nyms, we range words in which the same idea exists, but positively in one, and negatively in the other; thus, we shun a thing upon which we have absolutely come, by a positive act; we avoid it by not going near it, or in its way. A fault is a positive error; a defect is something wanting in the nature of construction of a man or machine; and the want of which makes an error. Despair is positive, at least in its present meaning, for its etymology would teach us otherwise; hopelessness is negative. He who despairs, once was possessed of hope, now lost; the hopeless man may have been always without it as he is now. Additional examples are found in the following words:-Disability and inability; disbelief and unbelief; freedom and liberty; to permit and to allow; to prevent and to hinder; barbarous and inhuman; excessive and immoderate.

V. The last category in which synonyms may be placed for purposes of reference, is that of miscellaneous, which is evidently an arrangement for the sake of convenience; in this will be included those words of like meaning which baffle all our efforts to classify them under the preceding heads. Thus : brute and beast; consequence and result; contest and conflict; discretion and prudence. Every wild animal is, in common language, a brute; a tame one is a beast. A consequence follows an event, or an action as an antecedent, as necessary to it: a result is an

expected or sought-after production of a combination designed to produce it. Disgrace is the consequence of intemperance; but 20 is the result of 10 + 10. As further examples we may state, a fault and a mistake; an idea and a notion; to abbreviate and to abridge; vengeance and revenge; to conjecture and to guess; hurry and despatch; to copy and to imitate; every and each; alone and only.

It has only been deemed necessary to give here a brief outline of synonymy, in order to proceed intelligently to the consideration of rhetorical precision as belonging to a perspicuous style. The extended study of synonyms opens to us the study of the languages from which our own is derived, and the philology of these languages, and presents a field to cultivate, which demands labour, time, and difficulty; but enough may be learned by the use of any good etymological dictionary, and a strict attention to the usage of those who are the best speakers and writers in modern times, to make us habitually precise in our language, and to insure, thus far at least, perspicuity to our style. A habitual effort to be precise in speech begets such a delicacy of critical observation that we find it difficult and painful to be otherwise than precise.

To return now to the laws of precision as an element of perspicuity in style, we remark, that the first violation of it consists in the misuse of synonymous terms;

this has been clearly indicated in the preceding pages; let us give a few examples;-If we should say the great fault in Cæsar's character was a want of humanity, and his ambition was an equally great defect; we should have misused the words fault and defect. The words teach and learn, are very frequently misapplied, although in more modern times this misapplication is unpardonable. We teach a lesson to a person; we learn a lesson from a person. In the time of Shakspeare, the two words were used interchangeably, as, in the Tempest, Caliban is made to say :

"You taught me language; and my profit on't

Is, I know how to curse; the red plague rid you,
For learning me your language."

But modern usage, finding two distinct fields for these words, has given them, each, its separate service. But these are suggestive only of the many instances of words in the English language, which are used indiscriminately as synonyms, by careless and ignorant writers, and which rob their productions of that precision necessary to their entire perspicuity.

But again, since precision requires that the language used, do no more nor less than convey the exact thought of the writer, it seems evident as an axiom, that all unnecessary words should be rejected; thus-entirely perfect, would imply that there might

be things perfect and still not entirely so: "The cup was as full as it could hold," is a common phrase, in which the latter words are manifestly unnecessary, since if it be full it can hold no more, and the one word full describes its condition entirely.

It is evident that two things are requisite to the attainment of precision in writing :-First, to understand clearly the subject to be presented; to state clearly in the mind every proposition and argument which make up the discourse, before couching it in language; and Second, to understand perfectly the meaning, force, and comprehension of the words which we use in expressing them.

But it has been also said, that precision has to do with the structure of sentences, as well as the use of words. Not only, then, must a sentence be grammatically correct, but it must also convey the exact meaning of the author in this grammatical language. We shall only lay down a few general rules on this subject.

(94.) Of the Structure of Sentences.

Precision demands, that there be no ambiguity in the sentence; and this ambiguity arises, as we have seen from the use of improper words, or, as we now proceed to show, from their being so put together as to confuse or deceive. It is this putting together which we consider in the structure of sentences.

By a sentence is meant, a collection of words containing a finished sense, and ended with a colon or period; and a paragraph is a collection of sentences bearing upon the same immediate topic of the discourse. But sentences are simple or compound; long or short; and these characteristics affect style. Short epigrammatic sentences, each containing an independent proposition, give a cheerfulness and even brilliancy to composition. Long and complex sentences sometimes impart dignity to discourse, but often weary the hearer. Sentences fail of attaining perspicuity in many ways; some of these we shall now explain.

I. By a bad arrangement of the words, perspicuity is lost. The placing of a qualifying clause or member of the sentence, in a wrong place, alters the meaning; or at least, if we understand it, makes a glaring fault thus: "I set out upon the road, which my brother had taken, with four post horses.' This should have been rendered: "I set out, with four post horses, upon the road my brother had taken."

II. The perspicuity of a sentence is destroyed by using the same word more than once in different senses. Thus: "They were persons of such moderate intellects before they were impaired by their passions." The second they refers to intellects; but it might be referred to persons; and thus the sense is doubtful.

III. The misuse of the relative pronouns, who, which, what, whose, gives rise to obscurity. Thus