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I. COMMON JURY.

II. SPECIAL JURY.

JURY. (COMMON AND SPECIAL.)-See town council of the borough of Dublin, the oppoGRAND JURY. CRIMINAL LAW. site party pleaded, that that jury was a special jury, "and that at the time of the striking of the jury aforesaid, and the arraying of the said panel, the said juror was a town councillor of the borough of Dublin, and that the same was well known to the said defendant at the time of the striking of that the challenge was good, and the counter-plea the said jury, and arraying of said panel." Held,

When to be Summoned.]—Challenge by the defendant to the array, because the jurors in this case, or any of them, were not summoned to serve upon the said jury six days before the day named; the plaintiff replied, that there was another distringas lodged with the sheriff, and that the jurors were summoned thereon six days, &c., and that they were the same jurors, named in the distringas, lodged in this case, and that they were in attendance ready to be sworn. Held, on demurrer to this replication, that the jury were summoned in sufficient time. Keogh v. Walker, 2 Ir. L. Rep.

210, C. P.

array, because

The defendant challenged the six days before the first day of the Nisi Prius sittings the jurors empanuelled were not, nor was any of them, nor any jury of the county of the city, &c., summoned to serve upon the jury for the trial of the issue in that cause, by virtue of any writ of venire facias, distringas, &c. Held, on demurrer, that the challenge was bad. Watters v. Hughes, 2 Ir L. Rep. 362, Ex.

An issue being joined on a challenge to the array, on the ground that the jurors were not summoned six clear days before the date of the trial, Held, that the omission of a few jurors would not vitiate the panel. Taylor v. Gibney, Bl. D. &

0.85.

Held, that triers are not to presume that all the jurors who did not appear in court were summoned in time. Ib.

A challenge to the array will not be allowed where the plaintiff is not in default. Hartigan v. McCarthy, Bl. D. & O. 86, note.

The question decided in Gillespie v. Cumming, was only as to the default of the plaintiff. Ib. Costs of Jury.]-See COSTS.

II. SPECIAL JURY.

The cause had been tried by a special jury, and, upon a bill of exceptions having been taken, a venire de novo was awarded. The defendant brought down the cause by proviso. The distringas was in the common form, except that the words "proviso," were written under the officers name, and it was objected at the trial, first, that the distringas was informal and irregular; and, secondly, that the special jury, struck upon the first trial, was the proper jury to try the case, and not the common jury by which it had now been tried. Held, that the cause had been properly tried. Smith v. Nangle, 2 Ir. L. Rep. 296, Q. B.

The form of a rule for a special jury when obtained by defendant after notice of trial served. Woods v. Sandford, 2 Ir. L. Rep. 380, Ex.

A town councillor of the borough of Dublin is exempt, and disqualified from serving on a special jury summoned within the borough; and one of the special jurors having been challenged at the trial, on the ground of being a member of the

no answer.

179, Ex. Ch. [Richards, B., dissentiente.]

O'Connell v. Mansfield, 9 Ir. L. Rep.

Under the 3 & 4 Wm. 4, c. 91, it is the duty of the Recorder of Dublin annually to revise the lists of the jurors of the county of that city, and to cause a general list of jurors to be made out, and delivered to the clerk of the peace of the said city, for a new trial, on the ground that these general for the purposes of the ensuing year. On motion lists, from which were framed the juror's book, and for the purpose of prejudicing the traversers in the special jury list, were fraudulently dealt with, their defence. Held, that this was not a proper hell, 7 Ir. L. Rep. 261, Q. B.; S. C. Armstrong ground for a motion for a new trial. Reg. v. v. O'Conand Trevor, 11 Cl. & Fin. 155, Dom. Proc.

A town councillor of the borough of Dublin is exempt from serving on any special jury summoned in trials in the superior courts, and the the officer at striking of the special jury, or by a objection may be taken advantage of either before challenge to the polls, when the juror comes to be S. C., 8 Ir. L. Rep. 331, Ex. Ch. sworn. Long v. Barrett, 7 Ir. L. Rep. 439, C. P.;

taken before the officer, it can be taken advantage Sed quære, whether, if the objection be not by way of challenge. lb., 8 Ir. L. Rep. 331, Ex. Ch.

Costs of Special Jury.]-See COSTS.

JUSTICE (OF THE PEACE)-See MAGIS

TRATE.

JUSTIFICATION, (PLEA OF)-See PLEADING. TRESPASS.

LANDLORD AND TENANT-See DEED
EJECTMENT. Covenant. REPLEVIN. TRESPASS.
Use and Occupation.]-See ASSUMPSIT.
Notice to Quit.]-See EJECTMENT.
Demise.]-See EJECTMENT.
Reversion.]-See EJECTMENT.

Tenantcy at Will.]-A tenant holding under a lease, containing a clause of forfeiture, omitted to perform the condition, but was allowed to remain thirteen years in possession after the forfeiture. Held, that the landlord having allowed a reason. able time to elapse after the forfeiture became complete, the tenant became at all events a tenant at will, which tenantey must be determined before the bringing of an ejectment. Johnson v. Russell, 4 Ir. L. Rep. 170, Q. B.

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In an action for the disturbance of a fishery, the plaintiff, in proof of his title, proved the execution of a lease, of the locus in quo to him, by a corporation, which lease, to be valid, required the consent of certain parties thereto, and recited that such consent had been obtained. Held, that such

was sufficient proof of its validity, without actual proof of such consent, which the jury might presume, evidence to the contrary not having been given, and the onus probandi lying on the party who asserted the invalidity of the instrument. Gabbett v. Clancy, 8 Ir. L. Rep. 299, Q. B.

Over-holding Tenant.]-A tenant over-holding, after the expiration of a notice to quit by the landlord, is not liable to a distress for rent which became due subsequently, unless there has been an agreement for a new tenantcy, or a renewal of the former one. Daly v. Colbert, 3 Ir. L. Rep. 355, C. P. Rent.]-See DEBT. Covenant. Use anD OCCU

PATION. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.

A. being possesed of certain premises for two terms of years, under separate leases, at the yearly rent of £12, and £16 respectively, assigned the said premises to B., "subject to the payment of the yearly rent of £44, and to the performance of the covenants" in the original leases. A. subsequently by deed reciting, that he was entitled to a profit rent of £16 per annum out of the premises in question, sold, and conveyed his interest thereon to C. Held, that there was a sufficient reservation of rent on the assignment from A. to B., and that C., as the assignee of the former, was entitled to maintain an action of debt against the latter, for the recovery of the arrears of the rent. Clarke v. Coughlan, 3 Ir. L. Rep. 427, Ex.

Rent may be conveyed, severed from the reversion, so as to give the grantor an action of debt for the arrears. Ib.

Rent arising from the sale of the profit of the land, there being no tenantcy, is not apportionable between the executors of the tenant for life and the remainder man. Dease v. O'Reilly, 8 Ir. L. Rep. 52, Q. B.

Double Rent.]-In debt for double rent, under the 15 Geo. 2, c. 8, s. 9, Ir., for not giving up possession pursuant to the tenant's notice to quit, the declaration must aver the notice to have been in writing. Farrel v. Donnelly, 4 Ir. L. Rep. 476, Ex.

Surrender.]-L., lessee, pur autre vie, assented to a new letting, by the landlord, of a part of the demised premises to M., who entered into possession. Held, that this was a valid surrender by act and operation of law, within the Statute of Frauds, (7 Wm. 3, c. 12, Ir.,) of the interest of L., in the part demised to M. Lynch v. Lynch, 6 Ir. L. Rep. 131, Ex.

The doctrine of surrender by act and operation

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of law, as laid down in Thomas v. Cook, (2 B. & Al. 119,) in the case of a chattel, recognised and applied to a freehold. Ib.

Contracts of tenantcy.]-A. being possessed of certain premises under a lease for thirty-one years still unexpired, the reversion in fee of which be longed to B. did by parol agreement on the 15th of March, 1837, permit and suffer B. to take posses sion of, and from thenceforth to occupy and use for the purpose of planting trees, a certain portion of the said demised premises upon the terms of the yearly rent reserved by the lease, being reduced by a certain sum agreed upon, and which said reduced yearly rent was for some time paid by A. to B. who judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench, (5 Ir. gave receipts for the same. Held, overruling the judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench, (5 Ir. L. Rep. 287,) that this parol demise did not amount to a re-denise. Delap v. Leonard, 6 Ir. L. Rep. 473, Ex. Ch.

Defendant by parol agreement with the plaintiff took a portion of his land for grazing, the plaintiff undertaking to watch the cattle of the defendant, and reserving to himself the grazing of a horse. Held, that this was a mere contract for agistment, and the Possession of the land did not thereby pass to the defendant. Mulligan v. Adams, 8 Ir. L. Rep. 132, Q. P.

Land was prepared and tilled by A. a tenant for life, and allotted by him, at a certain rate per acre, in small portions to his labourers for the purpose of planting potatoes, the labour being done at his expense; the potatoes were planted by the labourers and above ground when A. died, and the remainder man prevented the labourers from carrying off the crop until they had paid him the rate so agreed upon. Held, that the contract created by such holding was not a demise of the land, but a sale of the profit derivable therefrom. Dease v. O'Reilly, 8 Ir. L. Rep. 52.

LANDS' CLAUSES CONSOLIDATION ACT-See PUBLIC COMPANY.

LEASE-See LANDLORD and Tenant.

LETTERS TESTAMENTARY-See ADMINISTRATION. PLEADING. SCIRE FACIAS.

LEVARI-See SEQUESTRATOR.

LIBEL-See CASE.

LICENSE-See REVENUE.

LIEN-See ATTORNEY.

LIMITATIONS (STATUTES OF)-See PRACTICE (JUDGMENT.) SCIRE FACIAS. Process to save.]-See AMENDMENT.

Real actions.]-In replevin the plaintiff declared

on a taking on the 9th of August, 1838, and the lefendant avowed for five years arrears of rent, next efore and ending on the 25th of March, 1836, due o the defendant by virtue of a demise theretofore nade. To this avowry the plaintiff pleaded, amongst other pleas a plea of the 3 & 4 Wm. 4 c. 27 s. 42, o the whole amount of the arrears; the defendant lemurred that the plea of the statute should have been confined to the period of the five years which were beyond the six. Demurrer overruled. Ron v. Jackson, 2 Ir. L. Rep. 1, Q. B. The 3 & 4 Wm. 4 c. 27, applies to conventional

rents between landlord and tenant. Ib.

Wil

Quære, are arrears of rent reserved by indenture

within the 42nd section of the 3 & 4 Wm. 4 c. 27.
Armstrong v. Lloyd, 2 Ir. L. Rep. 70. C. P.
The 3 & 4 Wm. 4 c. 27 does not apply to claims
for tithe composition as between the tithe claimant.
and the owner of the land, but only to estates in a
tithe. The withholding tithe composition by the
occupier of the land, is not the adverse possession
intended by the 15th sect. of the 3 & 4 Wm. 4 c.

27. Lord Shannon v. Hodder, 2 Ir. L. Rep. 223.
If no rent be paid under an existing lease, con-
taining an express clause of re-entry for the non-
payment of the same, for upwards of 20 years, the
landlord is barred by the 3 & 4 W. 4, c. 27, from
recovering in an ejectment brought for the non-
payment of the rent. Mannion v. Bingham, 3 Ir. L.

Rep. 456, C. P.

Where an additional rent in the nature of a penal rent, was reserved by indenture of demise between landlord and tenant. Held, that such rent was not

within the second section of the statute of limitations

(3 & 4 Wm. 4 c. 27.) Daly v. Bloomfield, 5 Ir. L. Rep. 65, Q. B.

Semble, no rent reserved upon an indenture of demise between landlord and tenant is within that section. Ib.

was not a discontinuance within the 3 & 4 W. 4, c. 27, s. 3. Ib.

Held, that a use and possession of part of these quarries by the grantee of the lands would not justify a presumption of the possession of the whole so as to vest the title of the grantor. Ib.

Judgment.]-A judgment of Trinity Term, 1817, against A. who since died, in 1831 a scire facias issued, but no further proceedings were had thereon; in 1835 the judgment was re-docketted. The court gave liberty to issue a scire facias to revive the judgment against the heir and terre-tenants of the conuzor. Kelly v. Croghan, 2 Ir. L. Rep. 88, C. P.

Scire facias by the executors of the conusee of a judgment more than twenty years old at the issuing of the writ of scire facias. Plea, the statute of Limitations, (3 & 4 W. 4, c. 27, s. 40.) Replication, judgment of revivor recovered by the plaintiff withcient answer to the claim, and that the replication in twenty years. Held, that the plea was a sufficient answer to the claim, and that the replication was bad being a departure from the case made in the scire facias. Farran v. Beresford, 5 Ir. L. Rep. 487; 10 Cl. & Fin. 333, Dom. Proc. overruling the judgments of the Courts of Queen's Bench and Exchequer Chamber. 2 Ir. L. Rep. 110, Ex. Ch.; S.C.

2 J. & S. 97.

A new right accrued to the executors by the judgment of revivor. Ib.

Semble, a judgment of revivor by the executors of the conusee is that which secures the money within the meaning of the 3 & 4 Wm. 4, c. 27, 8. 40, and the time runs from the entry of that judg

ment. Ib.

ments are concerned by the 3 & 4 Wm. 4, c. 27, Semble, the 8 Geo. 1, is repealed, as far as judgs. 40. Ib. [The 8 Geo. 1, is repealed by the 7 & 8 Vic. c. 90, registration of Judgments Act.]

Application for a scire facias to revive a judg

An ejectment for non-payment of rent is main-ment on the 23d November, 1840, on an allegation tainable during the continuance of the lease, though more than twenty years have elapsed since the last payment. Crosbie v. Sugrue, 9 Ir. L. Rep. 17, Q.B. The 3 & 4 W. 4, c. 27, s. 2, does not apply to rent received on a demise. Ib.

Ejectment on the title. The plaintiff produced and proved a lease of the premises, bearing date 1769, and made by E. D. W. to J. A. " for and during the term of sixty-six years, provided the said E. D. W.'s lasted so long," but gave no evidence of the existence of the interest of E. D. W. in the premises. There was some evidence of a verbal negotiation between the defendant and the plaintiff for a new lease between 1835 and 1838 in which latter year the defendant got into possession. Held that motwithstanding proof of the death of the said E. D. W. in 1821, the jury were properly directed to find a verdict for the plaintiff, and that as the lease must be taken to have expired in 1834 there was no ground for the operation of the statute of Limitations. Wilfor the operation of the statute of Limitations. Wilson v. Hendren, 7 Ir. L. Rep. 429. C. P.

If mines be excepted to the grantor in a lease his right and title is not barred or extinguished if he omit to work them for twenty years, such right re mains in the grantor as if he had never executed the grani. M'Donnell v. M Kinty, 10 Ir.L.Rep. 514,Q.B. Held, that an omission to work quarries granted

1820, a similar application having been previously of payment of interest on the 23d of November, to be in time to save the bar of the Statute of refused in consequence of an informality. Held, Limitations. Kent v. Lawrence, 3 Ir. L. Rep. 61, C. P.

heir and terre-tenants of the original conusor. Seire facias, to revive a judgment against the Plea, Statute of Limitations. Replication, a revival of the same judgment, against the personal representative of the original conusor, within twenty years from the issuing of the scire facias. Held, sufficient. Martin v. M'Causland, 3 Ir. L. Rep. 113, C. P.

A payment of interest, by the personal representative of the original conusor, within 20 years, is sufficient to keep the judgment alive against the lands in the hands of his heir and terre-tenants. Ib.

Scire facias, against heir and terre-tenants, tested on the 25th of November, 1827, and directed to the sheriff of T., reciting a judgment of Michaelmas Term, 1806, by O., against W.; that O. died, and assigned the judgment to the plaintiff, and that W. appointed two executors, who obtained probate, and had died seized. Plea, by H. W., the heir of the that in Easter Term, 1819, another writ of scire conuzor, the Statute of Limitations. Replication,

facias, issued by the executors of O., for the revival of the same judgment, that the sheriff returned that he had warned R. W. &c., and that in Michaelmas Term, 1819, judgment was had in this scire facias. The replication contained no averment that R. W. was the heir of the conusor, nor did it connect him in any way with H. W., the present defendant. Rejoinder, nul tiel record. Held, on motion, in arrest of judgment, that a judgment against the heir at law, is of the same effect as a judgment against the conusor himself, and that the statute commenced to run from the judgment of 1819 only. White v. White, 3 Ir. L. Rep. 118, Ex. The court allowed the scire facias to revive the judgment to issue, there being a recital of a judgment in a deed of mortgage, executed by the conusor to the conusee, within the last twenty years, for the purpose of securing the judgment along with other debts, and proceedings had been taken for the foreclosure of the said mortgage, but had been discontinued. Lanigan v. Fogarty, 3 Ir. L. Rep. 185, C. P.

Quære, if such a recital in a mortgage be an acknowledgment in writing, within the meaning of the 3 & 4 Wm. 4, c. 27, s. 40. Ib.

A plea of the Statute of Limitations, (3 & 4 Wm. 4, c. 27, s. 40, is no answer to a scire facias, in which a judgment obtained more than twenty years before the issuing of the scire facias, and an award of execution on the same, to the administrator of the conusee, against the conusor, within the 20 years, are stated. Conlan v. Bodkin, 7 Ir. L Rep. 467, C. P.

repre

A judgment was obtained in 1813, and revived by scire facias, at the suit of the executor of the conusee, against the heir and terre-tenants of the conusor, in 1829. A bill was filed in 1833 in the Court of Exchequer in Ireland, against the sentatives of the real and personal estate of the debtor, praying for an account, and payment of the principal and interest due on the judgment, out of the debtor's personal or real estate. Held, that a plea of the Statute of Limitations, (3 & 4 Wm. 4, c. 27, s. 40,) by a defendant claiming a part of the real estate, under a settlement bearing date subsequent to the original judgment, but prior to the judgment of revivor, was no bar to the suit. Farrell v. Gleeson, 7 Ir. L. Rep. 478, Dom. Proc. To a scire facias in 1846, to revive a judgment recovered in 1811 by W. against L., which scire

The court allowed a scire facias to revive a judg-facias stated, the recovery, in 1827, of a judgment ment against the original conusor, where there had been neither payment, nor acknowledgment, nor any proceeding on the judgment within the last twenty years, beyond an order for liberty to issue a scire facias to revive it. Lynch v. Bourke, 3 Ir. L. Rep. 286, C. P.

The conusor of a judgment, obtained in 1814, became insolvent; liberty to issue a scire facias, to revive the judgment, was granted on an application, grounded on admissions of the debt contained in the insolvent's schedule, filed in 1818, and in the answer of his assignee, to a bill filed in 1826 by the conusee, to raise the amount of the judgment. Neligan v. Gunn, 3 Ir. L. Rep. 354, Ex.

Debt for the recovery of a judgment of 1812. The action was commenced, and issue joined, in 1830, since which, no proceedings were taken, and the judgment was now, (1842,) barred by the 3 & 4 Wm. 4, c. 27, s. 40. The court allowed the plaintiff to proceed in the said action against the defendant, giving a terms notice, on an affidavit by the plaintiff, that the proceedings had been suspended in consequence of the embarrassed state of the defendant's circumstances. Starkie v. English, 5 Ir. L. Rep. 419, C. P.

A scire facias was permitted to be issued to revive a judgment more than 20 years old, recovered against a personal representative, de bonis testatoris, though there had been no payment of principal, or interest, or acknowledgment in writing, within 20 years, and nothing to keep it alive except the continuance of a Chancery suit. Gower v. Monks, 6 Ir. L. Rep. 343, C. P.

The court allowed a scire facias to issue to revive a judgment more than twenty years old, and no revivor or acknowledgment in writing, but the affidavit stated, that "about fifteen years" since the plaintiff had been allowed to retain, on account of interest on the judgment, a sum of money payable to the defendant. Hunt v. Hunt, 3 Ir. L. Rep. 375, C. P.

in an action of debt, by the executors of W. against L., for the amount of the judgment debt of 1811, and of another judgment debt due from L. to W, and contained an averment, that, upon the reco very of the judgment in 1827, a present right to receive the amount of the judgment of 1811 accrued to the executors of W. Held, that a plea of the Statute of Limitations, (3 & 4 Wm. 4, c. 27, s. 40,) was a valid defence. Waters v. Lidwell, 5 Ir. L. Rep. 362, C. P.

A judgment in an action of debt upon a judg ment, has not, upon the latter, the same effect, as a judgment of revivor by scire fucias. Ib.

Personal actions.]-A., in 1833, being indebted to B., distrained, whereupon C. became surety that A. would pay the rent in December following, or SO, and re-deliver the goods to B. A. did not do B. recovered judgment against C. and compelled C. to pay the debt by instalments. Held, that to an action by C. against A. for a breach of this special agreement of indemnity, and also for money paid to his use, A. could not plead the statute of limitations-the payments on foot of the judgment recovered by B. having been made within six years before the commencement of the action. Considine v. Considine, 9 Ir. L. Rep. 400, Q. B.

Bond-Plea of Payment.]-To debt on a boud dated in 1806, the defendant pleaded solvit post diem, and at the trial, the plaintiff having failed to prove that any suit had been commenced or prosecuted for the recovery of said debt, or any payment of principal or interest, or other satisfaction made on account of said bond, within twenty years before the commencement of the suit. Held that the judge ought not to have left the question of pay ment to the jury, but to have directed a verdict for the defendant. Kemmis v. Macklin, 8 Ir. L. Rep. 401, C. P.

Acknowledgments to Bar.]-A. and B. were de

fendants in certain suits in which a reference was made to the Master to report the incumbrances affecting the freehold lands of A., and amongst others he reported B. a creditor by judgment affecting them for a certain sum. Held, that this was not such an acknowledgment in writing, by the agent of A. to B. as would take the case out of the statute of limitations. Hill v. Stawell, 2 Ir. L. Rep. 302, Q. B.

his schedule filed in the Insolvent Court acknowledged the right of the plaintiff to the damages, &c. Rejoinder, that he did not within twenty years before the issuing of the scire facias acknowledge to the plaintiff his right to the said damages, &c. modo et forma. At the trial it appeared that the debt acknowledged in the schedule was one due upon a promissory note, but the amount was the same as in the scire facias, and evidence was given that they were one and the same debt. Held, that upon the issue as joined the plaintiff was entitled to recover. Dugdale v. Vize, 5 Ir. L. Rep. 568, Q. B.

The plaintiff, an attorney, furnished the defendant with a bill of costs, and wrote a letter stating that he was aware that some of the matters were beyond six years, but that he took it for granted Semble, an insolvent's schedule is a sufficient acthat the defendant would not take advantage of the knowledgment of a debt within the statute. Ib. statute of limitations against him. The defendant This statute has a retrospective operation, and an in answer wrote, "P. will attend for me to tax acknowledgment made before its enactment is suffiyour costs, which will be best for both parties, as cient to take a case out of the bar created thereby. Ib. one will know what to pay, the other what to re- Assumpsit against the administrator of J. Š. for ceive." Held that this was a sufficient acknow-wages due and money lent. It was proved that J.S. ledgment to take the demand out of the bar of the statute 9 Geo. 4, c. 14, s. 1. Murphy v. Meredith, 5 Ir. L. Rep. 120, Ex.

had, shortly before his death, and within six years of action brought, stated to a third party that he owed the plaintiff nearly £60 for wages and money

Held, that this was not a conditional acknow-lent, and that the money lent was £34. Held, that ledgment, or agreement to pay on taxation, and that it was not therefore necessary that the costs should have been taxed before the action brought. Ib.

A sci. fa. was issued in 1839, to revive against the conusor a judgment of 1807. In 1827 a schedule was filed by the conusor in the court for the relief of Insolvent Debtors, containing an admission of the judgment debt, but no payment or satisfaction had been made upon account, nor any proceeding taken for the recovery thereof, within twenty years next before the issuing of the writ. Held that an acknowledgment in writing within the 40th section of the 3 & 4 W. 4, c. 27, was not sufficient to set up or give validity to the judgment which had been barred in 1833, (at the time of the passing of that act), by the operation of the 8 Geo. 1, c. 4. Morrogh v. Power, 5 Ir. L. Rep. 494, Ex.

this statement was not sufficient to take it out of the statute of Limitations, (9 Geo. 4, c. 14, s. 1.) Lusk v. Auld, 10 Ir. L. Rep. 452, Ex.

A proposal for a lease unaccepted or signed by an agent is not a sufficient acknowledgment of title to take the case out of the statute of Limitations. Corporation of Dublin v. Judge, Bl. D. & O. 162, N. P. [Per Lefroy, B.]

An acknowledgment in writing by the mortga gor of the payment of interest on a mortgage and not signed by him. Held, sufficient within the 40th section of the 3 & 4, W. 4, c. 27, to take the case out of that statute. In re Commissioners of Wide Streets, Cork, 1 Ir. Jur. 9, Rolls.

An acknowledgment, by one maker of a joint and several promissory note, that interest had been paid thereon, and indorsed on the note, Held not to be Semble, that an admission of the debt in the evidence against his co-contractor, either as an acschedule of an insolvent is a sufficient acknowledg-knowledgment of the fact of payment, or, after the ment to prevent a judgment being barred by the 3 & 4 W. 4, c. 27, s. 40. Ib.

Scire facias to revive a judgment against the heir and terre-tenants of the conusor. The judgment was of 1814; the conusor was insolvent in 1819. An acknowledgment by the insertion of the judgment in his schedule, within twenty years, was held to be a sufficient acknowledgment to warrant the issuing of the writ. McCarthy v. O'Brien, 2 Ir. L. Rep. 67, Q. B.

Scire facias. Plea, statute of Limitations. Replication, an acknowledgment in writing setting forth a schedule filed by the defendant in the Insolvent Court, in which he admitted himself to be indebted to the conusee of the judgment in three bonds, but which were different in amount and date from that on which the judgment was entered, and the defendant rejoined that there was no acknowledgment. Held, that parol evidence was admissible to show that one of the bonds mentioned in the schedule was identical with the bond on which the judgment had been entered. Hanan v. Power, 8 Ir. L. Rep. 505, Q. B. [Perrin, J. dissentiente.] Scire facias. Plea, statute of Limitations, (3 & 4 W. 4, c. 27.) Replication, that the defendant by

indorser's death, as an entry made by a deceased person against his interest. Murtagh v. Crawford, Ir. Jur. 14, Ex.

A statement in the schedule of an insolvent debtor in the year 1828, that she had been "defeated," in 1824, in a former ejectment brought on the demises of three lessors of the plaintiff, one only of whom was a lessor in the present action. Held that this was no acknowledgment of title, within the 14th section of the 3 & 4, W. 4, c. 27, in any one of the said lessors. Hobson v. Burns, 1 Ir. Jur. 227, Q. B.

Held that such statement did not amount to more than a mere narrative of a past transaction, and was not an acknowledgment within the 14th section (3 & 4 W. 4, c. 27.) Ib.

Quære, whether a statement by an insolvent in his schedule is, under any circumstances, a sufficient acknowledgment within the 14th section. Ib. [See Barrett v. Bermingham, Flan. & Kel. 556.]

Adverse possession.]-A possession without payment of rent, or an acknowledgment in writing for more than twenty years, was held to be a sufficient bar to an ejectment for the recovery of the lands—

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