IX.-MOTIONS. (See different heads.) Generally.]-A motion brought upon a notice served before the affidavits were filed, on which it is grounded, is irregular, and will not be entertained, though copies of the affidavits be served at the same time with the notice. Anonymous, 2 Ir. L. Rep. 169, Q. B. The defendant is entitled, on the last day of term, to discharge the plaintiff's notice of motion with On costs, it not being in the list. any other day cause; and the opposite party gave notice of a mo- A notice of motion to set aside proceedings for irregularity should specify the irregularity. Kirk v. Anderson, 6 Ir. L. Rep. 467, Q. B. Filing an answering affidavit, and appearing on the notice is no waiver of the irregularity. Ib. A notice of motion is irregular if it does not state in term, the course would be to put it in the list, the grounds on which it is made, and a reference to and have it discharged with costs. 2 Ir. L. Rep. 210, C. P. Laird v. Laird, The court will not allow the costs of a motion to set aside proceedings, when the notice of motion does not sufficiently specify the defect upon which the motion is grounded. Lynch v. Ejector, 2 Ir. L. Rep. 240, Ex. No motion can be entertained when the cause is out of court, until the expiration of a term's notice to the defendant. Jones v. Lucy, 3 Ir. L. Rep. 361, C. P. The notice of motion to set aside proceedings should state on whose behalf the motion is made. Crawford v. M'Donnell, 4 Ir. L. Rep. 104, Q. B. An affidavit of merits made in compliance with a notice of the opposite party, though not sworn or filed until after the day on which the motion might originally have been made, may be used upon the motion. Boileau v. Homan, 4 Ir. L. Rep. 118, C.P. The court will allow an affidavit to be read in support of a motion in Chamber, though not filed at the time of the service of the notice, if a copy be served with the notice. Smith v. Blair, 4 Ir. L. Rep. 397, Q. B. Ch. A notice of motion should always state the grounds upon which it is to be made. Anonymous, 4 Ir. L. Rep. 434, Ex. The affidavit of service of a notice of motion did not state that it had been served before six o'clock in the evening. Held, that defect was not waived by the appearance of the party served, and a cautionary notice served by him, which only specified another alleged defect in the notice. Boileau v. Homan, 5 Ir. L. Rep. 183, C. P. A notice of motion founded on an affidavit "to be filed," is irregular and cannot be used. Taylor v. White, 5 Ir. L. Rep. 44, Ex. The notice of motion ought not to state that it will be grounded on affidavits " to be filed." Lewis v. Kirwan, 5 Ir. L. Rep. 123, Ex. Costs of a motion will not be given if the party moving omit to ask them. Levy v. Fenton, 5 Ir. L. Rep. 129, Ex. À notice of motion will not be discharged till set down in the list by one or other party. Stevens v. French, 5 Ir L. Rep. 244, C. P. An objection to a notice of motion, stating it to be grounded on affidavits," this day filed," though not filed till the following day, is waived by the opposite party filing an answering affidavit. Cooper v. Kerby, 5 Ir. L. Rep. 254, Ex. Counsel should not move, unless furnished with a brief of the documents upon which the motion is founded. Anonymous, 6 Ir. L. Rep. 237, Ex. A party filing an affidavit as cause against a conditional order, served no notice of a motion to show an affidavit filed is not sufficient. Larkin v. Lawder, 7 Ir. L. Rep. 227, C. P. A motion to extend the time for making up a bill of exceptions must be upon notice. Russell v. Whalley, 7 Ir. L. Rep. 492, Ex. "When there are two notices pending at the same time, one to show cause against a rule nisi, and the other to make rule nisi absolute, unless the other party shall move his motion on or before 8 day to be named in said notice; and which day sha!! not be less than two days after the day named in the notice of showing cause; and if, after the said second notice shall become moveable, a question of precedency, as to the two motions, shall arise, that in such case the motion first brought forward is to have precedency." Q. B. 18th April, 1845. A notice of motion should specify the grounds of the irregularity on which the proceedings are sought to be set aside. Cator v. Flattery, 8 Ir. L. Rep. 117, Q. B. Taking out an attested copy of a declaration waives an irregularity in the notice of its being filed, and the rule to plead. Cannon v. Willington, 9 Ir. L. Rep. 138; S. C. BI. D. & O. 47, C. P. A notice of motion signed by an attorney, who is not the attorney upon record, for the party moving -10 Ir. L. Rep. 461, Ex. is insufficient. Strettle v.— The court will not, in the absence of new facts or documents, review an order made upon motion. Lord Miltown v. Reeves, Bl. D. & O. 273, Q. B. order must stand or fall upon the documents on By the settled practice of the court a conditional which it has been obtained. White v. Doolan, 3 Ir. L. Rep. 500, Ex. When an affidavit has been filed as cause against a conditional order, but no counsel appeared to shew cause, the court will not, without notice to the opposite party, make the conditional order absolute. Fenton v. Motherwell, 4 Ir. L. Rep. 353, Q. B. Motion for Liberty to Tot.]-In an action of covenant on an annuity deed, by the executor of the grantor, who had obtained judgment on demurrer, the ordinary rule for liberty to tot is the proper one. Brien v. Lord Ponsonby, 7 Ir. L Rep. 422. [Pennefather, C. J., dissentiente.] Motions for Liberty to Proceed.]—The court refused to allow the plaintiff to proceed in a replevin suit, giving a term's notice, when nearly four years had elapsed since the last step was taken, though some of the goods had not been returned. Armstrong v. Freeman, 5 Ir. L. Rep. 174, C. P. Liberty to proceed, giving a term's notice on a A declaration filed six years back, will be granted, unless the defendant can shew some special cause to the contrary, such as the absence or death of a material witness. Moroney v. Danagher, 5 Ir. L. Rep. 562, Ex. When issue has been joined for three years, liberty to proceed, on giving a term's notice, must be applied for by motion in court upon notice. O'Reilly v Monaghan, 5 Ir. L. Rep. 567, Ex. Issue had been joined, and notice of trial served six years back, and then withdrawn at the request of the defendant then promising to settle the demand; and subsequently in two years by a letter, the court gave the plaintiff a conditional order for liberty to proceed to trial, giving a full term's notice, and serving the order on the defendant and his attorney personally, previous to the next Connor v. Blake, 6 Ir. L. Rep. 341, C. P. The 29th rule of the court, requiring a term's notice, before going to trial, if the cause be three terms at issue, is not now acted upon. Condon v. Condon, 7 Ir. L. Rep. 427, Q. B. term. Motion for New Trial.]—The court will not grant a new trial when the damages would necessarily be nominal, and there is no title in question. Purcell v. Nolan, 1 Ir. L. Rep. 258, C. P. A new trial will not be granted upon the ground that the count in the declaration was not properly framed, if it could have been correctly done. Minheer v. O'Leary, 1 Ir. L. Rep. 73, Q. B. A tenant, sued for use and occupation, and who obtains a verdict by reason of the misdirection of the judge, cannot rely upon a wrongfnl eviction by the landlord during the tenantcy, suspending the rent, as cause against a motion for a new trial. Smyth v. Kellett, 1 Ir. L. Rep. 43, Q. B. When the trial is had before a Baron of the Exchequer the order for a new trial is absolute in the first instance. Doe v. Kennedy, 1 Ir. L. Rep. 35, Ex. In an action against the defendant as the acceptor of three bills of exchange the plaintiff produced three witnesses, one of whom, who had but imperfect means of knowing the defendant's hand writing, after stating his belief that two of the bills were accepted in the hand-writing of the defendant, admitted that he thought the acceptance of one of the bills more like the hand-writing of the defendant than the other; the second witness having also given general evidence as to his belief of these acceptances, gave evidence similar to that of the former witness, and added that the hand-writing of the defendant's nephew was very like that of the defendant; the third witness positively swore that neither of these bills were in the hand-writing of the defendant and that one of them was written by his brother. Upon this evidence there was a verdict for the plaintiff, the defendant not having examined any witness. Upon motion to set this verdict aside, and for a new trial upon the ground that it was had against the weight of evidence, and by surprise, and founded on affidavits denying that the defendant ever accepted those bills or authorized any person to do so, and that he was misled by observations of the plaintiff's attorney to the effect that he intended to rely solely upon a case of authority and not of actual hand-writing. Held, that this verdict was not against the weight of evidence; but the court, without ad. mitting the surprise, considering the unsatisfactory evidence of hand-writing and the positive swearing of the defendant, granted a new trial. Smith v. M-Gonegal, 2 Ir. L. Rep. 267, Q. B. If a party intend to rely upon a case of surprise for the purpose of disturbing a verdict, he should bring the fact of surprise under the attention of the judge that a note of it may be taken. 1b. A. declared for the disturbance of a water-course, through which he alleged he had a right to have the water of a certain ancient stream flow, "at all reasonable times." It appeared that A. was tenant from year to year to B., who had a use of this and certain other water from the same stream for more than twenty years, using one at one time, and another at another time, as he pleased; and under whom, until the interest of B was evicted, the plaintiff had been enjoying the benefit of the stream. Since the eviction the tenant had been holding as tenant from year to year to the head landlord, as he previously held from B; a verdict being found for the plaintiff. Held, on a motion for a new trial, or for a non suit, on the ground of a variance between the right declared on, and proved, that there was no variance. Hough v. Kennedy, 2 Ir. L. Rep. 182, Q. B. Water alone cannot be demised without deed; but may be so in conjunction with land. Ib. Where a verdict was had subject to objections, and the court were of opinion that one of the questions, which the judge at nisi prius refused to leave to the jury, should have been so left. A new trial was refused, as it appeared the result of a second trial would be similar. Kennedy v. Hayes, 2 Ir. I Rep. 186, Q. B. The Judge at nisi prius has no power to reserve leave to the party against whom the verdict is given, to move to set aside that verdict, and have a verdict entered for himself without the consent of the opposite party. Hely v. Hicks, 3 Ir. L. Rep. 92, Ex. The court will not disturb a verdict, though the conclusion the jury came to was not such as the members of the court might individually have arrived at. Rooney v. White, 3 Ir. L. Rep. 153, Ex. A trial was had by consent upon several judgments of the same date, and between the same parties, and the plaintiff attempted to rebut certain payments, given in evidence by the defendant, by the production of two other judgments against the same party, and which were vested in the plaintiff in a different right from the four preceding, and were the subject of two other distinct actions. The court set aside a verdict for the plaintiff, on payment of costs by the defendant. Daly v. Kelly, 3 Ir. L. Rep. 174, C. P. In an ejectment on the title there was an issue comprehending two questions, viz., a part and parcel question, and of the existence of a cestui que vie. The attention of the judge was not directed to the 7 W. 3. c. 8. and the jury found for the defendant, without stating, or being asked by counsel or judge, on which of the grounds the verdict was found. The court set aside the verdict, and directed a new trial. Cooote v. O'Fallon, 3 Ir. L. Rep. 265, C.P. Held, that the evidence as to M. H. being the principal debtor, was some proof of the allegation in the declaration of a pre-existing separate debt due by M. H. to the defendant; also that the judgment was some evidence of the bond and warrant, and therefore, the court could not set aside the verdict on the ground of the inducement not being proved. Honan v. Ryan, 6 Ir. L. Rep. 106, C. P. The expression by a judge, of his opinion as to the facts of the case, without submitting them ex clusively to the jury, is no ground for setting aside a verdict for mis-direction of the judge. Reg. v. O'Connell, 7 Ir. L. Rep. 261, Q. B. On a motion for a new trial on the ground, that an affidavit had been improperly rejected in evidence the court, if it see that the evidence so rejected will not affect the verdict, will not grant a new trial. White v. Dowling, 8 Ir. L.. Rep. 128, Q. B. The court, in setting aside a verdict on the ground of the non-production of a written agreement, will put the defendant under the terms, to produce the document to enable the plaintiff to have it stamped. Thunder v. Warren, 8 Ir. L. Rep. 181, Ex. When an order nisi had been made, setting aside a verdict generally, and no mention made of the costs of the trial, the party succeeding in the second trial is entitled to the costs of the former. Rush v. Purcell, 8 Ir. L. Rep. 379, Q. B. Notice of motion to set aside verdicts, and for new trials, must, according to the practice of this court, be served within the first two days, and moved on within the first four days. The court will not relax the stringency of this practice, though the party seeking the dispensation, has been prevented from serving notice by a fatality, unless he disclose to the court a case of merits. Blake v. Vaden, 10 Ir. L. Rep. 1, C. P. The court, prior to the motion, will not allow additional affidavits, in answer to affidavits filed to resist the application, to be filed by the party applying for a new trial. Kelly v. Ďolphin, 2 Ir. L. Rep. 78, C. P. Where a cause had been tried by a special jury, and upon a bill of exceptions a venire de novo was awarded, and the defendant brought down the cause by proviso, it appeared that upon the latter occasion the distringas was in the common form, except that the words "by proviso" were written under the officer's name, and it was objected at the trial; first, that the distringas was informal and irregular; and secondly, that the special jury which had been struck on the former trial was the proper one to try the case. The court refused to disturb the verdict had for the defendant. Smith v. Nangle, 2 Ir. L. Rep. 296, Q. B. and refused, it is contrary to the rule of court to grant any other motion that is substantially the same. 1b. If the judge at Nisi Prius entertain a doubt, and wish to have the question reserved for the opinion of the court, costs will not in general be given against the unsuccessful party. Aliter, if the question be reserved by the party seeking the advantage of them. Barrett v. Hyndman, 3 lr. L. Rep. 109, Q. B. [See Acc., Daly v. Colbert, Ib. 355.] On a motion for a new trial, on the ground of excessive damages, the certificate stated that the damages were excessive, for the reasons, in the affidavit of the defendant, stated. Held, that this certificate was defective, in omitting to state the facts from which it appeared that the damages were excessive. Doe v. Power, 3 Ir. L. Rep. 438, Ex. The court will not give leave to serve notice of motion for a new trial on the last of the four days, though an affidavit be made of the party being ignorant of the record being in this court, or of the rule of the court. Coppinger v. O'Dell, 4 Ir. L. Rep. 297, C. P. If a defendant in ejectment have judgment against him for non-appearance to confess lease, entry, and ouster, the court will not grant a new trial on any terms, unless it clearly appear that the defendant has a just and legal defence to the action. M Donald v. Lawton, 4 Ir. L. Rep. 303, C. P. A notice of motion for a new trial, which refers to the certificate of counsel for the grounds of the motion, is informal. Anonymous, 4 Ir. L. Rep. 434, Ex. A motion to increase or reduce damages is in the nature of a new trial motion, and subject to the same rule; and notice of it must be given within the first four days of term. Taylor v. White, 5 Ir. L. Rep. 44, Éx. A record was tried a second time in mistake, pending a notice for a new trial; the parties on both sides appearing, and producing their evidence, and a verdict given against the party who obtained the first verdict, if the court are satisfied there has been a fair investigation, they will not disturb it. Knox v Lord Lucan, 5 Ir. L. Rep. 96, C. P. To set a verdict for surprise, the party applying should state specifically the evidence he could have produced. Ib. Semble, if the facts appear upon the record, and are proved, the judge should not non-suit. The proper course is to move to arrest the judgment, or for judgment non obstante veredicto. Keenan v. Phillips, 5 Ir. L. Rep. 440, Q. B. The court will not, after refusing an application for time to make up a bill of exceptions, grant a If an objection be taken at the trial as to the conditional order to set aside the verdict. Bridge-effect of a deed, and cannot be sustained on a motion ford v. Dublin and Kingstown Railway Company, 3 Ir. L. Rep. 19, C. P. The court will not postpone the entry of judgment on the postea, in a trial of an ejectment, and a verdict had for the defendant, until after the trial of witnesses of the defendant who were indicted for perjury; the motion being a new trial motion, and moveable during the first four days of term. Rogers v. E. of Arran, 3 Ir. L. Rep. 25, C. P. If an application to set aside a verdict be made for a non-suit, the party making it is not precluded from looking into the deed, and making any other objection. Kingston v. Ready, 5 Ir. L. Rep. 367, Q. B. X.-DISCONTINUANCE. 1 & 2 Vic., c. 109.]-The court after argument of points saved will not permit the plaintiff to discontinue without costs, under the 1 & 2 Vic., c. 109. Purcell v. Wigmore, 1 Ir. L. Rep. 318, Ex. note. [Per Pennefather, B.] the Quære-where a defendant had demurred to the t count of a declaration, but neither pleaded or nurred to the indebitatus counts, and after arguat of demurrer, but before judgment, the plaintiff ved the defendant with a rule for judgment geney, and the defendant then pleaded to the whole laration; on motion by the plaintiff to set aside plea as irregular, and for judgment generally court gave judgment for the plaintiff on the Jurrer allowing the plea to stand to the indebiscounts only and requiring the defendant to ept short notice of trial;-was there any disconLance before the court gave judgment on the deTer? French v. Tottenham, 10 Ir. L. Rep. 245. respass for taking, detaining, and impounding ds, and that thereby the goods were lessened and aged; the plea applied to the taking and left lessening and damaging unanswered, plaintiff ided over without marking judgment of nil dicit the part of the declaration uncovered by the plea. d, that he had not thereby worked a discontinue. Atkinson v. Nesbitt, 9 Ir. L. Rep. 271, C. P. JUDGMENTS, (See Scire Facias. Warrant.) Fenerally. Semble, the grounds of a foreign gment are not examinable in another country, ess such judgment be plainly repugnant to ural justice, or to the law of the land where it pronounced. Sims v. Thomas, 3 Ir. L. Rep. Ex. A vested remainder in fee after an estate tail in session is bound by a judgment, although such ted remainder never came into possession of the usor. Martin v. M'Causland, 4 Ir. L. Rep. C. P. The day marked on the margin of the judgment, suant to the 7 W. 3, c. 12, s. 11, is the true e of the judgment. O'Loughlin v. Fogarty, 5 L. Rep. 63, Ex. [Per Brady, C. B.] After judgment the functions of the attorney are end, and he is not then competent to sign, on alf of his client, a consent to vacate it. Dean Mahon, Bl. D. & O. 34, Ex. V. Upon the motion of the assignee of a judgment to le a scire facias to revive, the affidavit should state t a memorial of the assignment had been enrolled, an attested copy of it be produced. Seaward v. les, Bl. D. & O. 262, Ex. In bringing a writ of error from the Exchequer amber to the House of Lords it is necessary that original transcript of the judgment from the irt below, as well as also the judgment of the urt of Exchequer Chamber should be lodged with clerk of the errors of that court. Rogers v. Decourt, Bl. D. & O. 91, Q. B. Rule for Judgment.]-The rule for oyer does stop the entering the rule for judgment, though it ps the entering the judgment itself. Fitzpatrick Fleming, 1 Ir. L. Rep. 238, Ex. After the court gives judgment on a motion for Igment as in case of non-suit, or for a new trial, is not necessary to enter the four day rule for Igment, but judgment may be signed immediately there be no reservation in the conditional rule. yle v. Kiernan, 2 Ir. L. Rep. 273, Q. B. The rule for judgment may be entered on a plea of confession with stay of execution, at any time within a year from the time when the stay of execution expired. Oldham v. Dowling, 4 Ir. L. Rep. 468, Q. B. A judgment of non pros was set aside as irregular, the rule for judgment having been entered within the year, but not served till after its expiration. Rorke v. McCarthy, 6 Ir. L. Rep. 29, Ex. Plea, Motions in Arrest of Judgment.]—In an action for use and occupation, the declaration-entitled generally, as of Easter Term, 1840-stated, that the defendant, "heretofore to wit on the 31st of October, 1840," was indebted, &c. The money counts averred, that the defendant, "on the day and year aforesaid," was indebted, &c. general issue, verdict for the plaintiff. A motion in arrest of judgment was refused, the court presuming that the judge at Nisi Prius directed the attention of the jury to the matters properly in issue, and excluded from their consideration all causes of action which had not accrued before the commencement of the term of which the declaration was entitled Taylor v. White, 5 Ir. L. Rep. 44, Ex. In an action of covenant, the defendant craved oyer, and pleaded that the deed was void, because made in pursuance and performance of said supposed agreement, for the purpose of evading a Statute, and the jury having found for the plaintiff, it was held that the defendant could not move in arrest of judgment, on the ground of a corrupt agreement being embodied in the deed as pleaded. Osborne v. Byrne, 5 Ir. L. Rep. 93, C. P. A motion in arrest of judgment must be made Power, 8 Ir. L. Rep. 505, Q. B. within the first four days of term. Hanan v. It is not the practice to grant concurrent orders to arrest the judginent, and set aside the verdict. Conway v. Lewis, 6 Ir. L. Rep. 421, Q. B. Entering Judgment.]—Where there was a plea of confession as to part of a count, and nonassumpsit as to the remainder, the court, after trial and verdict, will give liberty to enter judgment on the confession nunc pro tanc. Lindsay v. Cluxton, Bl. D. & O. 286, Ex. Where there are issues in fact and law, and the plaintiff succeeds on the former, the court will not direct their officer to enter judgment on the demurrer, for the purpose of allowing the plaintiff to have judgment on the postea, unless the defendant consent. Bolton v. Cooke, Bl. D. & O. 43, Q. B. In an action of debt to recover the sum of £60 plaintiff marked judgment for £690, being the sum stated in the commencement of the declaration as the aggregate of all the counts. Held, that this judgment was irregular, and that plaintiff should not mark judgment for a larger sum than he was entitled to issue execution for. Lord Miltown v. Reeves, Bl. D. & O. 272, Q. P. Where a defendant dies, between the term in which a demurrer has been argued, and the pronouncing of judgment by the court, judgment will not be entered nunc pro tunc, if there are issues in fact undisposed of. Armstrong v. Lloyd. 3 Ir. L. Rep. 57, C. P. Where after verdict for the plaintiff, and pending a motion for a new trial, the defendant died, the court granted liberty to enter up judgment as of a former term, upon the terms of the plaintiff undertaking not to interfere with the rights of intermediate bona fide creditors or purchasers. Hozier v. Powell, 3 Ir. L. Rep. 406, Ex. The court will not allow a plaintiff to mark judgment as for want of a plea, because the defendant being a female pleads in the masculine gender. Berry v. M'Neill, 4 Ir. L. Rep. 17, C. P. The court will grant but a conditional order to enter up judgment against a defendant. who has not appeared to the writ of distringas, in an action of quare impedit. Marquis of Winchester v. Bishop of Killaloe, 6 Ir. L. Rep. 344, C. P. In February, 1844, by an order of nisi prius, a verdict was taken for the plaintiff, subject to arbi tration; in Michaelmas Term, 1846, a balance was found to be due by the plaintiff, and a verdict was entered for the defendant, who died on a day in the same term, prior to the entry of the verdict for him. The court held that the proceedings were notwithstanding, regular, and directed the judgment to be enrolled as of the first day of Easter Term, 1844. Wright v. Keene, 10 Ir. L. Rep. 97, Ex. Amendment of Judgments,]-See AMENDMENT. Priority of Judgments.]—There can be no priority between judgments entered as of the same day. Daly v. Kelly, 3 Ir. L. Rep. 176. [Per Ball, J.] The second section of the 9th G. 4, c. 35, relating to judgments entered within twenty years before the passing of the act, does not apply to the case of purchases made before that act. Held, that a judgment of Easter Term, 1809, did not lose its priority over a subsequent conveyance, for valuable consideration, executed on the 20th of September, in the same year, although the judgment was not revived or redocketted since the entry thereof, nor within five years after the passing of the 9th Geo. 4, c. 35. Geraghty v. Abbott, 8 Ir. L. Rep. 60. Ex. C. in Hilary Term, 1818, recovered a judgment against R. M.. and in the same term recovered another against R. M. jun. These judgments were revived Hilary Term, 1821, and again in Michaelmas Term, 1840, against the heir and terre-tenants of each conusor; an annuity deed of the 11th June, 1819, charged the lands of the conusors with an annuity of £225. The judgments were not revived or redocketted within five years after the passing of the 9th Geo. 4, c. 35. Held, that the judgments were null and void against the parties entitled under the annuity deed, by reason of their not having been revived or redocketted pursuant to the provisions of the 9th Geo. 4, c. 35. Collyer v. Marnell, 10 Ir. L. Rep. 353, Q. B. [Per Blackburne, C. J., and Crampton, J.; contra, per Burton, J. and Perrin, J. Judgment of Non Pros.]-The words of the 27th general rule are to be construed strictly; therefore, the year is to be computed from the return day of the writ, and not from the date of the appearance; and consequently the rule for judgment of non pros must be entered within one year from the return of the writ. Lewis v. Meehan, 3 Ir. L. Rep. 350, Ex. A judgment of non pros was set aside as irregular, the rule for judgment having been entered within the year, but not served till after its expiration. Rorke v. McCarthy, 6 Ir. L. Rep. 29, Ex For not joining in demurrer books.Where a party applies for leave to enter judgment on the his portion of the demurrer books. Held, that noground that his opponent has neglected to supply Hackett, 2 Ir. L. Rep. 278, Q. B. tice must be given of such application. Roche v. where the defendant has taken a demurrer, and The court will allow a plaintiff to enter judgment neglected to furnish the points to be argued, although called upon to do so, and notice of the mo tion having been given. Willne v. O'Connor, 2 Ir. L. Rep. 284, Q. B. As for want of a plea.]—Although the defendant, a female, pleaded the general issue in the masculine gender, the court would not allow the plaintiff to mark judgment as for want of a plea, she having had had notice to amend, and which notice had not been attended to. Assignee of Berry v. M'Neill, 4 Ir. L. Rep. 17, C. P. Judgment by default.]-The defendant in an ac tion on a bill of exchange by allowing judgment to go by default, admits the date of the bill to be stated in the declaration; and the officer may cal. culate interest therefrom. Doyle v. Duffy, 6 Ir. L. Rep. 153, C. P. As in case of non-suit.]-Where a party obtains a conditional order for judgment, as in case of non suit, and does not make it absolute, the court will not allow him to do so after an undertaking and notice of trial served, though that notice be withdrawn. Carey v. Williams, 1 Ir. L. Rep. 115, C. P. On a motion for judgment as in case of a nonsuit, after default in a peremptory undertaking to go to trial, the plaintiff will be put under terms to pay the defendant the costs already incurred,-the costs of the motion, and further that the defendant may enter up judgment without further motion, if the plaintiff again fail in this undertaking to go to trial. O'Donohoe v. O'Donohoe, 1 Ir. L. Rep. 9,Q. B. Where a cause has been entered for trial, but not tried, and the plaintiff be guilty of no default, the defendant cannot have judgment as in case of nonsuit, his remedy is to bring the case to trial by proviso. Wright v. Hodgens, 1 Ir. L. Rep. 268, Ex. A rule to stay proceedings until the payment of costs, of not proceeding to trial pursuant to notice must be vacated before the defendant can apply for judgment as in case of non-suit. Read v. Shew, 1 Ir. L. Rep. 269, Ex. It is not necessary to serve a notice of a motion for judgment as in case of non-suit. Anonymous, 1 Ir. L. Rep. 345, Q. B. On a motion for judgment as in case of non-suit, after notice of trial has been served and withdrawn, if it appear that the record was withdrawn at the instance of the defendant, or by any understanding to that effect between the parties, that will be a sufficient answer to such motion. Clarke v. Callaghan, 1 Ir. L. Rep. 345, Q. B. Where a conditional order has been obtained for judgment as in case of non-suit, a peremptory dertaking is not of itself sufficient Cause against an absolute order, the plaintiff must How some "just |