« EelmineJätka »
act, though he had taken no part in the actual duty TRAVERSE-Sec PLEADING. MANDAMUS. of making it. Fourthly—that the applotment hav
Quo WARBANTO. ing been made, it became the only standard for measuring the amount of composition payable by the parties thereto, and had reference back to the pe- TREAT (NOTICE TO.)-See Public Comriod of making such composition. Semble- That
PANY. RAILWAY. until the making of the applotment, it was optional with the party entitled to the composition, but not
TRESPASS-See INSOLVENT. imperative on him, to resort to the provisions of the 4 G. 4, c. 99, regulating the payments of composition according to the grand jury cess. Armstrong
I. TRESPASS. v. Kilikelly, 1 Ir. L. Rep. 270, Ex
II. TRESPASS FOR MESNE RATES. An applotment book stated the quantity of land contained in each of several holdings, and the gross pass qu. cl. f, under the general issue, not only an
slandlord may justify in an action of tresamount of tithe composition charged thereon re-entry to distrain, but also the continuing in possesspectively, but omitted to specify the acreable a
sion beyond the time that was necessary for the mount of such composition. Held, that the applot: purposes of the distress. Purcell v. Nolan, 1 Ir. ment was not therefore invalid. Defendant on all | L. Rep. 258, C. P. former occasions having paid his composition for the said land, and previous to the action promised to the defendant cannot, under the general issue, give
In an action of trespass for assault and battery, pay. Held, it was not open to him to object to in evidence by way of mitigation of damages, matthe applotment. Purcell v.Wigmore, 1 Ir. L. Rep. ter of defence, which, if pleaded, would amount to
a justification. Pugolas v. Holland, 3 Ir. L. Rep. Certificate of Composition.]—Where the rector 533, Ex. of the parish was the sole claimant of the tithes. In an action of assault and battery brought by Held, that a certificate of the tithe composition un- A. against B. & C., it appears that A. came to the der the 4 G. 4 c. 99, s. 25, was sufficiently certain, house of B. to enter into a final settlement for some though it did not name or describe the party to debts he owed him, and for which the latter agreed whom such composition, or any portion thereof, to take one-fourth as a composition. A. B. & C. was payable. Lodge v. Creaghe, 1 Ir. L. Rep. 315, were in B.'s office, engaged in this arrangement for Ex.
some time, when B. had to go out to his shop to a A tithe.payer will not be allowed to set up, as a customer, and soon after, an altercation having arisen defence, the title of a third party not named in the between A. & C., who was the book-keeper and certificate of composition. Lord Shannon v. Stough relative of B., C. committed the assault complained ton, 3 Ir. L. Rep. 521, Ex. Ch.
of, which was of a violent character, and lasted
twenty minutes. It appeared there was no cause Evidence.] The presumption of a defendants of quarrel immediately between A. & C. The disliability to tithe composition, arising from his pos- pute arose altogether out of the settlement between session of the lands, is not rebutted by the state. A. & B.; and that the shop in which B. was, during ment of the plaintiff's witness, the land agent of the the entire of the assault, was adjoining the office in defendant, that there had been an outstanding lease, which it was committed, and was only separated and that the defendant bad entered into the posses from it by a glass door, which was partly open and sion of the land upon a parol surrender, without from which C. called for a rope to hang the plainany
instrument in writing; the defendant, in such tiff, wbich was thrown to him by a person in the circumstances, not falling within either of the ex- shop; and there was great reason to infer that B. ceptions contained in the 12th section of the 2 & 3 could hear, if not see nearly all that occurred in W. 4, c. 119, being neither tenant from year to the office. The learned judge who tried the case, year, nor at will, within the meaning of the act. directed the jury, that if B. ordered the assault, or Lord Shannon v. Stoughton, 3 Ir. L. Rep. 521, encouraged it, or expressed approbation of it, or Ex. Ch. As to what is evidence of the liability of the game.countenance to it, or did anything to adopt it
as his own, they should find a verdict against him ; defendant in an action for tithe composition. Ib. and added he should be surprised if they found
Statutes of Limitation ]-The 3 & 4 W.4, c. 27, against B. The jury found against B. On mos. 2, does not apply to claims for tithe composition, tion to set aside this verdict for misdirection, and as between the tithe claimant and the owner of as being against law and evidence. Held, that the land, but only to estates in tithe. Lord Shannon question for the jury, was correctly left to them in v. Hodder, 2 Ir. L. Rep. 223, note, Ex.; Lord the preliminary part of the learned judge's charge ; Shannon v. Stoughton, 3 Ir. L. Rep. 521, Ex. Ch. and though the court disapproved of the strong
expression of opinion by the learned judge, thought
did not amount to a misdirection. Held also, TOLLS.
the verdict was not against the weight of evidence. Vessels sailing froin Cork to Dublin, through St. [Crampton, J., dissentiente.] Treanor v. Campbell, George's Channel
, are not subject to the toll given 3 Ir. L. Rep. 387, Q. B. by the 3 G. 2, c. 36 (the Skerries act) to the pro
In an action of trespass and false imprisonment prietor of the Skerries light-house, Boyce v. Jones, against the sheriff, who pleaded the general issue, 4 Ir. L. Rep. 231, Q. B.
the plaintiff's counsel stated the case to be an abuse in the mode of executing a writ of ca. sa., and gare mencement of the work, there having been no ner in evidence, among other things, certain notices
, assignment. Wily v. Boyd, 5 Ir. L. Rep. 421, C.P. served by plaintiff on the defendant, which recited In an action of trespass on the case, the declara. and adınitted that she had been arrested on such a tion stated, that A. being possessed of a certain writ. Held, that the defendant baving omitted to quarry, B. wrongfully and injuriously obstructed prove said writ, the judge ought to have directed him in the use and enjoyment of it, by turning large the jury to find for the plaintiff. Deering v. Pal. quantities of water upon the same. A. on the trial mer, 4 Ir. L. Rep. 421, C. P.
proved that B. had stopped up a drain which A. had Semble—That the omission by the landlord to opened to prevent the water from flowing into the give a bill of particulars of distress, under the 6 & quarry, and also that B. had filled a pipe that had 7 W. 4, c. 75, even if necessary, would render the been sunk in order to drain the quarry. Held, that landlord a trespasser ab initio. Daly v. Bloom- such acts being immediate injuries, an action on the field, 5 Ir. L. Rep. 65, Q. B.
case could be sustained, but that the trespass viet In trespass for false imprisonment, it appeared that armis was the proper remedy. Scott v. Nelaw, i on the 19th of September, 1833, the plaintiff being Ir. L. Rep. 207, Q. B. then in the custody of the sheriff of Kildare, at the Semble, where an injury is done to the soil and suit of J. S. M. and others, the defendant issued a freehold, plaintiff has no election, but must bring ca. sa. against him on foot of a judgment previously trespass vi et armis. Ib. obtained. During the year 1839 the plaintiff, being “ It appears to the court it should have been still in confinement, obtained in various ways dis- an action of trespass vi et armis
. The distinguishcharges from several of the writs under which he ing circumstance is that in this form of action the was detained, and amongst others from that of de- injury should be wilful, forcible, and the conse. fendant, which, together with the judgment under quence immediate, although if there he consequenwhich it was issued, was set aside by an order of tial damage that will go as an aggravation of the the court on the 23rd of November, 1839. There trespass, but will not convert it into an action of was slight evidence that the judgment was set trespass on the case, and in this case there is also aside for misconduct on the part of the defendant or an injury to lands.” Ib. [Per Pennefather
, C.J. bis attorney. Under these circuinstances upon the To a declaration in trespass g. c. f. for breaking question whether the plaintiff having been in lawful &c., the plaintiff's close, and erecting pens and custody at the suit of other creditors, during all the tables there, the defendant pleaded the single plea time that the defendant's detainer was laid on, an of the general issue, and at the trial proved a' de. action of trespass did not lie at the suit of the plain- mise for a term of years of the locus in quo in the tiffs against the defendants. Pennefather, C. J. and following terms :-“ All that and those part of the Perrin, J. were of opinion that it did not. [Burton house known as No. 119, North King street, corner and Crampton, J.J. dissentientibus.] Coppinger v. of Smithfield, consisting of the small room of the Bradley, 5 Ir. L Rep. 257, Q. B.
bar of said house, fronting Smithfield, &c, together But by reason of the adınission of illegal evidence, with the front part of said premises
, extending misdirection of the learned judge, and excessive da- from said office to the centre of the said Smithfield mages, the court awarded a venire de novo. [Penne market, &c., and to be used by said R. B. (plaintif) father, C. J. dissentiente, holding that judgment as a stand for the sale of cattle and hay, according should be entered for the defendant.] Ib. to the usage of Sinithfield market.” And also gave
Quære, would an action on the case lie uuder the evidence of a custom for the owners of houses in circumstances of the case ? Ib.
Sinithfield, to let their frontage to salesmasters “ It is wrong to say that no man shall be made a at a rent; and of the commission of the trespass contrespasser by mere construction of law, it is true no plained of. On the other hand, the defendant gave man can be a trespasser in any sense when no tres- evidence of no such usage being in existence in pass has been committed, but when a trespass is com- Smithfield, which was a public markket; and mitted persons may, by construction of law, be par. evidence of nu title in the lessor of the plaintiff to ties to that trespass; it is upon this principle that demise the frontage. And the judge directed the the advisers of a trespass before the act, and the jury, that if they believed that on a market day, the assenters to it afterwards, are trespassers; all are plaintiff had taken possession of the locus in quis, principals in trespass, and one may then be a tres and was in actual possession of the said frontage passer in relation to an act which he had advised or demised to him ; and while so in possession, the directed, although the man by whom the act is done defendant entered thereon against the will of the is no trespasser at all, as in the familiar instance of plaintiff, they should find for the plaintiff
. Held, the execution of a false writ by a sheriff—the sheriff' that the said direction was correct
, and that it was is justified by the writ, but the party who gave it to not competent for the plaintiff, on the pleadings as be executed may be a trespasser." 16.
framed, to raise any question beyond that of posIn a declaration in trespass q.c.f. containing two session of the premises by the plaintiff, and the counts for entering the plaintiff's close, and digging commission of the act of trespass while he was in drains, &c., and two counts de bonis asportatis, and that possesion. Dubitante, Doherty, C. J.; and another for expulsion, the defendant pleaded and dissentiente, Torrens, J., the latter of whom beld proved at the trial leave and license to do the acts that the judge ought to have distinguished between complained of, viz. to scour the drains. Held, that a right to exclusive possession, which would bare it was not competent for the plaintiff to rely on evi- enabled the plaintiff to have maintained the action, dence of a revocation of the license after the com- and a mere right over the surface of the soil, which
would have been only a right of easement ; and to caused the plaintiff to be greatly terrified, and to be have submitted to the jury, that if they believed put in great peril and apprehension of the said carthere was a right to exclusive possession, they riage overturning ; and from reasonable apprehenshould find for the plaintiff, but that if he had but a sion of the said carriage overturning, then and there right to a mere easement, the action was not main to fall towards to, and upon the ground ; and in so tainable, and they should find for the defendant. falling, one of the legs of the plaintiff, without his Burriss v. Coffey, 6 Ir. L. Rep. 298, C. P.
will, then and there struck against one of the wheels « If an action of trespass quare clausum fregit is of the lastmentioned carriage, by means whereof brought
, and the plaintiff show a possession, and the said leg was fractured. Held, to be a count the defence intended to be set up is, that at some in trespass vi et armis, and not in case. Spear remote period the ground in question was conferred v. Chapman, 8 Ir. L. Rep. 461, Ex. Ch.; S. Ć. Ib. on the public by the owner in fee, for a market, 278, «Ex. the defendant is not at liberty to give evidence to sustain such a defence on the plea of the gene- Pleas—first the general issue-second, as to ejeci.
Pleadiny.]-In an action of trespass qu. cl. fr. ral issue; the question ought to be raised on the pleadings, as I have said, by a special plea fully possessed of the said premises, and the plain.
expelling, &c., actio non, because he was lawthat the locus in quo was a public market, and that tiff having entered thereon, and unlawfully taken being such, the defendant was justified in entering thereon, and exposing his cattle on it for sale.” 16. possession of the said premises, and without the
license of the defendant, he expelled her therefrom. [Per Jackson, J.] An exclusive possession in the plaintiff is neces
Held, that this plea was bad upon demurrer; besary to be proved in a possessory action, and
no case had ; and because it purported to be a justifica
cause it did not shew a better title than plaintiff has been cited to show, nor is there any that I am tion'; yet it did not show title to warrant a justifiaware of, establishing that where a party has a mere
cation. Tucker v. Kirvan, 4 Ir. L. Rep. 376, Q. B. right over the surface of the soil, without a right to make use of the soil itself, or of its produce natural,
In trespass qu. cl. fr., where there are several or otherwise, for his own purposes, that an action of counts, stating distinct trespasses, in different closes trespass can be maintained. 16. [Per Torrens, J.] cial demurrer, to justify in one plea the several
and at different times, it is sufficient, even on speBut there is no case that I can discover, nor has any been cited in the argument, in which a mere trespasses—such plea appearing on the face of it right of enjoyment over or on the surface of the soil
distinct. Kirwan v. Joy, 8 Ir. L. Rep. 500,
to treat the trespasses, times, and closes, as several without any right to appropriate it to us ufructuary
Q. B. purposes, or to derive usufructuary enjoyment froin it, has been held to give such an exclusive possess certain horse against the plaintiff. Plea, that the
Trespass for an assault and battery, by riding a sion as to enable the party to bring trespass. 16. defendant was riding in a careful manner along the [Per Torrens, J.]
A city attachment having issued against A., and public highway ; and whilst so riding, the plaintiff having been placed in the hands of the city marshal negligently, carelessly, and improperly walked along
and across the middle of the highway, and thereby to execute, he seizes the goods of B. The execution creditor – not being present at the seizure, and not knocked and thrown down, and bruised and injured
came in contact with the said horse, and was thereby having given the marshal any indemnity is not
&c., as in the declaration mentioned, without any liable in an action of trespass de bonis asportatis at the suit of B. Smith v. Holbrooke, 9 Ir. L. Rep. said hurt was occasioved by the negligent, careless
default on the part of the defendant; and that the 155, Q. B. Where an ejectment had been brought for non, the default of the defendant; and that if the plain
and improper conduct of the plaintiff, and not by payment of rent, and the demise laid in May, and tiff had exercised due care, the same would not a consent for judginent given, with stay of execution until the November following, when the habere was have happened. Held bad on special demurrer as executed, though the landlord had entered in the amounting to the general issue; and also that it August previous, and sold the crop sold by the was bad as purporting to be in confession and
avoidance, and yet did not admit the trespass, or tenant. Held that the landlord could not be made liable in an action of trespass de bonis asportatis for Mathews, 10 Ir. L. Rep. 316, Q. B.
circumstances justify it. selling the crop. Nugent v. Phillips, 8 Ir. L. Rep. 17, Q. B. [See Baldwin v. Irvine, 1 Ir. Jur. 215, trespass, and before the exhibiting of the bill, it
Trespass—Plea, that after the committing of the Ex.) Held, also, that where a landlord recovers in
was agreed between plaintiff and defendant, that
the latter should do and perform certain work, ejectment, his title has reference to the day of the demise, and the tenant is a trespasser from that for the same, for the plaintiff
, in satisfaction and
which was then agreed upon, and furnish materials period. 16. [Perrin, J., dissentiente.] The declaration stated that the defendant while
discharge of the trespass. Averment_That in driving a carriage, drove with force and violence pursuance of the agreement, the defendant did and against another carriage, on which the plaintiff was
performed the work, and found and provided masitting, and forced it with a great shock, over a raised terials for the same for the plaintiff; and that the part of the road, and caused it to sway and incline plaintiff accepted and received such work and mato over-turn ; and thereby with force and violence terials in full satisfaction and discharge of the tres
pass. Depurrer, upon the grounds that neither
the nature of the agreement, nor particulars of the the other tenants of the lessor. Held, that there work performed, had been stated with sufficient was no variance between the right claimed in the certainty. Held, that the plea was good ; first, be- declaration, and that which passed by the least. cause the statement of the agreement was imma- Metcalf v. Rorke, 8 Ir. L. Rep. 137, Q. B. terial, and could not have been traversed by the Quære, does a grant amount to a grant of com. plaintiff; and secondly, that a statement of the par- mon appendant or appurtenant. 16. ticulars of the work would have been objectionable, as falling within the rule prohibiting the introduce
Costs, 2 G. 1, c. 11 ss. 14 & 15.]-When, on the tion into pleading of matters of evidence. Craig v. trial of an action for trespass, at which the defenByrne, 7 Ir. L. Rep. 500, Ex.
dant did not appear, some evidence was given that
the defendant asserted title to the premises at the Evidence.]—In an action of trespass in a several time of the trespass, and the plaintiff took a verdiet fishery, a person relying on the 19th section of the for nominal damages. The judge refused to cere 5 & 6 Vic. c. 106, as giving him title to erect a tify under the 2 G. 1, c. 11, ss. 14 & 15. Der. stake weir, must prove the previous written consent neil v, M Donnell, 3 Ir. L. Rep. 182, C. P. of the landlord to such erection. A letter of the
This is not a question for the court, but for the landlord, without any date, authorising such erec-judge at nisi prius. Ib. tion, and no evidence offered aliunde, of such let- The 2 G. I, c. 11, s. 15, comprises but two speter having been written before the erection of the cies of action—assault and battery, and trespass weir, was held not to be admissible evidence for Iqu. cl. fr. In an action of trespass, brought by that purpose. Lord Templemore v. Allen, 8 Ir. L. plaintiff against the defendant, for driving a coach Rep. 199, Q. B.
against one upon which the plaintiff was riding, In an action of trespass, the plaintiff claimed a by reason of which he was thrown to the ground
, several fishery in a navigable river, and in proof and broke his leg; the jury having found for the thereof, gave in evidence certain patents and an- plaintiff with 6d. damage, and 6d. costs ; and the cient documents, showing that certain weirs and judge having refused to certify that the trespass gurgites within those limits, had been granted to was voluntary and malicious. Held, that the the party under whom the plaintiff claimed; and plaintiff was entitled to the full costs of the suit the judge at the trial, refused to tell the jury that Spear v. Chapman, 8 Ir. L. Rep. 461, Ex. Ch. this passed a continuous fishery within the limits s. c. 16., 278, Ex. claimed ; but left it to them to say, whether the right to that several fishery was in the plaintiff'; and whether the place where the defendants fished
II. TRESPASS FOR MESNE RATES. was within the limits claimed. Held, that this did
In an action of trespass for mesne profits, in not amount to a misdirection. Gabbett v. Clancy, which the general issue only is pleaded, the judge 8 Ir. L. Rep. 299, Q. B.
ment in ejectinent is conclusive evidence of the Quære, did the word gurgites pass a several fish- plaintiff's title, whether that judgment has been ery within the boundaries. 16. The plaintiff in proof of his title, proved the Nolan, 2 Ir. L. Rep. 96, Ex.
obtained on verdict, or by default. Armstrong v. execution of a lease to him of the locus in quo by a
In trespass for nesne profits, when there was a corporation; which lease, to make it valid, required plea of the general issue, two pleas of liberum tenethe consent of certain parties thereto, and recited that such consent had been obtained. Held, that the court will order the latter to be taken off the
mentum, and a plea of nu property in the plaintiff
, such was sufficient proof of its validity, without file, on the ground that it is an unnecessary plea
. proof of such consent, which the jury might pre. Jack v. Swift, 3 Ir. L. Rep. 7, Q. B. sume, evidence to the contrary not having been Semble - The plea of no property, concluding to given, and the onus probandi lying on the party the country, to a declaration in trespass for mesne who asserted the invalidity of the instrument. Ib.
profits, is a bad plea. Ib. A fiat for a lease of the fishery, granted by
Where a defendant in ejectment, pending the Queen Elizabeth, with proof of payment of rent proceedings, entered into an agreement subsequent under the lease, Held to be sufficient evidence to to the service of ejectment, with the agent of the presume a seisin in the crown, without proof of lessor of the plaintiff
, to give a consent for jadę. enrolment of this lease. The want of enrolment is inent, with a stay of execution, and that he should an objection to the validity of the lease, not to its have the crops. `Held, in an action of trespass for admissibility as evidence. 16.
mesne rates, that this agreement did not preclude Held that an inquisition taken in 1614, was suf. the plaintiff from recovering nominal damages for ficient evidence, as a matter of reputation of the the trespass, antecedent to the date of the agreeexistence of a certain place, without proof of the
Baldwin v. Irvine, 1 Ir. Jur. 215, Ex. commission on which it was grounded. Ib.
In an action of trespass on the case, the plaintiff Evidence.]– Where an action of trespass for declared that he was possessed of a certain messuage, mesne rates is brought against a party, who let by reason whereof he ought to have benefit of tur- judgment in ejectment go by default
, an attested or bary in a certain common; and in proof of that examined copy of the affidavit of the service of right, relied on a lease demising to him certain the ejectment, is sufficient evidence of the fact of lands, together with benefit of turbary in a bog such service, in the action for mesne profits. Ara. convenient to the demised premises in common with strong v. Norton, 2 Ir. L. Rep. 96, Ex.; and itt
acc., Earl of Listowell v. Greene, 3 Ir. L. Rep.
Jesse, (2 N. & M. 36 ; S. C. 5 B. & Ad. 31), shows
the unanimous opinion of the twelve judges in EngA vessel belonging to a number of part owners, was such circumstances as it was essentially necessary
land to have been, that the court will presume only forcibly
taken by the minority out of the possession for the plaintiff to have proved, to support his deof the majority, and sent by the former upon foreign claration ; that after verdict we cannot presume voyages, on one of which it was ultimately lost. that anything not in the declaration, or necessarily Held, that trover could not be maintained. One tenant in common of a chattel, cannot maintain to be inferred therefrom, was proved at the trial. trover for it against his co-tenant while the right Barry v. Cambie, 6 Ir. L. Rep. 57, Ex. Ch. of recaption remains ; but when that right has been put an end to by the act of the co-tenant, an action WARRANT OF ATTORNEY—See Pracof trover lies. Knight v. Coates, 1 Ir. L. Rep.
TICE. (JUDGMENT.) STAMP.
Entering Judgment.]—The court allowed judgDamages.]- If an agreement be made concerning ment to be entered upon an old bond and warrant, goods, and in fraud of that agreement the goods which had been executed to the obligee, as a sebe taken possesion of, it is a conversion, and the curity against a judgment entered on another bond, value of the property being the amount to be re-in which he was a surety for the obligor, that it covered, where the property converted was bills might be assigned as counter security to the purof exchange, the jury were directed to include in chaser of certain lands of the obligee. Chambers the damages the interest then due. M'Keever v. v. Bateson, 3 Ir. L. Rep. 365, C. P. M.Kain, Bl. D. & O. 80, N. P. [Per Brady, C.B.] Where the warrant of attorney was joint, the
In an action of trover for a paid bill of exchange, court would not allow the obligee to enter judgment the owner is entitled to substantial damages. Dunne against the surviving obligor, though the obligor v. Thorpe, Bl. D. & 0. 128, N.P. (Per Pigot, C.B.] who had died was a minor when he executed the
bond and warrant. Anonymous, 1 Ir. L. Rep. 36,
C. P. TRUSTEES-See JUDGMENT. (ASSIGNMENT.)
Upon a motion to enter up judgment against one
of three obligors in a bond, it appeared that the bond TURBARY_See TRESPASS. (EVIDENCE.) was in terms joint and several, and the warrant was to
confess a "judgment or judgments, &c.," on "a deCutting for sale.]—See De Burgho v. Gabbett, claration or declarations;" but in other respects 1 Ir. Jur. 276, Q. B.
purported to be joint. Held, that from the terms
of the warrant, it might be inferred that the parUNDERTAKING.
ties had several judgments in their contemplation, To give material evidence.]—See Practice. to enter up a separate judgment. Wallace v. Rus
as well as a joint judgment; and leave was given MOTION TO CHANGE Venue.
sell, 2 Ir. L. Rep. 15, Q. B.
Judgment cannot be entered upon a joint bond UNION-(ACT OF)
and warrant, against the survivor of two obligors; The court will not permit a plea, calling in ques. Coleman v. Cox, 2 Ir. L. Rep. 16, Q. B.
but the party will be left to his action on the bond. ion the power of the Imperial Parliament to bind Irelaud, to be argued; but will direct it to be taken
A motion on behalf of the wife to enter up judgbeen made by the opposite party. Clarke v. Kelly, band's, passed for the amount of the wife's prooff the file, though no inotion for that purpose has ment in the names of the trustees of a narriage
settlement, upon a bond and warrant of the hus. | Ir. Jur. 294, C. P.
perty; and it appeared that the trustees refused to
enter judgment; that one of them had issued an USE AND OCCUPATION-See Assumpsir. attachment against the obligor's goods, and that the
sun secured on the bond would be lost; but the
trustees had not received specific notice of this VARIANCE_See DIFFERENT Actions. PLEAD- motion. The application was refused. Campion PRACTICE.
v. Campion, 2 Ir. L. Rep. 13, Q. B.
The Court of Exchequer will allow judgment to VENDOR AND PURCHASER-See Deeds, be entered on a Kerry bond, at the suit of the exJUDGMENTS. (PRIORITIES.)
ecutor of the obligee. Adams v. Houston, 2 Ir. L. Rep. 241, Ex.
Judgment will not be entered on a bond and VENIRE DE NOVO-See PRACTICE.
warrant more than twenty years old, on a general
allegation of interest having been paid within that VENUE-See PLEADING. PRACTICE.
time. The affidavit should state by whom interest was paid. Creed v. Creed, 3 Ir. L. Rep. 61, C.P.
Judgment was not entered on a bond against the