tioned as to carriers and other bailees, however, does not extend to their servants: if the servant of a carrier convert the property intrusted to him to his own use, he will be guilty of larceny, even in cases where a conversion by his master would be merely a breach of trust. Upon an indictment for stealing a quantity of barilla, it appeared that the prosecutors employed one Bryant, a master-carman, to cart some barilla for them from the London Docks, and Bryant sent Harding his carter for it; Harding, in collusion with others, whilst on his way from the Docks with a cart-load of the barilla, allowed the others to take away the whole of it, together with the cart, horses, &c.: some doubt being entertained whether, as the barilla was delivered to Harding to carry, he could be deemed guilty of larceny in converting it to his use, the question was submitted to the judges; but they were unanimously of opinion that this was larceny in the servant, and that it was immaterial whether the barilla was stated to be the property of the prosecutors or of Bryant. R. v. Harding, Hayes, Cooke, and Mears. R. & R. 125.

The felonious taking, actual or constructive, must be either proved expressly, or circumstances must be proved from which the jury may imply it. Where upon an indictment for horse-stealing, the prosecutor proved that he put the horse to agist with a person at a distance, that having heard from that person of the loss of the horse, he went to the field where it had been put to feed, and discovered it was gone; but the agister or his servant was not called, nor was any other evidence given of the loss of the horse: Gurney, B., held this to be insufficient, for it was consistent with all this that the prisoners might have obtained the horse honestly from the agister, and not by felony. R. v. Yend and Haines, 6 Car. & P. 176. A very usual mode of proving the taking is, by proving that the stolen property was very shortly afterwards found in the prisoner's possession, and that he was not able to give a satisfactory account of the manner in which he came by it. But his possession must be proved to have been very recent after the felony committed; where the goods were found in the prisoner's possession 16 months after they were stolen, this was holden to be no evidence that he stole them. Anon. 2 Car. & P. 459. And in another case, where the stolen property was found in the prisoner's possession three months after they were stolen, J. Parke, J., ordered the prisoner to be acquitted, without putting him upon his defence. R. v. Adams, 3 Car. & P. 600. And even in cases where the possession is recent, it only raises a presumption of guilt, which may be rebutted by evidence, showing that the prisoner came honestly by the property. See R. v. Stimpson, 2 Car. & P. 415.

2. The prosecutor must prove a carrying away. But any, the slightest removal of the chattel taken, from the place in which it was found, will be sufficient. Arch. Sum. 127. Where it appeared that the prisoner, who was sitting on the driving box of the Exeter mail coach, took hold of the upper end of a bag that was in the front boot, and lifted it. from the bottom of the boot on which it rested; he handed the upper end of it to another person near him, and they were both endeavouring to pull it out of the boot, with a common intent to steal it, when the guard of the coach coming up, they dropt the bag again into the boot; the judges were of opinion that this was a complete asportation of the bag, sufficient to constitute larceny. R. v. James Walsh, R. & M. 14. So where it appeared that the prisoner drew a pocket book out of the inside breast pocket of the prosecutor's coat, about an inch above the top of the pocket; but the prosecutor suddenly putting up his hand, the prisoner let go the book whilst it was still about the person of the prosecutor, and the book fell back again into the pocket: the judges unanimously held this to be a sufficient asportation to constitute a simple larceny. R. v. William Thompson, R. & M. 78.

3. Of the goods stated in the indictment, or some of them. At common law, larceny can be committed of personal chattels only: not of things attached to the freehold, such as trees or vegetables growing, or the like: not of bills of exchange or other mere securities for money, for they are but choses in action, and not chattels; not of animals feræ naturæ, unless they be tamed or confined, and be fit for the food of man; and therefore, upon an indictment for stealing "five live tame ferrets confined in a certain hutch," although proved to be valuable animals, the judges held that it was not larceny, and the judgment was accordingly arrested. R. v. John Searing, R. & R. 350. A stealing of those things, however, is made punishable by the present statute, in most instances. See the Index.

The goods must be described with sufficient certainty in the indictment, and proved in substance as laid. Where a prisoner was convicted of stealing "ten pounds in monies numbered," the judges held the conviction to be wrong, because the indictment did not specify the species of coin stolen, R. v. Fry, R. & R. 482. Upon an indictment for stealing" six handkerchiefs," it appeared that the property stolen consisted of a piece of silk containing six handker chiefs in number, distinguished from each other by a line of white cotton, although not severed or cut from each other, but in one piece, just as they came from the loom : it was doubted at first whether the property was rightly described;

but upon the case being referred to the judges, they held that it was. R. v. William Nibbs and Henry Yeams, R. & M. 25. Where a man was indicted for stealing a brass furnace in the county of Hereford, and it appeared that he stole it in Radnorshire, broke it in pieces, and afterwards brought it into Herefordshire, where he was apprehended: Hullock, B. held that the indictment was not supported by the evidence; he never had the brass furnace in Herefordshire, but merely pieces of brass. R. v. Halloway, 1 Car. & P. 127. In an indictment for a larceny of live animals, it is not necessary to state them to be alive, because the law will presume them to be so, unless the contrary be stated; but as to dead animals, it was formerly holden that the indictment should state them to be so, otherwise it would be a misdescription, and fatal. And therefore, where upon an indictment for stealing "two turkies," it appeared that the turkies were dead when they were stolen: Hullock, B. held this to be a fatal variance; for "turkies" mean live turkies. R. v. Halloway, 1 Cur. & P. 128. So, where upon an indictment for stealing four live tame turkies, it appeared that the prisoners stole them alive in Cambridgeshire, killed them there, and then brought them into the county of Hertford, where they were indicted the judges held that as the prisoners had not the turkies in a live state in the county of Hertford, the charge as laid was not proved; and Holroyd, J. observed, that an indictment for stealing a dead animal, should state that it was dead, because upon a general statement that the party stole the animal, it is to be intended that he stole it alive. R. v. Edwards and Walker, R. & R. 497. But in a more recent case, where a man was indicted for receiving a "lamb," knowing it to have been stolen, it appeared that the lamb had been killed before the prisoner received it, and it was objected that it was misdescribed in the indictment : the point being reserved for the opinion of the judges, they held that the objection ought not to prevail; it was immaterial to the prisoner's offence whether the lamb was alive or dead; in either case his offence and punishment were the same. R. v. Puckering, R. & M. 242.

:

Where the goods consist of several articles, they must have been all stolen at the same time, or at times so near to each other that the several takings may appear to be parts of the same continuing transaction, otherwise each larceny should be made the subject of a separate indictment; and therefore where it appears that the goods were stolen at several distinct times, the Court will put the prosecutor to his election for which act of larceny he will prosecute, and will oblige him to confine his evidence to that. See R. v. Smith and Jefferies, R. & M. N. P. C. 295, post. But the Court

will not thus put the prosecutor to his election, merely because the goods might have been, and probably were, stolen at different times, if, from any thing appearing in the case, it be not impossible that they might all have been stolen at one time. R. v. Dunn and Smith, R. & M. 146. See also R. v. Jones, 4 Car. & P. 217, post.

4. That the goods stolen were the property of the prosecutor, as stated in the indictment: that is to say, either that he was the actual owner of them, or that they were at the time in his custody as bailee. Where goods are in the possession of a bailee at the time they are stolen, they may be described either as the goods of the owner or of the bailee. They may be described as the goods of the owner, although he may never have had possession of them: and therefore, where bank notes, the property of one Nash, but which never had been in his possession, being by his orders, sent by an agent of his in the Isle of Wight to his agent in London, and by the latter to an agent of Nash's at Worcester, were stolen, and were described in the indictment as the property of Nash, the judges held that they were properly described as Nash's property. R. v. Remnant, R. & R. 136. Or they may be laid to be the property of the bailee. See R. v. Wymer, 4 Car. & P. 391, as for instance in the carrier in Remnant's case, from whom the notes were in fact stolen. Where the owner of a house let a room in it furnished to a lodger, and some of the furniture was stolen: the judges held that the furniture stolen should be laid to be the property of the lodger, and not of the owner of the house; for the owner was neither in possession, nor entitled to the possession of it, and could not have maintained trespass. R. v. John Belstead, R. & R. 411. S. P., R. v. George Brunswick, R. & M. 26. And where a bailor steals his own goods from his bailee, they should be stated in the indictment to be the goods of the bailee. See R. v. Wilkinson and Marsden, R. & R. 470, and ante, p. 270. R. v. Bramley, R. & R. 478, ante, p. 271. They must never however be laid as the property of a person who has not had either actual or constructive possession of them. See R. v. Adams, R. & R. 225. Where the goods are the joint property of several, they must be stated in the indictment to be the goods of all, otherwise the party must be acquitted. And where a father and son carried on business jointly as farmers, and the son died; and the father afterwards carried on the business for the joint benefit of himself and of his son's children; some of the sheep on the farm being stolen, and being laid in the indictment to be the property of the father and his son's children, the judges held it to be correctly laid. R. v. John Scott, R. & R. 13.

Where

it appeared that D. and C. carried on business in partnership; and C. dying, his widow for about a month afterwards acted as partner, and regularly attended the business of the shop; at the end of which time the stock in trade was divided between D. and the widow during the month, however, some of the stock in trade being stolen, and it being charged in the indictment to be the joint property of D. and the widow, it was objected that the children of C. should also be named with D. and the widow as joint proprietors, or (as no administration had been taken out to C.) the goods should be described as the property of the ordinary and of the surviving partner; but the judges held the goods to be correctly described as the property of D. and the widow. R. v. Eleanor Gaby, R. & R. 178. Where a larceny is committed of the property of partners, however, the old rule of requiring the names of all the partners to be set out in the indictment, is now dispensed with, for by stat. 7 Geo. 4. c. 64. s. 14. it is sufficient to name one," and to state the property to belong to the person so named, and another or others," as the case may be; vide ante, p. 206; and where a bible and hymn-book, which had been presented to the Methodists' Society at Feckenham, were stolen from the methodist chapel there, and were described as the property of John Bennett and others, Bennett being one of the society, and also one of the trustees of the chapel: J. Parke, J. held it to be correct. R. v. Boulton, 5 Car. & P. 537. In the case of larceny of goods or chattels provided for at the expense of any county, riding, or division, it is sufficient to state them to belong to the inhabitants of such county, riding, or division respectively, without specifying the names of any. 7 G. 4. c. 64. s. 15. Vide ante, p. 207. Goods or chattels provided for the use of the poor of any parish, township, &c. to be used in the workhouse or poorhouse, or by the master or mistress thereof, or the workmen or servants therein, may be described as belonging to the overseers of the parish, &c. for the time being, without specifying their names. 7 G. 4. c. 64. s. 16. Vide ante, p. 207. Where the indictment stated the goods to be the property of the overseers of the poor for the time being," of the parish of K., the judges held it sufficient; the words " for the time being," sufficiently imported that the goods were the property of those who were overseers at the time of the theft. R. v. Went, R. & R. 359. See R. v. Beacall, R. & M. 15. So materials, tools, or implements for making, altering, or repairing highways (not being turnpike roads), may be described as belonging to the surveyors of the highways of the parish, &c. for the time being, without specifying their names. 7 Geo. 4. c. 64. s. 16. Vide ante, p. 208. So property under turnpike trusts, mate