Acts ii. 8-12. Amongst many others, the learned Grotius is full and express for searching out the law of nature in this manner. You shall hear his own words, which he speaks in that excellent work of his, De Jure Belli et Pacis. 'The existence of natural law is usually proved both à priori and à posteriori, the former being the more refined mode of proof, the latter the more suited for popular apprehension. The proof à priori, is by showing that something does or does not accord with our rational and social natures, and this of necessity. That à posteriori is by gathering together and reckoning, not perhaps with absolute certainty, but at least with great probability, as parts of a system of natural law, all points which among all nations-I mean all the more civilized-are considered as such.'1 And he does annex this reason of it, 'A universal effect requires a universal cause."2 When you see such fresh springs and streams of justice watering several kingdoms and nations, you know that they are participations of some rich fountain, of a vast ocean. When you see so many rays of the same light shooting themselves into the several corners of the world, you presently look up to the sun, as the glorious original of them all. Let me, then, a little vary that place in the Acts of the Apostles: You may hear every man in his own language, in his own dialect, and idiom, speaking the same works of nature; Parthians, and Medes, and Elamites, and the dwellers in Mesopotamia, and in Judea, and Cappadocia, in Pontus, in Asia, Phrygia, and Pamphylia, in Egypt, 1 Esse aliquid juris naturalis, probari solet tum ab eo quod prius est, tum ab eo quod posterius; quarum probandi rationum illa subtilior est, hæc popularior. A priori, si ostendatur rei alicujus convenientia aut disconvenientia necessaria cum natura rationali ac sociali. A posteriori vero, si non certissima fide, certe probabiliter admodum juris naturalis esse colligitur id, quod apud gentes omnes aut moraliores omnes tale esse creditur.—Prolegg. 2 Universalis effectus universalem requirit causam. and in the parts of Libya about Cyrene, and strangers of Rome, Jews and proselytes, Cretes and Arabians, you may hear them speak in their own tongues the wonderful works of God and nature. For whatsoever is natural and essential, is also universal in order to such a species. The philosopher1 speaks to this very pertinently: Whatsoever is natural is immoveable, and in the same manner perpetually energetical; as fire does not put on one colour amongst the Grecians, and paint its face otherwise among the Persians; but it has always the same ruddiness and purity, the same zeal and vehemency.'2 As nature shows choice variety and needlework in this, in that she works every individual with several flourishes, with some singular and distinguishing notes, so likewise she plainly aspires to concord and unity, whilst she knits all together in a common and specifical identity. Not only in the faces of men, but in their beings also, there is much of identity, and yet much of variety. You do not doubt but that in all nations there is an exact likeness and agreement in the fabric and composure of men's bodies in respect of integrals, excepting a few monsters and heteroclites in nature; nor can you doubt but that there is the very same frame and constitution of men's spirits in respect of intrinsicals, unless in some prodigious ones, that in the philosopher's language are 'mistakes of nature.'3 As face answers face, so does the heart of one man the heart of another, even the heart of an Athenian the heart of an Indian. Wherefore the votes and suffrages of nature are no con 1 Aristotle. 2 Τὸ μὲν φύσει ἀκίνητον, καὶ πανταχοῦ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει δύναμιν, ὥσπερ τὸ πῦρ καὶ ἐνθάδε καὶ ἐν Πέρσαις καίει. 8 'Αμαρτήματα τῆς φύσεως.—Aristot. Prov. xxvii. 19. temptible things. No report quite dies out, which many nations spread,'1 as the poet sings. This was the mind of that great moralist, Seneca, as appears by that speech of his: 'With us the fact of a thing appearing true to all proves its truth.'2 But the orator is higher and fuller in his expression, 'But in everything the agreement of all nations must be believed to indicate a law of nature.' And that other orator, Quintilian, does not much differ from him in this: We hold those things true, to which common opinion has given sanction.' Or, if the judgment of a philosopher be more potent and prevalent with you, you may hear Aristotle telling you, 'It is best that all men should seem to agree to what shall be said.' You may hear Heraclitus determining, that 'general opinion' is an excellent 'test' of truth; and therefore he was wont to lay down this for a maxim, 'Things generally believed are worthy of credit;' which may be rendered, 'The voice of the people is the voice of God;'9 yet upon this condition, that it be taken with its due restraints and limitations. If you would have a sacred author set his seal to all this, Tertullian has done it, 'That which is found agreed upon by many, is not a mistake, but a truth handed down to them.'10 Surely that must needs be a clear convincing light, that can command respect and adoration from all beholders; it must be an orient pearl indeed, if none will trample upon 1 Φήμη δ ̓ οὔτις πάμπαν ἀπόλλυται, ἥντινα λαοὶ 2 Apud nos veritatis argumentum est aliquid omnibus videri. 3 Omni autem in re, consensio omnium gentium lex naturæ putanda est. 4 Pro certis habemus ea, in quæ communi opinione concessum est. 5 Κράτιστον πάντας ἀνθρώπους φαίνεσθαι συνομολογοῦντας τοῖς ῥηθησο μένοις. * Ο λόγος ξυνός. 8 Τὰ κοινῆ φαινόμενα πιστά. * Κριτήριον. • Vox populi vox Dei. 10 Quod apud multos unum invenitur, non est erratum, sed traditum. it. It must be a conquering and triumphant truth that can stop the mouths of gainsayers, and pass the world without contradiction. Surely that is pure gold that has been examined by so many several touchstones, and has had approbation from them all. Certainly it is some transcendent beauty, that so many nations are enamoured withal. It is some powerful music, that sets the whole world a dancing. It is some pure and delicious relish, that can content and satisfy every palate. It is some accurate piece, that passes so many critics without any animadversions, without any 'various readings.' It is an elegant picture, that neither the eye of an artist, nor yet a popular eye, can find fault withal. Think but upon the several tempers and dispositions of men,-how curious are some! how censorious are others! how envious and malicious are some! how various and mutable are others! how do some love to be singular, others to be contentious! how doubtful and wavering is one, how jealous and suspicious is another! and then tell me whether it must not be some authentical and unquestionable truth, that can at all times have a certificate and commendamus from them all. Then look upon the diversities of nations, and there you will see a rough and barbarous Scythian, a wild American, an unpolished Indian, a superstitious Egyptian, a subtle Ethiopian, a cunning Arabian, a luxurious Persian, a treacherous Carthaginian, a lying Cretian, an elegant Athenian, a wanton Corinthian, a desperate Italian, a fighting German,2 and many other heaps of nations, whose titles I shall now spare, and tell me whether it must not be some admirable and efficacious truth, that shall so overpower them all, as to pass current amongst them, and be owned and acknowledged by them. 1 Variæ lectiones. 2 Note M. I Yet notwithstanding, as we told you before, that the obligation of nature's law did not spring from reason, so much less does it arise from the consent of nations. That law, indeed, which is peculiarly termed 'the law of nations,"1 has its vigour and validity from those mutual and reciprocal compacts which they have made amongst themselves; but the meeting of several nations in the observation of nature's law, has no binding or engaging virtue in it any otherwise than in an exemplary way; but yet it has a confirming and evidencing power, that shows that they were all obliged to this by some supreme authority, which had such an ample influence upon them all. Thus you know the sweetness of honey, both by your own taste, and by the consent of palates too; yet neither the one nor the other does drop any sweetness or lusciousness into the honeycomb. Thus you see the beauty and glory of light, and you may call most men in the world to be eye-witnesses of it, yet those several eyes add no gloss or lustre to it, but only take notice of it. Man being, as the philosopher2 styles him, 'a sociable and peaceable creature ;'3 as that sacred orator1 terms him, a congregating creature that loves to keep company ;'5 he must needs take much delight and complacency in that in which he sees the whole tribe and species of mankind. agreeing with him. Why then do the Jews look upon the 'heathen peoples' with such a disdaining and scornful eye, as if all the nations, in comparison of them, were no more than what Isa. xl. 15 the Prophet says they are in respect of God, 'as the drop 1 Νόμιμον εθνικόν—Jus gentium. 3 Ζῶον πολιτικὸν, καὶ ζῶον ἥμερον.—Hist. Anim. Opera, tom. i. p. 488. Bekker, Berolin. 1831. • Chrysostom. ὁ ̓Αγελαστικὸν καὶ συγγνῶμον ζῶον. 2 Aristotle. lib. i. par. i. 26, 27; גוים 6 |