electors and incomplete part of a thousand electors over (b.) One polling agent may be employed in each polling Provided that this section shall not apply to any engagement or employment for carrying into effect a contract bonâ (3) A person legally employed for payment under this 66 This section is made applicable to school board elections by sec. 36. In the case of those elections" school district" or division of the metropolis is to be deemed to be substituted for "borough" or "ward." The section only refers to the employment of persons for payment or promise of payment. There is no prohibition as to the employment of persons who act without payment. With respect to the penalty for illegal employment, see sec. 17. As to exceptions which may be allowed in pursuance of the Act, see sec. 20. In Ex parte Stopes, L.G.C. (1889), 361, an application was made by S. for an order relieving him from the consequences of his having contravened the provisions of this section. S. was an unsuccessful candidate at an election of County Councillors. Twenty-four persons were employed for payment in connection with his candidature, whereas the maximum number that could be legally employed, having regard to the number of electors, was seven. It was stated by S. in his affidavit that he had employed Y. as his agent, without payment or promise of payment, and that it was by the fault of this agent that the statute had been contravened. He had expressly instructed Y. that under no circumstances was he to incur any expense without the authority of H., a solicitor of experience, who acted as honorary secretary. He had on several occasions cautioned Y. against the employment of paid canvassers, &c., and had repeatedly told him that the canvassers employed were not to be paid, and he had told the canvassers the same. Since the election, he had discovered that Y. had during the election incurred expenses and sanctioned payments without the authority of H., and that he had employed and paid ladies to act as guides to voluntary and unpaid lady canvassers contrary to his express instructions, and without the authority of H. Having regard to the fact that the candidate had expressly instructed his agent not to employ persons for payment beyond the legal number, and that he had engaged an experienced solicitor to whom the agent was to refer, and had directed his cashier to pay nothing, unless it was clearly a legal charge, without reference to that solicitor, and having in mind that this was the first election of County Councillors to which the Act applied, the Court came to the conclusion, 1 although with hesitation, that the excuse of the candidate might be allowed and the order applied for granted. In Packard v. Collings and West, 54 L. T., 619; 4 O'M. & H., 70, it was held with reference to a parliamentary election, that the employment by an agent of a candidate of persons to keep order at meetings connected with the election was employment for payment, in contravention of sec. 17 of the Corrupt and Illegal Practices Prevention Act, 1883. In Schneider v. Duncan, 54 L. T., 618; 4 O'M. & H., 76, it appeared that D. and his agents gave gratuitous refreshment to certain persons styled "workers" at a parliamentary election at which D. was a candidate. It was held that this was an illegal employment, and rendered the election of D. void. With regard to sub-clause 3, which provides that a person legally employed for payment may not vote, In re Parliamentary Election for South-Western Division of Essex, L.G.C. (1889), p. 35, may be referred to. In that case application was made under sec. 20 for exemption from the consequences of contravening this provision. The applicant was engaged as a sub-agent at a parliamentary election; he was, previously to his entering on his duties as sub-agent, informed by the election agent that he would not be paid for his services on account of the limited expenditure allowed by the Act; he voluntarily undertook the duties of sub-agent without any payment or reward, or promise of any payment or reward; and he voted in the election. When he voted he was under the impression and belief that he would receive no payment; and neither before, during, nor after the election did he ask for any payment for his services. After the election was over, however, the election agent finding that he had a surplus, paid him a sum of £26 as an honorarium, and £5 5s. for the use of his office as a committee room during the election; but he did not inform the agent that he had voted. The Court refused the application for relief. Mr. Justice Stephen: The applicant if he intended to accept payment for his services ought not to have voted, and when he had voted he ought not to have taken the money. The case is not one in which, if he has committed an offence, he ought to have protection. Name and Address of Printer on Placards. 14. Every bill, placard, or poster having reference to a municipal election shall bear upon the face thereof the name and address of the printer and publisher thereof; and any person printing, publishing, or posting, or causing to be printed, published, or posted, any such bill, placard, or poster as aforesaid, which fails to bear upon the face thereof the name and address of the printer and publisher, shall, if he is a candidate, be guilty of an illegal practice, and if he is not the candidate, shall be liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding one hundred pounds. The election of a member of a school board is a within the meaning of this enactment. 66 municipal election In Bettesworth v. Allingham, L. R., 16 Q. B. D., 44; 44 W. R., 96, an information was laid under this section against the appellant, who was a candidate for election as a member of a local board. It appeared that the respondent received from his own servant at his residence a printed address and letter having reference to the election and purporting to be signed by the appellant, but without the printer's name and address thereon. This document was printed for publication by instructions conveyed to the printer in a letter from the appellant's brother, who resided with him, and the printer had debited the appellant with the cost of the printing, but had not been paid the amount. Upon these facts it was held by the Court that there was no evidence that the appellant printed or caused to be printed the document in question, so as to create an offence by him under the section. It also appeared that placards or posters without the printer's name or address, which had been printed by the instructions of one E., who was advertised in a local newspaper as the chairman of a committee for promoting the election of appellant, and who sent the copy to the printer, were posted about the district at the expense of E. The Court, without deciding whether there was an offence in respect of the posting of these placards or posters, held that as the justices had convicted the appellant for both the alleged offences, the conviction being bad as to one of them was bad altogether. In Re Election of County Councillors for Barstow Division of Essex, 5 T. L. R., 59, the question was raised whether an election circular printed on note paper to be sent by post was a bill, placard, or poster, within the meaning of this section. In this case the circular, which was without the name and address of the printer and publisher, was printed on paper of notepaper size, to be sent by post or hand, and asked for the vote and interest of the electors to whom it was sent. The Court held that the circular was not a bill, poster, or placard within the penal enactment, and that an order of exemption under sec. 20 was not required. In Re Election of County Councillors for East Suffolk and Borough of Eye, L.G.C. (1889), 27, where a circular letter on small paper, which did not contain the name and address of the printer and publisher, had been sent by post, the Court made no order of exemption on the ground that it was not required. The same course was taken in Re Election of County Councillors for Knutsford Division of Cheshire. In Ex parte Clarke and others, 52 L. T., 260, Re Huntingdon Municipal Election, posters were issued in the following terms, without the name and address of the printer and publisher: "Economy, order, efficiency. Vote for Clarke, Godliff, Hawley, and Ridgley, Liberal Candidates." C., one of the candidates, was aware that it was an offence to publish a poster which did not bear upon the face of it the name and address of the printer and publisher, and he read to the printer the section in the Act bearing on this, and distinctly impressed upon him the absolute necessity for strictly observing its provisions. He was assured by the printer that the utmost care would be taken in the matter. He never directly or indirectly concurred in or authorised the printing, publishing, or posting of any placard during the election which had not upon its face the name and address of the printer and publisher, and the act of omission did not arise from any want of good faith on his part. The Court held that sufficient cause had been shown to justify the making of the order of exemption. In Ex parte Clarke and others, 52 L. T., 260, the printer also applied for an order for exemption. It was stated in his affidavit that he had given strict injunctions to his workmen to add his name and address as printer and publisher to the posters issued in connection with the election. This, however, was omitted by them, and in consequence of the pressure of work at the time, the bills were delivered to the bill-poster for posting without having been read or examined by him. Within half-an-hour after the posters had been delivered, the bill-poster came back and called his attention to the omission. He took back the posters and gave peremptory instructions to his workmen to correct the mistake, which had inadvertently been made. In case the bill-poster had posted some of the bills, although he understood from him that he had not done so, he sent round an apprentice with a stamp and ink to impress his name and address on any of the bills that he might find. Only four or five were found, and to these the name and address were added. The Court held that sufficient cause had been shown for making the order applied for. It is to be observed, however, that sec. 20 only provides for orders of exemption in cases of illegal practice, payment, employment, or hiring. If a candidate prints, publishes, or posts any bill, placard, or poster without the name and address of the printer and publisher, or causes it to be printed, published, or posted without such name and address, it is an illegal practice; but the offence, when it is committed by a person other than a candidate, is not so described. In Ex parte Lenanton, 53 J. P., 263, and in Ex parte Pierce, 53 J. P., 263, the Court held that they had no power to grant relief to a printer who had been guilty of an offence under this section, with reference to a bill, placard, or poster. Saving for Creditors. 15. The provisions of this Act prohibiting certain payments and contracts for payments, and the payment of any sum, and the incurring of any expense, in excess of a certain maximum, shall not affect the right of any creditor who, when the contract was made or the expense was incurred, was ignorant of the same being in contravention of this Act. Sec. 5 prescribes the maximum of the expense that may be allowed, but the provisions of that section do not apply to a school board election. Use of Certain Premises for Committee Rooms or Meetings to be Illegal Hiring. 16. (1.) (a.) Any premises, which are licensed for the sale of any intoxicating liquor for consumption on or off the premises, or on which refreshment of any kind (whether food or drink) is ordinarily sold for consumption on the premises, or (b.) Any premises where any intoxicating liquor is supplied to members of a club, society, or association, or any part of any such premises, shall not, for the purpose of promoting or procuring the election of a candidate at a municipal election, be used either as a committee room or for holding a meeting, and if any person hires or uses any such premises or any part thereof in contravention of this section he shall be guilty of illegal hiring, and the person letting or permitting the use of such premises or part thereof, if he knew it was intended to use the same, in contravention of this section, shall also be guilty of illegal hiring. (2.) Provided that nothing in this section shall apply to any part of such premises which is ordinarily let for the purpose of chambers or offices or the holding of public meetings or of arbitrations, if such part has a separate entrance, and no direct communication with any part of the premises on which any intoxicating liquor or refreshment is sold or supplied as aforesaid. The application of this section to the elections of members of school boards is limited by the provision in sec. 36, so that it is not unlawful to hold a meeting for the purpose of promoting or procuring the election of a candidate to any such office on any licensed or other premises not situate in an urban sanitary district, or in the metropolis. It will be observed that subject to this exception, the use, whether with or without payment, of any such premises as those referred to in the section as a committee room, or for holding a meeting for the purpose of promoting or procuring the election of a candidate, is prohibited. With regard to the definition of the term "committee room," see note to sec. 4. As to the penalty for illegal hiring, see sec. 17. With regard to the exceptions which may be allowed when this provision is contravened, see sec. 20. The room The terms of this section are similar to those in the Corrupt and Illegal Practices Act, 1883, with reference to parliamentary elections. In Pascoe v. Puleston, it appeared that a large committee room was hired for the purpose of a parliamentary election, but a portion of the building which contained this room was used for the sale of coffee and other refreshments. occupied as a committee room had a separate and distinct entrance from that to the refreshment room. The only possible communication between the committee room and the coffee room was by an intricate way through a narrow passage leading to the back yard of both premises, where were the necessary offices for the use and convenience of persons using the rooms. The room which had been occupied as a committee room, was a large hall fitted · up and used for committees, lectures, and religious services, and was quite unconnected with the coffee tavern and the business carried on there. While the room was occupied as a committee room by the candidate or his agent, the door to the back yard was kept locked, and was not used by them, nor were any refreshments obtained from the premises for them, or for any of those who resorted to the committee room during that time. Denman, J., observed that under the circumstances stated the room in question must be regarded as separate from the coffee room, and might legitimately be used as a committee room. In Ex parte Montefiore, L.G.C. (1888), 1160, 5 T. L. R., 78, an application was made by M. for an order under sec. 20, relieving him from the consequences of having contravened the provisions of this section in connection with a school board election for one of the divisions of the metropolis. It appeared that M. had held meetings at a working men's club in W., and also in a house at S., at both of which intoxicating liquors were supplied. As to the first, he stated in his affidavit that he was not aware at the time that he engaged the room that liquors were supplied there; but as to the other, he stated that he "had been advised by persons whom he understood were conversant with the law" that if communication between the room and the part of the building in which liquors were sold, or supplied, was blocked up during the meeting by locking of doors, there would be no contravention of the Act, but he had since found reason to fear that it was not so, and that there might have been an offence committed under the Act. As to the room in the working men's club in W., the Court held that as M., when he engaged the room was not aware that the sale of liquors took place on the premises, the case might be considered as one of inadvertence within the enactment in sec. 20, and made an order exempting him from the consequences of the illegal act. As regards the room in S., Lord Coleridge said that the applicant stated that he had been advised by persons he understood to be conversant with the law that he might do the act, and he accordingly did it. It did not appear that he had taken any legal advice, and it might have been that he had merely asked the question of some one who took an interest in his election. He had taken that advice, and had chosen to run the risk, and, that being so, it could not be said that he had acted inadvertently, and therefore as to that no order could be made. In Re James Hart, L.G.C. (1885), 934, a similar application was made in connection with an election of a member of the London School Board, H. |