VENANT.

ORNEY-GENERAL-See PARTIES.

na suit instituted against a charity or the crown the Attorney-General ought to be fully apprised of the proceedings. Potts v. Turnley, 57. Attorney-General having been made a notice party in respect of a recognizance by a receiver, as if within the 15th and 23rd General Orders, where he should have been an answering party, counsel for the AttorneyGeneral appearing at the hearing, and consenting to be bound, the court made a decree. Abbott v. Abbott, 155. KER. A., being a stockbroker and notary public, received money on deposit, and paid it out on checks like a banker, and in some other respects acted as a banker, he did not hold himself out to the public as such, nor did it appear he was generally believed to be one, and in his books the alleged banking accounts were mixed with others, as a stockbroker and trader. Held, that he was not a banker within 33 G. 2, c. 14, requiring the enrolling and registry of banker's deeds. Stafford v. Henry, 133.

Quære, does that Act apply to bankers not issuing notes. Ib.

A cred tor who appears in court to oppose the confirmation of a banker's certificate, under 33 G. 2, c. 14, and 40 G. 3, c. 22, will be restrained by injunction from proceeding at law for recovery of his debt, pending the proceedings for the allowance of the certificate. Guinness v. Fitzsimon, 357.

A party trading openly as a banker, found to be a banker within the meaning of the 33 G. 2, c. 14, and 40 G. 3, c. 22, notwithstanding that he carried on another more ostensible business than that of banker. Ib., (Masters Office,) 359.

Ib.

Held, that 33 G. 2, c. 14, and 40 G. 3, c. 22, extend to all bankers, as well those whose banks are not of issue, and those which are so. INKRUPT. A bankrupt is privileged from arrest, under section 136 of the 6 W. 4, c. 14, only when actually coming to surrender, and therefore where a bankrupt returned from Liverpool on the 20th, was arrested on the 23rd, the court refused to dis

A caveat was entered, and allowed to expire; the plaintiff enrolled the decree without giving notice to the defendant. Held, not irregular. Tilly v. Browne, 258.

A caveat should be renewed after 28 days. CHARGING ORDER.

Ib.

Where a charging order has been obtained by a judgment creditor upon funds reported to a creditor in a cause, the court, where there is no controversy as to the right to the fund charged, will direct it to be paid to the petitioner without a bill being filed. Fulton v. Farran, 66.

Semble, when there is a conflict of right the fund will not be transferred on motion. Ib.

COSTS, of. See COSTS. CHARITY, in a suit against, Attorney-General should be fully apprised of the proceedings. Potts v. Turnley, 57.

CHOSE IN ACTION.

A legatee assigned his legacy without giving notice to the executor, or the person on whose lands the assets of the testator were a charge; the executor died, the legatee obtained administration de bonis non, wasted the assets, and became insolvent. Held, that notice to the debtor was not necessary to complete the assignment, that the assignees could not be taken to have purchased from an executor, the assignment being as between the parties complete before administration granted to the legatee, that it having been found that the funds wasted were received as assets, it could not be considered payment. Molloy v. French, 350. CODICIL-See WILL. CONDITION, in restraint of Marriage-See MARRIAGE. CONDITIONAL ORDER for Receiver.

GAGE.

See MORT.

Marriage with- See WILL. CONVEYANCE.

The court has no jurisdiction, under the 28 G. 3, c. 35, to order the master to execute a conveyance to a purchaser where the heir of the conuzor is a minor resident out of the jurisdiction. M Grehan v. Rankin, 2.

The 28 Geo. 3, c. 35, which provides that in some cases the court may order the execution of conveyances by the master does not apply to the case of a married woman, resident out of the jurisdiction. Nugent v. Piers, 211.

COSTS, GENERALLY. The court will not allow a claim for costs to be interfered with by any set off not actually arising in the cause, although the set off arises in another suit concerning the same matter. Reilly v. Shiel, 31, Eq. Ex.

In a possessory suit for an injunction, the rule, that costs
of suit are not given, does not apply to the costs of
the motion shewing cause, and if the cause is insuffi-
cient, the defendant becomes liable to the costs of
the motion. Coppinger v. Carnegie, 27.
Semble, costs in Equity are not in the nature of dama-
ges but of debt. Archbishop of Dublin v. Lord
Trimleston, 49.

Costs were given against a trustee, who, having a bene-
fit under a deed, compelled a plaintiff to establish a
will by which it was revoked. Irvine v. Rogers, 74.
In taxing costs allowances were claimed, which the
taxing master refused to make, the question not
being raised by the requisition. Order made refer-

COSTS GENERALLY, (continued.)

ing it to taxing master to make such allowance if any. Walshe v. Sheehy, 78.

Costs of receivers account not passed in time disallowed. Bessonet v. Waller, 150.

A Court of Equity will direct a taxation, although all the costs be for conveyancing. Limerick and W. Railway v. O'Ferrall, 193.

An overpaid creditor puisne to the plaintiff has no right to his costs, though he was not paid off at the time of putting in his answer. Meredyth v. Creed,

210. Administrator by his answer put forward accounts

which were completely falsified; he was charged with the costs of the suit. Orr v. Milliken, 217. A bill filed on behalf of a lunatic in pursuance of the master's report, to clear away doubt from the lunatic's title, which without suit could not have been done, and the lunatic having succeeded, held that under the circumstances the principal defendants, trustees of a charity, were entitled to the costs out of the lunatic's estate. In re Turnley, 257. A decree of the Court of Chancery in Ireland directed that the plaintiffs who resided in England should pay to a defendant her costs of suit. This defendant, previous to exemplifying the decree, issued a subpoena out of the Irish Court of Chancery, and caused it to be personally served on the plaintiffs. Held that this proceeding was unnecessary, and the costs of this personal service were not allowed. Stamer v. Nesbitt, 298.

Semble, the 41 Geo. 3, c. 90, s. 6, which provides for the exemplification of Irish decrees in the Court of Chancery in England, applies to decrees or orders which direct payment of costs generally, as well as those in which a particular sum is named. Ibid. The court will order a solicitor to attend and tax his costs, and if the taxing master has been unable to proceed on account of his non attendance, he will have to pay the costs of the motion. In re Kelly, 329. A mortagee's solicitor obtained the carriage of a sale in a lunacy matter, and wrote a letter to the committee's solicitor promising to do his best to save expense to the lunatic; the sale took place within a very short time after the title had been investigated for the mortgagee by the same solicitor. Held that the solicitor was not entitled to charge part of the costs of preparing the abstract, or for any matters he appeared to have previously performed when investigating title for the mortgagee. In re Bell, a lunatic,

349.

Semble, that even if such letter had not been written, he would not have been entitled to such a charge a second time. Ibid.

A notice party having entered a special appearance under the 19th general order, held entitled to her costs under the special circumstances of the case. Callaghan v. Callaghan, 350.

Contribution to-See DECRee. See RAILWAY COM

PANY.

Of pauper-Bill filed in January, 1842, 3rd of June. Plaintiff obtained a conditional order for liberty to sue in formâ pauperis. On the 28th of June the defendant answered; on the 3rd of November the conditional order was made absolute; on the 13th of January, 1843, the bill was amended, and no further steps were taken by the plaintiff. On the 10th of January, 1845, the defendant answered the amended bill, and on the 24th of June obtained an order dismissing plaintiff's bill with costs generally. In 1849 the plaintiff was arrested under an attachment for these costs. The order of June, 1845, was set aside, and the plaintiff ordered to be discharged. Staunton v. Barrington, 317.

A bill by a pauper plaintiff will be dismissed without costs so far as relates to costs subsequent to the order admitting plaintiff to sue as a pauper. Ibid. Quære, as to the costs incurred in the interval between the absolute and conditional order. Ibid.

Of an ejectment by head landlord when a receiver has been appointed. See RECEIVER.

Of

Of receiver not accounting within time limited by general order. See ACCOUNT, RECEIVER. purchaser-Where several objections to the title have been taken by a purchaser, some of which are allowed, and others overruled, on motion to discharge the purchaser, and that he be paid his costs, the costs of the objections which have been overruled will be set off against those which have been allowed. Ras kell v. Church, 259.

Of retainer of solicitor-The case of in re Bracey (14 L. J., C. 299), where it was held that under a common order directing the reference of a solicitor's bill for taxation, the taxing master has jurisdiction to decide a question of retainer, will not be followed. Belas v. Norris, 267.

Of stayed suits - Where there are several suits, and a decree having been obtained in one, proceedings in the others are stayed. The plaintiffs in the stayed suits are personally liable in the first instance to pay the costs of the several defendants, who are not obliged to wait till the funds are realized under the decree. O'Keefe v. Holmes, 78. Confirmed on appeal, 125.

Where a creditor's suit has been stayed by reason of a prior decree having been obtained in a similar suit, and the plaintiff ordered to pay the costs in the stayed cause, he will be entitled to be repaid them only in the same priority as his own demand. Tangney v. Holmes, 162.

Semble, except those of prior encumbrancers, as to

which he may make out a case to entitle him to be paid in the same priority as the incumbrancers themselves. Ibid.

When a creditor's suit, instituted in the Court of

Chancery, has been stayed by reason of a prior decree to account in the Exchequer in a cause of a similar frame, and between the same parties and the plaintiff in the stayed suit had paid the costs of one of the defendants, the court will not order the receiver in the first cause to pay the plaintiff in the stayed suit the amount of the costs so paid to the prejudice of prior incumbrancers. Levinge v. De Montmorency, 251 Eq. Ex.

In such a case the plaintiff in the stayed cause is per sonally liable to the costs of prior incumbrancers if the fund proves deficient, and puisne creditors are only entitled to their costs in the same priority as their demands, but this court will restrain the defen dant from proceeding against the plaintiffs in the stayed suits for their costs therein until the fund is realized. Ibid.

The Courts of Chancery and Exchequer exercise a concurrent jurisdiction, and the rule as to the enforce ment of costs under staying orders is the same, whether the suits are instituted in the same or diffe rent Courts of Equity. Ibid.

In stayed suits, plaintiff's personally liable. Fawcett v. Biggs, 352; and see Loftie v. Forbes, 352 Solicitor's lien for-Though a solicitor discharge him.

COSTS GENERALLY, (continued.)

self, the court will not direct him to deliver up to his former client documents on which he claims a lien, unless a case of pressing necessity or danger of loss be made out. Limerick and W. Railway v. O'Ferrall, 193.

Where a solicitor has a general lien upon papers of his client, which are required for the purposes of a suit, the court has the power of forcing him to bring in the deeds, and of preserving his rights as they existed on the papers. Levinge v. Montmorency, 285, Eq. Ex. Security for-A mortgagee resident out of the jurisdiction, presented a petition for a receiver, and a conditional order was obtained. Upon a pet tion to show cause, the respondent objected to the petitioner being heard without giving security for costs. petitioner was allowed to proceed, his solicitor personally undertaking to pay any costs which the court might direct. Prater v. Portarlington, 259. COVENANT, not to assign, waiver of. See LEASE. CROWN. See ATTORNEY-GENERAL. DECREE, service of deemed good. See PRACTICE.

The

A decree against two for payment of costs is joint and
several, and the registering of such decree under 3 and
4 Vic., c. 105, s. 27, does not alter its effect. Arch-
bishop of Dublin v. Trimleston, 49.

Where a decree declared that the defendants A and B
should pay to the plaintiff his costs of the cause
when taxed and ascertained. Held that the effect
was not necessarily to establish contribution in moie-
ties between the parties; such contribution will de-
pend on the circumstances of the case.
An enrolment will not be opened for a party who delays
the application. Tilly v. Browne, 258.
See CAVIAT.

DEMURRER for multifariousness,

Ibid.

See PLEADING.

EVIDENCE.

Evidence of a defendant who might have been made a co-plaintiff is admissible for the plaintiff under the 6 and 7 Vic., c. 85. Kelly v. Bennison, 17.

A defendant claiming under a deed impeached by the bill may be examined in support of the deed on behalf of co-defendants. Irwin v. Rogers, 17. The 97th general order, allowing documents to be proved by affidavit, does not apply when the existence of the instrument is denied by the defendant's answer. Bagnall v. Horne, 33.

EVIDENCE, (continued)

FEE

Where a bill stated leases and outstanding terms, and
the answer admitted a belief of their existence, but
ignorance as to where they were, or by or to whom
granted, held to be sufficient evidence of their exis-
tence to enable the court to grant relief. Maturin v.
Wilson, 281.

A defendant against whom a bill has been taken pro
con. may be examined for plaintiff. Kelly v. Fox, 21.
Deaf wittness permitted to read depositions. See
WITNESS.
FARM RENT.

A bill having been filed to recover

a fee farm rent a receiver was granted, the bill containing a statement that there was a loss of title deeds, and confusion of boundaries. Ogleby v. Campbell, 106.

FINES. See RENEWAL FINES.

GENERAL ORDERS-See PRACTICE.
GOOD FAITH. Bill filed contrary to. See JURISDIC-

Form of order of reference. Ex parte Hutton, 107.
Receiver, under. Ex parte Johnson, 132.

Primary fund for payment of debts, suppression of ma-
terial facts. Ex parte Kennedy, 147.

Fee to counsel allowed on petition. In re Darcy, 212. INCUMBRANCE, sale subject to. See PRACTICE. INJUNCTION against railway company. See PRACTICE. Where a person put into possession of a gatehouse as caretaker after several years refused to give posses. sion, in order to raise the question whether such a bill would lie, a conditional order for an injunction was granted against him. Moore v. Marsh, 42. Injunction against corporation of Dublin to restrain them from applying Pipe Water Rate in payment of interest on debentures refused, the majority of the debenture holders not being before the court. Jackson v. Corporation of Dublin, 177.

Upon such application court will take into consideration the balance of inconvenience, and although the act complained of is improper, if the granting the injunction is attended with injustice or inconvenience to third parties, the motion will be refused. Ib. See BANKER. Costs of. See COSTS. INTEREST. Interest on Renewal Fines. See RENEWAL FINES.

JUDGMENTS. Judgments of the Exchequer rank in the same priority with those of other courts obtained in or as of the same term, the Exchequer judgment having relation to the first day of term, although the day of the plaintiff's appearance named in the declaration be subsequent to it. Smith v. Chichester, 65. A. having obtained a judgment in respect of a salvage advance, extended a receiver appointed by B. a prior judgment creditor. Held, that on petition, the court will not decide the question of priority, B. insisting on his right to be paid in the priority of his judgment. O'Grady v. Glover, 153.

Subpoena to Hear. See PRACTICE. See CHARGING

ORDER.

JUDGMENT CREDITOR. Proceeding at law with notice of a decree to account. See PRACTICE. H. sold horses at prices above their real value to G., a young man, entitled to a remainder in tail, expectant on his father's life estate, G. gave security for the price by judgment, on a bill filed by a person claiming through G., the judgments were ordered to stand as security for the real value of the horses only, although it appeared that the sale had not been

See LIMITATIONS.

JURISDICTION. Where a bill has been filed contrary

to good faith. Semble, the court has, at the instance of a defendant, summary jurisdiction to take the bill off the file. Nugent v. Leyden, 139. LEASE. Ecclesiastical lease, interest on fines. See RE

NEWAL.

Lease in 1819 containing a covenant, that the lessee, his heirs and assigns, should not set, sell, alienate, or otherwise dispose of any part of said demised premises, without the consent in writing of the lessor. In case of breach a penal rent was reserved; in 1824 the lessee assigned with consent; in 1845 there was another assignment without consent. Held, that the consent to the first assignment was not a general waiver of the covenant, and the lessor was entitled to the penal rent. Steward v. Hassard, 291. LEGACY, assignment of. See CHOSE IN ACTION.

See

Executory. See WILL. LIMITATIONS, Statute of. An acknowledgment by a mortgager in writing of the payment of interest on the mortgage, and not signed by him, Held, insufficient, within the 40th section of the 3 & 4 W. 4, c. 27, to take the case out of the Statute. In re Commissioners of Wide Streets, Cork, 9.

Where a testator devises lands, subject to the payment
of his just debts, directly to the devisee, and without
the intervention of trustees. Held, that there is no
trust created so as to save a debt from the operation
of the Statute. Dundas v. Blake, 121.
A judgment creditor cannot avail himself of the pen-
dency of a foreclosure suit, as keeping his debt alive,
when it is barred by the Statute of Limitations.
Bennett v. Bernard, 145.

A judgment creditor revived against the heir, but not against the executor of the conusor, after an allocation order in a suit to administer the conusor's estate, upon motion on notice to all parties, the judgment creditor obtained leave to come in and prove. The fund in court was produced by a sale of the testator's personal estate. Held, that the master was precluded from going into the question, whether the judgment was barred as against the executor, and the proper time for raising the question was on the application for liberty to prove. Hutchins v. O'Sullivan, 325. LUNATIC. See GUARDIAN.

Costs of making Title to a Lunatic's Estate. See
Costs.

MIANTENANCE, allowance for, court refused to appoint a receiver over. Gardiner v. Blessinton, 250. MARRIAGE, condition in restraint of. Bequest of an an

nuity to A. V. C., a widow, for her life, provided she did not marry again. Held, that the annuity determined on the second marriage of A. V. C, and the proviso that she should not marry again, was not a condition subsequent, so as to be void as in restraint of marriage. In re Corkers, 316. With consent. See WILL.

MARRIED WOMAN, conveyance by. See CONVEY

the motion will be moved at the sitting of the court, Graves v. Graves, 155.

Notice parties. See PARTIES, COSTS. PARTIES. When a person not an idiot or lunatic, bat of a weak mind, files a bill to recover the arrears of an annuity, by his son and next friend, without a commission of lunacy having been issued, Attorney Ge neral is not a necessary party. Carr v. Osborne, 2. At the hearing, a bill was allowed to stand over for amendment by adding parties. The plaintiff added the necessary parties by supplemental bill, which contained new matter affecting the parties to the original suit. Held that they were necessary parties. Macnamara v. Blake, 317.

Where a bill was filed subsequent to March, 1843, and by a supplemental bill judgment creditors were made notice parties, a decree was made, giving them liberty to surcharge and falsify the accounts taken in the original cause, and in default that they should be bound by the proceedings. Williams v. Walker,

331.

PAUPER, costs of. See COSTS
PERPETUITY, purchase of. See RENEWAL FINE.
PLEADING (Demurrer). A bill against an executor to

carry into execution the trusts of a will, and for pay.
ment of annuity thereby granted, stated that an
agreement had been entered into by the defendant
with one E. R., by which he was to pay the annuity,
and that certain premises had been assigned to secure
same; that after the death of E. R., S. M. R.
pro-
cured from defendant an assignment of said pre-
mises. The defendant by his answer stated that the
annuity had been assigned to him by the plaintiff,
The bill was amended, and prayed that the assign
ment should be declared fraudulent and void. Held
on demurrer that the case made by the amended bill
was no misjoinder, nor was there any departure from
the case made by the original bill. Tomlinson v.
Cox, 17.

Bill by A., B., and C., to foreclose a mortgage against X., tenant for life, and Y. tenant in tail in remainder. Y. files a bill against A., B. and C., also against D. solicitor for the plaintiffs in the first cause, praying that the bill may be taken as a cross bill against A., B., and C., and that the mortgage and other deeds executed to give effect to same might be declared fraudulent and void, and that A., B., and C. might be directed to account as mortgagees in possession, and that an account might be taken of the sums due on foot of a judgment obtained by D., subsequent to the mortgage, and that certain bills of costs which formed part of the sum secured by the judgment might be taxed. Demurrer by A., B., and C. for multifariousness. Another demurrer by D. Both demurrers allowed. Crofts v. Allman, 113. Bill by an uncertificated bankrupt to raise the arrears of an annuity, making the assignee a defendant, and charging that the arrears due amounted to £646; that of the creditors who proved under the commis. sion, all had signed a composition deed save one, to whom £130 was due, and also charging specific collusion between the asignee and the debtor. De murrer by the assignee allowed, without costs. Wyse v. Waters, 130. Plea-Bill stated that, in 1838, J. W. made a will; that in 1845 he made another will, by which the former one was revoked; that in 1846 the second will was destroyed by the direction of J. W., and in 1848 J. W. died intestate, and plaintiff, as heir at law, entered into possession of all his real estates, and prayed that the evidence of the witnesses to the will of 1845, and of the person who destroyed same, might be perpetuated. Plea, that there were tenants in possession of some of the real estate who had not paid rent to or acknowledged plaintiff, and the matters in dispute could be immediately tried by action at law against same. Plea allowed. Lindsay v. Lind

say, 218.

PLEADING, (continued.)

Overruled on appeal, 289. Where a bill charges that a defendant is connected with the preparation and execution of certain fraudulent leases, and seeks a discovery of the matters alleged to be fraudulent, the defendant cannot, by a plea of professional confidence, protect himself from discovery. Kelly v. Jackson, 233.

Plea to bill of revivor. See RENEWAL. Semble, a supplemental bill cannot pray to modify the original decree. Macnamara v. Blake, 317. As to judgment creditors made notice parties by supplemental bill. Williams v. Walker, 331. Bill filed to raise a fee farm rent. A receiver granted, the bill containing a statement that there was a loss of title deeds, and confusion of boundaries.

v. Campbell, 106.

Ogleby

A mo

A bill to raise a judgment was taken pro con. tion for a receiver was granted, although the bill did not pray for a receiver. Richardson v. Austen, 20. POLICY OF ASSURANCE. Mortgagee is not bound to account for the sums paid to him on foot of a policy of assurance effected in Ireland on the life of his debtor, when the premiums have been paid out of his own money, and there is no contract between mortgagee and mortgagor on the subject. Bell v. Ahearne, 153.

POOR-RATE. A judgment was obtained by the guardians of a poor-law union for rate due by the defendant as immediate lessor after the proceedings at law; a receiver was appointed over the defendant's interest in the lands, out of which the rate became due, upon application by the guardians that the receiver might pay this rate. Held that the judgment against the immediate lessor did not prevent the guardians from proceeding against the occupier, under the 6 and 7 Vic., cap. 92, s. 3. and that the receiver was bound to pay the amount. Montmorency v. Pratt, 315.

POWER OF REVOCATION. See REVOCATION. PRACTICE. See CAVEAT, CONVEYANCE, RECEIVER, COSTS, EJECTMENT, NOTICE.

Amendment-After demurrer allowed as to one defendant by the operation of the 64th general order, the plaintiff having paid the costs to that defendant, amended the bill, and issued a subpœna against the defendant, who appeared. Held that the plaintiff could not take the bill pro con. against him. Hornebrooke v. Ware, 117.

A demurrer allowed under 64th general order; liberty
to amend refused, the costs not having been paid.
Sherlock v. Disney, 127.

Second amendment after demurrer allowed. Lord
Cork v. Blennerhasset, 164.

Where the plaintiff at the bearing has obtained leave to
amend, he cannot again set down the cause without
discharging the order, or amending the bill. Baker
v. M'Dermott, 162.

An order to amend without prejudice to an order pro con. will not be granted when the amendment might prejudice the plaintiff. Ibid.

Where a demurrer, not having been set down for ar-
gument, was allowed under the 64th general order,
the court will not permit the record to be amended
by reintroducing upon it the defendant, against whom
the bill was dismissed, a new defence having arisen
since the filing of the original bill. Sherlock v.
Disney, 195.

Replication amended. Rowland v. M'Donnell, 195.
Notice of motion to dismiss served on the 14th of
April. On the same day notice of amendment was
served, but the bill was not amended till the 16th.
Held that the amendment was no answer to the mo-
tion to dismiss. Seaver v. Fivey, 258.
Striking out a plaintiff is not such an amendment as
may be made by the Deputy Keeper of the Rolls
under the 49th general order. Vance v. Ranfurly,

284.

After issue joined and witnesses examined by the de

PRACTICE, (continued.)

fendant, the plaintiff will not be permitted to amend the bill by introducing new matter, which will alter the frame of the suit, and to which an answer is required. O'Keefe v. Lanigan, 328.

Continuing proceedings under sheriff's act-Where a notice pursuant to the first order under the 154th general order has been served, and before the second order has been made, the court cannot continue proceedings, under the 5 and 6 Wm. 4, c. 55. Lawlor v. Lowry, 251.

The court has authority to permit the assignee of a judgment to continue the proceedings in his own name, but where the original proceedings have been taken by a trustee, and an assignment has thus been rendered necessary, the court will not give the costs of the motion to continue. Weir v. Ormsby, 283. Depositions-Where by mistake of the examiner a witness was not examined to two interrogatories, a re-examination was allowed after publication had passed, and the cause was set down for hearing. Molony v. O'Brien, 20.

A defendant against whom a bill has been taken pro con.
may be examined for the plaintiff. Kelly v. Fox, 21.
Proof of documents by affidavit. See EVIDEnce.
Deaf witness permitted to read depositions. See WIT-

NESS.

The court will not make an order to suppress depositions on the ground that some of the interrogatories were leading, unless it is shown what part of the deposition is an answer to the leading interrogatory, and then only so much will be suppressed. Kirkwood v. Lloyd, 225.

That a deposition is not evidence is an objection for the hearing, and is not to be taken by motion to suppress depositions. Ibid.

The court is not bound to suppress depositions in all cases of irregularity, and where by accident the defendant's solicitor gave but two days' notice of examining a witness, instead of four, as required by the 87th general order, the court permitted the deposition to stand, with liberty to the plaintiff to cross-examine the witness. Guirey v. Loughnane, 283. Elect, rule to-If a plaintiff proceeds at law and in Equity, a defendant cannot, immediately after a hort or evasive answer, enter a side-bar rule to elect. Such a rule is entered at the peril of the defendant, and if upon exception the answer is found not to be full, the rule will not be effectual. Read v. Dublin and D. R. Co., 19.

General orders-The general orders are binding on the court, but may be relieved against in cases of fraud or inevitable accident. Downing v. Hodder, 137.

Under the 93rd general order the term vacation is re

ferable to the period when the court is not sitting. Anderson v. Mulvany, 154.

A. B. devised property to his wife for life, and after charging with legacies, and amongst others to T. V., he directed the residue, after his wife's decease, to be divided among the legatees in the same proportion as the legacies. The testator also authorised his wife to appoint trustees to carry the will into execution. By her will the widow appointed trustees for that purpose. After her death a suit was instituted to carry the will of A. B. into execution, and a decree for a sale pronounced. Held that the trustees did not sufficiently represent T. V. to bring the case within the 24th general order, and in his absence a good title could not be made to a purchaser. Ruskell v. Church, 185.

Injunctions Where a railway company, having agreed to purchase lands, entered and carried on their works without the leave of the vendor, or having paid or lodged the money in bank, the court granted an injunction until the money was paid. Anderson v. Newry and Warrenpoint Railway Co., 11, Eq. Ex. Costs of injunction in possessory suits. See COSTS. Answer filed on the 31st of March; exceptions taken