benefit of all and every the children and issue of his said daughter which she might happen to leave her surviving, to take the same as tenants in common, and not as joint-tenants, and their respective heirs and assigns; and if but one such child, then upon trust for such only child, his or her heirs and assigns, for ever. But if his said daughter should happen to die without leaving such issue, or leaving such and all of them should die during their minority and without leaving lawful issue, then upon trust for such person or persons, and in such manner as his said daughter should, by any deed or will to be by her legally executed and attested, limit, dispose of, give or devise the same unto. And as to all the rest, residue and remainder of his personal estate and property whatsoever, after payment of a legacy of 500l. to his wife, and of all his just debts, funeral and testamentary expenses, he gave and bequeathed the same to his trustees, their executors and administrators, upon trust for the sole use and benefit of his wife Ann, and permit her to receive the dividends during her life, with remainder for the sole use and benefit of his daughter, Eliza Ann Cancellor, and to permit and empower her to receive the dividends during her life, (her receipt to be a sufficient discharge,) as if she were sole and unmarried. And from and after the decease of his said daughter upon trust for the use and benefit of all and every the children and issue of his said daughter which she might happen to leave her surviving, and if there should be but one such child, then for the sole use and benefit of such only child, his or her executors or administrators; and in case there should be no such children or issue of his said daughter, or being such and all of them should die during their minority and without leaving lawful issue, then upon trust for such person or persons as his said daughter should, by any deed or will to be by her respectively legally executed and attested, give or bequeath, direct or appoint, or dispose of the said residue of his personal estate or any part thereof; and the testator appointed his widow and daughter executrixes. By a codicil, dated the 18th of December 1832, the testator gave a cottage, which he had purchased subsequently to the date of the will, to the trustees, upon the same trusts. The testator died on the 26th of March 1836, and the estate having been handed over to the trustees, the testator's widow received the income thereof for her life. She died on the 6th of August 1849, and the testator's daughter then received the income and died on the 1st of February 1862, having had six children, four of whom died infants and unmarried during her lifetime. The other two, Charlotte Cancellor and the Rev. J. H. Cancellor, survived her, and both had attained twentyone. Charlotte Cancellor, who was the plaintiff, was unmarried; but J. H. Cancellor was married and had one child, who was an infant, and was born in January 1862. The following questions were raised by the trustees: whether upon the death of Eliza Cancellor, the plaintiff Charlotte Cancellor, and her brother J. H. Cancellor, were entitled to the property of the testator in equal shares, or whether the child now born and the children that might be born of J. H. Cancellor were entitled to participate. Mr. Baily and Mr. Osborne appeared for the plaintiff. Mr. Bazalgette and Mr. Aikin, for the infant grandchild, and Mr. Vaughan Hawkins, for the trustees. North v. Martin, 6 Sim. 266. 18 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Chanc. 5. Roddy v. Fitzgerald, 6 H.L. Cas. 823. KINDERSLEY, V.C.-This will presents so many difficulties that every suggestion made as to one portion is met by some difficulty in another. The testator intended that his wife and daughter should successively enjoy the income of his property, real and personal, and then that it should go to the children or child, or some class of issue of the daughter, and the question now is, to whom did the testator mean it to go? The testator might have anticipated that his daughter would have many children who might marry and die and leave issue, and some might survive, and so on, taking all the ordinary chances into consideration; but he certainly uses language the most difficult to be interpreted. The two clauses in the will giving the rent and personalty are nearly identical in words; but there is a difference, which consists principally in the gift over, the language being, "in case there shall be no child or issue of my said daughter," in the case of the personalty, whereas in that relating to the realty it is, "in case my said daughter shall happen to die without leaving such issue," not using the word "children." Many things have been suggested. It has been said that the first limitation, taken alone, supposing there was nothing else to control it, clearly gives to every child, grandchild and individual, being more remote issue of the daughter who survived her, equal shares in fee simple per capita; and no doubt, standing alone and uncontrolled, that would be the result of the language, and it is contended for the infant, that it was so uncontrolled. It is a clear rule that in "considering a will" the testator must be taken to use the words in their primary and natural sense, unless the context shews that he meant them in a secondary sense; and therefore the whole question is, whether there are other clauses in the will sufficient to control the effect of these words, and it is contended that there are such words. First, the effect of the infant's contention would be that children, grandchildren and parents would take together, pari passu, per capita as tenants in common: a very improbable intention, which this Court would not adopt unless such intention was clear, and there was nothing to control it and shew that he did not so intend; in any case the Court would most unwillingly arrive at the conclusion that children, grandchildren, or great-grandchildren or issue however remote, of a child, should take pari passu, although, no doubt, in this case this clause standing alone would have that effect. Immediately following are the words, "if but one such child, then the whole to such only child, his heirs and assigns for ever." One view is, that if one child survived the daughter, although there might be a score of issue of other predeceased children, that one child would exclude all of them, although if there was no child living at her death the issue would all take pari passu; nothing could be more improbable or monstrous, although it is justly said that you cannot control the caprice of a testator. Another suggestion is, that the testator, in using the words " one such child," did not refer to an actual child in the proper and primary sense, but to a child of the daughter's child descended from the testator. That is plausible, but it must be remembered that as at first the words are "child and issue," the Court is bound to take those words in the primary sense, unless there is reason to control it, and it must be taken to mean an actual child, a descendant of the testator in the first generation. Afterwards the testator uses the words "such issue" simply, which embraces grandchildren in its natural sense, but there is nothing there to throw light on this intention. Looking at the corresponding clause as to the personalty, the language is different, and that may assist the construction, the word "child" being also used, and therefore he has so used the terms as to shew that he did not confound them, but had in his mind the distinction between the two. It is said that you may reconcile the clauses and get over the difficulty by holding, that children living at the death of the daughter took, that is, actual children and issue of predeceased children of the daughter, taking by substi tution for their deceased parents, and it would certainly to some degree get over the difficulty if it could be adopted. But there is nothing in the language pointing to substitution; the word used is "and" issue, not "or," which might give some semblance of such an intention, although no doubt it is said that the words point to children in the aggregate. Having thus adverted to the various suggestions, and the difficulties which stand in the way of adopting them, still some meaning must be given; and taking the words of the first gift and the words of the gift over in the clause relating to the personalty, I think the words "child and issue" must be taken in the primary sense, namely, the word "child" to mean children properly so called, the word "issue" children generally, that is, those more remote than children proper. However reluctantly, therefore, I must Lands Clauses Act-Costs of separate Investments. A railway company having taken land which was the subject of a suit, and paid the money into court, the parties obtained an order for re-investing a large portion of the money in land. They then applied by petition for a small portion of the remaining fund to be invested, and they served all the parties to the suit-Held, that, the Court considering this purchase to be for the benefit of the parties, and neither capricious nor unnecessary, the railway company must pay the costs, It was In this case certain lands, forming part of the property of the late Samuel Brandon had been taken by the South-Eastern Railway Company, and the purchase-money, amounting to 7,000l., had been paid into court under the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act. A portion of this sum, amounting to 6,2007., had been re-invested in the purchase of land with the sanction of the Court, leaving 8007. still in court. now required to lay out a further sum of 80%. in the purchase of a small piece of land, under these circumstances: a lease of this property had some time since been granted to a person named Neale for twenty-one years, with a proviso, that if the lessee did not renew at the expiration of his term, then that the lessee should be bound to sell to the lessor an adjoining piece of land, upon part of which an inn, called The White Lion, stood. The lease not having been renewed, it was now proposed to purchase the small piece of land mentioned in the last paragraph, and to pay for it out of the balance of the money paid into court. A petition was presented by the parties interested in the estate to obtain the sanction of the Court to the purchase, and asking that the costs might be paid by the railway company. Mr. Baily and Mr. Hardy appeared in support of the petition. Mr. Walford, Mr. Cracknall, and Mr. Elderton appeared for parties in the suit who had been served with this petition. Mr. J. T. Humphry, for the railway company, submitted that the costs ought not to be paid by the company. After 6,2007. had been laid out in a particular purchase, the parties had no right to invest the remainder in driblets and call upon the company to pay the costs. They might otherwise put the company to the expense of a separate set of costs for every 801. of the 8007. left; at any rate, there was no necessity for serving all the parties to the suit as the petitioners had done. They cited Haynes v. Barton (1). KINDERSLEY, V.C.-The principle this Court has adopted for carrying out the intention of the legislature with respect to cases of this kind, is that, inasmuch as railway and other companies of the same character are authorized to take the private property of individuals, whether they desire to part with it or not, they must, as a compensation for this uncommon power, submit to bear all expenses of re-investing the purchase-money in other lands. The person whose property they are taking has a right to say that, but at the same time this Court will not allow the obligation on the part of the company to be made use of, so as capriciously to entail upon them unnecessary expense. In the present case the question is, whether there is any mode of dealing with the matter except the course which has been taken. I think there is not. The property taken by the company, and represented by this money, was part of the subject-matter of the suit of Brandon (1) 30 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Chanc. 804; s. c. 1 Dr. & Sm. 483. v. Brandon and brought into this court in that suit, and in the matter of the Railway Act. If there were no suit the parties could by petition have the purchasemoney re-invested; but still it would be impossible to deal with the money except by coming to the court. It has been ingeniously suggested, why should the trustees have bought this little piece of land with this 801.? Could they not have bought it with other money? But that is founded on the supposition that there is other money, which there is not. It has been said there is no authority to buy this land; but no authority is required: if it had been, I should have given it. There is evidence that it is a desirable purchase; and the only question then is, could they have come here without serving all parties to the suit? Clearly not. The petition has been properly entitled in the act and in the suit; the case, therefore, comes within the principle which I have referred to at the outset, which governs these cases, that expense, not capriciously, but rightly incurred, in order to get the authority of the Court for the application of the money, must be borne by the company. No doubt the expense of more than one investment is somewhat heavy, but the legislature has provided that the company shall bear the expense of more than one purchase when the Court thinks it is for the benefit of the cestuis que trust to have it in more than one. Here it is, in my opinion, for the benefit of the estate, and the company, therefore, must pay the costs. the 7th of August 1860, gave all his real and personal estate to the defendant absolutely, and he appointed the defendant executor of his will. John Bull, the eldest son of the testator, entered a caveat against the probate of the testator's will on the ground that the testator was, at the time of the date and execution thereof, of unsound mind and incapable of making a valid will. In consequence of such caveat the defendant, Thomas Bull, instituted a suit in the Court of Probate to try the validity of the will against John Bull and Mary Anne Bull the daughter of the testator. On the 5th of February 1861, that suit came on for trial, before Sir Cresswell Cresswell, Judge of the Court of Probate; and pending such trial the suit was compromised, and an order was thereupon made by the learned Judge whereby it was ordered, with the consent of the parties, that a verdict should be entered for the plaintiff in that suit (meaning Thomas Bull, the defendant in the present suit) on all the issues; and with the like consent it was ordered that the same plaintiff, Thomas Bull, should pay to Mary Anne Bull an annuity of 257. for her natural life, and that the order should be made a rule of the Court of Probate at the instance of either of the parties if the Court should see fit. Shortly after the said compromise the defendant, Thomas Bull, proved the will of the testator in the Court of Probate. On the 18th of May 1861, a memorandum or minute of the order of the Court of Probate of the 5th of February 1861, was left with the Senior Master of the Court of Common Pleas, at Westminster, who forthwith entered the same in the proper book kept for that purpose, in pursuance of 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, and the amount of the damages by such order ordered to be paid was in the memorandum or minute stated to be 251. per annum. On the 24th of July 1861, the order of the Court of Probate of the 5th of February 1861, was made a rule of that Court; and on the 19th of October 1861, a memorandum or minute of that rule was left with the Senior Master of the Court of Common Pleas, at Westminster, in pursuance of 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110. By an indenture dated the 16th of November 1861, Mary Anne Bull assigned the annuity of 25l., ordered to be paid as before mentioned, to the plaintiff Thomas Pratt. The testator was at the time of his death possessed of and entitled to certain leasehold property, in the county of Middlesex, of which the defendant upon his taking out probate of his father's will became possessed. The bill prayed (among other things) that it might be declared that the annuity of 251. during the life of Mary Ann Bull, was a charge upon all the leasehold property of or to which the defendant Thomas Bull became entitled as before mentioned. The bill was filed on the 12th of September 1862. The defendant demurred for want of equity. By the 25th section of the act constituting the Court of Probate (20 & 21 Vict. c. 77.) it is enacted that "the Court of Probate shall have the like powers, jurisdiction and authority for enforcing all orders, decrees and judgments made or given by the Court under this act, and otherwise in relation to the matters to be inquired into and done by or under the orders of the Court under this act, as are by law vested in the High Court of Chancery for such purposes, in relation to any suit or matter depending in such Court." Mr. Bacon and Mr. Hardy, in support of the demurrer.-The Courts whose judgments when registered were to operate by virtue of 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110. as charges on land were enumerated in that act, and among them the Ecclesiastical Court, which formerly exercised the jurisdiction now exercised by the Court of Probate, was not mentioned. If, then, the registered judgments of the Court of Probate operated as a charge on land, such operation must arise by force of the act constituting that Court. That act, however, afforded no pretence for such an argument; for the 25th section of the act creating the Court of Probate said no more than that that Court should have the same power of enforcing its orders as the Court of Chancery. The act did not give to the orders of the Court of Probate the same effect as the orders of the Court of Chancery. The effect of a registered order of the Court of Chancery was to create a charge on land. But the enforcing of an order of the Court of Chancery meant an entirely different thing. Thus the order in question did not constitute a valid charge on land. They referred to The Thames Ironworks and Shipbuilding Company (Limited) v. the Patent Derrick Company (Limited), 1 Jo. & H. 93; s. c. 29 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Chanc. 714. Mr. Malins and Mr. Bilton, in support of the bill, relied on the section above stated. STUART, V.C.-The object of this bill is to give to an order of the Court of Probate the same effect and to obtain the same benefit under it as can be obtained under a judgment of a Court of superior jurisdiction duly registered according to the provisions of the 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110. If an order of the Court of Probate is to have the force and effect of a registered judgment of a Court of law, or of a registered decree or order of the Court of Chancery, it must have that force and effect either by express words in the act of parliament which constituted the Court of Probate, or by necessary implication from the language of the two acts of parliament construed with reference to each other. It is quite clear that inasmuch as the Court of Probate was not in existence at the time when the 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110. was passed, there cannot be found in that act words to support the case made by the bill. The words of that act are confined to judgments of the superior Courts of common law at Westminster, and orders and decrees of the High Court of Chancery. The act of 20 & 21 Vict. c. 77, which constituted the Court of Probate, might have declared, and probably would have expressly done so if the legislature had intended, that all orders, judgments and decrees of that Court should have the same force and effect as judgments of the superior Courts of common law at Westminster and orders and decrees of the High Court of Chancery. There are, however, no such express words to be found in the 20 & 21 Vict. c. 77, but in the 25th section there are very remarkable words, which say that the Court of Probate |