which amount was thereupon inserted in the order of Sessions. At the Quarter Sessions for the said isle, held on the 3rd of January 1855, an order was made estreating the recognizances entered into by Jeffrey Ely and his sureties, pursuant to the 9 Geo. 4. c. 61. s. 27, and which were described in the order of estreat as being conditioned for his " appearance at the last General Quarter Sessions, then and there to try an appeal against an order of, &c. refusing an application for a licence to sell exciseable liquors, &c., and then and there to abide the judgment of the said Court and pay such costs as might be awarded by the said Court,"-" the said J. Ely having refused to pay to the said Justices the sum of 221. 16s., being the sum adjudged and ordered by the said Court to be paid by him for the costs of the said appeal" (1). Previous to this order being made, it was proved to the satisfaction of the Quarter Sessions by affidavit, that a demand had, on the 2nd of January 1855, been made upon the said J. Ely for payment of these costs, and that he had refused to pay them. No demand of the costs or estreat of the recognizances was made at the October Sessions, or the adjournment of them on the 14th of November.

Couch now shewed cause. The first objection raised in this case is, that the order of the Michaelmas Sessions is bad, because it directs the costs to be paid to the respondents instead of to the clerk of the peace, as required by the 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43. s. 27. But that only applies to appeals against a conviction, or order, which this is not. The 12 & 13 Vict. c. 45. s. 5. gives a cumulative power to frame an order in this form-The Queen v. Huntley (2). Then it is objected, that the January Sessions had no jurisdiction to order the estreat of the recognizances. But the 3 Geo. 4. c. 46. s. 1. requires the clerk of the peace to insert in a roll all forfeited recognizances certified to him by Justices out of Sessions, together with those forfeited at the Quarter Sessions,

(1) The recognizances were not brought before this Court; but was assumed that they were in the terms of the statute, and as set out in the order

to estreat.

(2) 3 El. & B. 172; s. c. 23 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) M.C. 106.

and to send a copy of such roll to the sheriff. Since that statute the Court of Exchequer has no power to deal with such estreats-The King v. Thompson (3). These recognizances could not have been forfeited at the adjourned Sessions, because the appellant was entitled to the whole of the sessions to comply with the order.(He was then stopped.)

Keane was then called upon to support the rule. The January Sessions had no power to estreat the recognizances upon an affidavit of a default occurring before those sessions commenced. The King v. Cossins (4) decides that estreats ought not to be made upon proof of misbehaviour committed out of court, but that it ought to appear by some act of Court that the condition of the recognizance is broken. The proper course to have been pursued was as suggested in The Queen v. the Justices of the West Riding of Yorkshire (5), to remove the recognizances into a superior court, and proceed by sci. fa.

[LORD CAMPBELL, C.J.-That was a recognizance for good behaviour. There is no authority for a sci. fa. upon a recognizance to pay costs.]

The 3 Geo. 4. c. 46. requires the clerk of the peace to send the roll of recognizances forfeited at the sessions to the sheriff within such time, not exceeding twenty-one days after the adjournment of such sessions, as the Sessions should fix. The 4 Geo. 4. c. 37. amended the previous act by authorizing the following or any subsequent sessions, held after the return of the roll and writ issued by a preceding Sessions, at the opening of the court, to insert in the following roll all forfeited recognizances, &c. which have not been paid &c. But this gives no power to a subsequent sessions to declare a recognizance forfeited because of a previous default.

[COLERIDGE, J.-When do you say the recognizance became forfeited?]

At the adjourned sessions in November; and it might have then been estreated. As to the other point, The Queen v. Huntley is, no doubt, a decision in favour of this order for costs.

(3) 3 Tyrw. 53.

(4) Parker, 54.

(5) 7 Ad. & E. 583; s. c. 7 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) M.C. 9.

LORD CAMPBELL, C.J.-This case has been very ingeniously argued by Mr. Keane, but there is no ground shewn for saying that this is a bad order. The case cited from Parker's Reports and The Queen v. the Justices of the West Riding of Yorkshire do not apply, because those were recognizances to be of good behaviour, which is widely different from the present, which are to abide the order of the Court of Quarter Sessions, and to pay such costs as it may impose, and which, upon application made in due time, the Sessions might estreat, and so there could be no necessity for a sci. fa. It, therefore, comes to the question, whether the order to estreat, made at the January Sessions was in proper time. Looking to the 3 Geo. 4. c. 46, the intention of the legislature seems to have been to give jurisdiction to the Quarter Sessions to estreat forfeited recognizances; and I think that in this case the application to estreat could not have been made to the former Sessions. It could not have been made to the original Sessions in October, because the amount of the costs was not then filled up. Neither could it have been made to the adjourned Sessions in November, because it was not then shewn that the recognizances had been forfeited. The first moment at which the order could be made was in the January Sessions, which, for some purposes, was a continuance of the former Court. The application was then made, and it was shewn by affidavit, to the satisfaction of the Court, that the recognizances had been forfeited, and the order was made.

COLERIDGE, J.-I am of the same opinion. I think, in order to give a reasonable construction to the 3 Geo. 4. c. 46, we must consider this case as falling within it. That statute contemplates two cases: one, where the recognizances are forfeited before Justices out of Sessions, who are to give information of them to the clerk of the peace; the other, where the forfeiture takes place at the Quarter Sessions, of which the clerk of the peace takes notice himself. He is to insert both of these in a roll.

Now, in neither of these cases has the party any opportunity of coming and staying the hands of the clerk of the peace; but the roll is sent to the sheriff for the purpose of levying, and if anything has

been done improvidently the party must seek his remedy in the Court of Exchequer. It seems to me that these recognizances were properly estreated at the January Sessions. If they were not so, it would be a case not provided for by the statute. We are not told how long it was before the adjourned Sessions in November broke up that this order for costs became effective by having the blanks filled up. In many cases it would be impossible to enforce such recognizances as these at the same sessions. There must be some interval allowed for compliance with the order of the Court. But if the party fails to comply with it in a reasonable time, I see no objection to the subsequent Sessions declaring the recognizances forfeited.

ERLE, J.-I think it is clear that these recognizances were properly forfeited at the January Sessions. The statute intended to provide a speedy mode of enforcing forfeited recognizances. The order which was here to be obeyed related to the payment of the costs of an appeal dismissed at a former sessions. Was this order disobeyed, so as to enable the former Sessions to declare the recognizances forfeited? I am of opinion that it was not. It was not a complete order at the October Sessions, and after it was filled up it would require to be served. As the costs were to be paid "forthwith," this would allow a reasonable time for the payment, and there are cases where a week, and even longer, has not been considered too long a time to satisfy that term (6). At the January Sessions it is brought to the notice of the Court that there has been a default in payment of the costs, and it is quite in accordance with the practice that this should be done ex parte. The cases referred to by Mr. Keane apply to recognizances for good behaviour, which stand on a totally different footing, and have no bearing upon the present case.

Rule discharged, with costs.

(6) Ex parte Lowe, 3 Dowl. & L. P.C. 737 ; s. c. 15 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) M.C. 99. The Queen v. the Justices of Gloucestershire, 16 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) M.C. 57.

Order of Removal Chargeability Casual Poor-Permanent Disability-Status of Irremovability.

A pauper having acquired the status of irremovability from the parish of B, by reason of five years' residence, met with an accident in parish C, in September 1847, when passing through C. on his way to B, which rendered his removal to the union workhouse necessary. The cost of his maintenance was charged to B. until December 1849, and afterwards and until the 22nd of September 1854, to the common fund of the union, and between that date and the 27th of October 1854, to C, on which latter day an order for his removal to W, the place of his settlement, was obtained by C. Since the accident, the pauper had at different times been employed in picking oakum in the workhouse, and at the date of the order of removal he was permanently disabled from rheumatism aggravated by the accident:Held, that at the date of the order the pauper was to be considered as inhabiting in C, and not merely as casual poor, and was therefore removable to W, the place of his settlement, notwithstanding the status of irremovability acquired in B.

Upon an appeal against an order for the removal of John Woolvin from the parish of Cuckfield, in the county of Sussex, to the parish of West Grinstead, in the same county, the order was quashed, subject to the opinion of this Court upon the following

CASE.

The pauper's place of legal settlement was admitted to be in the appellant parish. The appellant parish forms part of the Horsham Union. The respondent parish forms part of the Cuckfield Union. The pauper resided in the parish of Bolney (also part of the Cuckfield Union) from the year 1823 till about Michaelmas 1845 without receiving any relief during several months of 1844, during which, whilst residing in the said parish of Bolney, he received relief from the appellant parish. About Michaelmas 1845, the pauper be

ing still resident in Bolney, and being unable to work on account of illness, and consequently, requiring relief, applied by the direction of the relieving officer of the appellant parish to the overseers of Bolney to be taken to the Horsham Union workhouse, and the pauper, with one of his sons (then under the age of sixteen), was accordingly taken to that workhouse, where they were both received and maintained at the expense of the appellant parish for five. weeks, at the expiration of which time, namely, in November 1854, they again returned to Bolney, where part of the pauper's family had remained during the whole time of the pauper's absence. About February 1846, the pauper being again disabled, and requiring relief, of his own accord, went and applied personally to the board of guardians of the Horsham Union for re-admission, with his said son, to the Horsham Union workhouse; this application was granted, and he remained with his son in the said workhouse for seven weeks, when they again returned to Bolney. The pauper, up to this time, had never given up his lodgings in Bolney, but shortly after his last return from the Horsham Union workhouse he did so, and he and his family 'then went to reside with a married daughter in the said parish of Bolney. About Lady-day 1847, the pauper, being again unable to work on account of illness, applied for and obtained out-door relief from the relieving officer of Bolney, and continued to be so relieved until the 19th of May 1847, when he was admitted into the Cuckfield Union workhouse, situate in the parish of Cuck field, and the expense of his maintenance was charged to the parish of Bolney, and paid by the parish. Shortly after his admission into the Cuckfield Union workhouse the pauper was attended by the union medical officer for leprosy and chronic rheumatism, and continued to be so attended until the 21st of July 1847, when, at his own request, he was admitted into the Sussex County Hospital, at Brighton. On the 23rd of September 1847, the pauper being cured of the complaint for which he was admitted, left the hospital at his own request, with the intention of going back to the house of his said daughter in the said parish of Bolney, but on his road there he

went to the Cuckfield Union workhouse for the purpose of seeing his daughter Selina, who was thirteen years of age, and who, while he was an inmate of the hospital, had been admitted into the Cuckfield Union workhouse, and had been there maintained at the expense of the said parish of Bolney. After visiting his said daughter at the said workhouse the pauper left on the same day to go to Bolney, but when he had walked about half a mile from the workhouse, while he was still in the parish of Cuckfield, he fell and received an injury to his hip, which rendered him helpless; he was thereupon taken into the Cuckfield Union workhouse and remained there until the date of the order of removal; the cost of his relief and maintenance was charged to and paid by the said parish of Bolney from the time of the accident until the month of December 1849, when it was transferred to the common fund of the Cuckfield Union, to which it remained charged until the 22nd of September 1854, when the board of guardians, in accordance with a resolution, ordered the cost of the pauper's relief to be transferred and charged to the parish of Cuckfield, to which parish such relief continued to be charged from the date of such transfer until the 27th of October 1854, when the respondent parish obtained the said order for the pauper's removal to the appellant parish. The accounts of the parish of Cuckfield had not been audited since the relief had been so charged to the parish. Since the date of the accident the pauper had been at different times employed in the workhouse at picking oakum, but at the date of the order he was permanently disabled, from the effects of chronic rheumatism, aggravated by the accident. It was contended, on behalf of the appellants, upon grounds of appeal which sufficiently raised the question, that the said Justices had no jurisdiction to make the award, inasmuch as the said pauper had never come to inhabit, and was not at the date of the said order inhabiting in the said parish of Cuckfield within the meaning of the laws relating to the removal of the poor, and that if the expense of the maintenance of the said pauper was at the date of the said order

properly chargeable to the said parish of Cuckfield (which the appellants contend it was not), it was not such relief as would justify the removal of the pauper. The appellants further contended, that the expense of the maintenance of the said pauper was not at the date of the said order properly chargeable to the said parish of Cuckfield, and was wrongfully transferred to that parish, and ought to have been charged either to the said parish of Bolney or the common fund of the said union, inasmuch as the said pauper had resided in the said parish of Bolney for five years next before the application for the said order of removal within the true meaning and construction of the 9 & 10 Vict. c. 66. It was also contended, that the pauper was actually as well as constructively resident in the said parish of Cuckfield, and was de facto (and, it was urged, de jure also) chargeable thereto and legally removable therefrom, that he had not in contemplation of law resided in Bolney for five years next before the application for the said order, nor was he so residing at the date thereof, nor did the question of removability from that parish arise.

If the Court should be of opinion that under the circumstances appearing in the case the pauper had resided five years in the said parish of Bolney within the meaning of the 9 & 10 Vict. c. 66, and the expenses of his maintenance were therefore improperly transferred and charged to the respondent parish, or if properly so transferred and charged, the said pauper was not by reason of such chargeability removable from the respondent parish to the appellant parish, then the order of Sessions (quashing the order of removal) was to be confirmed. But if the Court should be of a contrary opinion upon both these points, then the order of Sessions was to be quashed, and the order of removal confirmed.

Creasy and Hurst, in support of the order of Sessions.-The case shews that the pauper had acquired in 1845 a perfect status of irremovability from Bolney, which nothing that took place afterwards can affect. The whole of the time during which he was absent from the parish of Bolney he was receiving relief, and that period is for all purposes to be excluded

from the computation of the five years under 9 & 10 Vict. c. 66.-The Queen v. the Overseers of Hartfield (1). They referred to 11 & 12 Vict. c. 116. But supposing a perfect status of irremovability not to be made out, the pauper never came to inhabit in the respondent parish, and was not, therefore, chargeable so as to support the order in question for his removal. He was only "casual poor," receiving relief in consequence of an accident when within the parish for a temporary purpose, and therefore not removable within the meaning of the 13 & 14 Car. 2. c. 12.-The King v. St. Laurence, Ludlow (2).

Pashley and J. J. Johnson, contrà.. The circumstances stated in the case as to the pauper's residence in Bolney down to September 1845 do not affect the real question as to the right to remove the pauper to the appellant parish. It is quite clear that upon the happening of the accident the pauper became chargeable to the parish of Cuckfield as casual poor, and that an order for his removal then would have been bad.

[LORD CAMPBELL, C. J.-When do you say an order for his removal could first have been made?]

As soon as the effects of the accident had been got rid of, and at all events when this order of removal was obtained. Suppose it had been necessary to amputate both legs, and the pauper had thereby become permanently disabled, must he not be considered afterwards as a person coming to settle, within the meaning of 13 & 14 Car. 2. c. 12? He ceased to be casual poor so soon as he was capable of being removed after the accident. Permanent disability is sufficient chargeability. Then, it is said that the pauper was constructively resident in Bolney, whilst he was in the union workhouse. But the continued residence of the pauper in the workhouse amounted, under the circumstances, to a breach in the residence in Bolney.

[LORD CAMPBELL, C. J.-The status of irremovability attaches to the pauper whilst in the particular parish. It gives

(1) 21 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) M.C. 65. (2) 4 B. & Ald. 660.

him no right of being removed back to the parish if out of it.]

If the pauper had returned voluntarily to Bolney the case would have been different.

(They were then stopped.)

LORD CAMPBELL, C. J.-The question here is, whether the Justices had jurisdiction to make an order for the removal of the pauper. Now, forgetting for the moment the statute, 9 & 10 Vict. c. 66, as to irremovability by reason of five years' residence in a parish, might not this order have been made, and was not the pauper chargeable to the respondent parish, so as to be removable to the appellant parish, the place of his settlement? When the pauper broke his leg in the respondent parish, and became chargeable in 1847, he could not on that account have been re

moved, because he was then only casual poor. A pauper must come for the purpose of settling in the parish in order to warrant his removal under the statute 13 & 14 Car. 2. I cannot find any evidence in this case of the pauper having come into the respondent parish for the purpose of settling there. But then he remains in the parish for several years, and can it be said that he did not at any time inhabit and settle in Cuckfield? I am of opinion that, under the circumstances of this case, the Justices might well come to the conclusion, that the pauper was in the parish of Cuck field for the purpose of gaining a settlement; and if so, the order for his removal could properly be made, and is therefore good. The irremovability of the pauper from Bolney does not affect the rights of the other parishes. There was, I think, no such disruption in this case as to deprive the pauper of his right to return to Bolney; but he remained in the respondent parish, by reason of the accident, and becoming afterwards permanently disabled and chargeable, so as to be removable, I think, irrespective of the status of irremovability in Bolney, the respondent parish was entitled to remove the pauper to the place of his settlement.

COLERIDGE, J.-I give no opinion on the case generally, as I did not hear the whole of the argument. I shall only say that the