THE pursuer is Inspector of the Poor of the parish of Minnigaff, and he raised this action for repetition from the defender for relief afforded to his illegitimate daughter, and for the expense of her funeral. The paternity, and the accuracy of the account sued for, were admitted. The defence was, that having maintained the bastard till she was twelve years of age, the defender was thereafter free.

The Steward-Substitute pronounced the following Interlocutor:

Having resumed consideration of this cause with the minute for the pursuer-No. 9 of process-for the reasons assigned in the subjoined Note, repels the defences: Decerns against the defender in terms of the conclusions of the summons: Finds the pursuer entitled to expenses, as the same shall be taxed by the auditor of this Court, to whom remits the pursuer's account thereof, when lodged, and decerns.

NOTE.-The claim advanced in the present summons is of a somewhat unusual nature, and the Steward-Substitute is aware of no decision of the Supreme Court, or dictum of any judge of the Supreme Court, in which its validity has been directly recognised; but it seems to him, nevertheless, to be founded on natural obligation, and strongly, though indirectly, supported by doctrinal as well as statutory sanction.

1

It is admitted-1st, that the late Mary M'Gill, who was born in 1841, was the illegitimate daughter of the defender, and always acknowledged by him as such; 2d, that she was alimented by him till she was twelve years of age; 3d, that | she was then taken by her maternal uncle, Robert Cochran, with whom she worked as a servant, and supported herself till the spring of 1862, when she fell into bad health; 4th, that on or about 22d October, 1862, she became, from illness and destitution, chargeable to the parish of Minnigaff, as the parish of her settlement, and continued to receive parochia relief from the inspector of that parish till her death, on or about 29th August, 1863, and was buried at the expense of that parish; 5th, that the account of disbursements by that parish to her, or for her behoof, now sued for, is correct; 6th, that the defender is able, if bound, to reimburse the said parish for these advances to his late daughter; and, 7th, it is not alleged that Mary M'Gill's mother was able or willing to relieve the said parish, to any extent, of said advances. The grounds on which alone the defender resists the present claim of relief at the instance of the parish are, that he, having alimented Mary M'Gill till she was able to support herself, and she having afterwards done so till 1862, she had, as an illegitimate child, no further legal claim or right to be alimented by him.

That defence is, in the Steward Substitute's opinion, untenable in the circumstances of this case.

That there is a natural obligation, on the acknowledged father of a destitute illegimate child, to afford it the means of subsistence, cannot reasonably be disputed. In infancy, at least, and before the child can contribute to its own maintenance, the natural obligation on the acknowledged father, as well as on the mother, rests on the strongest and clearest grounds.

That natural obligation may not, however, exist where the paternity is not acknowledged, and rests on evidence unsatis factory to the honest convictions of the reputed father. Nature does not call upon him to support a child which he does not believe to be his; but where he both believes and acknowledges the child to be his, he is clearly bound by natural as well as civil law to maintain it till it can maintain itself. (Erskine, b. 1, til. 6, sec. 56. Pott v. Pott, and dicta of Lord Gillies therein. 7th December, 1833. Shaw 12, p. 183.)

How long does that legal obligation subsist? The defender maintains that it ceases as soon as the child can support itself, and does not revive on any future disability of the child to maintain itself.

No decision of any Court, nor doctrinal authority, has been referred to in support of that plea. It is strongly though indirectly discredited by several institutional writers, by at least one judgment of the Supreme Court, and by the Poor Law Statute. Erskine says (b. 1, til. 6, sec. 56)—"The obligation which lies on parents to maintain their indigent children is perpetual, insomuch that though the parent him

self should be reduced to necessitous circumstances, yet as long as he keeps house he is obliged to give the same enter tainment that he takes to himself to such of his children as have not sufficient funds for their own subsistence. Parents are thus bound to maintain their issue, though the relation should be merely natural; not only the mother, who is always certain, but likewise the father, if he hath either acknow ledged the child for his, or may be presumed from other circumstances to have begotten him." Bell (Principles, p. 561, Ed.) says the amount and period of aliment are regu lated "by the condition of the parties, and the child's ability to subsist itself;" and Fraser (Domestic Relations, Vol. ii., p. 51) says "There can, however, from the nature of the thing, be no precise age fixed as an inflexible rule, as one child may be able to work sooner than another, and the aliment will be claimable during its entire life if it be physi cally or mentally incapable of supporting itself."

In the early case of Finlayson v. Gown, 7th July, 1899, F. C., the Sheriff sustained the claim of aliment against the father of the illegitimate child, "ay, and until the child shall be able to earn its own livelihood;" but that judgment being advocated on other points, the Court eventually sus tained the Lord Ordinary's judgment, by which aliment was found due by the father, "ay, and while it (the said child) shall be unable to support itself." There are certainly no grounds to infer from these authorities that the father's obligation to maintain his child ceases absolutely and entirely on the child attaining any specific age, or on its being able to maintain itself for a time. The contrary is plainly presumable. Where the paternity is acknowledged, the relationship or natural tie between the parent and child does not cease when or because the child is able to earn its own bread: it continues till death dissolves it. The civil or legal obligation ceases for the time that the child can support itself, just because the indigence, which is one of the grounds of that obligation, no longer exists. But, on the return of that indigence of the child, it is not only consistent with reason and nature, but also with the authority above referred to, that the fathers's obligation to support his child should revive.

According to Erskine, that obligation is "perpetual;" and the Supreme Court expressly found in Sanderson's case that it endures "ay, and while the child shall be unable to sup port itself."

If the father's obligation was held to be of that enduring or "perpetual" character previous to the enactment of 8th and 9th Vict., cap. 83, his liability has been, if possible, more decidedly and firmly established by sections 80 and 71 of

that statute.

By the first of these sections (viz., 80th), "every mother and every putative father of an illegitimate child, after the paternity has been admitted or otherwise established, who shall refuse or neglect to maintain such child, being able to do so, whereby such child shall become chargeable to any parish or combination, shall be deemed to be a vagabond, under the provisions of the aforesaid Act of the Scottish Parliament, passed in the year 1579, and may be prosecuted criminally," etc.

The father's responsibility is there made to depend-1st, on the child's becoming chargeable to a parish; and, 2d, on the father's ability, and neglect or refusal to support it. The Act recognises no other limitation or condition of the father's liability.

Accordingly, it is not thought that the plea maintained by the defender in this case would have been a valid defence in a prosecution against him under the 80th section of the statute.

The right and title of the pursuer to bring the present action of relief against the defender is as clearly recognised in the 71st section of the Act, which provides that "Where in any case relief shall be afforded to a poor person found destitute in a parish, or combination, it shall be lawful for the parochial board of such parish or combination to recover the monies expended in behalf of such poor person from any parish or combination within Scotland, to which he may ultimately be found to belong, or from his parents, or other persons who may be legally bound to maintain him."

The obligation of the parents is here again recognised absolutely, and without limitation, either as regards duration, or the age or previous ability of the child to maintain itself.

And with reference to the declared purpose of the Poor

Law Act, and the heavy burden imposed by it on so many persons honourably struggling, with slender means, to support their own families, and to contribute their quota for the really destitute, it would indeed have been anomalous, as well as iniquitous, if an opportunity had been afforded, under the provisions of the Act, to the wealthy fathers of illegitimate children to throw the burden of supporting them, at any period of their lives, or under any circumstances, on a fund drawn, in many instances, from persons of straitened means, and intended for the support of those who have no other source or means of support.

NOTE.-The defender admits that his illegitimate daughter, who died on 29th August, 1863, fell into bad health in the previous year, and in consequence became, and continued chargeable to the parish of Minnigaff, as the parish of settlement, from 224 October, 1862, until her death, being the period embraced by the pursuer's account of advances libelled. The Sheriff has, therefore, no doubt that the defender is liable to relieve the pursuer of his advances. The rule that a father, either of a legitimate or an illegitimate child, is liable to relieve a parish of proper and necessary advances made for the child's support whenever and as long as the child has become and continued a proper object of parochial relief appears unquestionable. Besides the case of Potts, that of Finlayson, cited by the late Professor Bell, and also by Mr Fraser, under the passages cited in the note of the Steward-Substitute, and the doctrine stated by these authors, afford a sufficient answer to the defender's plea in the present

case.

Act. RICHARD HEWAT, Castle-Douglas. Alt. HENRY GLOVER, Gatehouse.

12TH MAY, 1864.

SHERIFF COURT, ABERDEENSHIRE—

PETERHEAD.

(MR SHERIFF SKELTON.)

DEVERALL'S SEQUESTRATION. Competition for Trusteeship-Promissory note-Substitute Payec.—Held, that a promissory note granted to a person, whom failing, to his wife, was null, as containing a substitution.

Promissory Note-Voucher - Affidavit defective Correction of.-Held, that a promissory note granted twelve months prior to sequestration by a bankrupt to his father, was not a voucher sufficient to support a vote by the father in his son's sequestration without a statement in the affidavit of the manner in which the debt arose, and that an affidavit defective in this respect could not be ratified by amendment.

In this sequestration a competition for the office of trustee having arisen, the Sheriff-Substitute pronounced the following judgment, which shows the nature and grounds of the objections to the votes:

Having heard parties' procurators on the note of objections for Adam Milne Gray, and Alexander Clark, both merchants in Aberdeen, competitors for the office of trustee, and trustee in succession respectively, in the sequestration of Wm. Gordon Deverall, merchant in Peterhead, to the votes made on behalf of James Hutchison, auctioneer in Peterhead, as trustee in the said sequestration, at the meeting of creditors held on the twenty-sixth day of April, 1864, Finds and declares, for the reasons stated in the subjoined Note, the said Adam Milne

Gray and Alexander Clark to have been duly elected trustee, and trustee in succession respectively, on the the said sequestrated estates: Finds the unsuccessful competitor, James Hutchison, liable in the expenses of the competition; allows an account thereof to be given in, and when lodged, remits to the auditor of Court to tax and report, and decerns. Farther, having heard parties' procurators on the note of objections for Oswald Prosser, writer in Aberdeen, a competitor for the office of a commissioner in the said sequestration, to the votes made in behalf of Robert Reid, tobacconist, Aberdeen, John Mackintosh, merchant in Peterhead, and James Hutchison, jun., Queen Street, Peterhead, at the in the subjoined Note, the said Oswald Prosser, John Mackintosh, and Robert Reid, to have been duly elected commissioners on the said sequestrated estates, and decerns. NOTE. At the hearing, parties' procurators stated to the Sheriff-Substitute that they had agreed between themselves that the objections to the claim of James Deverall should alone be debated, as the disposal of that claim would necessarily determine the competition for the offices of trustee and commissioners, and the Sheriff-Substitute has therefore not thought it necessary to scan the claims on each side, but It seems unsimply to declare the successful competitors. They are necessary to dwell on the 1st and 2d objections. As to the 1st, it would be a very anomalous rule both bad. that the oath of the concurring creditor, emitted and produced with the petition for sequestration, while not requiring to be in different terms from that for voting, should for no There is nothing in the purpose whatever be made of new. Act of Parliament to infer such a rule. The oath of this It

concurring creditor was really made in the sequestration. was produced as a requirement with the petition, and is of the same date, and is to all intents an oath in the process of sequestration, though it was necessarily emitted just before sequestration was actually awarded. The creditor thereafter produced it at the meeting for election of trustee, with the notes as his title to vote. It bears that the bankrupt "is duly indebted"-that is on the date of sequestration being awarded. The Sheriff-Substitute is glad to observe that Mr Murdoch, in his manual, in accordance with these views, lays it down that an oath may be good for concurring in the petition, and for voting and ranking, provided it is adapted to each of the cases (and it is so here to petitioning aud voting), because he Conceives it would be a great hardship to put the creditor to such unnecessary expense.

As to the second objection, it is not required that the oath shall set forth that the debt was due at the date of the sequestration in express words. There is no prescribed form of the oath; but in any forms given by the authorities on ankrupt law, there is no reference to the sequestration at all. The third objection raises a nice question, but on the whole it must be considered to be well-founded. The two promissory notes to which it applies are granted to "Mr Jas. Deverall, mariner in Peterhead, and failing him, Mrs Barbara Gordon or Deverall, his wife, or to his or her order." (Bell's Prin., 305.) Though bills or notes are properly mercantile instruments, the use of them in Scotland has not been restricted to mercantile

66

men; yet in the use of them the same rules are applied as in the strict mercantile employment of the instrument. According to Mr Thomson, in England no document can be considered as a bill or note in which payment is made to depend on a the obligant or the payee, as where a bill or note is made contingency, or in which there is any uncertainty either as to payable to A. or B. (Thomson on Bills, pp. 10-12.) "This rule," he says, appears in the abstract to be consistent with our law;" and he lays it down that bills or notes which are void be an effectual ground of claim on a bankrupt's estate. At in this, or any of the grounds there mentioned by him, cannot page 11 he refers to various English cases upholding his doctrine; but farther on he quotes a case decided in the Scottish Courts which involved the same principle as here. was one of a bill drawn and accepted, payable to the drawer or order, "or failing him by decease, to my second son, Alexander Waddell." (Ibid, p. 19, Inglis v. Wiseman.) The Court sustained the objection that it contained a substi tution of heirs. Now, in the present case, there was not a substitution of heirs, and it has been endeavoured to show that in this there is a difference between the cases, as the substituted payee here was the wife, and therefore cadem persona with the first-named payee. This appears to the

The case

NOTE.-The Steward-Substitute is convinced that the advances made by the pursuer to Peter Kergan in 1857 were humanely applied to alleviate what appeared, and was represented by Kergan's wife, to be a case of destitution. But on the grounds assigned in the prefixed Interlocutor, he cannot regard Kergan as at that time a proper object of Parochial relief. His means of subsistence then amounted to 6s a-week, punctually paid, with a free house, which raised his income to about 7s a-week, subject to no contingency or abatement, and without taking into account any earnings, necessarily small, made by his wife's labour on those rare occasions when she could leave her own household and obtain outdoor or other employment. In such circumstances Peter Kergan was neither destitute nor dependent on parochial aid.

His condition, even with a wife and three children to maintain, was better than that of an able-bodied labourer having a wife and much larger family to support in health and sickness on 12s, and even 14s a-week of average earnings when employed, but liable to diminution from unfavourable weather, temporary sickness, or similar causes.

And yet such a labourer has no legal claim to parochial relief, although his wife and family may be prostrated by disease, and his means exhausted by the unavoidable extra expenditure thus occasioned. If any doubt previously existed as to the power of parochial boards to afford to the ablebodied relief in these exceptional cases of temporary distress, it has been dispelled by the recent decision of the Supreme Conrt.

It is not shown that before, or on advancing these sums to Kergan in 1857, the pursuer made due inquiry as to the amount of Kergan's means and ability to support himself and family. Such inquiry would have shown him to be not an object of parochial relief, but of charitable consideration to his relations or benevolent neighbours, able, though not bound, to assist him, just as an able-bodied labourer is in a scason of temporary pressure or destitution from want of employment or other temporary cause.

The other portion of the pursuer's claim is founded on stronger grounds.

Peter Kergan's family burdens and expenses had then increased, and his means of sustaining them had greatly diminished. It was impossible, on an income of about 5d per day, to procure food, clothing, and lodging for six persons, if Kergan could even have avoided the additional expense of education for some of his children.

He was at that time obviously unable, by his own labour, or the means at his disposal, to maintain himself and family without aid from the parish or the defender.

He was, in law, destitute, and the pursuer, when applied to for relief to him and his family, was bound by the Act 8 & 9 Vict., cap. 83, secs. 69 and 70, to afford relief, including suitable provision for the education of the applicant's

children.

Having afforded that necessary relief to Peter Kergan, the pursuer was then entitled, by the 71st section of said Act, "to recover the monies expended on behalf of that poor person' from the defender, his legitimate son, as "the person legally bound to maintain him."

The defender does not seriously deny his ability to afford the relief that is demanded. The burden, which from the father's great age and increasing ailments, can only be of a temporary nature, will not deprive the defender of any of the necessaries of life, and slightly, if at all, interfere with his comforts.

He does not dispute his obligation to maintain or contribute what is necessary to maintain his father. He resists the present claim solely on the ground that the sums advanced or expended by the pursuer were employed in supporting Peter Kergan's present wife, the defender's stepmother, and her children by Kergan, whom the law, he pleads, does not oblige him to maintain.

The Steward-Substitute has overruled that plea. He considers it, with reference to the peculiar circumstances of the case, inconsistent with sound, legal, or moral principles-1st, by the poor law enactments the pursuer, when relieving Peter Kergan, was bound to provide relief for his wife and young children dependent on him. He was bound to regard them as a destitute family, and to provide for them collectively as such. While living with Peter Kergan, his wife and children had no separate or independent claim to parochial relief. Their derivative claim arose entirely from the

inability to maintain them of Peter Kergan (husband of the one and father of the others), on whom the primary obligation lay. The parochial relief, therefore, afforded by the pursuer was, in law, given to Peter Kergan to enable him to support his family, and the defender's obligation to relieve the parish of that burden must be co-extensive; 2d, it cannot for a moment be contended that if that family had consisted of the defender's own mother and his full brothers and sisters, he could have maintained this plea of non-liability. And still it would only be as members of Peter Kergan's family that he could, in Peter Kergan's lifetime, be called on to support either his wife or children; for there is, by law, no stronger obligation to support full brothers or sisters than those of half blood. It is, no doubt, established by the law of Scotland, that a son who does not represent his father, lucrative, is not bound to support his indigent brothers or sisters, and if this action had been at their instance, or at the instance of the parochial board for relief directly afforded to them, the defence against such a claim, however ungenerous, would have been insuperable. In like manner, an action at the instance of the defender's stepmother, or of the pursuer directly for her behoof, would have been untenable, or at least of very doubtful competency. But the present action is essentially of a different character. It is for relief of advances made to Peter Kergan, the defender's father, whom he is confessedly bound to maintain while indigent. It cer tainly does not, in law or reason, justify the defender's failure to fulfil that obligation that his father's destitution is more severe and insupportable from his having to maintain, besides himself, a wife and young family. Nor is it a humane or just reason for the defender's refusal or neglect to afford any relief to his indigent father, that the father, as in duty bound, would have shared that relief with his starving wife and children.

Further, it appears on the face of the account sued for, that the annual allowance made by the parish to Peter Kergan during the four years and nine months that he received relief amounted, exclusive of a free house, which the defender was bound to afford, altogether to about somewhat less than £6 per annum. That is surely not a sum which a person in the defender's circumstances could reasonably have grudged for the personal requirements of his aged and infirm parent, who, in the son's own words, "had always supported an unblemished character up to the present," and had displayed an honourable and commendable spirit of independence by supporting himself and his family by the sweat of his own brow till he all but reached his eightieth year. Although the defender is himself far beyond the reach of poverty, his father, during the time that this relief was afforded, received what was barely sufficient to keep him and his family alive in the condition, and subject to the privations of paupers. If the defender is, in strict law, entitled to refuse assistance to his destitute stepmother and her young family, is he also entitled to demand and avail himself of her services, as a constant and careful attendant on his sickly octogenarian father, without any remuneration or means of support?

He is clearly obliged to provide, not only nourishing food, cordials, medical assistance, clothing, and shelter for his father, but also such attendance as his great age and infirmities render no less indispensable. The Steward Substi tute is convinced that the defender could not have procured that assistance, and supplied these wants, on terms more favourable to him than the parish has done. If the remuneration to which the wife would have been entitled, as a hireling attendant on Peter Kergan, has been expended in maintaining herself, and in maintaining and educating Peter Kergan's young family, what conceivable loss or injury has the defender sustained by that arrangement?

By entering into that arrangement the pursuer, as inspector of Balmaghie, did what, in the Steward-Substitute's opinion, was most advantageous to the pauper Peter Kergan, not prejudicial to the defender, and more beneficial, in a moral and social point of view, than if he had separated Peter Kergan from his wife and children, put the latter into the poor-house, and furnished Peter with a female attendant at an average of £6 or £8 per annum. At all events, the other arrangement, which kept the family together, was adopted by the parish, in bona fide, as the best, and was not distinctly or decidedly objected to by the defender, whose duty it was to suggest a better or different arrangement, if it seemed to him objectionable, when the relief afforded by the parish was first

intimated to him in 1859. In his letter of 22d January, 1859 (No. 12 of process), the defender founds on Colonel Laurie's pension to his father of 3s a-week (which the father's wife and children were clearly entitled to share the benefit of) as his reason for refusing all sort of relief to his father, adding that, "when Mr Laurie gives up giving him that, I don't object assisting him, but I never will have anything to do with his wife or family, nor you cannot force me. never pay one farthing of what you are giving or what you have given. I put you to defiance-no law in the world can compel me to support another man's wife and family." The defender has resolutely acted on these not very dis

interested Malthusian views of his filial obligations.

I will

He has for nearly five years refused to alleviate, to any extent, his father's destitution, although fully apprised of it. He has allowed the pursuer to provide for the old man's urgent wants during that period in the way deemed by him the most suitable, without evincing the slightest sympathy or interest in the charitable work. His conduct and letters: clearly indicate his wish and intention to relieve himself entirely of the burden of his father's support, and to throw the burthen on the parish. He can neither plead poverty in excuse, nor law in defence of that conduct.

The pursuer, on behalf of the parish of Balmaghie, will, without doubt, gladly accede to any reasonable arrangement proposed by the defender for his father's future maintenance and comfort. Though allowed an opportunity of proving any advances made by him to his father, or for his behoof during the period embraced in the account sued for, in addition to £1 given to the pursuer, and now credited, the defender has failed to offer such proof, and has not even tendered his own oath on the point. In these circumstances, any further deduction from the pursuer's claim seemed inadmissible. The cases of M'Connocher v. Webster and Donald, decided in the Sheriff Court of Kincardine (Poor Law Magazine, Vol. v., P. 399), and M'Adam v. M'Adam or Young, decided in the Sheriff Court of Lanarkshire (Poor Law Magazine, Vol. v., p. 330), do not seem to the Steward-Substitute precedents which can rule or influence the judgment in the present case. These were pronounced in actions brought to oblige a son-inlaw to maintain his father-in-law. The two Courts seem to have taken opposite views, and given conflicting judgments on the point. But if they had fortunately come to the same conclusion in the matter, it is not thought that, with all the respect that would have been due to such an authority, the present case could in the slighest degree have been ruled or affected by it.

In these cases, the question of legal liability was fully open, while in the present case the question to be dealt with, viz. the son's liability to maintain his father, is no longer open. Indeed, it never was an open question. And the point as to the stepson's liability to maintain his stepmother and half brothers and sisters is only indirectly raised, and has been disposed of on special grounds, which do not cccur in the cases above referred to. A case more closely applicable, or rather identical with the present case, seems to have been decided in the Sheriff Small Debt Court at Glasgow in March, 1863, in conformity with the views taken by the Steward Substitute in the present case (see Poor Law Magazine, Vol. v., p. 342).

This Interlocutor was appealed, but the

Sheriff

SHERIFF COURT, LANARKSHIRE-GLASGOW.

(SHERIFFS SIR A. ALISON AND BELL.)

HARKINS v. JAMES M'KECHNIE.

Damages-Breach of promise of marriage. Circumstances in which modified damages given, and costs on the lowest scale.

THIS was an action for the recovery of £250, for damages sustained by the pursuer, and solatium to her in conse quence of the defender having, on or about the 17th May, 1862, promised and agreed to become the husband of the pursuer; but he refused to marry the pursuer, and married another person. The defence was a denial, with the explanation that, if any promise was made, it must have been when the defender was kept in the pursuer's father's house, and so much under the influence of liquor as to be unaware of what he was doing or saying.

The record having been closed and proof led, the Sheriff-Substitute pronounced the following Interlocu

tor:

Having heard parties' procurators, and resumed considera. tion of the proof and whole process, Finds it proved that on or about the 17th May, 1862, the defender made a proposal of marriage to the pursuer, and that she agreed to accept him as her husband: Finds that, on various occasions during the succeeding six weeks, the pursuer and defender met as engaged persons, and the defender mentioned to certain of the pursuer's friends that they were to be married, and ultimately the 16th July was named as the day when the marriage was to take place: Finds that the pursuer had a situation as servant or nurse in the Royal Infirmary, which she gave up early in June in expectation of her marriage with the defender: Finds that the defender afterwards broke off from his engagement to the pursuer, and in October, 1862, married another person; but being conscious that he had not treated the pursuer well, he offered to pay her a sum of £10, which she refused: Finds that the defender is liable in damages to the pursuer for breach of contract; but in regard to the quantum of said damages, finds that the pursuer was only twenty-five years of age, while the defender was a widower, and well advanced in life in May, 1862: Finds that the defender was also addicted to habits of extreme intemperance, and the pursuer's father, who was in the defender's employ ment, seems to have taken advantage of these habits to sug gest to the defender that the pursuer would make him a suitable wife: Finds that the first occasion on which the defender talked of matrimony to the pursuer was on Saturday the 10th May, and he did so at the instigation of the pur suer's father, they being both then in a state of intoxication, and the pursuer's said father himself admits that he thought the defender then spoke in jest, and nothing more would have come out of the matter had not the defender renewed the proposal on the following Saturday, when he was compara tively sober, and followed it up afterwards: Finds that the pursuer, apparently accommodating herself to her father's plans, accepted the defender without any previous wooing, and it is not very probable that her feelings can have snstained any severe shock by his breach of contract: Finds that there is no evidence that the pursuer put herself to any expense in making preparations for the marriage, or that she was thrown for any length of time out of a situation: Therefore, and in the whole circumstances, assesses the damages payable by the defender at the sum of twenty pounds, and quoad ultra assoilzies him; but finds him liable in expenses; allows an account of said expenses to be given in, and remits the same to the auditor to tax and report, and decerns.

Both parties appealed against this Interlocutor, and after hearing parties' procurators, the Sheriff pronounced the following judgment:

Having heard parties' procurators, under their mutual appeals upon the Interlocutor appealed against, proof adduced, and whole process, adheres to the Interlocutor ap pealed against, finding damages due to the pursuer; but, for the reasons stated in the following Note, modifies the damages decerned for to £10 10s sterling in all, for which, with interest, decerns against the defender; quoad ultra assoilzies the defender, and finds the pursuer entitled to expenses, but directs them to be taxed on the lowest ordinary Court scale, and so far alters the Interlocutor complained of, but quoad ultra dismisses both appeals, and decerns.

NOTE. The evidence in this case, in the Sheriff's opinion,