To this the assignees replied, that the qualifying words in the 3rd section of the act of 1862 reserved the power of disposition to registered mortgagees given by the 43rd and 66th sections of the act of 1854; and therefore that the bankrupts as registered mortgagees, although they had deposited the instruments of mortgage, still had a power of disposition, and might have executed a valid assignment of the mortgages notwithstanding the deposit. But, on referring to the provisions of the act of 1854 as to the disposition or transfer of mortgages, it appears that the statutory form of assignment can only be executed by indorsement on the instrument of mortgage. The words of the form of transfer in Schedule K, referred to in the 73rd section of the act of 1854, seem to be conclusive on this subject, as they include the words "the within written security." So that, without the production of the original instrument of mortgage, no valid assignment or disposition could be made. The deposit of the original mortgages with the plaintiffs seems, therefore, to have taken from the bankrupts the power of making any effectual disposition or transfer of the mortgages, and thus that deposit constitutes the plaintiffs equitable mortgagees, who have a valid security on the ships. So far, therefore, as the bill prays for a declaration that the plaintiffs have a lien on the proceeds of the ships, they are entitled to a deeree to that effect, together with the costs of the suit as to that part of the case. But as to the second question, which involves the consideration of the validity of the bill of sale, the plaintiffs have failed. In the case of Bittlestone v. Cooke it was held, that where a bill of sale of all a trader's goods is in part for a by-gone debt, it is an act of bankruptcy; and the Court referred to the cases of Graham v. Chapman and Smith v. Cannan as authorities on this point. It must, I think, be considered that the law is so settled. The case of Hutton v. Cruttwell was decided on the ground that the bill of sale was executed to secure a present advance of money made on the faith of that security, and not as to any part of it for an old debt, because the gross amount secured by the deed was advanced at the time by the creditor to whom the bill of sale was executed. In the present case the bill of sale is expressly given as a security for the old debt and also for future advances. It seems, therefore, to be within the decided cases. It is an act of bankruptcy in itself, and the bill must be dismissed with costs so far as relates to the bill of sale. An attempt was made, on the part of the plaintiffs, to support the bill of sale, on the ground that the assignees were bound to admit it by a memorandum signed by the Commissioner in the margin of the affidavit of proof of the plaintiffs' debt. But no such point is raised by the allegations in the bill or by the prayer; and if it had been raised, neither the terms of the memorandum nor the evidence seem to establish with sufficient clearness that there was any agreement which bound the assignees to admit the validity of the bill of sale. Therefore, upon the whole, as to the equitable lien claimed by the plaintiffs on the proceeds of the ships, there must be a decree in favour of the plaintiffs, with costs; and the bill, so far as it seeks relief in respect of the bill of sale, must be dismissed, with costs. certain products consist of a method of purifying it from sulphuretted hydrogen and ammonia, by passing it through the following porous material, and of renovating the material employed after it has become inert, &c. I effect this in the following manner: I take the sulphates, the oxychlorides, or the hydrated or precipitated oxides of iron (which I prefer to use in rather a damp state), either by themselves, or mixed with sulphate of lime or muriate of manganese, &c., and absorb them into or mix them with sawdust or peat-charcoal in coarse powder or breeze, or other porous or absorbent material, so as to make a very porous substance easily permeable by the gas. The material is to be put into a fierce fire (such a one as is used for dry lime answers the purpose), and the gas is to be passed through it, whereby the gas will be deprived of its sulphuretted hydrogen and part of its ammonia, which will be absorbed into the porous material, water being at the same time formed by the union of the oxygen of the oxide and the hydrogen of the sulphuretted hydrogen absorbed. As soon as the material ceases to purify the gas from sulphuretted hydrogen, the gas is to be shut off from the purifier, and a communication opened to the external air: by the agency the purifying material will be renovated, &c. The air will re-oxidize the iron of the sulphuret of iron which has been formed, &c. As soon as the iron is re-oxidized, the gas is to be passed through it again," &c.—"Hydrated or precipitated oxides of iron may be conveniently prepared for these purposes by decomposing sulphate or muriate of iron with lime, &c. They may then be absorbed into or mixed with sawdust, peat, charcoal or breeze, or other such material, and afterwards exposed to the air, the purifying of coal-gas from sulphuretted hydrogen, &c., by passing it through the precipitated or hydrated oxides of iron, and from whatever source obtained, either by themselves, or, what is much better, made into a more porous material, by being absorbed into or mixed with sawdust or peat, charcoal or other porous material, &c. But I do not claim per-oxides of iron or manganese made at a red heat, or the oxide of iron mixed with chloride of calcium, or the muriates and sulphates of manganese, iron and zinc, and absorbed into sawdust." The defendants applied to the purifying of gas a natural substance called bog ochre, which the plaintiff affirmed contained precipitated oxide of iron, and that, therefore, this employment by them was an infringement of his patent. The properties of this bog ochre were also from time to time restored by exposure to the air, as shewn in the plaintiff's specification; and of this also the plaintiff complained as an infringement. On a motion by the plaintiff, Wood, V.C., on the 14th of February 1862, ordered that the following question of fact be tried before this Court by a special jury of the county of Middlesex, that is to say, "Is the material used by the defendants, the Liverpool United Gaslight Company, in the first instance for purifying gas a precipitated oxide of iron?" and that an injunction be awarded to restrain the defendants, &c. from making use of the plaintiff's invention, comprised in the letters patent dated the 28th of November 1849, in the bill mentioned, in renovating or re-oxidizing the purifying materials used by them for the purifying of gas, whether the same be a precipitated or hydrated oxide of iron by the action of the air whenever such materials from time to time cease to absorb sulphuretted hydrogen, so that they may be used over and over again to purify the gas, until the further order of this Court. But such injunction is not to come into operation for six weeks from this time. Sir Hugh Cairns and Mr. Druce now moved, by way of appeal, to reverse or vary this order. Mr. Rolt, Mr. Grove and Mr. Marten appeared for the plaintiff, in support of the Vice Chancellor's order. The following cases were cited: Hills v. Evans, 31 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Hills v. the London Gaslight Company, Beard v. Egerton, 8 Com. B. Rep. 165; s. c. 19 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) C.P. 36; and Betts v. Menzies, 30 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Q.B. 81. Nov. 6. The LORD CHANCELLOR.-The first question I have to decide is, whether the application by the defendants to the purification of gas of a certain natural substance called bog ochre be or not an infringe ment of the plaintiff's patent? The plaintiff insists that it is: he affirms that the bog ochre contains a large quantity of precipitated oxide of iron; and that the application of precipitated oxide of iron from any source obtained, be it natural or artificial, pure or combined with other substances, is a violation of his patent. The defendants deny that the material in question does contain precipitated oxide of iron; but if it does, they insist that it is a native or natural, and not an artificial, oxide; and they contend that, according to the true construction of the plaintiff's specification, and the judicial interpretation it has received, the patent is limited to the application of such oxides only as are prepared or obtained by some artificial means. The construction of the plaintiff's specification in this cause must be the same as that which was given to it in the former case of Hills v. Evans, in which the validity of the patent was established. It is material to state how and why it was held to be valid. The patent was impugned on the ground of want of novelty. Specifications of older patents were produced, in which various statements were found as to the applicability of the oxides of iron to the purification of gas; and it was insisted that the plaintiff's discovery was thereby anticipated. But the plaintiff's patent was supported on the ground that these earlier descriptions were too general, comprehending (as they did) materials that would purify and materials that would not purify, whence the reader of such former specifications was still left under the necessity of ascertaining by experiment and further discovery what was the exact description of the purifying agent. This appeared to be done by the plaintiff's specification, and the validity of his patent was therefore established. But the plaintiff's objection to the former specifications was in the former case retorted against himself. In his specification he describes the purifying agents he employs as "the hydrated or precipitated oxides of iron"; and in one place he uses the words "precipitated or hydrated oxides." Now, it appeared from the evidence in Hills v. Evans (which is always admissible to shew what external objects are denoted by terms of art) that of hydrated oxides of iron some are native, that is, formed in the laboratory of nature, and some are artificial, that is, made or resulting from some intervention of human agency. Of the native or naturally-formed oxides of iron some are efficient for the purification of gas, and some will not serve that purpose. Again; of hydrated oxides of iron some are formed by precipitation, and some (so far as we know) are not so formed; but (according to the then state of the evidence) it appeared that all the known precipitated oxides of iron are artificial and are hydrated. It was objected therefore, that inasmuch as the plaintiff used the term "hydrated oxides" without limitation, thereby embracing both native hydrated oxides that would not answer the purpose, and the artificial hydrated oxides that would, the specification was too general, and the patent void. In answer to that objection I held that, having regard to the whole of the specification, the plaintiff had described and meant to include such oxides only (whether hydrated merely, or hydrated and precipitated) as were prepared or obtained by artificial means. Upon a more accurate examination of the judgment of the Court of Exchequer, I find that, in reality, the same conclusion was drawn by the learned Judges of that Court. This is apparent from the following passage (5 Hurl. & N. 368). The reasoning of the Court seems to be thus: Precipitated oxides and artificial hydrated oxides are the same thing. We find that the plaintiff meant to describe such hydrated oxides only as are artificial; therefore he meant such hydrated oxides only as are precipitated. With much of the observations of the Court of Exchequer I cannot concur; but I concur in the conclusion that by the terms hydrated or precipitated oxides, the plaintiff intended to denote such oxides only as were artificially prepared or obtained. But this is not the character of the bog ochre as it is primarily and in the first instance employed by the defendants. The ochre is used by the defendants in the first instance in its primitive natural state as dug from the bog; and even if it be, as the plaintiff affirms, a hydrated oxide of iron formed by precipitation, it is clear that it is a native, that is, a naturally-formed oxide, and, whilst used in that state, must, by the very conditions on which the plaintiff's patent was supported, be held not to be included in the plaintiff's specification. I cannot, therefore, grant any injunction to restrain the defendants from using the bog ochre in its primitive or natural state. The more material question still remains. The principal impurity from which it is desirable to cleanse the gas is sulphuretted hydrogen. The hydrated oxide of iron effects this by attracting the sulphur, which combines with the iron whilst the oxygen of the oxide uniting with the hydrogen, water is formed, and thus the sulphuretted hydrogen disappears by being resolved into its constituent elements, which enter into new combinations. The chemical combination of the sulphur with the oxide of iron forms a new chemical substance, called sulphuret of iron, which is inert and useless for purification. But the plaintiff discovered that when this sulphuret of iron is exposed to the atmosphere in such a manner as to cause the atmospheric air thoroughly to permeate and pervade the mass, the sulphur is driven off and precipitated, the iron is re-oxidized by taking up new oxygen from the air, and thus a new hydrated oxide is by this application of a natural agent artificially obtained. It is material to observe that by this process, directed by human agency, a new purifying material is prepared. It is not as if the air merely freed the iron of an integument of sulphur, which, coating the oxide, obstructed the exercise of its still inherent power; but the facts are, that the sulphur being chemically and not mechanically combined with the oxide, the latter is converted into a sulphuret, and it is by the subsequent acquisition of new oxygen that it is re-converted into a new oxide. This new oxide I hold to be an oxide artificially prepared or obtained, although it is the result of the natural properties of the air, because those properties are guided and directed to this end by human agency and design. Upon all this the evidence in the cause is without contradiction or dispute. The defendants admit that when the bog ochre in its natural state has been so long used as to become inert, it is revivified and restored by the use of the process described in the plaintiff's specification, and in that secondary state again applied to the purification of gas. I hold, therefore, that whilst the defendants employ the bog ochre in its natural state, they use a native oxide of iron, which, whether it be hydrated only, or hydrated and precipitated, is not within the plaintiff's patent, and no injunction can be granted against the use of it; but that when they use the ochre after it has been re-oxidized, they use a material which is within the plaintiff's patent, being an artificial hydrated oxide; and this I restrain them from employing. The Vice Chancellor granted an injunction to restrain the defendants from using the plaintiff's process or invention of reoxidization. I cannot grant any such injunction, because the plaintiff specifies and claims that process or discovery as applicable only to the renovating the purifying materials he describes, that is, the hydrated or precipitated oxides which are within his patent; and if this ochre be not one of such oxides, the revivification of it is not within the plaintiff's specification. In fact, it is only by the defendants using that process, or some other process of renovation, that the bog ochre is brought into the condition of being one of the plaintiff's patented purifying materials, that is, a hydrated or precipitated oxide artificially prepared or obtained. Therefore, declare that the user by the defendants of the bog ochre employed by them in the purification of gas, so long as the same is used in its native state or condition, is not an infringement of the plaintiff's patent, but that the user of the same material in the purification of gas after it has been re-oxidized or renovated by the means described in the plaintiff's patent, or any other means, is an infringement of the plaintiff's patent, and ought to be restrained by injunction, and restrain the same accordingly. Direct an account of all the bog ochre that has been employed or used by the defendants in the purification of gas in any other than its native or primitive state, and of the gains and profits that have resulted from such user or employment, with all usual directions. No costs on either side. By a settlement, a sum of money was to be raised after the death of the settlor and another person for all the children of the settlor's son, other than an eldest or only son, for the time being entitled to certain other property. The eldest grandson died before the period when the amount could be raised or he became entitled to the other property: ·Held (reversing the decision of one of the Vice Chancellors), that his representative was entitled to share in the fund to be raised for the younger children. This was an appeal from the decision of Kindersley, V.C., on the 12th of July 1862, reported 31 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Chanc. 867. By an indenture of settlement, dated the 7th of September 1814, after reciting that Estcourt Cresswell was entitled to certain hereditaments in Devonshire after the decease of Thomas Fry, and that the said E. Cresswell had agreed to secure as a provision for the younger children of Richard Estcourt Cresswell, his eldest son, the sum of 13,000l. upon the said hereditaments, it was witnessed that he, the said E. Cresswell, did demise unto his trustees, their executors, administrators and assigns, all the said hereditaments in the county of Devon (subject to the life estate of T. Fry) for the term of 1,000 years from the death of the said T. Fry, upon trust immediately after the death of E. Cresswell and T. Fry to raise by sale or mortgage the sum of 13,000l., which said sum was to be held "in trust for all and every the child and children of R. E. Cresswell now born or hereafter to be born during his life, or in due time after his decease, other than and besides an eldest or only son for the time being entitled, under or by virtue of a certain indenture of settlement, bearing even date herewith, to the estates thereby settled in possession or in remainder immediately expectant on the decease of the survivor of them, the said E. Cresswell and R. E. Cresswell, as the said R. E. Cresswell should appoint; and in default of such appointment, then if there shall be but one such child of the said R. E. Cresswell (other than and besides an eldest or only son so for the time being entitled as aforesaid), the said sum shall be for the portion of such one or only child, and be an interest vested in such child, being a son, at the age of twenty-one years, or being a daughter on her attaining that age or marriage; and if there should be two or more children of the said R. E. Cresswell (other than and besides an eldest or only son so for the time being entitled as aforesaid), then in trust for such children, and the share or shares of such of them as should be a son or sons to be an interest vested in him or them respectively at his or their age or respective ages of twenty-one; and the share or shares of such of them as should be a daughter or daughters, at her or their age of twenty-one or marriage." And it was provided that if there should be more than one child for whom portions were intended to be provided, and any of these, being a son or sons, should depart this life or become an eldest or only son so for the time being entitled as aforesaid under the age of twenty-one years, or being a daughter should depart this life under that age and unmarried, then his or her share should go over to the others. By the second deed above referred to and executed on the same day, a certain other estate called the Bibury estate was conveyed to the use of E. Cresswell for life, with remainder to the use of R. E. Cresswell for life, with remainder to the use of R. E. Cresswell the younger (the eldest grandson of E. Cresswell) for life, with remainder to the first and other sons of R. E. Cresswell the younger in tail male, with remainder over. E. Cresswell died in July 1823; R. E. Cresswell the younger attained the age of twenty-one and died in 1837, leaving a widow, but without issue male; and the second, third and fourth sons of R. E. Cresswell the elder having previously died without issue, the fifth son, W. H. Cresswell, became the eldest son. R. E. Cresswell the elder then died; and T. Fry died in 1860, when this suit was instituted for the purpose of having a construction put upon the terms of the two deeds of settlement. The Vice Chancellor having decided that the personal representative of R. E. Cresswell the younger was not |