The cases above mentioned had reference, as already stated, to the case of a municipal election, the directions for the guidance of voters in those elections set forth in the Ballot Act, 1872, requiring that the voter shall" place a cross on the right hand side opposite the name of each candidate for whom he votes-thus, X." As regards the taking of the poll at a school board election the provisions of the Ballot Act are modified by the regulations of the Education Department, those regulations providing (1) that "each voter shall be entitled to a number of votes equal to the number of members of the school board to be elected, and may give all such votes to one candidate, or may distribute them among the candidates as he thinks fit"; and (2) that "the voter may place against the name of any candidate for whom he votes the number of votes he gives to such candidate in lieu of a cross and the form of directions for the guidance of the voter in voting contained in the Ballot Act, 1872, shall be altered accordingly." In Phillips and another v. Goff and another, 17 L. R., Q. B. D. 805, 55 L. J., Q. B. 512, 35 W. R., 196, which had reference to a school board election, several questions were raised with regard to ballot papers which were not marked with the number of votes intended to be given to each candidate. The guiding principle adopted in that case was that, if the voter indicated with clearness for what candidates he intended to vote and how many votes he intended to give to each candidate, the statute was satisfied.

Where a single cross was placed opposite the name of each of several candidates, this was held to indicate that the voter intended to give one vote for each candidate opposite whose name the cross was put in other words that each cross meant a vote. Where there were more crosses than one opposite the name of a candidate, it was held that each cross should be counted as a vote for the candidate opposite whose name it was put. If the crosses exceeded the number of members to be elected, the voting paper would of course be invalid. There were also ballot papers marked with crosses and a figure combined. In one instance a single cross had been placed opposite the names of five of the candidates and figures had been placed opposite their names, which figures added up exhausted the whole number of the votes which the voter was entitled to give. It was held that the voter meant the cross to indicate that he intended to vote for the person against whose name it had been put, and that he meant the figures to indicate the number of votes he gave for each candidate. In another instance the figure 2 was placed between two crosses, thus, X 2 X, opposite the name of one candidate, and opposite the names of others were placed crosses, which, with those two, made up the full number of votes that the voter was entitled to give. In that case it was held that the figure must be rejected and the votes counted by the crosses. Where a single stroke had been placed opposite to the names of several candidates, it was held that the voter must be considered to have intended to give one vote for each candidate. Where eleven strokes were placed opposite the name of one candidate-eleven being the number of votes to which the voter was entitled-the voter was regarded as having meant to give his eleven votes to that candidate. Where two strokes were placed opposite the name of each of several candidates, the same view would apply, and each stroke should be counted as one vote. If the number of strokes on any voting paper exceeded the number of candidates the paper was of course bad. Where two strokes were placed opposite the name of one candidate only, the number of members to be elected being eleven, the two strokes were held to signify the number 11, and not two votes only.

There were also cases in which there was a single cross opposite to the name of one candidate only, although there were eleven members to be elected. Cockburn, C. J., said: I should myself arrive at the conclusion that the voter intended to give all his eleven votes to the one candidate opposite whose name he had put the cross. . . . .. The question is not one of law but of fact, which the Commissioner is the proper authority to determine. We must leave it to him to say whether in his opinion the single cross meant one vote or eleven votes, and if he has a real doubt upon the matter he must act upon it, and regard the voting paper as void for uncertainty. It is clear that the voter intended to vote in one way or the other, and I think the Commissioner would be wrong in rejecting the voting paper unless he is left in complete uncertainty as to which way the voter did intend to vote. Denman, J., said: I confess I think that the single cross put opposite the name of a single candidate indicates the intention to give one vote only. I agree that the question is not wholly one of law. It is no doubt better not to turn into a point of law a question like this, which can be better dealt with at the place by the Commissioner, with his experience and knowledge of the habits, and ways, and class of persons who vote at these elections. If he comes to the conclusion that it is reasonably certain that the voter meant to give eleven votes to the candidate, he must act on that conclusion. If he thinks the voter only intended to give one vote, he must count the cross as one vote. If he is quite in the dark how many votes were intended to be given, he must reject the voting paper for uncertainty, even though it was clear that there was an intention to vote in one way or the other.

In Re Wigtown Burghs Election Petition, 1874, 2 O'M. & H. 223, the Lords of the Second Session held to be valid certain votes which were objected to on the ground that the papers were not marked with the materials provided by the returning officers-viz., black-lead pencils-but with ink.

With regard to the stamping of ballot papers it appeared in Ackers v. Howard (L. R., 16 Q. B. D. 739, 55 L. J., Q. B. 273, 54 L. T., 651, 34 W. R., 609) that at a parliamentary election the returning officer had at the counting of the votes accepted as valid votes ballot papers which had not been marked upon the face with the official mark required by the Ballot Act, 1872. The question for the decision of the Court was whether it was essential to the validity of a vote given under the Ballot Act that the ballot paper on which the vote was given should be marked on both sides with an official mark as prescribed by sec. 2 of that Act, or whether it was sufficient, so far as the validity of the vote was concerned, if the ballot paper had the official mark at the back only. The Court stated that the question was not whether the presiding officer or those to whom the conduct of the election was entrusted had in all respects discharged the duty cast upon them, but whether by reason simply of the omission to stamp the ballot papers on the face the voters had lost their votes. The Court held that they had not. They had complied with all the requirements of the statute and the directions prescribed for their guidance, and the Court therefore were not prepared to hold that the votes were lost by reason of an omission not pointed out as material by the statute or the directions. If it were intended by the legislature that such votes should be bad, it would be impossible to suppose that in declaring in the 2nd section what votes should be bad and not counted, it would have confined itself to the absence of the official mark on the back of the ballot paper.

Questions occasionally arise as to the right of candidates at a school board election to appoint agents to attend at the polling stations in like manner as candidates at a parliamentary election. The case of Clementson v. Mason, L. R., 10 C. P. 209; 44 L. J., C. P. 171; 32 L. T., N. S., 325; 23 W. R., 620, with regard to a municipal election, bears upon this point. The Ballot Act expressly provides for the appointment of agents of candidates in parliamentary elections, but by sec. 20, No. 6, enacts that "nothing in this Act shall be deemed to authorise the appointment of any agents of a candidate in a municipal election; but if in the case of a municipal election any agent of a candidate is appointed, and a notice in writing of such appointment is given to the returning officer, the provisions of this Act with respect to agents or candidates shall, so far as respects such agents, apply in the case of that election." This section left it open to some question whether, in a municipal election, there was any actual authority for the appointment of agents of candidates: but in the case above referred to such appointments were recognised; and Mr. Justice Denman observed, with reference to agents appointed to attend at polling stations: "Though the present was the case of a municipal election, I think that the agents appointed by the candidate are personation agents, having precisely the same duties as those appointed in the case of a parliamentary election." The election of a school board, subject to such modifications as are contained in the order of the Education Department, is to be conducted in like manner as a poll at a contested municipal election under the Ballot Act; and the case of Clementson v. Mason leads to the inference that agents may be appointed by candidates in a school board election. In Clementson v. Mason it was also decided that a candidate in an election under the Ballot Act has a right as such candidate to be present in the polling station during the polling, although he does not either himself undertake the duties of an agent or assist his agent in the performance of such duties; and that consequently the presiding officer has no authority to exclude such candidate therefrom, if he does not interfere with the polling or in any other way misconduct himself.

With regard to ballot boxes and other fittings required in a school board election, the Education Department, in their circular letter of 17th June, 1886, with reference to the expenses of returning officers, state as follows:

"With respect to ballot boxes and other fittings, I am to remind you that in boroughs those provided for municipal elections must be used for the school board elections free of charge (sec. 14 Ballot Act). As to parishes, if ballot boxes and fittings have been provided for a school board election in a parish, my Lords think that an arrangement should be made by which the same ballot boxes and fittings should be used in a school board election in any other parish in the same union. The ballot boxes and other fittings of course belong to the school board of the parish which paid for them, but each parish which uses them would no doubt be willing to pay a certain sum for the privilege of using them."

The Parliamentary Elections (Returning Officers) Act (38 & 39 Vict., c. 84) contains a clause to the effect that in parliamentary elections it shall be the duty of the returning officer, so far as practicable, to make use of ballot boxes, fittings, and compartments used for school board elections; and that for the use of ballot boxes, when hired, the sum to be charged by the returning officer shall not exceed 5s. each.

With regard to the inspection of ballot papers after an election, the cases of Ex parte J. Pym Yeatman, R. v. Beardsall, and Stowe v. Jolliffe may be referred to.

In Ex parte J. Pym Yeatman an application was made in July, 1877, for a mandamus calling on the Judge of the County Court for Surrey to make an order for the inspection of the ballot papers in the election of members of the School Board of London for the division of Lambeth. Mr. Yeatman was not returned as elected, and he alleged that he had not been credited with all his votes. In one polling district alone more than 500 of such votes must, as he alleged, have been omitted. The Judge of the County Court had refused to make an order for an inspection of the ballot papers, being of opinion that the statements in the affidavit in support of the application were not strong enough to justify him in making the order. The Lord Chief Justice asked whether there was anything to show that, if Mr. Yeatman had been credited with the votes said to be omitted, it would have entitled him to be returned as a member of the board. It was replied that the affidavit did not go so far as that, as Mr. Yeatman had only seen some of the ballot papers at the counting of the votes, and he could not pledge himself as to the others. The court, under these circumstances, refused the rule.

In Stowe v. Joliffe (L. R., 9 C. P., 446; 43 L. J., C. P. 173; 30 L. T., N.S. 299; 22 W. R., 946), where an election petition had been presented, an affidavit was made by the petitioner's attorney that it was requisite for the purposes of the petition, and to enable him duly to prepare the case of the petitioner, that he should be allowed to inspect the rejected ballot papers, the counted ballot papers, and the counterfoils of the ballot papers, in the custody of the Clerk of the Crown in Chancery; and the Court of Common Pleas were moved to make an order accordingly. The application as regards these documents was subsequently limited, the petitioner asking that the sealed packets containing the rejected ballot papers should be opened, and the backs only shown to the petitioner and his agent, the petitioner, being willing to accede to the condition that care should be taken that the front of the rejected ballot paper should not be seen; and, further, that inspection should be allowed of such of the counterfoils as had upon them a sequence number corresponding with the number on the rejected ballot papers. Brett, J., was in favour of the order being made. "The backs of the rejected ballot papers," he said, "would give the party no information without the corresponding counterfoils; but, by comparing the sequence number on the counterfoil with the number on the register, it would be seen who voted, but not how he voted." Grove, J., held that, assuming that the Court had power to grant inspection of these documents, a strong case should be made out to warrant it ; and, in the present instance, no sufficient ground had been shown. Denman, J., concurred. He said: "It is not enough that inspection is asked for. The Court must be satisfied, by evidence on oath, that it is reasonably and bona fide required for the purpose of a petition questioning the election." In R. v. Beardsall, L. R., 1 Q. B. D. 452; 45 L. J., M. C. 157; 34 L. T., N.S., 660, it appeared that a prosecution having been instituted against a deputy returning officer, who had presided at a booth during a municipal election, for having fraudulently placed seventeen different papers, purporting to be, but to his knowledge not being ballot papers, in the ballot box, a County Court Judge made an order under Rule 64 in the First Schedule of the Act, directing the town clerk of the borough to produce and show, for the purpose of the prosecution, the rejected ballot papers relating to the election for the ward, and certain counterfoils of

ballot papers, counted ballot papers, and spoilt ballot papers, and to open the sealed packet containing those documents, and the marked copy of the register, and to take all such proper means as he should deem necessary, in order that the mode in which the particular voter had voted should not be discovered, and further ordered that no person should be allowed to see the face of the counted ballot papers. At the trial of the indictment, Blackburn, J., allowed the counterfoils and marked register produced under the order to be given in evidence, and the face of the voting papers to be inspected, so as to show how the votes appeared to have been given. A verdict of guilty was entered against the prisoner, but it was admitted that if the counterfoils had not been inspected there would not have been any evidence against him, and that if the ballot papers had not been opened so as to show that all the false votes were on one side the evidence would not have been so strong, and the verdict might have been different. The question for the Court was, whether it was wrong under the circumstances to allow the counterfoils and the marked register to be given in evidence, and to allow the face of the voting papers to be inspected, so as to show how the votes purported to be given. For the prisoner it was contended that the County Court Judge had no power to make such an order as he did in this case, unless a municipal election were in question. The power of the County Court Judge would appear from rule 64 to be but ancillary to that of the election tribunal, and he could only make such an order for the purposes of such a Court. If the order was valid, it had been disregarded, as it expressly declared that no person should be allowed to see the face of any counted ballot papers. The Court held that the order of the County Court being within the terms of the Act was valid, and that the documents taken out of the packets and produced under the order during the trial of an indictment against the prisoner for an offence against the Ballot Act were properly admissible in evidence.

(c.) In a parish which is not situate in the City of London or in a borough, other than the borough of Oxford, the book containing the last rate made for such parish more than one month previously to any date shall be the register of the ratepayers entitled to vote in such parish at that date; and every rate-payer whose name appears in such rate-book shall be entitled to vote unless he is disqualified for voting, and no person shall be entitled to vote whose name does not so appear.

The rate-book being practically the register of voters, collectors and assistant overseers must carefully guard against any unauthorised alterations in that book. In more than one instance the Local Government Board have required the resignation of an assistant overseer, who, it was considered, had made alterations in the rate with the view of giving votes at the school board election.

The Poor Rate Assessment and Collection Act, 1869 (32 & 33 Vict., c. 41), by sec. 17, provides that "a poor rate shall be deemed to be made when it is allowed by the justices, and if the justices sever in their allowance" (or, in other words, when it is not signed on the same day by all the justices by whom it is allowed), "then on the day of the last allowance."