with. There is nothing even so strong in the regulations under the health section of the Insurance Act, and the fact that an employer chooses to say: "I will not take you unless you produce your insurance card here and now, I will not even give you an opportunity of getting an emergency card if your card is lost, or of getting your card from your late employer if you can, but unless you can produce your card here and now, I will not take you," does not seem to me to be a natural consequence of the employer not returning the card, or one which naturally follows from the breach of the obligation to return, if there were a breach.

I agree, therefore, on that ground that damages cannot be recovered, and therefore this appeal must be allowed.

In the

AVORY, J.-I agree that this appeal should be allowed. The first question which was raised in the case which has not been dealt with either by my Lord or by my brother Pickford, but I believe they agree with me in answering it, was whether there was dispute within the meaning of the Employers' and Workmen Act 1875. circumstances of this case, and it would appear from the decision in Charles v. Mortgagees of Plymouth Works (64 L. T. Rep. 466: 60 L. J. 20, M.C.), that this undoubtedly was a dispute within the meaning of the Act, although the employment had in fact ceased.

On the second question, whether an action will lie for the breach of the statutory duty to return the insurance card, I feel the same difficulty as has already been expressed as to whether such an action will lie, having regard to the decision in Atkinson v. Newcastle and Gateshead Waterworks Company (ubi sup.), and especially_having regard to sects. 69 and 70 of the National Insurance Act. Sect. 69 provides for a penalty in the event of any employer being guilty of any contravention of or non-compliance with any of the requirements of the Act; and sect. 70 especially empowers the employee to bring an action in certain events which do not include the present case of the nonreturn of an insurance card. I think it may very well be contended that where there is an express power given to bring an action for some breaches of duty under the Act, that impliedly excludes any right of action for the breach of other provisions of that Act.

Upon the question on which my Lord and my brother Pickford have based their judgment, I entertain some doubt. My difficulty arises from the finding of fact in par. 11 of the case that the respondent tried to obtain work but was unable to do so as he could not produce his cards. I feel some difficulty in the face of that finding of fact in saying that this damage could not be held to be the consequence of the breach of duty; but I base my judgment in saying that this appeal ought to be allowed upon the ground that, in my opinion, the evidence here does not establish a breach by the appellant of his statutory duty to return the cards.

As has already been pointed out, the card is the property of the Insurance Commissioners; it is intrusted to the contributor during its currency, and upon its expiry it is to be returned to the Society, if the contributor is a member of a society, and if not a member it is to be handed in at any post-office. In the case of a lost card any person finding it, unless he can at once return it to the

[CRIM. APP.

contributor, is to drop it into a letter-bux, and by regulation No. 14, and sub-sect. 5, it is provided that any employer who is unable to return the card or insurance book of any insured person to him on the termination of the employment, shall return the card or book forthwith to the commissioners. Under these circumstances it appears to me that the post-office is the agent of the Insurance Commissioners who issue the cards and who receive them back. These cards were in fact intrusted to the agent for delivery to the contributor, and it appears to me therefore when it is once found as a fact that the cards had been properly posted to the last known address of the workman and that the post office had received notice of the change of address and had in fact delivered letters to the respondent at his new address, that the default or neglect on the part of the post-office to deliver this letter was the default or neglect of the owner of the cards, and not the default or neglect of the appellant who sent them by post. Therefore I think that the appeal must be allowed. Appeal allowed. Solicitors for the appellant, Kenneth Brown, Baker, Baker, and Co.

COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL.

Monday, Nov. 25, 1912.

(Before Lord ALVERSTONE, C.J., DARLING and AVORY, JJ.)

REX v. HERION AND OTHERS. (a) Vagrancy-Repeated offences under Vagrancy Act 1898 (61 & 62 Vict. c. 39), s. 1-Whether punishable with whipping under Vagrancy Act 1824 (5 Geo. 4, c. 83) ss. 4, 5, 10.

Under the provisions of sect. 1 of the Vagrancy Act 1898 every male person committing an offence of the kind therein specified "shall be deemed a rogue and vagabond within the meaning of the Vagrancy Act 1824, and may be dealt with accordingly."

66

Held, that upon a second conviction under that section the offender may be dealt with as an incorrigible rogue "under sect. 10 of the Act of 1824, and, on being sent to quarter sessions, may be ordered to undergo the punishment of whipping.

THIS case was referred to the Court of Criminal Appeal by the Home Secretary.

The prisoners, three young men, had severally been convicted at petty sessions a second time of the offence of unlawfully and persistently soliciting for immoral purposes, contrary to the provisions of sect. 1 of the Vagrancy Act 1898.

By sect. 1 of the Act of 1898:

Every male person who (a) knowingly lives wholly or in part on the earnings of prostitution or (b) in any public place persistently solicits or importunes for immoral purposes, shall be deemed a rogue and vagabond within the meaning of the Vagrancy Act 1824 and may be dealt with accordingly.

By sect. 4 of the Vagrancy Act 1824, persons convicted of the offences therein specified are to be deemed " rogues and vagabonds," and may be

(a) Reported by R. F. BLAKISTON, Esq., Barrister-at-Law.

punished with three months' imprisonment with hard labour.

By sect. 5:

Every person committing any offence against this Act which shall subject him to be dealt with as a rogue and vagabond, such person having been at some former time adjudged so to be and duly convicted thereof shall be deemed an incorrigible rogue,

and upon conviction at petty sessions he may be committed to prison until the next quarter sessions.

And by sect. 10:

When any incorrigible rogue shall have been committed to the house of correction, there to remain until the next general or quarter sessions, it shall be lawful for the justices of the peace there assembled to examine into the circumstances of the case and to order, if they think fit, that such offender be further imprisoned in the house of correction, and be there kept to hard labour for any time not exceeding one year from the time of making such order, and to order further, if they think fit, that such offender be punished by whipping.

The prisoners having been sent by the convicting magistrate to the London Quarter Sessions, the deputy chairman sentenced them each to nine months' hard labour and to receive twenty-five strokes with a birch rod. The prisoners sent in a petition to the Home Secretary asking him to remit the portion of the sentence which ordered them to be whipped. The Home Secretary referred the matter to the court, it being doubtful whether the provisions of sect. 1 of the Vagrancy Act 1898 enabled the court to deal with a prisoner convicted a second time under that Act as an incorrigible rogue within the meaning of sect. 5 of the Vagrancy Act 1824.

Percival Clarke for the prisoners. — The Vagrancy Act 1824 deals with three classes of offenders. In sect. 3 it imposes for certain minor offences specified in the section a maximum punishment of one month's hard labour, and the offenders against the section are styled "idle and disorderly persons." In sect. 4 a more serious class of offences is dealt with, and for these a maximum punishment of three months' hard labour is imposed, the offenders being termed "rogues and vagabonds." And by sect. 5 it is provided that a person twice convicted of "any offence against this Act which shall subject him to be dealt with as a rogue and vagabond" shall be deemed an "incorrigible rogue.' The punishment for an incorrigible rogue is provided for by sect. 10, under which the maximum term of imprisonment is raised to twelve months with hard labour, and the court is empowered to order whipping in addition. Therefore being an incor. rigible rogue is something different from being a rogue and vagabond, and constitutes a higher degree of offence. Then under the provisions of the Vagrancy Act 1898 offenders against that Act are to be deemed rogues and vagabonds within the meaning of the Act of 1824 and dealt with accordingly. That means that they are to be treated as offenders under sect. 4 and to be punished as provided by that section-viz., imprisoned for a term not exceeding three months. There is no provision in the Act of 1898 for dealing with a person convicted a second time under that Act as an incorrigible rogue, nor can MAG. CAS.-VOL. XXV.

[СВІМ. АРР.

the court do so under the Act of 1824, for sect. 5 of that Act only applies to persons committing second offences against that Act. The later Act does not provide that the two Acts shall be read together as one Act.

Comyns Carr, for the prosecution, was called upon.

The judgment of the court was delivered

Lord ALVERSTONE, C.J.-There is no doubt about this case. The appellants were respectively sentenced to nine months' imprisonment and to be whipped, and the appeals are against the latter portion of the sentences, though, if Mr. Clarke is right in saying that the prisoners can only be punished under sect. 4 of the Act of 1824 and not under sect. 10, the sentence of nine months' imprisonment is as invalid as that of the whipping. The Act of 1898 creates two new offences and says that persons who commit them shall be deemed to be rogues and vagabonds under the earlier Act, and shall be dealt with accordingly. It does not itself specify the punishment to be awarded, but leaves the offenders to be dealt with under the earlier Act. The effect of that is to add two new offences to sect. 4, and, it is to be observed, offences much more serious in character than many of the original offences under that section.

The statute says that persons committing the new offences shall be dealt with as rogues and vagabonds. Then how are rogues and vagabonds dealt with ? Sect. 5 of the earlier Act provides that " Every person committing any offence against this Act which shall subject him to be dealt with as a rogue and vagabond," after a previous conviction for a similar offence shall be deemed an incorrigible rogue, who by sect. 10 is to be punished as therein provided. It is true that sect. 5 only deals with persons committing offences "against this Act," but in our opinion the new offences are to be read into sect. 4 and treated as offences under that section, with the consequence that on a second conviction for such an offence the offender may be dealt with under sect. 10. The appeals must be dismissed.

Appeals dismissed.

Counsel for the appellants instructed by the Registrar of Court of Criminal Appeal. Counsel for the Crown instructed by the Director of Public Prosecutions.

Tuesday, March 18, 1913.

(Before CHANNELL, BRAY, COLERIDGE, BANKES, and ROWLATT, JJ.)

REX v. MARKS LANDOW. (a) Criminal law- Procuration - Attempt-Difference between attempt and intention-Insufficient direction to jury.

Where an appellant was convicted of an attempt to procure his wife to leave her usual place of abode with the intent that she should become an inmate of a brothel outside the King's Dominions, the conviction was quashed on the ground that the jury were insufficiently directed as to the difference between an attempt and an intention or idle threat.

(a) Reported by R. F. BLAKISTON, Esq., Barrister-at-Law.

4 Ꭰ

APPEAL against a conviction for attempted procuration at the Central Criminal Court before the Recorder of London. The appeal first came on for hearing before Channell, Bray, and Coleridge, JJ. on the 11th March, and was ordered to be put down for rehearing by a special court, consisting of five judges.

The wife of the appellant after having been, according to her story, an inmate of a brothel in Buenos Ayres, had returned to England to the protection of her father and brother. While in London, in the company of her brother, she met the appellant in the street. Some conversation took place between them, in the course of which the prosecutrix told the appellant that she did not intend to keep him in the future as she had been doing up to that time, and the appellant then said that it was for him to decide and that she would have to go back to the same house where she was before. The prosecutrix alleged that the appellant was very violent and wanted to hit her.

The appellant was indicted at the Central Criminal Court for having on the 1st Jan. 1910 procured his wife Rosa Landow to leave her usual place of abode in the United Kingdom with intent that she should become an inmate of a brothel outside the King's Dominions. In a second count the appellant was charged with having on the 5th Jan. 1913 attempted to procure his said wife to leave her usual place of abode with the same intent. The learned recorder ruled that there was no evidence to go to the jury on the first count, there being no corroboration of the woman's story that her husband procured her to be an inmate of a brothel at Buenos Ayres. The appellant was convicted of attempted procuration on the 5th Jan. 1913, under the second count and was sentenced to eighteen months imprisonment with hard labour and twelve strokes with the cat.

St. John Hutchinson for the appellant.-The statement of the woman that she had been in a brothel at Buenos Ayres was entirely uncorroborated, and this was so held by the learned recorder with regard to the charge in the first count of the indictment. Her brother corroborated her statement that the appellant had asked her to go back to Buenos Ayres, but that was not the corroboration required by the statute, as it did not implicate the accused. It was correct to say that the statute did not require corroboration of the whole of the woman's account, but there must be corroboration with respect to evidence implicating the accused in some material particular, and such corroboration was wanting in this case. It might well be that the appellant's wife had a dressmaking business at Buenos Ayres, and had been able to assist her husband in that way, quite apart from her own account of her life abroad. He also submitted that there was no evidence that what the appellant said or did was an attempt to procure and not merely an idle threat or an expression as to what he intended to do in the future. If there had been evidence of that kind, it would have been for the jury to put a construction on the words used by the appellant and say whether in their opinion the words did constitute an attempt. This was a most difficult question of law, and the jury should have had a clear

[CRIM. APP.

direction from the learned recorder
on the
point. But in his summing up there was no
such direction to be found. Counsel referred
to the following cases in support of his argu-
ment:

Reg. v. William Taylor, 1 F. & F. 511;
Reg. v. Eagleton, 8 Cox C. C., at p. 570;
Rex v. Laitwood, 4 Cr. App. Rep. 248.

Travers Humphreys for the Crown.-My submission is that the evidence of the woman's brother supplies the requisite corroboration; her account of the attempt to procure her to leave the country was corroborated by him, and this was a material part of the offence. The court must look at the way in which the case was conducted at the trial. Counsel who appeared for the defence never suggested that the woman had not been an inmate of a brothel in Buenos Ayres, and the defence on the first count of the indictment was that the woman was already a prostitute. The point taken now was not raised in the court below. Counsel for the defence cross-examined the woman as to her life at Buenos Ayres and said, as a reason for not calling the appellant, that as he had been living on his wife's earnings from prostitution no one would believe him. There was plenty of corrobation as to the woman's description of her life in Buenos Ayres. It had been proved that in quite a short time she sent her husband 251, and that he wrote to her abroad in her maiden name. As to the second point dealt with by counsel for the appellant no submission was made to the recorder that there was no evidence of an "attempt" to procure and no special direction to the jury was necessary on this point. The learned recorder had said "the question is whether he was desirous on Jan. 6th and did attempt to compel her against her will, to resume the life she had been following for some three or four years." There had been no miscarriage of justice even if a more complete direction was desirable. Counsel referred to the following cases:

Rex v. Cohen, 3 Cr. App. Rep. 234;

Rex v. Patrick O'Connor, 108 L. T. Rep. 384. The judgment of the court was delivered by CHANNELL, J.-Several interesting questions have been brought up for argument before the Court. The case has been considerably complicated by the way in which it was conducted at the trial, there having been in effect admissions made by the learned counsel for the prisoner. Therefore it is undesirable for the court to pronounce any statement of law except upon the one point on which we are agreed that the appeal should be allowed. There was evidence put before the jury which they might have found did amount to an attempt by the appellant to procure his wife to go to Buenos Ayres, but that was not evidence upon which the jury must necessarily have come to that conclusion. It was therefore a case in which the learned recorder should have been particularly careful to explain to the jury what they would not otherwise easily understand-the dif. ference between an attempt and an intention or a mere idle threat. The court thinks that the learned recorder did not in fact sufficiently explain this to the jury. Very probably he was misled by the way in which the case was conducted in the court below, and therefore the court is not surprised that he apparently overlooked the neces.

sity for a proper direction on this particular point. The learned recorder should have directed the jury that before the words used by the appellant could be construed as an "attempt" at procuration they must have shown an effort on his part to make his wife go to Buenos Ayres. If it were possible to construe the words as merely expressing a desire that she should go or an intention at some future time to persuade her to go, that would not be an attempt. There would have been no miscarriage of justice if it had been a case where the jury could have only found the verdict which they did. But the court is agreed that though probably, if the jury had been so directed, they would have brought in the same verdict, we cannot say that the jury would necessarily have done so. The appeal must, under these circumstances, be allowed, and the conviction quashed.

Appeal allowed and conviction quashed. Counsel for the appellant instructed by the Registrar of the Court of Criminal Appeal.

Counsel for the Crown instructed by Wontner and Sons.

Supreme Court of Judicature.

HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE.

KING'S BENCH DIVISION Wednesday, April 2, 1913.

(Before RIDLey, Pickford, and AVORY, JJ.) LLOYD (app.) v. Ross (resp.). (a) Motor cars-Locomotives - Use of, on bridgesRegulation by Local Government Board-Regulation prohibiting heavy motor-cars from passing over bridges except by consent-Validity-Locomotives on Highways Act 1896 (59 & 60 Vict. c. 36), 88. 1, 6-Motor Car Act 1903 (3 Edw. 7, c. 36), 8. 12-Heavy Motor Car (Amendment) Order 1907, art. 14.

Under the powers given by sect. 6 of the Locomotives on Highways Act 1896 and sect. 12 of the Motor Car Act 1903, the Local Government Board made a regulation with regard to the use of a heavy motor-car on a bridge forming part of a highway, that if the person who is liable to the repair of the bridge puts up a prescribed notice that the bridge is insufficient to carry a heavy motor-car beyond the weight specified in the regulation, then any such heavy motor-car cannot be driven upon the bridge except with the consent of the person liable to the repair of the bridge.

Held, that the regulation made by the Local Government Board was not ultra vires, but was valid and binding, notwithstanding the power given to the council of a county to make by-laws restricting the use of locomotives on a specified bridge in their county, and that consequently the driver of a motor.omnibus, which was a heavy motor-car beyond the prescribed weight, was properly convicted under the regulation for driving the heavy motor-car over a bridge on which the prescribed notice had been placed by the person liable to the repair of the bridge, without the consent of such person.

(a) Reported by W. W. ORR, Esq., Barrister-at-Law.

[K.B. DIV.

CASE stated by justices for the county of Middlesex.

At a petty sessions held at Highgate in and for the petty sessional division of Highgate in the county of Middlesex an information was preferred by Alfred Percy Ross (the respondent) against G. Lloyd (the appellant) charging that he the appellant, being the person driving a certain heavy motor-car, No. 3059, in contravention of the regulations made for the use of heavy motor-cars on bridges contained in the Heavy Motor Car Order 1904, as amended by the Heavy Motor Car (Amendment) Order 1907, did on the 6th July 1912 in the parish of Hornsey in the county aforesaid, at Cranley-gardens, Muswell Hill, in the petty sessional division of Highgate, drive the said heavy motor-car over the bridge which carried Muswell Hill-road over the Great Northern Railway at Cranley.gardens.

The information was on the 17th July 1912 heard and determined by the justices (the parties respectively being then present), and upon such hearing the appellant was duly convicted by the justices of the offence, and they adjudged that he should forfeit the sum of 10s. and also pay the sum of 68. for costs.

Upon hearing of the information the following facts were proved: (1) That the appellant did on the 6th July 1912 drive a heavy motor car, to wit, a motor-omnibus, the property of the London General Omnibus Company Limited, over the bridge aforesaid. (2) That at either end of the bridge there was affixed the following notice :

Motor Car Acts 1896 and 1903.-This bridge is insufficient to carry a heavy motor car the registered axle-weight of any axle of which exceeds three tons or the registered axle-weights of the several axles of which exceed in the aggregate five tons, or a heavy motor-car drawing a trailer if the registered axle-weights of the several axles of the heavy motor-car and the axleweights of the several axles of the trailer exceed in the aggregate five tons.-Great Northern Railway Company, King's Cross Station, London.

(3) That the registered axle-weight of the rear axle and the registered axle-weights of the several axles of the heavy motor-car exceeded those specified in the notice in that the registered axleweight of the front axle was two tons and that of the rear axle four tons. (4) That such notice was affixed by the Great Northern Railway Company the body liable to the repair of the bridge, in accordance with the Heavy Motor Car Order 1904 as amended by the Heavy Motor Car (Amendment) Order 1907, art. 14.

It was contended on behalf of the appellant: (1) That the article in the Heavy Motor Car (Amendment) Order 1907 was ultra vires inasmuch as it delegated to the person liable to the repair of the bridge powers given to the Local Government Board alone, and purported to close a bridge forming part of a highway by the mere affixing of a prescribed notice without inquiry by or direct authority from the Local Government Board. (2) That sect. 6 of the Locomotives on Highways Act 1896 gave no such power of delegation as art. 14 purported to assume. (3) That the Local Government Board, if the regulation of the user of the bridges was in their hands at all, could alone decide as to the sufficiency or insufficiency of a bridge for the use of heavy motor-cars. (4) It was further contended by the appellant that by sect. 1 of the

Locomotives on Highways Act 1896, proviso (a), the user of bridges by heavy motor-cars was specifically put under the control of the council of any county or county borough, and that prevention or restriction of user was dependent on such council having satisfied themselves that such user would be attended by damage to the bridge or danger to the public. (5) That such proviso was unrepealed and in full force, and that the Local Government Board in purporting to make the regulations herein before mentioned did so without the authority of Parliament and in excess of the powers conferred on them.

The justices being of opinion that the regula. tions before mentioned were good and binding regulations, and that sect. 1 of the Locomotives on Highways Act 1896 did not affect their validity, convicted the appellant.

The questions of law arising on the above statement for the opinion of the court therefore were: (1) Whether art. 14 of the Heavy Motor Car Order 1904 as amended by the Heavy Motor Car (Amendment) Order 1907 is a valid and binding regulation. (2) Whether the control of the user of bridges by heavy motor-cars is by sect. 1 of the Locomotives on Highways Act 1896 still within the sole jurisdiction of the county and borough councils.

If the court should be of opinion that the conviction was legally and properly made, then the conviction was to stand; but if the court should be of opinion to the contrary, then the conviction was to be reversed.

The Locomotive Act 1861 (24 & 25 Vict. c. 70) provides :

Sect. 6. It shall not be lawful for the owner or driver of any locomotive to drive it over any suspension bridge, nor over any bridge on which a conspicuous notice has been placed by the authority of the surveyor or persons liable to the repair of the bridge, that the bridge is insufficient to carry weights beyond the ordinary traffic of the district, without previously obtaining the consent of the surveyor of the road or bridge master under whose charge such bridge shall be for the time being, or of the persons liable to the repair of such bridge.

[The remainder of the section was repealed by the Locomotives Act 1898.]

The Locomotives on Highways Act 1896 (59 & 60 Vict. c. 36)-an Act to amend the law with respect to the use of locomotives on highways— provides :

Sect. 1 (1). The enactments mentioned in the schedule to this Act, and any other enactment restricting the use of locomotives on highways and contained in any public general or local and personal Act in force at the passing of this Act, shall not apply to any vehicle propelled by mechanical power if it is under three tons in weight unladen, and is not used for the purpose of drawing more than one vehicle (such vehicle with its locomotive not to exceed in weight unladen four tons), and is so constructed that no smoke or visible vapour is emitted therefrom except from any temporary or accidental cause; and vehicles so exempted, whether locomotives or drawn by locomotives, are in this Act referred to as light locomotives. Provided that-(a) the council of any county or county borough shall have power to make by-laws preventing or restricting the use of such locomotives upon any bridge within their area, where such council are satisfied that such use would be attended with damage to the bridge or danger to the public.

Sect. 6 (1). The Local Government Board may make regulations with respect to the use of light locomotives

[K.B. DIV.

on highways and their construction, and the conditions under which they may be used. (2) All regulations under this section shall have full effect notwithstanding anything in any other Act, whether general or local, or any by-laws or regulations made thereunder.

The Motor Car Act 1903 (3 Edw. 7, c. 36)—an Act to amend the Locomotives on Highways Act 1896-provides:

Sect. 12 (1). The Local Government Board by regulations made under sect. 6 of the principal Act [that is, the Act of 1896] may, as respects any class of vehicle mentioned in the regulations, increase the maximum weights of three tons and four tons mentioned in sect. 1 of that Act, subject to any conditions as to the use and construction of the vehicle which may be made by the regulations.

The Locomotives Act 1898 (61 & 62 Vict. c. 29) provides:

Sect. 6 (1). The council of a county and of any borough containing a population of ten thousand or upwards, may by by-law (c) prohibit or restrict the use of a locomotive on any specified bridge in their county or borough, if they are satisfied that such bridge is unsuited for locomotive traffic, or that such use would be attended with damage to the bridge or danger to the public. (2) If any person in charge of a locomotive acts in contravention of any by-law under this section he shail

be liable for each offence, on summary conviction, to a fine not exceeding five pounds. (3) Any by-law made under this section shall be subject to confirmation by the Local Government Board.

Sect. 7 (1). Where the owner of a locomotive iaggrieved by any restriction or prohibition placed, either before or after the passing of this Act, on the passing of locomotives over any bridge, either under sect. 6 of the Locomotive Act 1861, or under any by-law made under this Act, or any enactment repealed by this Act, that owner may appeal to the Local Government Board and that board, if they consider that the bridge is sufficient to bear the weight of locomotives, and that there is no other reasonable cause for imposing the restriction or prohibition, may order the restriction or prohibition to be removed, or to be varied.

Seot. 17. (2) Nothing in this Act shall affect light locomotives within the meaning of the Locomotives on Highways Act 1896.

The Heavy Motor Car Order 1904 (of the 27th Dec. 1904), after reciting the powers given to the Local Government Board under sect. 6 of the Locomotives on Highways Act 1896 and sect. 12 of the Motor Car Act 1903 to make regulations with respect to the use of locomotives on highways and their construction and the conditions under which they may be used, and that the Local Government Board in pursuance of those powers made the following regulations, provided:

"heavy

Art. 2. In the regulations-the expression motor-car" means a motor-car exceeding two tons in weight unladen. The expression "axle-weight" means, in relation to an axle of a heavy motor-car, or of a trailer, the aggregate weight transmitted to the surface of the road or other base whereon the heavy motor-car or the trailer moves or rests, by the several wheels attached to that axle when the heavy motor-car, or the trailer, is loaded. The expression registered axleweight" means, in relation to an axle of a heavy motor. car, the axle-weight of that axle, as registered by the registering authority in pursuance of the regulations.

The Heavy Motor Car (Amendment) Order 1907, made under the powers given by the same