certain signals in use, upon a certain railway called the Manchester, Sheffield and Lincolnshire Railway, in the township of Dukinfield in the said county of Chester, unlawfully and wilfully did obstruct and cause to be obstructed a certain engine and carriages then using such railway, against the form of the statute in such case made and provided, and against the peace of our said lady the Queen her crown and dignity.

And the jurors aforesaid upon their oath aforesaid, do further present that the said Joseph William Hadfield, on the day and year aforesaid, unlawfully and wilfully did obstruct and cause to be obstructed a certain engine and carriages, then using a certain railway called the Manchester, Sheffield and Lincolnshire railway, in the said township of Dukinfield and county of Chester, against the form of the statute in such case made and provided, and against the peace of our said lady the Queen her crown and dignity.

On behalf of the prosecution, it was proved that at about eleven o'clock on the night of the 14th of January last, the clerk in charge of the Dukinfield station of the Manchester, Sheffield and Lincolnshire railway locked up all the doors of that station. He had just pre'viously dispatched the last train timed to stop at that station, and had seen that all persons, passengers and others, had left the station. He then arranged the signals for the night. There was a semaphore signal on the platform, having several arms with a separate lever to work each arm, and there

were

two signals at about 200 yards' distance from and on either side of the station, one on the "up" line and the other on the ."down" line, and both worked by levers from the platform at the station. The clerk put out the lights of the semaphore signal, and placed the arms down to indicate .the lines "all clear," and the two distant signals he arranged so as to shew white lights also, indicating that the lines were clear. He went to bed on the premises, and in a few minutes heard a knocking at the station door, and immediately afterwards he heard a person, who subsequently turned out to be the prisoner, climbing over a door in the wall of the

66

station. The clerk heard the prisoner walk along the platform towards the semaphore signal and rattle the levers. He then looked out of the window and saw that one arm of the semaphore was at right angles with the post, and another at an acute angle, the former signifying danger," the latter "caution." He went out and found the prisoner outside the station, near some steps, leading to the door over which he had climbed to get into the station. The prisoner was not sober, and having been told by the clerk that he had been seen meddling with the signals, he ran away, but was followed by the clerk, who overtook him and gave him into custody. On his way back to the station, the clerk saw a goods train, which under ordinary circumstances would have passed through Dukinfield station without slackening speed, moving slowly though the station on the up line, and on arriving at the station he saw that both the distant signals shewed red lights, indicating "danger," and that all the levers of the semaphore had been altered.

It appeared from the evidence of the driver of the goods train, that he had observed the distant signal on the "up" line, shewing the red light, and that in consequence he shut off steam and approached the Dukinfield station cautiously, and that at the station he brought the train "very near to a stand and could have come to a stand at any moment," but seeing no one on the platform he passed on.

It was also proved that the mail train going in the same direction and on the same rails as the goods train, was due at Dukinfield station in about half an hour after the goods train so passed through the station. At the close of the evidence for the Crown it was objected by the counsel for the prisoner that the case was not within the above-mentioned section, as the facts proved did not amount to an "obstruction" within the meaning of the section. I however left the case to the jury, reserving the question hereby raised for the opinion of this Court, and the jury found the prisoner guilty. Judgment was respited, and the prisoner was discharged upon entering into his own re

cognizance to come up to receive judgment when called upon.

The opinion of the Court for the consideration of Crown cases reserved is requested as to whether, upon the above facts, the prisoner was properly convicted.

No counsel appeared for the prisoner. Horatio Lloyd, in support of the conviction. It is submitted that these facts constitute an obstruction within the meaning of the statute.

KELLY, C.B.-I think there was an obstruction within the meaning of the Act. The driver of the goods train, seeing the signals, so nearly came to a stand that he could have stopped at any moment. I think this was as much an obstruction as if the prisoner had put a log of wood on the rails before the goods train.

BLACKBURN, J.-The previous section (section 35) enumerates various acts, which if done maliciously and with any of the intents there mentioned, amount to a felony. One of such acts is the making or shewing, hiding or removing any signal or light upon or near to any railway with intent to obstruct any engine, carriages or trucks using such railway. Then the section now in question (section 36) provides that whoever, by any unlawful act, shall obstruct or cause to be obstructed any such engine or carriage, shall be guilty of a misdemeanour. The prisoner in the present case was a drunken man, and therefore a jury would never have found that he acted as he did maliciously, and with any of the intents mentioned in the statute, but in fact a train was delayed, and the working and machinery of the line put out of order. Now the question is whether that amounts to causing the engine and carriages to be obstructed. Any act which causes the train to be obstructed, though not of a physical character, is I think within the meaning of the section, therefore the conviction ought

to be affirmed.

MELLOR, J.-I am of the same opinion. I think that section 36 contemplates and includes the acts specified in section 35.

MONTAGUE SMITH, J.-I am of the same opinion.

MARTIN, B.-I cannot agree with the rest of the Court. I think it is straining

the enactment beyond what the words bear, to include such an act as the prisoner committed. An act which only operates on the mind of a careful and watchful driver of a train, so as to induce him to drive slowly, is not, in my opinion, an obstruction within the meaning of this section. We are construing a criminal statute, and I do not think we ought to strain the words beyond their plain meaning, in order to meet a mischief which the framer of the statute did not contemplate. Therefore I think this conviction ought to be quashed.

Conviction affirmed.

On the trial of an indictable offence, committed on board a British ship on the high seas, it is not necessary to prove the register of such ship under the Merchant Shipping Act, 1854, part 11, or that she belongs to a person qualified to be owner of a British ship according to the terms of that Act.

Upon the trial of an indictment against a. sailor for wounding the mate on board a ship on the high seas, the master of the ship, the boatswain, and one of the crew, stated that the ship was a British ship, and that she was sailing under the British flag:-Held, that the ship was sufficiently proved to be a British ship.

Case reserved by Hannen, J.

At the Spring assizes for Cornwall upon an indictment which charged the

*Coram Bovill, C.J., Willes, J., Byles, J., Hannen, J., and Cleasby, B.

prisoner with maliciously wounding one W. Bedlington, with intent to do him grievous bodily harm;

It was proved at the trial that the prisoner was a sailor on board the bark, Statesman, and that while on the high seas, on a voyage from Alexandria to Falmouth, he inflicted on W. Bedlington, the mate of the vessel, a dangerous wound with a knife.

The master, the boatswain, and one of the crew of the Statesman, all stated that the vessel was a British ship, of Shields, and that she was sailing under the British flag, but no proof of the register of the vessel or of the ownership was given.

It was objected on behalf of the prisoner that this evidence was not sufficient to establish that the ship was a British ship, and that without proof of the ship having been registered as a British ship, the prisoner could not be convicted. No counsel appeared.

Cur. adv. vult.

Judgment was delivered on June 4, by BOVILL, C.J.-We think the conviction in this case was correct. The evidence was, in our opinion, sufficient to prove that the vessel was a British ship without proof of her having been registered, and even if it had appeared that she had not been registered we think the prisoner ought still to have been convicted; first, because there is nothing in the Merchant Shipping Act to take away the criminal jurisdiction of the Court, and next, by reason of the provision at the end of sect. 106 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 17 & 18 Vict. c. 104 (1), which provides that, as regards

(1) By 17 & 18 Vict. c. 104. s. 19, "No ship hereby required to be registered shall, unless registered, be recognised as a British ship."

By sect. 106, "Whenever it is declared by this Act that a ship belonging to any person or body, qualified according to this Act to be owners of British ships, shall not be recognised as a British ship, such ship shall not be entitled to any benefits, privileges, advantages or protection, usually enjoyed by British ships, and shall not be entitled to use the British flag or assume the British national character; but so far as regards the payment of dues, the liability to pains and penalties, and the punishment of offences committed on

the punishment of offences committed on board such a ship, she shall be dealt with in the same manner as if she were a recognised British ship (2). The conviction will therefore be affirmed.

Conviction affirmed.

board such ship, or by any persons belonging to her, such ship shall be dealt with in the same manner, in all respects, as if she were a recognised British ship."

Sect. 107. "Every register of, or declaration made in pursuance of the second part of this Act, in respect of any British ship, may be proved in any Court of Justice, or before any person having, by law or by consent of parties, authority to receive evidence, either by the production of the original or by an examined copy thereof, or by a copy thereof purporting to be certified under the hand of the registrar, or other person having the charge of the original; which certified copies he is hereby required to furnish to any person applying at a reasonable time for the same, upon payment of 18. for each such certified copy; and every such register or copy of a register, and also every certificate of registry of any British ship, purporting to be signed by the registrar or other proper officer shall be received in evidence in any Court of Justice, or before any person having, by law or by consent of parties, authority to receive evidence as prima facie proof of all the matters contained or recited in such register, when the register or such copy is produced, and of all the matters contained in or endorsed on such certificate of registry, and purporting to be authenticated by the signature of a registrar, when such certificate is produced.

(2) Offences peculiar to the “Discipline" clauses of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1854, ss. 239-259, stand on a different footing. In such cases it is essential to a conviction that the fact that the ship is a British ship be proved by the register or an examined or certified copy under sect. 107.-See Leary v. Lloyd, 29 Law J. Rep. (N. s.) M. C. 194.

Receiving Stolen Goods-Evidence-Previous Conviction of Receiver-Onus of Proof

-Notice-Habitual Criminals Act, 1869 (32 & 33 Vict. c. 99), s. 11.

By the Habitual Criminals Act, 1869 (32 & 33 Vict. c. 99), s. 11, where any person who has been previously convicted of any offence specified in the first schedule hereto and involving fraud or dishonesty, is found in the possession of stolen goods, evidence of such previous conviction shall be admissible as evidence of his knowledge that such goods have been stolen; and in any proceedings that may be taken against him as receiver of stolen goods, or, &c., proof may be given of his previous conviction before evidence is given of his having been found in possession of such stolen goods; provided that not less than seven days' notice shall be given to such person that proof is intended to be given of his previous conviction, and that he will be deemed to have known such goods to have been stolen until he has proved the contrary. On the trial of a receiver of stolen goods, a notice was proved to have been duly given him in the above form, and a previous conviction for larceny was proved against him, and such evidence was relied on as proof of guilty knowledge. The pri soner offered no evidence to rebut such evidence of guilty knowledge :-Held, that in the absence of any enactment in the statute that he should be deemed to have known such goods to have been stolen until he proved the contrary, the notice could not have the effect it purported to have, and that such receiver was not called upon to prove that he had not such guilty knowledge.

CASE reserved by a learned Commissioner of Assize on the South Wales Circuit:

John Davis was tried and convicted before me at the last Assizes for the county of Glamorgan, upon an indictment charging him with receiving stolen goods knowing them to be stolen. At the trial a notice under the 11th section of

*Coram Kelly, C.B., Martin, B., Blackburn, J., Montague Smith, J., and Mellor, J.

the 32 & 33 Vict. c. 99, was proved to have been duly served upon the prisoner. It was further proved that in the year 1867, the prisoner had been convicted of received the goods which were the subject larceny. It was also proved that he had of the indictment, and that those goods were stolen. I told the jury that the legislature must be taken to have intended that the notice should have the operation which, upon the face of it, it purported to have, and that the prisoner ought to be deemed to have known such goods to have been stolen until he proved the contrary. The prisoner was not defended by counsel, but entertaining doubts whether the above direction was right, I reserved a case for the opinion of this Court and admitted the prisoner to bail. The question for the opinion of the Court is, whether my direction to the jury was right.

No counsel appeared.

Cur. adv. vult. Judgment was (on June 11) delivered by

KELLY, C.B.-This conviction must be quashed. There is no enactment in the statute to give the notice the effect it purported to have, and to throw the onus of proof of absence of guilty knowledge on the prisoner.

Conviction quashed.

[IN THE COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH.] 1870. TUBB appellant, GOOD respondent. Metropolitan Building Act, 1855 (18 & 19 Vict. c. 122), s. 51-Fees due to District Surveyor.

The fees due under the Metropolitan Building Act, 1855 (18 & 19 Vict. c. 122), s. 51, to a district surveyor, one month after the roof of any building surveyed by him in pursuance of the Act shall have been covered in, are payable by whomsoever at that time answers the description of "builder, occupier, or owner," and cannot be charged upon a person subsequently becoming the owner of the premises.

CASE stated by one of the Metropolitan Police Magistrates for the opinion of the Court of Queen's Bench :

:

In May, 1866, notice was given by one Savage, a builder, to Joseph Good, the district surveyor of Poplar, and hereinafter called the respondent, of his intention to erect three houses in Lefevre Road, North Bow, under 18 & 19 Vict. c. 122 (Metropolitan Building Act), s. 38.

The houses were duly inspected by the respondent as district surveyor. The roofs of the houses were covered in on the 9th of July, 1866, and on the 6th of August, 1866, the respondent became entitled to receive five guineas as the amount of fees due to him from the builder, owner, or occupier of the buildings so erected under section 51 of the above-mentioned Act.

William Tubb, the appellant, was not the builder, owner, or occupier of the buildings in 1866, but became the owner thereof prior to October, 1869. A proper bill, specifying the amount of the fees due to the respondent, was delivered to the appellant on the 1st of October, 1869, which the appellant refused to pay; whereupon a summons was issued against him, and came on for hearing on the 10th of February, 1870, at the Worship Street Police Court.

The appellant contended that he was not "such owner, &c.," as section 51 of the above-mentioned Act contemplated, and as the summons alleged, he not having been owner in 1866 or 1867.

The magistrate made an order for the payment by the appellant to the respondent of the sum of 51. 5s., subject to the opinion of this Court, as to whether, on the above stated facts, such decision was right in point of law.

Philbrick, for the appellant.-By s. 51 of the 18 & 19 Vict. c. 122 (Metropolitan Building Act, 1855), "one month after one month after the roof of any building, surveyed by any district surveyor, has been covered in, the district surveyor shall be entitled to receive the amount of fees due to him

the same,

owner, or occupier refuses to pay such fees may be recovered in a summary manner before a justice of the peace upon its being shewn to the satisfaction of such justice that a proper bill, specifying the amount of such fees, was delivered to such builder, owner, or occupier," &c. The appellant is not liable to the payment of these fees, having succeeded to the ownership after the same became due; and the liability created by the statute is not one which runs with the land, but attaches to the person to whom the service was rendered.

Bush Cooper, for the respondent.-The appellant is chargeable in this instance with the fee as "owner," which term applies to the person entitled to the rents and profits. It was not the object of the Act to make the person liable who merely covers in a building; such process does not of itself render it fit for occupation, and so long as the house is not fit for occupation, no fee is payable. It does not appear that any one was in receipt of the rents or profits arising from the premises in question, previous to the vesting of the ownership in the appellant; and the decision of the magistrate was therefore right.

BLACKBURN, J. (1)—I think it clear that the Act means that these fees are payable, when they become due, by the person who at that time answers the description of "builder, owner, or occupier." In this case the appellant's interest in the premises did not commence until long after the performance of the services in respect of which the fee is claimed, and I think therefore that he is entitled to our judgment.

MELLOR, J.-I am of the same opinion. The liability created by this statute is clearly not one which runs with the land. LUSH, J., concurred.

Judgment for the appellant.

S. T. Roberts, for respondent.

(1) Cockburn, C.J., had left the Court,