indistinctly known; in which cases information is given which demands a ready belief, or some position is proved which before was not granted to exist; and thus he convinces the hearer of the truth, and of his former error. In each case the process is that of clear argument. 2d. When he addresses the imagination of his hearers, he presents beautiful or touching pictures of such objects as are fitly introduced into the region of Imagination. Like the painter, he must propose suitable subjects, and treat them in a lively manner, rising to beauty and even sublimity of thought in his attempts to carry the hearer with him into the higher regions of Fancy. 3d. And here he trenches upon that third purpose of discourse which is to touch the passions; for here too the Fancy enables him to draw such scenes and characters as awaken love or grief, aversion or desire, and play upon the heart-strings, the notes and chords of its passions. 4th. By a combination of the three ends just proposed, does the orator strive to secure the fourththe influencing of the will: strong argument alone is often resisted by obstinacy, but when joined with a power over the imagination, and the control of the passions, persuasion is attained and the will over come. This latter attainment is the greatest triumph of the orator, and history is not without abundant records of men who have been gifted thus, not only to inform, to please, to move the heart, but also to sway the will and bring it an humble captive in the train of eloquence and genius. (13.) Conviction and Persuasion. Yet these four ends of discourse, we think, may be, for convenience, stated as ranging under one general topic, which we call instruction; and this, according to the manner in which it is conveyed, may be divided into conviction and persuasion. Instruction may be defined the process of conveying truth to others who are ignorant of it, either entirely or virtually. By conviction is meant the presenting of truth— i. e., the instruction of a person who believes the contrary, or is in doubt between the two. Thus a man is convinced of his error, or is led to believe that what he thought right is wrong, or that what he was doubtful about is truly wrong. The use of the word convicted, which would seem to belong directly to the word conviction, is a legal technicality, showing that although the criminal may not confess his guilt, and stands convicted only before the world, that the world itself is convinced of his guilt. In our use of the word conviction we mean the process and end of convincing. By persuasion we mean the act of influencing the will of another, and leading him to acknowledge or to do something of which his judgment may have been before convinced, but which his will so steadily resisted, that he may be said to have been practically ignorant of the tenet or the deed in question. Thus we have, as the lamentation of a heathen moralist, the apparent paradox Video, proboque meliora, and our own literature is full of similar aphorisms. Butler's couplet He that complies against his will, Is of his own opinion still, contains the same paradox; and the old Scotch adage, "a wilful man maun have his ain way," is only a little more homely and practical: it conveys the same truth. It will be observed that this division of instruction, into conviction and persuasion, contains at once the act of instruction, the manner of it, and the frame and temper of mind to be met and overcome. It is to both these processes then that the func tions of Rhetoric are to be applied. And in them both it may readily be seen, by an inverse process to the one just employed, we must address ourselves to the imagination of the hearer or reader, and use just means of exciting his passions. (14.) Division of Rhetoric. In this view of the subject it has become important to divide Rhetoric into such a number of parts, as correspond to the framing and arrangement of discourse, to produce these ends; and we now proceed to a convenient statement of these constituent parts of Rhetoric as the art of discourse. Following Aristotle in his general arrangement, Cicero has enumerated five parts of Rhetoric, which were meant to include, however, branches of learning now disjoined from Rhetoric. They were Invention, Disposition, Elocution, Memory, and Pronunciation. As we have regarded Rhetoric to be the art of discourse, applied indiscriminately to written or spoken discourse, Elocution, in its first intention, forms no necessary part of the subject; although, in connection with Oratory, we shall devote a chapter to its consideration. But elocution, in its second meaning, as "the application of proper words and sentences to invention," is in reality what our modern writers have called style; and under this head it will be treated. The early writers spoke with their lips; the modern speak through the pen and press. Memory being simply the firm perception by the mind of the things and words, applied to Invention, has come now to take its place in the domain of intellectual philosophy-a science very indeterminate in Cicero's day; and memory is consequently eliminated from his division of Rhetoric; and pronunciation, which then meant more than at present, including indeed the management of voice and gesture in speaking, lies in part within the domain of grammar, and in part in that of oratory. It would include what we now call delivery. Thus, from Cicero's own division, which was the result of a study of the Greek writers and of great experience, and which exhibits also the loose state of scientific classification at that day, we develope the true division of the subject into INVENTION, ARRANGEMENT, STYLE. And here it may be well to warn the student that these words are used with a technical and exact meaning, different from that which they bear in ordinary discourse, and yet not entirely disconnected from that. Let us explain this technicality. The word invention, derived from in and venire, to |