the ferry. But I do not see, when there is a conviction, and facts are stated to shew an exemption from liability, because the party convicted is exercising the right of ferry, how we can avoid determining the question of the exercise of the right of ferry, and that involves the disputed extent of the limits of the ferry; and for that purpose only, and not as binding in any other inquiry, the Court not only may, but must, go into the inquiry. On the one side it is said, that the appellant is free, because he is exercising the right of ferry; on the other it is said, that he is not free, because he was without the limits of the ferry. Looking to the facts, it seems quite clear that the appellant was without the limits of the ferry. A ferry is a franchise, and there may be fewer or more landing-places. If it had appeared here that this was a ferry from all or any landing-places in the Isle of Dogs, to all or any landingplaces in Greenwich, those would have been the limits. The right is extensive, with the duty of keeping a sufficient number of boats, and maintaining and keeping in repair convenient landing-places. But here it is clear, though there are large words in the grant, it is a defined right of ferry from a given point in the Isle of Dogs to landing-places in Greenwich. It would

be an usurpation on the Crown to have more landing-places in the Isle of Dogs, and the appellant, therefore, was not in exercise of the right of ferry.

WIGHTMAN, J.-I am of opinion that the appellant was properly convicted. He was carrying for hire without a licence, and the only question is, whether he is within the exempting clause, section 99. Taking the case as it stands, he was not in the exercise of the right or privilege to which the owners of the ferry were entitled, as he was half a mile below the ancient landing-place. A ferry is a franchise, in respect of the landing-places, according to the cases cited in the argument, and in the nature of a public way. In the present case, it is stated that there is an ancient landing-place in the Isle of Dogs, called "Potter's Ferry landing-place," and that the rights of ferry have been exercised between the said ancient landing-place and several landing-places at Greenwich, and that only on one or two occasions persons

Master and Servant, 4 Geo. 4. c. 34.Journeyman Tailor employed by the Job-Contract for Service-Conviction.

G. was employed by S, a master tailor, to make clothes as he should be required, each garment to be paid for according to an agreed list of prices. When engaged on a job, he was to work on the premises of S, and for him exclusively, until the job was finished. At the end of each job G. could leave if he chose, and S. was not bound to find him more work-Held, that, as G, during any particular job was to work exclusively for S, the relation of master and servant existed between them, and that he was liable under the statute 4 Geo. 4. c. 34. s. 3. to punishment by summary conviction for having neglected to complete a waistcoat which he had commenced to make for S.

This was an application for a certiorari to bring up a conviction, with the view of quashing it.

The conviction, as recited in the commitment, was made on an information by John Scholefield, of Wardleworth, tailor, against Edward Gordon, "for that, on the 15th of February now instant, at Wardleworth, in the said county, the said Edward Gordon did contract with the said John Scholefield aforesaid, tailor and draper, to serve him in his trade of a tailor in the capacity of a tailor, at certain wages, from thence to an indefinite time determinable by either contracting party on the said

(5) Erle, J. was in the Court for Crown Cases Reserved.

Edward Gordon finishing any piece of work he might from time to time be engaged on; and that the said Edward Gordon having accordingly entered into such service did afterwards, to wit, on the 16th of February now instant, at Wardleworth aforesaid, and before the term of his said contract was completed, wilfully neglect to fulfil his said contract, to wit, did unlawfully, and without any lawful cause or excuse, neglect to go on with the making of a waistcoat which he had then in hand, against the form of the statute in such case made and provided."

On the hearing of the complaint, at Rochdale, it was proved, on the part of the complainant that he was a tailor at Rochdale; that he employed many men, who worked for him on his premises; that the defendant came into his employ as one of these journeymen, about six weeks or two months before the complaint; that he was employed by Scholefield to make sometimes trousers and sometimes waistcoats, as he was required; that he was paid wages at a certain price per garment, according to a list of prices agreed upon between the master and the men. The work performed was done in the complainant's shop. It was shewn further that Gordon could refuse work if he liked, if work was offered which he had not agreed to do; and also that if Scholefield had no work for Gordon to do when he applied, he did not give him any. Scholefield further added, that his men did not work for other persons, and that if he found them working for others he should discharge them immediately. On the Thursday before his apprehension. he had work on hand, a waistcoat, at which he had been working at the shop on that day. He did not finish the waistcoat, and refused to do so, and said he was going to Sheffield. The Justice convicted Gordon, and directed him to be imprisoned for fourteen days for the offence in the house of correction at Salford.

Huddleston, in support of the application. A journeyman tailor is not within. the statute 4 Geo. 4. c. 34. s. 3. The cases shew that a contract like the present is not one which gives the Justices jurisdiction to convict summarily-Kitchen v.

Shaw (1), Lancaster v. Greaves (2), Hardy v. Ryle (3), Ex parte Johnson (4), Johnson v. Reid (5), Ex parte Ormerod (6), Bunbury v. Fuller (7).

Milward shewed cause in the first instance. -The Justice had jurisdiction. The complaint, was that Gordon had contracted to serve Scholefield, and had wilfully neglected to fulfil his contract. Though a tailor is not mentioned in the act, yet the present contract between a journeyman tailor and his employer is within the words and spirit of the statute. He referred to Lowther v. Earl Radnor (8) and Blake v. Lanyon (9).

WIGHTMAN, J.-Upon consideration of the whole of the evidence in this case, as well as of so much of the contract as is set out on the face of the information, I am of opinion that this rule should be discharged. The question is, whether, during the time that Gordon was employed to do a particular piece of work he was a servant to Scholefield within the meaning of the Master and Servants' Act. The contract between Gordon and Scholefield, I take it, amounted to this :-Gordon was not to serve for any specific time nor for any specific job originally agreed upon, but he was to serve to do such work as he should be set to do, and undertake to do, and he was to do it on the premises of his employer. The contract did not extend beyond the particular job he was engaged upon at any particular time, but during that job, and until it was finished, he was to work exclusively for his employer. I was struck at first with the strong analogy that appeared between this case and the cases of Lancaster v. Greaves, Hardy v. Ryle and Ex parte Johnson; but in all those

(1) 6 Ad. & E. 729; s. c. 7 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) M.C. 14.

(2) 9 B. & C. 628; s. c. 7 Law J. Rep. M.C. 116. (3) Ibid. 603; s. c. 7 Law J. Rep. M.C. 118. (4) 7 Dowl. P.C. 702; s. c. 9 Law J. Rep. (N.S.)

M.C. 27.

(5) 6 Mee. & W.124; s. c. 9 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) M.C. 25.

(6) 1 Dowl. & L. P.C. 825; s. c. 13 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) M.C. 73.

(7) 9 Exch. Rep. 111; s. c. 23 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Exch. 29.

(8) 8 East, 113.

(9) 6 Term Rep. 221.

cases, the decision that the party was not a servant turned mainly upon the circumstances that during the continuance of the particular employment the party was at liberty to work for other persons. But here, Gordon was to work on the premises of his employer, and for him only, until the work was done. The case of Lowther v. Earl Radnor, which was cited in support of the motion, has been well considered in other cases. Lord Tenterden, C.J., in Lancaster v. Greaves, observes, that the facts stated in the information in that case shewed that the relation of master and servant existed. Gordon, therefore, is, I think, brought within the words of the statute as an "artificer or handicraftsman," "or other person," who had contracted to serve "for any time or times whatsoever or in any other manner." These last words, "in any other manner,' to me very important. I think, therefore, that there was evidence here of such a relation between the parties as would give the Magistrates jurisdiction.

seem

Rule discharged.

Bankrupt, Indictment against-Evidence of filing Petition to Insolvent Court-Effect of Adjudication.

On an indictment against a bankrupt for fraudulently obtaining goods on credit, under section 253. of the 12 & 13 Vict. c. 106, it is necessary for the prosecution to prove the act of bankruptcy and other ingredients of the bankruptcy. Proof of the adjudication alone is insufficient.

Where the act of bankruptcy relied on was the bankrupt filing a petition in the Insolvent Court, a copy of the petition certified to be correct by the proper officer of the court, and made evidence of the petition under section 239, was held to be no evidence of the date of the filing of the petition, although there was on the back of the copy of the peti

* Coram Jervis, C.J., Parke, B., Wightman, J., Crompton, J. and Willes, J.

tion an indorsement purporting to state when the petition was filed.

Crompton, J. stated the following CASE. The prisoner was convicted before me, at the September Old Bailey Sessions, 1855, on an indictment containing counts framed on section 253. of the Bankrupt Act, 12 & 13 Vict. c. 106. One set of counts was framed upon the first branch of the section 253, which makes it a misdemeanour if any bankrupt shall within the three months next preceding the filing of the petition for adjudication in bankruptcy, under the false colour and pretence of carrying on business and dealing in the ordinary course of trade, obtain on credit goods with intent to defraud the owners thereof. Another set of counts was framed on the second branch of the same section, rendering it a misdemeanour if any bankrupt shall within such time, and with such intent, remove or conceal any goods so obtained.

In the course of the trial several objections arose, which I reserved for the opinion of the Judges. The filing the petition for adjudication in bankruptcy and the adjudication of bankruptcy were, on the 3rd of March 1855. The first objection was as to the sufficiency of the proof of the act of bankruptcy, and of the time when it was committed. The act of bank

ruptcy relied upon was the filing a petition in the Insolvent Court. The proof offered was a copy of a petition to the Insolvent Court, purporting to be signed by the officer in whose custody the petition was (12 & 13 Vict. c. 106. s. 239). The only proof offered as to the time of filing this petition was the indorsement on the back of the paper, amongst other things, of the time of the filing of the petition. The only signature of the officer was in the inner fold of the paper, which contained as follows:-" In the Court for Relief of Insolvent Debtors. I hereby certify the within to be a true copy of the petition of Thomas Lands. Richard Wyte, deputy to Henry Simpson, chief clerk of the said court, in whose custody such petition now is."

[The other objections stated in the case it is unnecessary to mention, as no judgment was pronounced upon them.]

The case stated that the Gazette containing the advertisement of the adjudication was not put in evidence.

Ballantine, for the prisoner.-There was no proof that the prisoner filed his petition in the Insolvent Court within the period required by the statute to support the adjudication. There is no evidence when the petition was filed. It might have been after the adjudication. The indorsement on the back of the petition, supposed to state the date of the filing, is no evidence, The copy of the petition certified by the officer is, no doubt, made proof of the petition by stat. 12 & 13 Vict. c. 106. s. 239. But the certificate of the officer does not profess to certify to the correctness of the indorsement; nor, if it had, could the statute have made it admissible. The in

It

dorsement is no part of the petition. was necessary to prove the act of bankruptcy and other elements of the bankruptcy. The indictment alleges them, and the practice is always to require them to be proved. It is not sufficient to rely on the adjudication alone. The King v. Jones (1) shews that it is not enough to prove that the prisoner has been adjudged bankrupt.

[PARKE, B.-Section 233. makes the advertisement in the Gazette conclusive evidence of the bankruptcy; but here the question of the conclusiveness of the adjudication does not arise, for the Gazette was not put in evidence.]

That provision does not apply to criminal cases.

[He then argued the other points.]

Francis, for the prosecution.-There was some evidence of the date. Looking at the petition and certificate, there was some evidence that the act of bankruptcy had been committed before the adjudication, which was all it was necessary to prove. By the Insolvent Act, the petition is to be subscribed forthwith. The adjudication is

more than two months after the date of the petition.

[PARKE, B.-The petition need not necessarily be filed for more than two months after it is subscribed.]

[WIGHTMAN, J.-The adjudication may have proceeded on some other act of bankruptcy.]

(1) 4 B. & Ad. 345; s. c. 2 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) M.C. 7.

Jones v. Nicholls (2) shews that the certificate makes the indorsement of the date of filing evidence.

[JERVIS, C.J.-There the order was part of the instrument, to which it was annexed.]

[WIGHTMAN, J.-The certificate does not purport to certify as to the indorsement.]

It was not necessary to prove the act of bankruptcy, or the trading, or the petitioning creditor's debt. Evidence of the adjudication was sufficient; or, at least, of the petition for adjudication and the adjudication. The case of The King v. Jones was decided on the old Bankrupt Act. The present act does not require the same proof. The Court will presume omnia rite acta in favour of the decision of the Court of Bankruptcy. The Queen v. Hilton (3) shews that proof of the adjudication is

sufficient.

[PARKE, B.-Section 253. does not say, "if any person" shall fraudulently obtain goods on credit, but "if any bankrupt."]

The word bankrupt there means any person adjudged a bankrupt-Cannan v. the South-Eastern Railway Company (4) and Norton v. Walker (5).

JERVIS, C.J.-It seems to me that the objection presented to us by Mr. Ballantine must prevail. By section 239. of the statute, the certified copy of the petition is admissible in evidence; but there is nothing to shew the date when it was filed. The indorsement on the back is no part of the petition, and it is not made evidence by the act of parliament. There is, therefore, no evidence when the act of bankruptcy took place. According to The King v. Jones, I think it was necessary for the prosecutors to prove all the ingredients of the bankruptcy. They have not done so. The conviction, therefore, must be quashed. The other Judges concurred.

(2) 3 Mo. & P. 12. (3) 2 Cox, 318.

Conviction quashed.

(4) 7 Exch. Rep. 843; s. c. 21 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Exch. 257.

(5) 3 Exch. Rep. 480; s. c. 18 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Exch. 234.

Evidence-Practice-Conviction on uncorroborated Testimony of Accomplice.

It is not a rule of law, but of practice only, that a jury should not convict on the unsupported testimony of an accomplice. Therefore, if a jury choose to act on such evidence only, the conviction cannot be quashed as bad in law. The better practice is for the Judge to advise the jury to acquit, unless the testimony of the accomplice be corroborated, not only as to the circumstances of the offence, but also as to the participation of the accused in the transaction; and when several parties are charged, that it is not sufficient that the accomplice should be confirmed as to one or more of the prisoners to justify a conviction of those prisoners with respect to whom there is no confirmation.

A CASE was stated by the Quarter Sessions of the county of Durham, to the following effect.

At the last July Sessions of the Peace for the above county, Stubbs and three other persons were indicted for stealing some copper. Three accomplices swore that Stubbs assisted at taking some of the copper and selling it to a marine storedealer. The latter being called stated, that the three other prisoners were the parties who brought the copper and sold it to him. No other evidence was adduced against Stubbs, but the accomplices were corroborated in other particulars with regard to the three other prisoners. The chairman directed the jury that it was not necessary that the accomplices should be confirmed as to each individual prisoner being connected with the crime charged; that their being corroborated as to material facts, tending to shew that two of the other prisoners were connected with the larceny, was sufficient as to the whole case, but that the jury should look with more suspicion at the evidence in Stubbs's case, where there was no corroboration, than to the cases of the others, where there was corroboration,

* Coram Jervis, C.J., Parke, B., Wightman, J., Cresswell, J. and Willes, J.

but that it was a question for the jury. The jury found all the prisoners guilty.

The question for the opinion of the Court was, whether the direction of the chairman was right.

No counsel appeared for the prisoner. Gray, for the Crown, was not called upon.

JERVIS, C.J.-We cannot interfere, though we may regret the result that has been arrived at, for it is contrary to the ordinary practice. It is not a rule of law that accomplices must be confirmed in order to render a conviction valid, and it is the duty of the Judge to tell the jury that they may act on the unconfirmed testimony of an accomplice; but it is usual in practice. for the Judge to advise the jury not to convict on such testimony alone; and juries generally attend to the Judge's direction, and require confirmation. But it is only a rule of practice. There is another point to be noticed. When an accomplice speaks as to the guilt of three prisoners, and his testimony is confirmed as to two of them only, it is proper, I think, for the Judge to advise the jury that it is not safe to act on his testimony as to the third prisoner in respect of whom he is not confirmed; for the accomplice may speak truly as to all the facts of the case, and at the same time in his evidence substitute the third prisoner for himself in his narrative of the transaction. In this case the jury have acted on the evidence, and we cannot interfere.

PARKE, B.-During all the time that I have been on the bench, I have usually laid down the rule as it has been stated by the Chief Justice Jervis, I have told the jury that they may find a prisoner guilty upon the unsupported testimony of an accomplice, but the Judges have been in the habit of advising them not to act on such testimony unless corroborated. There has been a difference of opinion among the Judges respecting the corroboration requisite. My practice always has been to tell the jury not to convict the prisoner unless the evidence of the accomplice be confirmed, not only as to the circumstances of the crime, but also as to the person of the prisoner.

WIGHTMAN, J.-It has not been the universal practice to require confirmation as to all the prisoners. In some of the