Page images
PDF
EPUB

of £100 out of the estate first falling into possession, and a similar annuity out of that next falling into possession for the maintenance of her said son, remainder to trustees for L. E. S. for life remainder to the trustees for 3000 years to raise £3000 for the said daughter, remainder to the use of the said son and his issue in strict settlement, remainder to the use of the said daughter, and to all other daughters in tail general, and no remainder after. There was also a covenant on the part of the husband to pay the said debts in the event of the death of L. E. S. and

all her issue before the death of her father, and before the death of the survivors of the three daughters of P. D., so that the terms of 1000 years would not vest. Fines were levied in 1779, in pursuance of the covenant in the foregoing deed. Held, that all the estates and interests (contingent as well as vested) in said D. estate to which L. E. S. was entitled under the limitations of the settlement of 1752 passed, and were bound by the said settlement of 1779, and the fines levied in pursuance thereof. Cole v. Sewell, 5 Ir. L. Rep. 190, C. P.

A partition having been made in 1809 of the said D. estate one-third of the same was allotted to L. E. S., and in 1814 a bill was filed by the trustee of the term of 1000 years in the deed of 1779, claiming the whole of the lands allotted to L. E. S. as comprised in the term, and L. E. S. insisting by her answer that one-fourth only was affected by the settlement of 1779, on a reference it was reported by the Master that the whole was subject thereto, and a final decree was accordingly pronounced for a sale of the whole of the said one-third of the D. estate. Afterwards by a deed executed in 1825, it was witnessed that for the barring all estates tail thereinafter mentioned, L. E. S. and her then husband conveyed all the D. estate allotted in severalty to L. E. S., and an undivided one-third of the said B. estate (which had come into possession) to a trustee that two recoveries might be suffered of said lands; and it was covenanted that they should enure as to such of the said undivided parts as were comprised in the said deed of 1779 to the uses in the said deed mentioned, and in the confirmation of it, and in particular of the term of 1000 years; and after reciting that three specified denominations of the land were not comprised in the deed of 1779, or the fines levied thereof, and the said equity suit, and the decree for the sale of the lands therein, and in the deed of 1779 recited; and that L. E. S. had agreed to make the said denominations subject to the said term, and the trusts thereof, it was agreed and directed that the said recoveries should enure to confirm the sale of the said three denominations for the term of 1000 years, and to give effect and validity to the said decree, and subject to the said term to such uses as L. E. S. should appoint; and as concerning the land comprised in the indenture of 1779 to such further and other uses as had not been thereby declared of and concerning the same as L. E. S. should by deed or will appoint. Held, that the whole of the D. estate, which was allotted in severalty to L. E. S. by the partition, save only the three omitted townlands, was limited and made subject to the uses of the said settlement of 1779 by the deed of 1825, and the recoveries suffered in pursuance thereof. Ib.

A lease for lives renewable for ever contained an agreement that it should be lawful for the landlord, his heirs and assigns, to enter and search for mines, &c., and carry away the ore, and further "to have, hold, and enjoy 200 or 300 acres, at their election, of the land most contiguous to the mines, making an abatement to the tenant for the same." Held, that this was a covenant and not a condition. Croker v. Orpen, 6 Ir. L. Rep. 351, Q. B. [Burton, J. dissentiente.]

A. in 1781 by lease demised certain premises to B. his executors and assigns for a term of 61 years, and three lives concurrent with a proviso, that in case the lives should drop within 61 years then the lease should be good for 31 years. In 1802 he demised the same premises to B., habendum to him and his heirs for the life of C. in the place, room, and stead, and by way of exchange for the life of D., the surviving in the lease of 1781, with a proviso that if C. died within the space of 11 years the lease should subsist for that period, this latter lease contained covenants not in the former lease. Held, that the new lease of 1802 operated as a new lease, and passed a legal estate. Bowen v. Keatinge, 9 Ir. L. Rep. 61, Q. B.

W. H. being seized of an estate tail in Whiteacre, certain judgments were obtained against him in 1824. Upon his marriage subsequently in that year Whiteacre was settled upon him for life with remainder for the benefit of the issue of the marriage, and a recovery was suffered to the uses of the settlement. In 1825 W. H. by purchase acquired Blackacre in fee. In 1826 several other judgments were obtained against him. In 1829 E. agreed to lend W. H. £2000 upon mortgage of his fee in Blackacre, and of his life estate in Whiteacre, provided the judg ment creditors of 1824 would release Blackacre from their judgments, to which they assented, and then (1829) executed a deed poll, which recited that W. H. being desirous to have Blackacre clear of incumbrances had requested the judgment creditors of 1824 to release it from their judgments, and that they being satisfied that the residue of the lands of W. H. were a sufficient security agreed thereto, and by the operation they released, exonerated, and for ever discharged Blackacre from their respective judgments, and from all writs of execution and executions, and every other writ then sued out, or thereafter to be sued out against Blackacre by vir tue of their respective judgments or otherwise in relation thereto, and they agreed (for their respective judgments only) to indemnify W. H. for all costs, damages, and expenses which should at any time be incurred by reason of Black acre being attached in execution under these judgments. Afterwards W. H. executed the proposed mortgage to E. Held that the legal effect and operation of the deed poll of 1829 was to exonerate Black acre as well as Whiteacre from the rights and remedies of the judgment creditors of 1824. Handcock v. Handrock, 10 le L. Rep. 565, C. P.

By indenture of the 19th of October, 1738, A, granted to J. M. and his heirs, certain lands, and amongst them "10 acres of Creggan," excepting mines, minerals and quarries, with liberty to A, bis heirs and assigns, to enter and dig, bore, search

Held also, that the Registry Acts ought to receive an equitable construction.

Held, that the rule of giving an equitable construction to Acts of Parliament, passed for the public benefit, in order to extend the remedy, and suppress the mischief contemplated by the Act, is a well established and subsisting rule. Ib.

for, and carry away, all mines, minerals, &c. By a deed of settlement, of the 2nd of January, 1739, A. granted to trustees and their heirs "all that and those the baronies, townships, manors, towns, lands, fee-farm rents, and hereditaments" thereinafter mentioned, amongst which were the " 10 acres of Creggan," and also "the water corn-mill of, and with thur-lagh, sucken, and molenture, growing, arising, or to grow or arise out of the said lands," and "the chief or fee-farm rents out of the premises mentioned," and "the reversion and reversions, remainder and remainders yearly, and the rents, issues, and profits of all in and every the aforesaid baronies, lord-lease for thirty-one years, "and during the life of

ships, manors, or reputed manors, lands, tenements, hereditaments, and premises, and all parts, parcels, and members, or reputed parts, parcels, and members of the said premises, or any of them," to hold for certain uses. By another deed of the 12th of April, 1822, were all "the baronies, castles, manors, towns, lands, quarter-lands, fee-farm rents, and other rents, tenements, and other hereditaments, with their and every of their rights, royalties, members and appurtenances, &c." subject to incumbrances upon certain trusts. Held, in an action of ejectment to recover the quarries and limestone on certain of the lands so granted, that the words in either deed were sufficient to pass the quarries. M'Donnell v. M‘Kinty, 10 Ir. L. Rep. 514,

Fraudulent Deed, 10 Car. 1, sess. 2, c. 3 Ir.]— In an issue under the Interpleader Act, to try whether a certain deed of assignment was fraudu. lent or not, the simple question as to whether it was intended to defeat or delay particular creditors is not a sufficient test of its bona fides. Semble, that it is enough for the party impeaching the deed to shew that it is within section 10 of the 10 Car. 1, sess. 2, c. 3, Ir., so as to enable him to make out a prima facie case, and that it then rests with the other party to prove that he is exempted from the operation thereof, and protected by the 14th section of the same statute. Holt v. Kelly, 1 Ir. Jur.

118, Q. B.

Alteration and interlineation.]-On the trial of an ejectment against over-holding tenants, the lessors of the plaintiff produced and proved the tenant's part of the lease, which purported to be a

A., (one of the lessees), which ever should last longest." The words in italics were interlined, and were introduced with the consent of B., the granter of the reversion under whom the lesssor of the plaintiff derived. Held that the interlienation did not avoid the lease, and that on the expiration of the thirty-one years, an ejectment might be maintained against the lessees, as over-holding tenants. Stoddart v. Neylan, 5 Ir. L. Rep. 116, Ex.

Stamps.]-The clause in the 56 Geo. 3, c. 56, sched. p. 1, (imposing additional duties on leases, &c. executed by power of attorney,) is applicable to leases, &c., for terms not exceeding three lives, or thirty-c y-one years. Mannix v. M'Carthy, 5 Ir. L. Rep. 372, Q. B.

A deed of assignment executed by the sheriff, on a sale under a fieri facias, requires an ad valorem stamp within the 56 Geo. 3, c. 56, sched. part J. Nagle v. Ahern, 3 Ir. L. Rep. 41, Ex.

An instrument which is in form a lease, may be stamped as such, though its legal operation be that of an assignment. Magrath v. Magrath, 3 Ir. L. Rep. 89, Q. B.

By indenture made between A., of the first part, B. and C. his wife, of the second part, and E. and F., trustees of the marriage settlement, of the third part, after reciting that B. and C. had received from and chargeable on the estates of A., and that B. had A. £850, part of C.'s fortune, which was charged ageeed to lend £800, part of the £850, A., in consideration of the £800 paid to him by B., conveyed by way of mortgage certain lands to E. and F. upon the trusts declared in the said marriage settlement of a sum of £1300 secured as therein mentioned. At the conclusion of the indenture there was a decla

Priorities-Registry.]-A. being seized of certain lands for lives renewable for ever, under a lease of 1796, by a deed bearing date the 19th of August, 1836, in consideration of a certain annuity, Conveyed all his interest in these lands to B. In 1839 B. died leaving A. surviving him, having pre-ration that a certain sum described as the balance viously made his will, whereby he devised and be of C.'s fortune, and as still remaining unpaid, and queathed the lands of Glennalougha, part of said charged on the estates of A. exclusive of a sum of ands, to C. and D. for a term of 500 years, to the £714 mentioned in the settlement, should be vested ase of B. for life, with remainder over, and ap-in E. and F. upon the trusts of the said sum of £1300. pointed C. and D. executors of his will. After the leath of B., C. executed a memorial of the deed of 836, and had it registered upon the 19th of May, 840. In May, 1840, A. conveyed those lands, mongst others, to the use of other persons, in deogation of the conveyance made to B., and this teed was registered on the 14th of May, 1840. Held, upon a conflict of priorities between these wo deeds, that C. was entitled, within the meaning f the Registry Acts (6 Anne, c. 2, and 8 Geo. 1, - 15) to register this deed, both in his character of xecutor to B. and also in his character of assignee f B. Murphy v. Leader, 4 Ir. L. Rep. 139, Q.B.

The deed was impressed with a stamp of £2 under the 5 & 6 Geo. 3, 56, Sched. Part 1, and was offered in evidence as a mortgage and conveyance of the legal estate, but rejected for the insufficiency of the stamp. Held, that it was rightly rejected, as it contained other matters not incident to the mortgage, and, therefore, required an additional stamp duty. Murphy v. Connolly, 6 Ir. L. Rep. 116, Ex. Semble, That besides being stamped as a mortit should have been stamped as a settlement. Ib. A. being in arrear with his landlord, B. who had distrained his goods for such arrears, by a deed executed between them it was witnessed that in con

gage

DISTRESS-See REPLEVIN.

sideration of B. releasing and discharging A. from the payment of such arrears, and in consideration of five shillings. D. assigned and surrendered to B. the said premises for the remainder of the term unexpired, and also the goods and chattels so distrained to hold the same as his own proper goods and chattels for ever. Held, that such a deed required only a surrender stamp, and that an ad valorem duty on the sale of the goods was not necessary to render it admissible evidence in that particular action. White v. White, 7 Ir. L. Rep. 50, Q. B.

A deed-pole in point of form a mortgage of lands in a foreign country, containing in the recitals a power of attorney, and containing also special covenants for the execution of a proper instrument according to law in that country, with a covenant for further assurance. Held to be a mere agreement for a mortgage, and not to require a £5 stamp. Campbell v. Hynes, 8 Ir. L. Rep. 12, Q. B.

DISTRINGAS-See JURY.

DOCUMENTS.

Production of.]-See PRACTICE.

DUBLIN.

Boundaries.]-See MUNICIPAL CORPORATION,

DUPLICITY-See PLEADING.

EASEMENT.

To a declaration in trespass, qu. cl. fr., and, erect. ing pens and tables thereon, the defendant pleaded the general issue, and at the trial proved a demise of the locus in quo, for a term of years, on the fol

Held, that the party objecting to the stamp as insufficient was bound to shew that the deed ope-lowing terms "All that and those, that part of rated as a mortgage in the country where the lands were situate. Ib.

Premises were demised for three lives renewable for ever, at a yearly rent and a fine, in a subsequent part of the lease the timber trees growing upon the premises were conveyed to the lessee, the stamp upon the lease was admitted to be sufficient for the rent and fine. Held that the grant of the trees, which had been already demised, did not change the character of the lease, so as thereby to render it a con veyance, and, consequently, that no additional stamp was required. Peacock v. O'Grady, 1 Ir. Jur. 363, Q. B.

Deed of Submission.]-See ARBITRATION.

DEFAMATION-See CASE, (ACTION ON.)

DEFENCE-See EJECTMENT.

DE INJURIA-See PLEADING.

DEMAND-See EJECTMENT. ENTRY.
PRACTICE.

DEMISE-See DEED. EJECTMENT.

DEMURRER-See PLEADING.

DETAINER-See ARRest.

DEVISE-See WILL.

DISCONTINUANCE-See PLEADING.

DISHONOUR.

Notice of]-See BILL OF EXCHange.

the house known as 119, North King-street, corner
of Smithfield, consisting of the small room of the
bar, of said house fronting Smithfield, &c., together
with the front part of said premises, extending
from said office, to the centre of the said Smith-
field-market." Also gave evidence of a custom, for
the owners of houses in Smithfield, to let their
frontage to sale masters at a rent, and of the com-
mission of the trespass complained of. On the
other hand, the defendant gave evidence of there
being no such usage-that Smithfield was a public
market-and, in evidence of no title the lessor
of the plaintiff to demise the frontage, the judge
directed the jury, that, if they believed that on a
market day, the plaintiff had taken possession of
the locus in quo, and was in actual possession of
the said frontage demised to him; and, while in
possession, the defendant thereon, against the will
of the plaintiff, they should find for the plaintiff.
Held, that the direction was correct, and that it
was not competent for the plaintiff, on these plead-
ings, to raise any question beyond that of possession,
and the commission of the act of trespass, while in
that possession. Coffey v. Burriss, 6 Ir. L. Rep. 298.
[Doherty, C. J., and Torrens, J., dissentientibus.]
On writ of error,
Held, that the direction of
the judge was incorrect. That he should have
explained to the jury the distinction between a
right to exclusive possession, which would have
enabled the plaintiff to maintain this action, and
such a right of occupation as was necessary for the
enjoyment of an easement, which was not sufficient
to maintain an action of trespass-and to have
directed the jury, that if they believed that the
plaintiff had a right to the exclusive possession,
they were to find a verdict for him, but if they
believed he had only a right to an easement, they
ought to find for the defendant, the action not
being maintainable. Coffey v. Burriss, 7 It. L. Rep.
509, Ex. Ch.

ECCLESIASTICAL COMMISSIONERS-
See CHURCH TEMPORALITIES ACTS.

DISPENSARY-See MANDAMUS. GRAND JURY. ECCLESIASTICAL COURT-See PROCTOR.

LESIASTICAL LAW-See EXECUTION.

ECTMENT-See COVENANT. DEEDS.

PLEADING.

I. ON THE TITLE.

II. NON-PAYMENT OF RENT.

I. ON THE TITLE. endment.]-See TITLE. AMEndment. vice.]-The court does not require the ser-f a party resident out of the jurisdiction. v. Ejector, 8 Ir. L. Rep. 3, Q. B. vice of an ejectment on the doctor and govera Lunatic Asylum, will not be deemed good > of a lunatic confined there, although he has own relations. Synge v. Ejector, Bl. D. &

1. Ex.

: affidavit of the service of an ejectment on le must be entitled strictly in accordance he frame of the demises, as laid in the declaLynch v. Ejector, 2 Ir. L. Rep. 240, Ex. party treat a married woman as a feme sole, ving her with an ejectment, the court will t aside a defence taken accordingly by her. . O'Brien, 1 Ir. Jur. 128, Ex.

vice of an ejectment, nunc pro tunc, on the ional assignee of an insolvent debtor, will e permitted, where the ejectment has not served before the first day of term. Fordel ctor, 3 Ir. L. Rep. 347, Ex.

attorney for receiving rents, but which did not give him authority to determine tenantcies. There was also some evidence of a parol authority, by the landlord to the agent, to serve this notice. Held, that the verdict for the plaintiff should not be set aside. Lord Sligo v. Davitt, 3 Ir. L. Rep.

146, Q. B.

A lease for lives, commenced on the 29th of September, 1811, expired 4th of March, 1835. On the 20th of March following, the bailiffs of the landlord having taken possession, the defendants were let back, on signing the following document -"Sir,-Allow us back into the possession of the will consider ourselves monthly tenants; and will land lately held by us under Mr. Cooper, and we getting one month's notice, and that without litigayield up the possession of the aforesaid lands on tion and trouble."-March 20, 1835. The defendants continued to pay the same rent, and on the same days, as under the expired lease, until served on the 8th of September, 1838, with notices to quit on the 25th of the following March, as on the day of the determination of the tenantcy. These notices were signed by the land agent of the landlord, who stated himself to be such. An ejectment Spring Assizes, 1840, but was not then tried. On had been brought, and was ready for trial at the the 23d of March, 1840, another notice to quit, on the 29th of the September following, was served on each of the defendants. Held, that the service of the second notice was no waiver of the previous notice. That the first notices were sufficient. That

the fact of the agent having signed the notices as such, and of the ejectment having been brought on Gan-rity in him to serve the notices. Cooper v. Flynn, the said notices, established a sufficiency of autho3 Ir. L. Rep. 472, C. P.

vice of an ejectment substituted on a co-trushe other being out of the jurisdiction. .Ejector, 3 Ir. L. Rep. 367, C. P.

an action of ejectment on the title, this court not require a party resident out of the juris, to be served. Lessee Moore v. Ejector, L. Rep. 3, Q. B.

signed by his agent and receiver. Held, that the
Ejectment by the landlord, on a notice to quit,
subsequent bringing of the ejectment was not suf-
ficient proof of the agent's authority to serve the
181, Ex.
notice to quit. Frewen v. Ahern, 4 Ir. L. Rep.

idavit to ground a motion for deeming ser-
of a summons in ejectment already had, good
e. Held insufficient, proper inquiries not
g been made for the defendant. Lessee Simp-rity to serve a notice to quit. Ib.
A mere receiver of rents, as such, has no autho-
Ejector, 6 Ir. L. Rep. 44, Ex.

tice to Quit.]-The notice to quit was served
e receiver, appointed by the Court of Chan-
in the matter of the lessor of the plaintiff, a
Dr.) Held, that an attested, and compared
of the order, in the minor matter, referring it
= master to approve of a proper person to be
er, an attested and compared copy of the
t, stating A. to be a proper person to be re-
, and an attested and compared copy of the
5 requiring the tenants to pay their rents to
such receiver were sufficient evidence of the
that A. was the receiver, in the minor's mat-
Crosbie v. Barry, 1 Ir. L. Rep. 232, Ex.
eld, that it must be presumed that the receiver
authority to determine the tenantry, by the
ce of the notice to quit. Ib.

mble, that such receiver was virtute officii,
rised to serve this notice. Ib.
ectment on a notice to quit, the notice was
d by an agent of the landlord, without stating
he signed as agent; the agent had a power of

Where a notice to quit is given by a person who is described therein as acting under a power of attorney from another. Semble, that on the trial of an ejectment, brought upon such notice to quit, the power of attorney must be produced and proved. Ib.

A tenant is precluded from disputing his own statement, with respect to the commencement of his tenantcy. Ib.

An authority to serve a written notice to quit, is not sufficient to authorise the party to give a parol notice to quit. Wood v. Ahern, 6 Ir. L. Rep. 95, Ex.

If the process server first read the original, and then the copy of the notice to quit. Held, to be a sufficient comparison, to make the service of such copy good service. Ib.

A receiver appointed by the Court of Chancery, has authority, by virtue of his office, to determine a tenantcy, by service of a notice to quit. Keating v. Cleary, 6 Ir. L. Rep. Ex.

[ocr errors]

Quære, if a subsequent recognition by the laud

lord, of the authority of an agent to serve a notice to quit, be in any case sufficient to make the notice good. Ib.

Such subsequent recognition should be before ejectment brought. Semble, it should be six months before the period limited by the notice for giving up possession of the premises. Ib.

Where a bill and answer have been put in evidence by the plaintiff, solely for the purpose of shewing the pendency of a cause, and, to establish the authority of the receiver, in that cause, to sign a notice to quit. The contents of such bill and answer cannot be given in evidence for the defend. ant. Parsons v. Purcell, 1 Ir. Jur. 213, C. P.

Semble, that even were it otherwise, admissions contained therein could not be made evidence of a written instrument not produced. Ib.

Trimleston v. Kemmis, 9 Cl. Fin., commented

on. Ib.

Demise.]-The notice to quit required the defendant to quit upon 1st of November, or at the end of the year of the tenantcy, which should expire next, after the end of half a year, from the

time of the service of the notice; and the demise

laid in the ejectment was laid upon the 1st of November. Held, that the demise was laid a day too soon. Lynas v. Hamilton, 3 Ir. L. 304, Q. B.

The demise stated that fifteen persons had jointly and severally demised, and at the trial it appeared, that the legal title, to the premises in question, was vested in but one of those persons. Held, that this demise was bad, not being consistent with the title proved. M'Auley v. Molloy, 4 Ir. L. Rep. 360, Q B.

If a landlord recover in ejectment, his title has reference to the day of the demise, and the tenant is a trespasser from that period. Nugent v. Phillips, 8 Ir. L. Rep. 17, Q. B.

Venue.]-The ejectment was brought for lands in one county, and after issue joined and before trial, those lands were, by virtue of a statute, declared to be within the boundaries of another county, and at the trial a verdict was found for the plaintiff, Held, that a motion for a non-suit, on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction, could not be maintained, the parties having appeared, and tried the issues. Heywood v. Reynolds, 6 Ir. L. Rep. 1, Q.B.

Semble, the proper course would have been to have put the question upon the record, and then moved in arrest of judgment. Ib.

Quære, is this a mistrial, and cured by the statute 17 & 18 Car, 2, c. 12. Ib.

In an ejectment for recovery of premises situate in that part of a county at large, which has been by the provisions of the statute, 3 & 4 Vic. cc. 108 & 109, included within the boundaries of a borough, which is a county in itself, the venue must be laid in the latter county. Evans v. Barber, 10 Ir. L. Rep, 481, S. C. BL. D. & O. 59. Ex.

The court will not change the venue in an action of ejectment on the title, when there have been two verdicts for the defendant in a previous ejectment about the same lands, in which he was the lessor of the plaintiff, upon the grounds of prejudices prevailing in his favour amongst the jurors of the county

where the lands are situated. Jackson v. Lodge,| Ir. L. Rep. 161, Q. B.

Lessor's Title.]-Where in an ejectment on the title by the executor of a co-lessee in a lease for years, it appeared that the granting part of the lease gave separate portions at separate rents to the res pective lessees, but the habendum and covenants in the lease were joint, and it further appeared that the testator died, leaving the co-lessors surviving, and his widow, who subsequently married the defend ant, and that the widow and the defendant continued since the death of the testator to pay rent, sometimes to the executors and sometimes to the head landlord, until the time of bringing the ejectment; upon the trial a verdict was had for the plaintiff subject to three objections: first, that the lease was a sepa rate lease for the three tenants respectively, and could not be received in evidence, as it had but one by being received in evidence it was established a stamp and ought to have had three; secondly, that the co-lessees took by survivorship, or if the deed a joint lease, and the executors had no interest a operated as a deed of partition as well as a lease it payments of rent by the defendant and his wife conrequired an agreement stamp; and thirdly, that the stituted a tenantcy from year to year. On motion these grounds, Held, first, that the lease was a joint to set aside the verdict and enter a non-suit upon lease; secondly, that the lease required an agree ment-stamp; thirdly, that there was evidence to go to the jury of a tenantcy from year to year, and which question ought properly to have been left to them but as the result would be the same upon a the rule for a non-suit absolute. Kennedy v. Hayes, new trial the court refused to grant one, and made 2 Ir. L. Rep. 186, Q. B.

In ejectment on the title the plaintiff proved a lease of 1775, made by his grandfather, and receipt from R. of rent reserved thereby for some time previously, and up to 1833, R. not being in possession or shewn to be connected with the lease of 1775, otherwise than by payment of rent in amount the same as that reserved by the lease; he further proved that he was heir at law of the lessor, and that the lease had expired; it also appeared that the defendant and some others were in possession for several years, and had not paid any rent to the lessor, but subsequently abandoned without any thing being levied under it, Held, that under such circumstances a notice to quit or demand of possession was not necessary before bringing the ejectment. Bagwell v. Boland, 2 Ir. L. Rep. 293, Q. B.

In 1768 a tenant demised for three lives in pur suance of a supposed covenant for perpetual renewal at £28, and his son who was tenant for life under a settlement in 1806, and subsequently in 1820 on each occasion of the falling of a life in the lease of 1768, demised by way of renewal in pursuance of the supposed covenant and deed in 1838, when the remainder-man, the lessor of the plaintiff, entered and continued to receive the rents till 1836, when on the death of the last cestui que vie in the original lease he brought his ejectment after a demand of possession, but without notice to quit, Held, that the question of a tenantry from year to year was properly left to the jury, and they having found in

« EelmineJätka »