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cause" for his delay. Gillman v. Connor, 1 Ir. L. Rep. 346, Ex.

If the record be brought down for trial and notice of trial withdrawn by the plaintiff, that will not be sufficient cause against this motion. Ib.

Aliter, if the cause be made a remanet, or the plaintiff be obliged by some circumstances of surprise to withdraw it. Ib.

Where it appeared by implication from the defendant's affidavit that the plaintiff's knowledge of the defendant's poverty was subsequent to the commencement of the action, and the defendant did not state an ability to pay, the court refused to allow a judgment as in case of non-suit to be entered. Going v. Dempsey, 3 Ir. L. Rep. 184, C. P.

In shewing cause against a conditional order for judgment as in case of non-suit the affidavit must state positively some just cause why plaintiff delayed going to trial. Wallace v. M Clelland, 3 Ir. L.

Where a cause was entered in the list of records for trial at the sittings after term, but in consequence of the death of the Lord Chief Baron was not tried, the court refused to give judgment as in case of non-Rep. 199, Q. B. suit, the plaintiff not having withdrawn the record or been in default. Graydon v. Reardon, 1 Ir. L. Rep. 355, C. P.

Where the indorsee of a bill of exchange having sued the acceptor ineffectually, sued his immediate indorser; after the commencement of the second action the debt and costs were paid by the acceptor; the court refused a motion by the indorser for judgment as in case of non-suit. White v. Doolan, 3 Ir. L. Rep. 500, Ex.

If the plaintiff withdraw the record after entering the case for trial, the defendant may have judgment as in case of non-suit, the mere entering of the record for trial not being sufficient to prevent it. Ib. Where the record is brought down to trial and Where a bill had been filed against a banking withdrawn with the assent of the defendant, he can. company, and a receiver appointed over all their not have judgment as in case of a non-suit. Anony-property, with a reference to the Master to report mous, 2 Ir. L. Rep. 167, Q. B.

The meaning of the rule as to bringing down the record, is not merely bringing it down and entering it but proceeding to trial, unless the cause be made a remanet. Ib.

Upon showing cause against a conditional order for judgment as in case of non-suit, it appeared that notice of trial had been served before the motion came on, that the sum to be recovered was but £5, and the plaintiff stated he had a just cause of action. Held, to be sufficient cause. Anonymous, 2 Ir. L. Rep. 263, Q. B.

Where in an action for false imprisonment arising out of a disputed right of fishing, the cause had been at issue since Michaelmas Term, 1838, and the delay from thence till June, 1839, was not accounted for except by an allegation that the principal action to try the right was pending during that time, and since June the plaintiff had been unable to proceed in consequence of the illness of his attorney. Held to be insufficient cause. v. Worthington, 2 Ir. L. Rep. 266, Q. B.

By the practice of the Court of Exchequer a peremptory undertaking to go to trial at the next sittings or assizes is considered as just cause against a motion for judgment as in case of non-suit. Tuthill v. Bridgeman, 2 Ir. L. Rep. 361, Ex.

Where a term intervenes between the obtaining the conditional order for judgment as in case of nonsuit, and the motion to make it absolute, the court will not make the order absolute on a certificate of no cause. Bell v. Bell, 3 Ir. L. Rep. 79, Q. B.

In Easter Term, 1839, the lessor of the plaintiff brought two ejectments for lands in the counties of M. and G.; defence was taken in Trinity Term following, and the defendant having refused to consent to waive temporary bars, the lessor was compelled to file a bill to compel him to do so, a decree was pronounced on the 2nd of June, 1840, there appeared to be no delay on the part of the plaintiff. A motion on the part of the defendant was held to be preinature, as the time in which he was engaged in the equity proceedings could not be counted against him. Rutledge v. Rutledge, 3 Ir. L. Rep. 102, Q. B.

on the suits to be prosecuted or defended by them, the court would not allow judgment, as in case of non-suit, to be entered against them in a cause at issue more than three terms, they undertaking to go to trial on the first nisi prius day in next term. Hughes v. Glenny, 4 Ir. L. Rep. 5, C. P.

In an ejectment on the title against eleven persons, the defences of five of those persons had been consolidated, and the cause was brought to trial against those five; but such trial was postponed at the instance of the defendants to the next assizes; and at the following assizes the plaintiff could not proceed, by reason of the absence of his counsel; and it was stated that the cases of all the defendants were similar. Held, that was a sufficient cause against a motion for judgment, as in case of nonsuit, on behalf of the defendants whose cases had not been brought to trial. Lord Powerscourt v. Brislin, 4 Ir. L.Rep 283, Q. B.

Issue was joined in Hilary Term; a motion for judgment, as in case of non-suit is moveable in Trinity Term. An affidavit is not necessary to sustain such a motion, and the court will refuse it, on the plaintiff giving a peremptory undertaking to go to trial, the costs to be costs in the cause. Comyns v. M.Grath, 4 Ir.L.Rep. 412, C.P., and see note, Ib.

In ejectment cases the cause is not at issue until the second declaration is filed, and three terms must therefore elapse from that time before judgment as in case of a non-suit can be obtained. Dempsey v. Nowlan, 4 Ir. L. Rep. 490, Ex.

An affidavit filed by one of several defendants, will not be considered as cause against a conditional order to enter up judgment as in case of non-suit obtained by another defendant. Chevelly v. Whittly, 5 Ir. L. Rep. 40, Q. B.

A party having entered a rule to stay proceedings, cannot move to enter judgment as in case of non-suit without having first vacated the rule. Raleigh v. Raleigh, 5 Ir. L. Rep. 182, C. P.

If a party permits an order for judgment as in case of non-suit be made absolute he cannot after object to the proceedings for irregularity. In ejectment the defendant may file a second declaration and enter up judgment as in case of non-suit, without enter

It is a sufficient answer to a conditional order for judgment, as in case of non-suit, in an action by the drawer against the acceptor of a bill of et change, that the bill has been paid by an indorse Manning v.10 Ir. L. Rep. 484, Ex.

ing a rule for liberty to proceed on giving a terms' entered without costs. Dowling v. Boswell, 10 lt. notice. Kenny v. Coffey, 5 Ir. L. Rep. 225, Q. B. L. Rep. 443, Ex. A conditional order for judgment as in case of non-suit was served on the 21st of November, entitled in a wrong cause, and the plaintiff gave notice of the irregularity the following day, and also gave notice of trial for the 26th, on the 23rd he withdrew the notice of trial and served notice of trial for the sittings after term, on the 25th the defendant served a conditional order properly entitled. Held, that there was no such laches as dissentitled the defendant to the benefit of his conditional order. Murray v. O'Hanlon, 5 Ir. L. Rep. 374, Q. B.

A peremptory undertaking to go to trial, is a sufficient answer to a motion for judgment, as in case of non-suit. Anonymous, 5 Ir. L. Rep. 242, C.P. The costs of such a motion are always costs in the cause. Ib.

A plaintiff will be allowed to enter a stet processus on the ground of the defendant's insolvency, notwithstanding default made in a peremptory undertaking to go to trial. Sterne v. Sheane, 6 Ir. L. Rep. 25, Ex.

In the Exchequer it is necessary to give notice of a motion for judgment, as in case of a non-suit. Anonymous, 6 Ir. L. Rep. 44, Ex.

A motion for judgment, as in case of non-suit, on the ground of the insolvency of the plaintiff, will not be granted after issue joined; but the court will stay the proceedings. Fitton v. Evans, 6 Ir. L. Rep. 466, Q. B.

In ejectment the cause is not at issue until the second declaration has been filed; but where the lessor of the plaintiff served notice of trial after defence taken; but before he had filed a second declaration. Three terms after the service of this

notice, the court gave liberty to the defendant to file a second declaration, and enter judgment thereon, as in case of non-suit. Creagh v. Creagh, 6

Ir. L. Rep. 528, Ex.

Semble,that if, in such a case, the defendant has a good defence to the action, the proper course, in order to obtain his costs, is to bring the case to trial by proviso. Ib.

Where a rule to stop has been entered-and after. wards withdrawn-that term is to be excluded in

computing three terms to found an application for judgment, as in case of non-suit. Danton v. Loughnan, Bl. D. & O. 45, C. P.

If a plaintiff proceed both at law and in equity, for the same demand, and elects to proceed in the latter, the court will enter judgment as in case of non-suit. Hollier v. Eyre, Bl. D. & O. 108, Ex.

If a plaintiff become insolvent after issue joined, the defendant is not entitled to judgment, as in case of non-suit, but a stet processus will be entered. Jones v. Newbury, Bl. D. & O. 147, Ex.

but

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Where a record has been left a remanet at Nisi Prius, and no proceedings taken for three years, the court will not grant liberty to the defendant to enter up judgment, as in case of a non-suit. Stevenson v. Stephens, 1 Ir. Jur. 39, Ex. [Collier v. Jones, 1 H. & B. 321, over-ruled.]

In quare impedit cases the court will only give a conditional order to enter judgment, as in case of non-suit, against a defendant who has not appeared to the writ of distringas. Marquis of Winchester v. Bishop of Killaloe, 6 Ir. L. Rep. 344, C. P.

obtained to set aside a judgment entered upon a Setting aside.]-Where a conditional order was bond and warrant, on the ground that they were forged; on motion to make the order absolute, A plaintiff in showing cause against a conditional the court being unable to decide on the conflicting order for judgment, as in case of non-suit, averred statements, directed the plaintiff to declare on the his belief that the defendant was in insolvent circum-bond, which not being done, the order was made absolute. Connors v. Connolly, 1 Ir. L. Rep. 244, stances, and stated facts from which such insolvency Q. B. might be inferred. The defendant in answer must aver that he is solvent. O'Connor v. Evans, 7 Ir. L. Rep. 210, C. P.

A defendant entitled to judgment, as in case of non-suit, will be allowed to enter that judgment without costs, the plaintiff having refused to proceed in consequence of the embarrassed circumstances of the defendant, and of the fact of his having threatened to take the benefit of the Insolvent Act, in the event of the plaintiff succeeding against him. Crawford v. Crowther, 8 Ir. L. Rep. 99, Ex.

Where the defendant had become insolvent after action brought, a motion to enter up judgment as in case of non-suit was refused with costs, the defendant having refused a stet processus out of court. Brennan v. Mullins, 9 Ir. L. Rep. 39, Ex.

In answer to a motion for judgment as in case of non-suit, it was shown that the proceedings had been carried on by an attorney, by the direction of a third party, in the names of the plaintiffs, without their knowledge or consent, or their being interested in the suit, and that the attorney had since died. The court ordered a stet processus to be

The court will set aside a judgment obtained on a parliamentary appearance, when there is a substantial question to be tried between the parties, though no irregularity be alleged in the marking of the judgment. Heron v. 51, C. P.

1 Ir. L. Rep.

where the party has by a fatality been prevented The court will set aside a regular judgment from pleading in time, though the time for plead ing had previously been enlarged. Ryan v. Francis,

1 Ir. L. Rep. 154, C. P.

Judgment was entered on a bond and warrant of attorney, executed by the defendant to the plaintiff, and no attorney being present at the execution. the former being in custody at the suit of the latter, The defendant being subsequently arrested under an execution on this judgment, took the benefit of the Insolvent Act, and returned the judgment in his schedule. Held, that by returning the judg Dobson v. ment, he waived the irregularity.

MDaid, 1 Ir. L. Rep. 236, Ex.

Where, after the expiration of the four-day rale

to plead, but before judgment had been marked, the defendant applied for time to plead, and ob. tained leave to serve a notice on the opposite party; after which the plaintiff's attorney marked judgment before the notice had been served upon him, though he had been verbally apprised of the order. The court set aside the judgment with costs, and enlarged the time to plead. Dancer v. Kelly, 3 Ir. L. Rep. 64, C. P.

After notice of trial in a quare impedit, the defendant entered into a consent that judgment should be entered against him, with sixpence damages, and a release of errors, on the understanding between the parties that such a consent carried the costs of the action, and the judgment was accordingly entered with costs. The court on a motion by the defendant, refused to strike out the portion of the judgment awarding costs. Archbold v. Bishop of Down and Connor, 3 Ir. L. Rep. 281, C. P. In a replevin case the defendant's attorney having promised the plaintiff's counsel additional time to join in demurrer, which was afterwards withdrawn by the orders of the defendant himself and judgment marked, the plaintiff having pleaded no plea to the merits, the judgment was set aside without any costs to either party, Daniel v. Bingham, 4 Ir. L. Rep. 136, C. P.

An affidavit of merits made in support of a motion to set aside a judgment should state positively that there is a good cause of defence, if the judgment be entered irregularly or mala fide no affidavit of merits is necessary. Lenehan v. Earl of Bantry, 4 Ir. L. Rep. 274, Q. B.

The court set aside a judgment marked for want of a replication, the plaintiff having omitted to enter a rule to discontinue under a mistaken impression, though the defendant had relied on the same, in an answer to a bill filed in equity by the plaintiff to raise the amount of the judgment. Lynch v. Lynch, 4 Ir. L. Rep. 298, C. P.

A judgment having been entered on a bond and warrant the latter of which alone was executed, the court set aside the judgment and execution without costs. M'Lernan v. M'Lernan, 4 Ir. L. Rep. 331,

C. P.

The court refused to set aside a regular judgment of non pros on the terms of the payment of the costs of it, the affidavit of merits being sworn by the attorney's clerk who conducted the business, and was positively contradicted by the affidavit of the defendant himself. Cater v. Flattery, 5 Ir. L. Rep. 175,

C. P.

Judgment of non pros was set aside as irregular the rule for judgment having been entered within the year, but not served until after its expiration. Rorke v. M.Carthy, 6 Ir. L. Rep. 29, Ex.

A fi. fa. having issued upon a judgment obtained upou a plea of confession filed in pursuance of a written authority signed without any attorney being present on his behalf, or any process having been served upon him, the court set aside the execution judgment, and previous proceedings with costs. Wilcox v. O'Gorman, 10 Ir. L. Rep. 459, Ex.

The defendant appeared in the Queen's Bench to a writ issued out of that court, the plaintiff's attorney served notice of a declaration and the rule to plead, and marked judgment in the Exchequer. Held, that

the judgment could not be sustained. Anonymous, 10 Ir. L. Rep. 467, Ex.

The defendant having appeared in the Queen's Bench to a writ sued out of that court, the plaintiff's attorney served notice of a declaration and the rules to plead and marked judgment. Held, that the judgment could not be sustained and that the defendant was not deprived of his right to object to its validity by having received notice of the declaration and rules to plead, without apprising the plaintiff of the defect in his proceedings. 1b.

Assignment of judgments.]—When a judgment has been assigned to new trustees by a person appointed for that purpose pursuant to an order of the Court of Chancery, made upon petition under the 1 W. 4, cap. 60, the court directed the proper officer to perfect the assignment. Burrowes v. Hogan, 2 Ir. L. Rep. 369, Ex.; S. P. Burrough v. Ferrard, Ib. 372.

A judgment, upon the marriage of the conusee, was assigned to the trustees of the marriage settlement, and a memorial of the assignment duly enrolled; the conusee having married a second time, the judgment was again assigned to the trustees of a second settlement. The personal representative of the surviving trustee of the first settlement having refused to assign the judgment to the surviving trustee of the second, the court refused to allow the memorial of the first assignment to be taken off the file in order that a memorial of the second might be enrolled. Beresford v. Beresford, 4 Ir. L. Rep. 316, Ex.

When a judgment, the property of an insolvent conusee, is vested in his assignee under the Insolvent Act, the court will direct an assignment by the latter to a third party to be enrolled without the judgment having been revived in the name of the assignee of the insolvent. Browne v. Browne, 1 Ir. Jur. 70, Ex.

Satisfaction of judgments.]-The defendant applied for leave to lodge the amount due to the plainon foot of two judgments, and for an order that the plaintiff should execute warrauts to satisfy same. There was a dispute as to the time to which the defendant was bound to pay interest, and the defendant had also been guilty of laches in making the application. The motion was refused. Quin v. Eastwood, 2 Ir. L. Rep. 165, Q. B.

A judgment creditor having got into possession of the lands of his debtor by elegit, and the officer, on a reference to account, having reported that he had been overpaid his debt, the court granted a couditional order to shew cause why satisfaction should not be entered on the roll. Birch v. Meredith, 3 Ir. L. Rep. 138, C. P. [See acc. Wilkinson v. Meredith, Ib. 139.]

The court will not order satisfaction to be entered on the record of a judgment on a warrant of attorney by one of two trustees of the fund secured by the judgment, though the other never accepted the trust, and was out of the jurisdiction, and refused to act. Satisfaction will not be allowed to be entered on a judgment obtained at the suit of two conusees, on the allegation that the full amount had been paid to one of them, the other having emigrated in 1837, and not having been heard of since. King v. King, 4 Ir. L. Rep. 329, C. P.

The court refused to allow a judgment to be satisfied on payment to the plaintiff's attorney of a sum agreed upon between him and the defendant, the plaintiff residing in New South Wales, although the attorney held a general power of attorney to sue for and give discharges for all debts due to the plaintiff, and had been empowered by letter to issue execution on said judgment. Brennan v. French, 4 Ir. L. Rep. 120, C. P.

Where a judgment has been satisfied under a warrant of attorney fraudulently and improperly obtained, and the facts, upon which the warrant is impeached, are clearly made out by the affidavits, the court will, upon motion, set aside the satisfaction entered on the roll, without directing an issue, or sending the case to be tried by a jury. Nuttall v. Nuttall, 4 Ir. L. Rep. 480, Ex.

A judgment collateral with a mortgage was obtained against E. C. in the names of two trustees; one of the trustees had never acted in the trusts, and had disclaimed by deed. Held, that a warrant to satisfy the judgment executed by the acting trustee alone was sufficient. Wise v. Creed, 8 Ir. L. 222, Q. B.

days of that time had been occupied in negociations for a compromise. Bridgeford v. Dublin & Kings town Railway Co., 3 Ir. L. Rep. 19, C. P.

The court, after refusing an application for time to make up a bill of exceptions, will not grant a conditional order to set aside the verdict. Ïb.

The defendant in a bill of exceptions stated that he had insisted before the learned judge, "that the said condition of re-entry, in the said fee-farm grant contained, was altogether gone by the assignment and release; and if not, that the said power of re-entry was gone by the assignment, in the matter of the insolvency of J. D." Held, that it was not open to the defendant to argue that the said right of re-entry had been transferred to the provisional assignee of the insolvent. Orr v. Stevenson, 5 Ir. L. Rep. 2, Ex. C.

By the operation of the rules of the Court of Common Pleas, a party taking a bill of exceptions at a trial in the sittings after term, is not irregular in not setting down the same for argument in the ensuing term. Reid v. Mitchell, 4 Ir. L. Rep. 300 C. P.

Where it was a matter of warranty in a policy of insurance, that the habits of a party whose life the words "strictly temperate" are subject to conwas insured, were "strictly temperate." Held, that

Searches for Judgments.]—An application since the passing of the Registration of Judgments Act, 7 & 8 Vic. c. 90, for liberty to inspect the judgment-struction, and that the defendants, (the directors of book and roll of the court to ascertain whether any judgments were entered against a third party was refused, the Act having directed that no search shall be made except in the office established under it. In re Bagot, 8 Ir. L. Rep. 295, Ex.

Quære, whether an executor or administrator would be entitled to make a search for judgments against his testator or intestate. Ib.

Releasing of Judgments.]-Judgments being a charge upon both B. and A. were by deed poll exexuted by the judgment creditors released as against B. Held, the effect of the release was to discharge both A. and B. Handcock v. Handcock, 10 Ir. L. Rep. 565, C. P.*

XI. BILL OF EXCEPTIONS.

When objections were taken to the judge's charge and overruled, and the judge gave time to have the exception reduced to writing and the document was not delivered to the judge until after the jury were discharged. Held, that they could not hear those exceptions, as it did not appear from the record whether they were taken before the jury were discharged. Close v. Batt, 1 Ir. Jur. 256, Ex.

The court with great reluctance allowed time for filing a bill of exceptions where the trial had taken place more than two years before, though the parties had by consent between them extended the time until within a few days of the term in which the application was made. Dawson v. Bell, 2 Ir. L. Rep. 279, Q B.

The court will not enlarge the time for making up a bill of exceptions though the evidence in the Case was very voluminous, where the whole long vacation had elapsed since the trial, and but four

By the 11 & 12 Vic. c. 48, s. 72, a portion of the lands charged may be released.-EDITOR.

the company), were not entitled to a direction from their literal sense; and a general exception taken the judge that those words should be construed in by the defendants to the judge's charge, so far as it much of the charge being admittedly right, and the was explanatory of their meaning, was over-ruled, defendants not having pointed out by their exception, the particular parts of it which were objectionable. Scanlon v. Sceals, 5 Ir. L. Rep. 199, Ex.

The counsel for the defendant objected to the testimony of B. M., on the ground that said testimony was offered to sustain her husband's deed; and called upon the judge to reject said testimony, but he refused, and permitted her to be examined, to sustain the issue on the part of the plaintiff; to which opinion of the judge, the defendant did then and there except, and the said B. M. was sworn and examined subject to said exception. Held, too large, as portion of her evidence was admissible. Burriss v. Coffey, 6 Ir. L. Rep. 29, C. P.

Second exception-That the learned judge should, upon the whole of the evidence so given by the parties, plaintiff and defendant respectively, upon the issue, have directed a verdict for the plaintiff, was held to be too general. Ib.

A motion to extend the time for making up a bill of exceptions, must always be upon notice. Russell v. Whaley, 7 Ir. L. Rep. 492, Ex.

A lease for years, containing a covenant to renew, which was declared on as absolute and unqualified, and the value of the interest under such lease, with the covenants for renewal being proved, and no evidence being offered of the eviction of the cove nantee by title paramount, but bare evidence of an eviction, and a notice served by the defendant, stating that he had no title to renew. Held on excep. tion, that the judge was right in refusing to direct the jury to find for nominal damages, as there was no evidence that the title to the term, if granted,

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would have been invalid. Semble, such refusal was not ground of exception. Kean v. Strong, 9 Ir. L. Rep. 83, Q. B.

Held, that exceptions, to different expressions in the charge of the learned judge, seriatim, without stating clearly what the judge did tell the jury, or what the defendant required him to tell them, was not a proper mode of framing a bill of exceptions; and per Blackburne, C. J., on this ground alone the exception should be over-ruled. Kean v. Strong, 1 Ir. Jur. 333, Ex. Ch.

XII. VENUE.

Local. In an action of assumpsit, for money had aud received, brought by the assignees of a bankrupt against the sheriff, to recover the proceeds of a sale of the bankrupt's effects made by the sheriff pursuant to writ of fi. fa. the venue is local. The venue will be changed in a local action on terms. Anonymous, 9 Ir. L. 394, Q.B. And see Hennessy v. Synge, 10 Ir. L. Rep. 184, Q.B.

Transitory. In an action for pound breach, and the removal of a distress, founded on the statutes 7 W. 3, c. 22, and 15 Geo. 2, c. 8, the venue is transitory. Earl of Meath v. M'Phail, 9, Ir. L. Rep. 316.

Motion to change venue.]-The court will change the venue to an adjoining county in an action against a magistrate if there be reason to suppose that a satisfactory trial cannot be had in the county where the venue was originally laid. Stewart v. Lynar, 1 Ir. L. Rep. 199, C. P.

The court will not change the venue in an action of ejectment on the title, where there have been two verdicts for the defendant. Jackson v.Lodge, 1 Ir. L. Rep. 161, Q. B.

Where the venue has been changed upon the usual affidavit the party seeking to retain the venue is not bound to come in within four days after the rule to change. Staunton v. Magrath, 1 Ir.L.Rep. 293, Q.B. The venue was changed upon the usual affidavit. A motion to retain it on the ground of partiality in the jury, and that the defendants exercised undue influence upon the jurors, was refused. O'Shaughnessey v. Lambert, 1 Ir. L. Rep. 104, Q. B.

Where the venue has been changed on the usual affidavit, and it appears incontrovertibly that the allegation in the affidavit is untrue, the court will bring back the venue. Nichol v. Hickson, 2 Ir. L. Rep. 328, Q. B.

The venue will not be changed on the ground that the plaintiff is a county surveyor, and is on that ac count possessed of influence with the jurors. Hall v. M'Kernan, 2 Ir. L. Rep. 359, Q. B.

In an action by an attorney for the recovery of a bill of costs, the venue was changed, before plea pleaded, to the adjoining county from the county of the city in which the venue was laid, upon an affi. had there. Boyse v. Smith, 2 Ir. L. Rep. 366, Ex. davit that a fair and impartial trial could not be

was changed from the county of a city to the adThe venue in an action on a policy of insurance joining county upon an affidavit that a fair and imgrounds are sufficient to change the venue from the partial trial could not be had in the former. Slight county of a city to the adjoining county. Scanlan v. Sceales, 2 Ir. L. Rep. 368, Ex.

The venue was retained in an action of covenant for waste, notwithstanding the defendant's affidavit that all the witnesses resided in the county to which the venue was sought to be changed, and that a view of the premises, which were in the county to which it was sought to bring the venue, would be necessary, on the terms that the plaintiff should previously admit the defendant's witnesses to view the premises to the trial. Hawthorne v. Denham, 3 Ir. L. Rep. 1, Q. B.

The court will not change the venue from the county of the city of Dublin to the county of the city of Cork, though the defendant state in his affidavit that he has twenty witnesses to examine, all of whom reside in the latter place, it appearing from the plaintiff's affidavit that some of his witnesses resided in the locality where the venue had been laid. Watson v. Kennelly, 3 Ir. L. Rep. 214, Q B.

The venue will be changed on special grounds in an action on a bill of exchange. O'Callaghan v. Sullivan, 3 Ir. L. Rep. 256, Ex.

In an action of libel the court refused to change the venue to the county in which the action had wholly arisen, though all the witnesses resided therein, the plaintiff having sworn to the prevalence there of excitement on the subject, though he did not deny but that an impartial trial might be had. Har-lagher v. Cavendish, 3 Ir. L. Rep. 375, C. P.

The court will not change the venue in an action on a bill of exchange, though the defendant swears that he himself and all his witnesses reside in the county to which it is sought to be changed. nett v. Torrens, 1 Ir. L. Rep. 116, C. P.

A motion to change the venue on the usual affidavit is too late after plea pleaded. Mulvany v. White, 2 Ir. L. Rep. 33, Ex.

In transitory actions an attorney has the privilege of suing in his own court, and laying and retaining the venue in the county it is situated in. An application to change the venue on the usual affidavit was refused upon that ground. Montgomery v. Cheyne, 2 Ir. L. Rep. 163, Q. B.

The common affidavit to change the venue is informal in not stating in express terms that the cause of action did not arise in the county in which the venue was laid, and also in introducing any thing beyond the usual form as to the place where the cause of action arose. Anonymous, 2 Ir. L. Rep. 286, Q. B.

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Where the defendant is prevented by the act of God from making the usual affidavit to change the venue it may be made by his attorney. Scott v. Macaulay, 4 Ir. L. Rep, 40, Q. B.

The rule to change was discharged on the usual undertaking to give material evidence, though the defendant undertook to admit such evidence at the trial. Ib.

No leave being reserved, the costs of a party appearing to oppose a motion to change the venue within the last four days of term will not be allowed, though he may have been served with notice of the motion. Mara v. Murphy, 4 Ir. L. Rep. 138, C. P.

In an action on a promissory note the court would not change the venue from Dublin to Mayo, on an affidavit stating "that the cause of action arose in Mayo, that the defendant had good grounds on the

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