Jarman on Wills, 731.) Doe on the dem. of Dean and Chapter of Westminster v. Freeman and wife, (1 T. R. 389;) Fry's case, (1 Vent. 203.) And in Webb v. Grace, (2 Ph. 701,) there was a covenant to pay an annuity to a person during her life, and a proviso that in case she should at any time thereafter happen to marry the annuity should be reduced, that was held to be a covenant to pay the full annuity until marriage, and afterwards the reduced annuity, as the proviso for reduction of the annuity was part of the original gift, and was not a condition subsequent, and void as being in restraint of marriage. [Counsel also referred to Acherley v. Vernon, (Willis 159;) Scott v. Tyler, Dick. 712;) Lowe v. Peers, (4 Burr. 2225;) Grace v. Webb, (14 Sim. 384;) Brooke v. Spong, (15 M. & W. 153;) Cooke v. Turner, (14 Sim. 502.)] Mr.Barnes contra.-There is no disposition over, and this condition should be construed strictly; the estate is given for her life and must vest. Conditions in defeasance must be construed strictly. (4 Bur. 2055; 1 Jarm. 732.) Milvers v. Slater, (8 Ans. 295;) and in Marples v. Banbridge the testator bequeathed to his wife, should she survive and continue unmarried, all his goods, chattels, estate and effects, to possess same during the term of her natural life, and from and after her death he disposed of same; the widow married, and it was held only to be a condition subsequent, and in terrorem.

and is hereby reduced to £20 only, which said sum of £20 shall in such case be paid and payable unto the said E. Castle from the time of her marriage for and during all the remainder of her life." In giving judgment the Lord Chancellor said "The questions which have arisen as to conditions subsequent in restraint of marrying do not appear to me to apply: there can be no doubt that marriage can be made the ground of a limitation ceasing or commencing; it is unnecessary to refer to the authorities for this purpose. Richards v. Baker, Sheffield v. Lord Orrery, Gordon v. Adolphus were cited in the ar

annum until marriage, and from that event happen ing of £20 per annum for life, there can be no doubt but that such a gift is lawful, and that after marriage there can be no demand for the £40 per annum. This claim is grounded on contract and obligation on the part of the grantor; the parties claiming must, therefore, prove that their claim is within the terms of the contract and obligation. What then are these terms? is there in this any contract or obligation to pay £40 annum after the marriage of E. Castle? the argument in favour of the claim assumes that there is an unqualified grant of an annuity of £40 per annum for life, and an attempt to defeat the gift by an illegal condition subsequent; this proposition I think fails in all its parts, for there is not any unqualified gift of an annuity of £40 for life, the contract and obligation is to pay to Eliza Castle during her life, subject to the proviso hereinafter contained, an annuity of £40, at certain times specified. The contract and obligation is not absolute and unqualified, but explained, qualified and bound by the proviso, and must be construed precisely in the same manner as if the terms of the proviso had been introduced into and made part of the contract and obligation. It is, therefore, to pay £40 per annum to her during so much of her life as she shall remain unmarried." Master Brooke, I have been informed, has come to the same conclusion upon this question which arose before him in another case. I consider that this annuity, was determined, and will make the order according to the prayer of the petition.

R. P. H. B. 30, fo. 76.

the inheritance. Much discussion took place, and
it appeared to the court that if any relief could be
given, it could only be by departing from the direc-
tion of that original decree; but that in order to
decide on it, the court must have every one before
it, who was interested in that decree, partly that
the security might not be affected in their absence,
and partly on the ground alluded to-that in a bill
to carry out a decree, the plaintiff must act for the
benefit of all interested under it. On these grounds
the court ordered it to stand over, with liberty to
bring the other parties interested before the court;
these appear to have been the representatives of
Bachelor. The simple course would have been
either by amendment to introduce them by name,
with an averment that they were the persons, mak-
ing no other variations; or which would also be not
improper, to bring them before the court by sup-
plemental bill; it is clear by the authorities that
you may do so. The plaintiff, therefore, might have
done what he has done, so far as he has gone right;
that is to say, might by supplemental bill have
made those persons parties; but he seems to have
thought he had more to do, and he does accordingly
do more. I have omitted to mention the trusts of
the settlement of 1842, through which J. H. Burke
the defendant, who has taken this demurrer, is a
necessary party to this suit, and if they had been
mentioned at the hearing, liberty would have been
given to the plaintiff to make the persons interested
under it parties; and, as in the case of Wood v.
Wood, (4 Y. & C. Ex. 135), that would have en-
titled him to take whatever steps might be neces-
sary against them. In that case the marginal note
is, that "when the court gives leave to amend, by
adding parties, the power so given is in no case to
be considered illusory, and therefore when it is
necessary to read evidence against the new party,
the plaintiff, notwithstanding the order be merely
to amend, may file a supplemental bill, and he may
incorporate in such bill any other mattter which
might, independently of the order to amend, be the
subject of a supplemental bill." An order had
there been made, that the bill should stand dis-
missed, unless the plaintiffs amended their bill, by
adding the official assignee as a party. Then, as
Baron Alderson said, "instead of doing this, the
plaintiff has filed a supplemental bill, in which he
introduced new matter, to which he made the for-
mer defendants parties." A motion was made to
take the bill off the file, and it was held that the
party had a right to adopt the course he had taken.
The court said, "If the party has a right to treat a
supplemental bill as a compliance with the order of
this court, I do not think he alters his position by
including other matters proper to form part of a
supplemental bill in that bill. For this he does
not want the permission of the court, but has a
right to include those matters in a supplemental
bill."-In this country the 56th general order gives
such permission." Suppose the plaintiffs here had
amended their bill in the way in which the defend-
ants suggest they ought to have done, and had also,
after doing this, filed a supplemental bill, including
the new matters, I am not aware that the defend-
ants could have objected to it. If so, it seems to
me that they may well consolidate the new matter
in a supplemental bill, filed under the permission

to amend.
This would be, in fact, the most con-
venient and compendious mode of proceeding." On
the authority of that case, therefore, so far as the
plaintiff rightly brought the defendants before the
court-that is, rightly constructed the suit-he was
justified in doing so, by supplemental bill. The
question is, what else he has done. He has intro-
duced a variety of statements relating to orders for
various purposes in Bachelor v. Blake, and the
other causes, and introduced into the present suit
for two reasons-one declared, and the other easy
to be guessed. He declares a purpose to use them
by way of estoppel, in this way, that the parties
having, by those orders, acted on the decree of
1819, cannot object to it. These are all material
as to the right to this money having been barred by
the statute of limitations; and also on the authori
ties referred to in Dundas v. Blake, (1 Ir. Jur. 121)
in which I lately gave judgment to sustain the
plaintiff's demand, if the suit were not to be treated
as supplemental. Altogether I cannot say that
these statements are irrelevant; they seem of vast
importance, whether as sustaining the right to the
decree of 1819, or as if he began now for the first
time on the settlement of 1773, without basing his
right to relief on that decree. But the more in-
portant they are, the more important it is that all
parties whom they may affect should be before the
court. The more I look at them, the more I think
that all the parties to the bill of 1844 should be
here in this bill. The parties deriving under the
settlements of 1799 and 1809, who might be much
affected by this proceeding, have a right to see.
before a decree on estoppel, that they are protected.
The decision in Jones v. Howell, (2 Hare. 342), is in
point, in which the rule is laid down how far parties
to the original bill are necessary parties. There the
defendants "to an original bill were held to be ne-
cessary parties to a supplemental bill against a new
defendant, where the interests of such original de-
fendants, as well as those of the new defendant
required that the new defendant should be a party
to the suit. Dyson v. Morris, (1 Har. 413), also
bears upon this part of the case. The interest of
the original defendants is the test whether they are
or not necessary parties. They have an interest to
see that there is no decree founded on an estoppel
which ought not to bind them; they have an in-
terest to see that the instrument to bar the statute
of limitations is not improperly used. On that
ground I must say, that the bill is wrong. I might
stop there, but when I look at the prayer, there is
a good deal to observe. The plaintiff appears to
have framed it on the assumption that it is a case
for the court to do what it has done in some cases,
that is, not carry out fully the decree of 1819, but
carry it out so far as it is right, and it is contended
that on the bill of 1844 that can be done. The
words "so far as may be necessary for the plain-
tiff's relief," are not material, and it does not appear
whether that can be done by consent, as in the case
of O'Connell v. Macnamara, (3 Dru. & W. 411);
whether by the court stopping short, and only doing
part of what had been previously decreed; or
whether, as in Hamilton v. Haughton, (2 Bli. 169),
the bill must be re-cast, for that case does not de
cide that a party is at liberty to take up an errone-
ous decree, and amend it. Lord Redesdale says,

"The amendment to this bill may be not only by plaintiff could not, upon a re-hearing, obtain the making proper parties to it, but by framing his relief asked by the second bill, nor could he, by such bill according to the rights of the parties, namely, second bill, obtain the relief thereby prayed, while to have the proper trusts carried into execution," the decree stood in its present form; that is to obtain which seems rather to imply that the plaintiff must the relief asked, the original cause must be re-heard file a new bill to carry out the deed, than modify with the second, and consequently, that the second the former decree, which is the relief which the bill was a supplemental bill, in the nature of a bill present bill seeks. After stating what I have al- of review, which ought not to be filed without the luded to, this prays that the plaintiff may be en- leave of the court." I did not advert to the leave titled to the full benefit of the suit so instituted by of the court, the want of which is an additional eleBachelor, and of the former decrees. It goes ment of irregularity here. I will refer now to a somewhat beyond the bill of 1843, but is not incon- case showing that such relief can only be obtained sistent with it; it goes on, "And if your lordship on a bill of review; the facts were not so strong shall be of opinion that the said several decrees as they are in the case before me, that is, the case of which were made in this cause, ought not to be Toulman v. Copeland, (4 Hare. 41), on re-hearing; carried into execution according to the terms it also illustrates the difficulty of making a variathereof, then that the same may be carried into tion in a decree. It turned on the question, whether execution for the benefit of the plaintiff, in such a substantial vendition was sought. It was the same manner, and from and with such modifications as thing in Ogilvie v. Heron, (13 Ves. 563,) which was to your lordship shall seem meet." What is the a decree pro confesso. Then, what does this bill meaning of, modify a decree? Is it that the court seek to have done? Is it to have the plaintiff deis to take an enrolled decree, and modify, that clared entitled to the benefit of the decree? or that is vary it, which the court has not power to do, a new decree be made? In Perry v. Phelips, (17 except on a bill praying to open the enrolment, and Ves. 173,) Lord Eldon seems to doubt whether a vary the decree for errors apparent on it, or such bill of this kind is open to plea or demurrer; he other grounds as the court allows, which this bill says, "If it is competent to the plaintiff, not filing a does not do? It goes on then, "that an account a bill of review together with a bill of revivor and may be taken of what is due to your suppliant on supplement in order to have the relief which may be foot of his charge, and also an account on foot of obtained by such a bill, but stating that he will not all prior and contemporaneous incumbrances, and determine whether there is error apparent in the dethat all other necessary accounts may be taken on cree, contending that there is, but in case it shall foot of the other parts, shares, or proportions of not prove so, electing in his prayer to make it a mere the aforesaid sum of £10,000, and that your plain- bill of revivor, or supplement, or both; the consetiff may be paid what shall appear due to him, or quence is, that all the protection against a bill of in default thereof, that what shall be found due to revivor, founded on error apparent in the decree, is plaintiff on foot of his demand, and all prior and gone by the effect of that alternative prayer. In the contemporaneous incumbrancers may be raised by case of newly-discovered facts the leave of the a sale of a sufficient portion of the townlands, &c. Court must be obtained, which gives protection, but comprised in the said term of 500 years, according this difficulty occurs from putting the case in the to the nature of such charges, and as the same alternative, that the defendant can neither plead nor respectively affect the inheritance in the said lands, demur, he must be brought to a hearing, and may or are secured only by means of such trust term, incur all the vexation of a suit, whether it shall turn and that all proper parties may join." That is to out to be a bill of review or not." The modern say, the court is to go back to the report passed doctrine seems to be that a bill contrary to the course by the decree of 1819, take up the account on that of the Courts is open to demurrer. I do not know, report, and make a new decree as if there had been however, whether there be any such case; I can only none, and thus have one decree enrolled directing find Story Eq. Pl. Sec. 638, where, speaking of dea sale of the fee and inheritance, and another direct-murrer to bills not original, he says, "It is also a ing an account and sale of the term, or of the fee, good cause of demurrer to a bill of either sort that as the case might be. No such bill was ever heard it is not brought according to "the course of the of; no such decree could be made, save on re-hear-court." At all events although on this defect of ing, or on a bill of review for error apparent. If parties I shall allow the demurrer, I shall give the we look to the recent cases on variation, we find plaintiff leave to amend by adding parties. them even more strict as to the practice than the earlier authorities. In Davis v. Bluck, (6 Beav. 393,) the case was not so strong as it is here. In that case "a contract was entered into for the sale

of the vendor's interest in a lease and premises at Doncaster, known as the betting rooms, for the remainder of the lease granted by A. A bill for specific performance was filed by the purchaser, in which (in the decree) the agreement was treated as comprising the premises held of A. An account of the rents was directed; it turned out that the rooms and premises were partly under A and partly under B; whereupon the vendor filed a second bill, praying a declaration that the whole was comprised in the agreement. Held, however, that the

ROLLS COURT.

HAMILTON GEALE AND WIFE v. JOHN Nugent
AND OTHERS; MICHAEL MOLONY, PETITIONER,
EDWARD JOHN NUGENT, RESPONDENT; SAME
PETITIONER V. SAME RESPONDENT.-July, 21.
An attorney or solicitor ought not to be appointed a
receiver, and if he should be appointed the Court
will, upon application for that purpose, direct
him to be removed on that ground.
When several judgments are vested in the same per-
son, separate petitions for the appointment of re-
ceivers should not be presented on foot of each