would have been only a right of easement; and to have submitted to the jury, that if they believed there was a right to exclusive possession, they should find for the plaintiff; but that if he had but a right to a mere easement, the action was not maintainable, and they should find for the defendant. Burriss v. Coffey, 6 Ir. L. Rep. 298, C. P. "If an action of trespass quare clausum fregit is brought, and the plaintiff show a possession, and the defence intended to be set up is, that at some remote period the ground in question was conferred on the public by the owner in fee, for a market, the defendant is not at liberty to give evidence to sustain such a defence on the plea of the general issue; the question ought to be raised on the pleadings, as I have said, by a special plea that the locus in quo was a public market, and that being such, the defendant was justified in entering thereon, and exposing his cattle on it for sale." 1b. [Per Jackson, J.] An exclusive possession in the plaintiff is necessary to be proved in a possessory action, and no case has been cited to show, nor is there any that I am aware of, establishing that where a party has a mere right over the surface of the soil, without a right to make use of the soil itself, or of its produce natural, or otherwise, for his own purposes, that an action of trespass can be maintained. 1b. [Per Torrens, J.] But there is no case that I can discover, nor has any been cited in the argument, in which a mere right of enjoyment over or on the surface of the soil, without any right to appropriate it to usufructuary purposes, or to derive usufructuary enjoyment from it, has been held to give such an exclusive possession as to enable the party to bring trespass. [Per Torrens, J.] 16. A city attachment having issued against A., and having been placed in the hands of the city marshal to execute, he seizes the goods of B. The execution creditor-not being present at the seizure, and not having given the marshal any indemnity-is not liable in an action of trespass de bonis asportatis at the suit of B. Smith v. Holbrooke, 9 Ir. L. Rep. 155, Q. B. Where an ejectment had been brought for nonpayment of rent, and the demise laid in May, and a consent for judginent given, with stay of execution until the November following, when the habere was executed, though the landlord had entered in the August previous, and sold the crop sold by the tenant. Held that the landlord could not be made liable in an action of trespass de bonis asportatis for selling the crop. Nugent v. Phillips, 8 Ir. L. Rep. 17, Q. B. [See Baldwin v. Irvine, 1 Ir. Jur. 215, Ex.1 Held, also, that where a landlord recovers in ejectment, his title has reference to the day of the demise, and the tenant is a trespasser from that period. Ib. [Perrin, J., dissentiente.] The declaration stated that the defendant while driving a carriage, drove with force and violence against another carriage, on which the plaintiff was sitting, and forced it with a great shock, over a raised part of the road, and caused it to sway and incline to over-turn; and thereby with force and violence caused the plaintiff to be greatly terrified, and to be put in great peril and apprehension of the said carriage overturning; and from reasonable apprehension of the said carriage overturning, then and there to fall towards to, and upon the ground; and in so falling, one of the legs of the plaintiff, without his will, then and there struck against one of the wheels of the lastmentioned carriage, by means whereof the said leg was fractured. Held, to be a count in trespass vi et armis, and not in case. Spear v. Chapman, 8 Ir. L. Rep. 461, Ex. Ch.; S. Ć. Ib. 278, Ex. Pleas-first the general issue-second, as to ejectPleading.]-In an action of trespass qu. cl. fr. ing, expelling, &c., actio non, because he was lawfully possessed of the said premises, and the plain. tiff having entered thereon, and unlawfully taken possession of the said premises, and without the license of the defendant, he expelled her therefrom. Held, that this plea was bad upon demurrer; behad; and because it purported to be a justificacause it did not shew a better title than plaintiff tion; yet it did not show title to warrant a justification. Tucker v. Kirwan, 4 Ir. L. Rep. 376, Q. B. In trespass qu. cl. fr., where there are several counts, stating distinct trespasses, in different closes and at different times, it is sufficient, even on special demurrer, to justify in one plea the several trespasses—such plea appearing on the face of it and distinct. Kirwan v. Joy, 8 Ir. L. Rep. 500, to treat the trespasses, times, and closes, as several Q. B. certain horse against the plaintiff. Plea, that the Trespass for an assault and battery, by riding a defendant was riding in a careful manner along the public highway; and whilst so riding, the plaintiff negligently, carelessly, and improperly walked along and across the middle of the highway, and thereby knocked and thrown down, and bruised and injured came in contact with the said horse, and was thereby &c., as in the declaration mentioned, without any default on the part of the defendant; and that the said hurt was occasioned by the negligent, careless and improper conduct of the plaintiff, and not by the default of the defendant; and that if the plaintiff had exercised due care, the same would not have happened. Held bad on special demurrer as amounting to the general issue; and also that it was bad as purporting to be in confession and avoidance, and yet did not admit the trespass, or state any circumstances to justify it. Mathews, 10 Ir. L. Rep. 316, Q. B. Ball v. trespass, and before the exhibiting of the bill, it Trespass-Plea, that after the committing of the was agreed between plaintiff and defendant, that the latter should do and perform certain work, Averment-That in for the same, for the plaintiff, in satisfaction and which was then agreed upon, and furnish materials discharge of the trespass. pursuance of the agreement, the defendant did and performed the work, and found and provided materials for the same for the plaintiff; and that the Plaintiff accepted and received such work and materials in full satisfaction and discharge of the trespass. Demurrer, upon the grounds that neither the nature of the agreement, nor particulars of the work performed, had been stated with sufficient certainty. Held, that the plea was good; first, because the statement of the agreement was immaterial, and could not have been traversed by the plaintiff; and secondly, that a statement of the particulars of the work would have been objectionable, as falling within the rule prohibiting the introduction into pleading of matters of evidence. Craig v. Byrne, 7 Ir. L. Rep. 500, Ex. Evidence.]-In an action of trespass in a several fishery, a person relying on the 19th section of the 5 & 6 Vic. c. 106, as giving him title to erect a stake weir, must prove the previous written consent of the landlord to such erection. A letter of the landlord, without any date, authorising such erection, and no evidence offered aliunde, of such letter having been written before the erection of the weir, was held not to be admissible evidence for that purpose. Lord Templemore v. Allen, 8 Ir. L. Rep. 199, Q. B. a In an action of trespass, the plaintiff claimed several fishery in a navigable river, and in proof thereof, gave in evidence certain patents and ancient documents, showing that certain weirs and gurgites within those limits, had been granted to the party under whom the plaintiff claimed; and the judge at the trial, refused to tell the jury that this passed a continuous fishery within the limits claimed; but left it to them to say, whether the right to that several fishery was in the plaintiff; and whether the place where the defendants fished was within the limits claimed. Held, that this did not amount to a misdirection. Gabbett v. Clancy, 8 Ir. L. Rep. 299, Q. B. Quære, did the word gurgites pass a several fishery within the boundaries. Ib. The plaintiff in proof of his title, proved the execution of a lease to him of the locus in quo by a corporation; which lease, to make it valid, required the consent of certain parties thereto, and recited that such consent had been obtained. Held, that such was sufficient proof of its validity, without proof of such consent, which the jury might presume, evidence to the contrary not having been given, and the onus probandi lying on the party who asserted the invalidity of the instrument. Ib. A fiat for a lease of the fishery, granted by Queen Elizabeth, with proof of payment of rent under the lease, Held to be sufficient evidence to presume a seisin in the crown, without proof of enrolment of this lease. The want of enrolment is an objection to the validity of the lease, not to its admissibility as evidence. Ib. Held that an inquisition taken in 1614, was suf ficient evidence, as a matter of reputation of the existence of a certain place, without proof of the commission on which it was grounded. Ib. In an action of trespass on the case, the plaintiff declared that he was possessed of a certain messuage, by reason whereof he ought to have benefit of turbary in a certain common; and in proof of that right, relied on a lease demising to him certain lands, together with benefit of turbary in a bog convenient to the demised premises in common with tha Costs, 2 G. 1, c. 11 ss. 14 & 15.]-When, on the trial of an action for trespass, at which the defendant did not appear, some evidence was given that the defendant asserted title to the premises at the time of the trespass, and the plaintiff took a verdict for for nominal damages. The judge refused to cer tify under the 2 G. 1, c. 11, ss. 14 & 15. M'Don nell v, M'Donnell, 3 Ir. L. Rep. 182, C. P. This is not a question for the court, but for the judge at nisi prius. Ib. qu. The 2 G. Î, c. 11, s. 15, comprises but two species of action-assault and battery, and trespass cl. fr. In an action of trespass, brought by plaintiff against the defendant, for driving a coach against one upon which the plaintiff was riding. by reason of which he was thrown to the ground, and broke his leg; the jury having found for the plaintiff with 6d. damage, and 6d. costs; and the judge having refused to certify that the trespass was voluntary and malicious. Held, that the plaintiff was entitled to the full costs of the suit. Spear v. Chapman, 8 Ir. L. Rep. 461, Ex. Ch. S. C. Ib., 278, Ex. II. TRESPASS FOR MESNE RATES. In an action of trespass for mesne profits, in which the general issue only is pleaded, the judg ment in ejectment is conclusive evidence of the plaintiff's title, whether that judgment has been obtained on verdict, or by default. Armstrong v. Nolan, 2 Ir. L. Rep. 96, Ex. In trespass for mesne profits, when there was a plea of the general issue, two pleas of liberum tenementum, and a plea of no property in the plaintiff, the court will order the latter to be taken off the file, on the ground that it is an unnecessary plea. Jack v. Swift, 3 Ir. L. Rep. 7, Q. B. Semble The plea of no property, concluding to the country, to a declaration in trespass for mesne profits, is a bad plea. Ib. Where a defendant in ejectment, pending the proceedings, entered into an agreement subsequent to the service of ejectment, with the agent of the lessor of the plaintiff, to give a consent for judg ment, with a stay of execution, and that he should have the crops. Held, in an action of trespass for mesne rates, that this agreement did not preclude the plaintiff from recovering nominal damages for the trespass, antecedent to the date of the agree ment. Baldwin v. . Irvine, 1 Ir. Jur. 215, Ex. Evidence.]-Where an action of trespass for mesne rates is brought against a party, who let judgment in ejectment go by default, an attested or examined copy of the affidavit of the service of the ejectment, is sufficient evidence of the fact of such service, in the action for mesne profits. Armstrong v. Norton, 2 Ir. L. Rep. 96, Ex.; and att ver EL acc., Earl of Listowell v. Greene, 3 Ir. L. Rep. 205, Ex. TROVER. A vessel belonging to a number of part owners, was forcibly taken by the minority out of the possession of the majority, and sent by the former upon foreign voyages, on one of which it was ultimately lost. Held, that trover could not be maintained. One tenant in common of a chattel, cannot maintain trover for it against his co-tenant while the right of recaption remains; but when that right has been put an end to by the act of the co-tenant, an action of trover lies. Knight v. Coates, 1 Ir. L. Rep. 53, Ex. Damages.]-If an agreement be made concerning goods, and in fraud of that agreement the goods be taken possesion of, it is a conversion, and the value of the property being the amount to be recovered, where the property converted was bills of exchange, the jury were directed to include in the damages the interest then due. M'Keever v. M'Kain, Bl. D. & O. 80, N. P. [Per Brady, C.B.] In an action of trover for a paid bill of exchange, the owner is entitled to substantial damages. Dunne v. Thorpe, Bl. D. & O. 128, N.P. [Per Pigot, C.B.] TRUSTEES-See JUDGMENT. (ASSIGNMENT.) TURBARY-See TRESPASS. (EVIDENCE.) Cutting for sale.]-See De Burgho v. Gabbett, 1 Ir. Jur. 276, Q. B. UNDERTAKING. To give material evidence.]—See PRACTICE. MOTION TO Change Venue. UNION (ACT OF) The court will not permit a plea, calling in ques tion the power of the Imperial Parliament to bind Ireland, to be argued; but will direct it to be taken off the file, though no motion for that purpose has been made by the opposite party. Clarke v. Kelly, 1 Ir. Jur. 294, C. P. VERDICT-See PRACTICE. Aider by Verdict.]-The case of Sweetapple v. Jesse, (2 N. & M. 36; S. C. 5 B. & Ad. 31), shows the unanimous opinion of the twelve judges in Engsuch circumstances as it was essentially necessary land to have been, that the court will presume only for the plaintiff to have proved, to support his declaration; that after verdict we cannot presume to be inferred therefrom, was proved at the trial. that anything not in the declaration, or necessarily Barry v. Cambie, 6 Ir. L. Rep. 57, Ex. Ch. WARRANT OF ATTORNEY-See PRACTICE. (JUDGMENT.) STAMP. Entering Judgment.]-The court allowed judgment to be entered upon an old bond and warrant, which had been executed to the obligee, as a security against a judgment entered on another bond, in which he was a surety for the obligor, that it might be assigned as counter security to the purchaser of certain lands of the obligee. Chambers v. Bateson, 3 Ir. L. Rep. 365, C. P. Where the warrant of attorney was joint, the court would not allow the obligee to enter judgment against the surviving obligor, though the obligor who had died was a minor when he executed the bond and warrant. Anonymous, 1 Ir. L. Rep. 36, C. P. Upon a motion to enter up judgment against one of three obligors in a bond, it appeared that the bond was in terms joint and several, and the warrant was to confess a "judgment or judgments, &c.," on "a declaration or declarations;" but in other respects purported to be joint. Held, that from the terms of the warrant, it might be inferred that the parties had several judgments in their contemplation, as well as a joint judgment; and leave was given to enter up a separate judgment. Wallace v. Russell, 2 Ir. L. Rep. 15, Q. B. Judgment cannot be entered upon a joint bond and warrant, against the survivor of two obligors; Coleman v. Cox, 2 Ir. L. Rep. 16, Q. B. but the party will be left to his action on the bond. A motion on behalf of the wife to enter up judgment in the names of the trustees of a marriage band's, passed for the amount of the wife's prosettlement, upon a bond and warrant of the hus perty; and it appeared that the trustees refused to enter judgment; that one of them had issued an USE AND OCCUPATION-See ASSUMPSIT. attachment against the obligor's goods, and that the VARIANCE-See DIFFERENT ACTIONS. PLEAD ING. PRACTICE. sum secured on the bond would be lost; but the trustees had not received specific notice of this motion. The application was refused. Campion v. Campion, 2 Ir. L. Rep. 13, Q. B. The Court of Exchequer will allow judgment to VENDOR AND PURCHASER-See DEEDS, be entered on a Kerry bond, at the suit of the ex JUDGMENTS. (PRIORITIES.) VENIRE DE NOVO-See PRACTICE. VENUE-See PLEADING. PRACTICE. ecutor of the obligee. Adams v. Houston, 2 Ir. L. Rep. 241, Ex. Judgment will not be entered on a bond and warrant more than twenty years old, on a general allegation of interest having been paid within that time. The affidavit should state by whom interest was paid. Creed v. Creed, 3 Ir. L. Rep. 61, C.P. Judgment was not entered on a bond against the 66 one or more Harris v. bond and warrant were executed by the defendant to the plaintiffs, whilst the former was in custody on mesne process at the suit of the latter, and without the presence of an attorney. The defendant, hav surviving obligor, the bond being lost, and the terms of the warrant being only to enter up judgments on a declaration to be filed." Young, 3 Ir. L. Rep. 377, C. P. Semble That a warrant of attorney for a judging been subsequently arrested on foot of the judg ment in debt for money had and received, does not authorise the entering of judgment in debt upon a bond. Otway v. Thynne, 3 Ir. L. Rep. 540, Ex. The court will not allow judgment to be entered on a warrant of attorney reciting a bond collateral therewith, where in fact, no bond had been executed. Connor v. Connor, 4 Ir. L. Rep. 315, Ex. The court on the application of the cestui que trust, permitted judgment to be entered on a bond and warrant of attorney, executed to the obligee as a trustee, no payment having been made on foot thereof to the latter. Tyrrell v. Magill, 5 Ir. L. Rep. 93, C. P. The court refused to enter a judgment against the survivor of two obligors, in a joint and several a judgment on one or more declaration or declarations, to be filed against us." Magee v. Magill, 5 Ir. L. Rep. 186, C.P. bond, when the warrant was to enter up 66 The court will not allow judgment to be entered up, without the production and filing of the warrant of attorney, as required by the 39th general rule, though it was sworn in an uncontradicted affidavit, to have been executed, and to be in the possession of a third party, from whom it could not be obtained. M'Ewen v. Earl of Charleville, 6 Ir. L. Rep. 144, C. P. A bond and warrant having been executed by a father and sou, on the marriage of the latter, to secure to the wife a sum exceeding the amount of her fortune, in the event of the bankruptcy or insolvency of the obligors, or either of them; and the son having committed what was contended to be an act of bankruptcy, the court granted an absolute order to enter judgment against the father alone, notwithstanding that the bond and warrant had been executed nineteen years since, on the suggestion by counsel of an apprehension that the available property of the father might be conveyed away before a conditional order could be made absolute. Kennedy v. Davis, 6 Ir. L. Rep. 113, C. P. Separate judgments cannot be entered on a joint and several bond, where the warrant authorises only one declaration to be filed. Anonymous, 8 Ir. L. Rep. 12, Q. B. Judgment cannot be entered against two surviving obligors, on a joint bond executed by three, with warrant authorising an appearance "for us, to confess one or more judgments, on one or more declarations to be filed against us." Stanfield v. Wilson, 8 Ir. L. Rep. 100, Ex. A warrant of attorney had been executed by an insolvent, under the provisions of the 1 & 2 G. 4, cap. 59, s. 28, to authorise the entering up a judgment against him. This court allowed judgment to be entered on that warrant, under an order of the Insolvent Court, though more than twenty years had elapsed. Campbell v. Regan, 8 Ir. L. Rep. 191, Q, B. Judgment was entered, against the defendant, on a bond by virtue of a warrant of attorney, which ment, took the benefit of the Insolvent Acts, and returned the judgment in his schedule. Held, that by returning the judgment in his schedule, the defendant waived the irregularity. Dobson v. M'Daid, 1 Ir. L. Rep. 236, Ex. 3 & 4 Vic. e. 105.]-A memorandum of satisfacordered to be entered on a warrant of attorney filed tion under the 18th section of the 3 & 4 Vic. c. 105, pursuant to the 12th section of the same statute. Dower v. Dumphy, 6 Ir. L. Rep. 128, Ex. Such an order may be made by a single judge or by the court itself. Ib. the penal sum of £600, with warrant of attorney to P. and J. M. executed a bond to the plaintiff in confess judgment, the plaintiff writing to them the following letter: "Gentlemen, you have this day executed to me your bond, with warrant of attor ney, for confessing judgment, in the penal sum of £600, now, I hereby declare that such bond, and any judgment to be entered thereupon, has been passed to me as a collateral security only for any overdue bills which I may hereafter discount for you, and for no other object." Separate judgments were entered on this bond within twenty-one days of its execution, but the warrant was not filed, nor was the letter to the defendants written upon the same paper as the warrant. The defendants having become bankrupts, Held, that such judgment was good against their assignees, and came within the saving clause of the 13th section of the 3 & 4 Vic. c. 105. Conlan v. M'Anaspie, 10 Ir. L. Rep. 295, Ex. feazance within the 14th section of the statute. Ib. Semble, that the above letter amounted to a de Semble, that the provisions of the 14th section apply to warrants of attorney collateral with bonds. Ib. Practice.]-A warrant of attorney, on which judgment had been entered, was allowed to be taken off the file for the purpose of entering judgment thereon in England upon the terms of vacating the judgment in this country. Wall v. Lighburne, 4 Ir. L. Rep. 177, Ex. WARRANTY-See ASSURANCE. When a horse was purchased, and after a month's trial returned to the vendor as unsound, (the horse being warranted,) but is not received by him. Held not sufficient to rescind the contract. Cripps v. Smith, 3 Ir. L. Rep. 277, Q. B. The declaration stated that in consideration that the plaintiff, at the request of the defendant, had then and there bought a horse of him, he then and there promised that the horse was sound. Held good on special demurrer, for that the sale and warranty were contemporaneous, and the statement in the declaration was not an averment of a sale being had before the promise was made. Smythe v. Morrisson, 10 Ir. L. Rep. 213, Q.B. WASTE. Cutting Bog.]-When waste, see De Burgho v. Gabbett, 1 Ir. Jur. 276, Q. B. WEIGH-MASTER. In 1847, the mayor and aldermen of the city of Limerick "nominated and appointed under hand and seal Alderman John Vereker, and the Hon. C. S. Vereker to be joint weigh masters of said city." John Vereker being then mayor of the city, and the Hon. C. S. Vereker an infant; it was admitted that the former took the oath required by the statute, and filled the office until his death in 1840, and that the tolls were in the corporation of the city. Held, that under the 4 Anne, c. 14, the appointment was in the mayor, and that the office of mayor and weigh-master were not incompatible. Honan v. Vereker, 10 Ir. L. Rep. 64, Ex. Held, that under the third section of the above statute, requiring that "there shall be appointed in every city one honest and discreet person who shall be weigh-master," an appointment of an infant or of two persons to the office is invalid, and that therefore the title of the Hon. C. S. V. determined on the death of J. V. in 1840. Ib. Quære, would a quo warranto information, at the relation of the plaintiff, have been maintainable for the office in question within the statutes 19 Geo. 2, c. 12, and 38 Geo. 3, c. 2. Ib. WEIRS-See CRIMINAL LAW. (NUISANCE.) WILL. Construction.]-The testator devised all his properties to his daughter for her life," and in case she died without issue," then to his three nieces, daughters of his sister, "and in case any of them should die, the said properties to revert to the survivors or survivor of them, and in case the three should die" then to any other child his said sister should have, and then bequeathed the above properties to the issue of his daughter, "and in case she has more than one child to go share and share among them, and in case all her issue should die the said properties to revert as above between his nieces, Held, that the nieces took under this will as tenants in common and not as joint-tenants. Scully v. O'Brien, 1 Ir. L. Rep. 287, Q. B. R. assignee of a lease for three lives devised the lands to trustees for his wife for life, remainders over for the whole of his interest. Held, that the wife was assignee for her life of the testator's entire interest. Maunsell v. Russell, 2 Ir. L. Rep. 205, Ex. The testator after devising an annuity to his wife charged on part of his real estate, devised a portion of that estate together with the other parts of his real estate to W. T. and his heirs, "but if W. T. shall die in the lifetime of my wife or afterwards without issue or heirs male lawfully begotten, living at his death, or if living who shall happen to die before they attain twenty-one; then I devise my estate and interest thereon to P. T. and his heirs, and further after my wife's death I devise to the said P. T. and his heirs my fee-simple estate in A. and my free-hold property in B., but if P. T. shall die without heirs male lawfully begotten in the lifetime of W. T., then I devise such my estates so devised to P. T., to W. T. and his heirs, and if W. T. shall die without such heirs as herein already mentioned, then after the death of the survivors of them I devise my said estates to my sisters S. and A. F. and their heirs. Held, that W. T. and P. T. in the original devises to them, took estates in fee or quasi fee subject to an executory devise over. Held W. T. having died in the lifetime of P. T. without leaving issue male, P. T. took in the estates devised to W. T. an estate in fee or quasi in fee subject to an executory devise over. Held, that S. T. having survived A. T. who died in the lifetime of P. T. unmarried and without issue, the said S. T. took in all the premises devised, an estate in fee or quasi fee by way of executory devise. Tisdall v. Tisdall, 2 Ir. L. Rep. 41, Q. B. The testators being seized in fee of certain freehold premises, devised same to trustees their heirs, &c., " upon trust to receive and take the rents, &c., thereof, and pay and apply the same unto my dear Marianne for her own sole and separate use, notwithstanding any future husband she may marry, and that her receipt only to my trustees shall be good and effectual discharges from time to time for the same and from and immediately after the decease of my said dear wife, in trust for such person or persons, and in such manner and form as my dear wife shall by any deed or will duly executed and attested, give, direct and appoint the same, and I give, devise and bequeath unto my said dear wife all and singular my goods, chattels, moneys, debts, to me owing, moneys in the funds and effects and property of what nature or kind soever, the same be for her own sole and absolute use for ever," and he appointed of the will which terminates with the words "direct his wife sole executrix. Held, that under the clause and appoint the same," the testator's wife took in the freehold premises thereby devised to her an estate for her life only, with a power of appointment by posing such estate to be legal and not equitable. any deed or will duly executed and attested, supHeld also, that under the clause of the said will commencing with the words " and I give devise and bequeath unto my said dear wife," she took an estate in fee-simple in said freehold premises contingent upon her not executing the power of appointment given to her by said will, and supposing such estate to be legal and not equitable. Bowyer v. Blair, 2 Ir. L. Rep. 149, Q. B. The testator having two sons Robert and Marcus devised as follows" I leave and bequeath to my said son Robert during the term of his natural life, all my estate right title and interest of and to the lands with the consent of his mother (if living,) then I of C., &c., and in case my son Robert shall marry devise the same to any issue he may happen to have by his wife, in such manner as he shall by deed or will direct, limit, or appoint; and for want of such appointment to go equally among them share and share alike, but in case my son Robert shall die the said lands of C. &c., shall go to my son Marcus without issue then and in that case it is my will that his heirs and assigns for ever." Held, that Robert |
