K.B. Div.] REX v. GOVERNOR OF BRIXTON PRISON; Ex parte THOMPSON. [K.B. Div. the warrant, as provided by the treaty in question that the depositions should be taken "before such judge or magistrate." Blackburn, J. pointed out that the Act did not make the production of a warrant and depositions a condition precedent to the Secretary of State acting as the treaty did, and that under the Act the only question was whether the magistrate had jurisdiction, and that sect. 14 makes any depositions on oath receivable in evidence. The magistrate must have evidence before him before he can issue his warrant, but it is not necessary that that evidence should be depositions taken before the foreign magistrate who issued the warrant. The State takes no cognisance of the point that the depositions must be taken before the foreign magistrate who issued the warrant. All that is necessary is to see that there is jurisdiction under the Act. The applicant is not entitled to go behind the Act or the requisition of the Secretary of State to the magistrate, and look to the treaty. He relies on Re Wilson (37 L. T. Rep. 354; 3 Q. B. Div. 42), in which there was a treaty with Switzerland to the effect that neither country should surrender its own subjects, and the question was whether the court would allow the surrender of a British subject. The decision was that the treaty must be taken to limit the operation of the Act and that therefore no British subject could be surrendered. That case turned on sect. 2 which merely applies the Extradition Act to the treaty by an Order in Council. That was not a mere question of procedure but affected the class of persons who could not be surrendered and therefore there could be no surrender of a British subject. It is a totally different case from the present and does not touch it. The form of the order of the Secretary of State to the police magistrate, as given in the schedule to the Act, says nothing about these preliminaries being conditions precedent. Art. 9 has no application to this case at all where a requisition has been made. It is dealing with the state of things that may arise on a complaint being brought before a magistrate under par. 2 of sect. 8, and a warrant being issued in consequence of that complaint and before any requisition at all is made, and it merely provides that in such case unless there is a requisition made within fourteen days the accused shall be discharged. The rule ought to be discharged on two grounds, first, because the defect alleged here is a mere defect of procedure which the court ought not to take into consideration, and therefore no cause is shown for the release of the applicant, and secondly, because whatever defect there may have been is now cured as there is in this country the deposition taken before the French magistrate who issued the warrant. [He also referred to Re Galwey (73 L. T. Rep. 756; (1896) 1 Q. B. 230).] Percival Clarke in support of the rule.-There was a defect in the proceedings and it is now too late to remedy it. The Extradition Act is by sects. 2 and 5 applied by Order in Council to the treaty, and under art. 9 of the treaty if the requirements as to the requisition are not complied with the prisoner must be discharged. In Re Counhaye (ubi sup.), decided in 1873, this point was suggested and argued on behalf of the prisoner, but the Attorney-General did not deal with it nor was it the important point of the case, and although Blackburn, J. referred to it in his judgment, it was not the point upon which the case was decided, so that the observations made by him were entirely obiter dicta, as the case was decided upon the ground that the offence charged was not within the Act at all. Then in the case of Re Wilson (ubi sup.), in 1877, which it is submitted overrules Re Counhaye (ubi sup.), so far as this point is concerned, the decision was that you must read the Act and the treaty together and that the treaty must be taken to be incorporated with and to limit the operation of the Act. In that case there was an article in the treaty which expressly excluded " nationals," a provision which was not in the Act, and it was proved that the accased was a British subject. The magistrate was of opinion that this fact was immaterial as he was not entitled to consider the terms of the treaty, but only the Extradition Act 1870, which contained no such limitation, and he committed the prisoner. That case therefore raised the exact point arising in this case, and after Re Counhaye (ubi sup.) had been cited, Cockburn, C.J. said that in every case the treaty limits the Act and the Act limits the treaty, and both are co-extensive and have to be read together. The case of Re Galwey (ubi sup.) has no bearing on this question, as all that it decides is that where a treaty provides that a Government shall not be bound to surrender its own subjects, the Secretary of State, though not bound to surrender a British subject, yet has a discretion to do so if he pleases. A requisition means something more than a mere request. Art. 9 provides that the prisoner shall be discharged if within fourteen days a requisition shall not have been made for his surrender in the manner directed by the treaty. Art. 7 specifies how the requisition for the surrender is to be made. It is to be made to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and is to be accompanied by a warrant of arrest issued by a judge or magistrate together with duly authenticated depositions or statements taken on oath "before such judge or magistrate "-that is. before the judge or magistrate who issued the warrant. Then the Foreign Secretary is to transmit the documents to the Home Secretary, who is to signify to a police magistrate in London that such requisition has been made and require him, if there be due cause, to issue his warrant for the apprehension of the fugitive. In this case the magistrate who issued the warrant was the French magistrate, but the depositions which accompanied the requisition were those taken before the magistrate in Brussels, and therefore the requisition was not accompanied by depositions taken before the magistrate who issued the warrant, as required by art. 7, and was therefore not made "in manner directed" by the treaty. The requisition must be in accordance with the treaty, otherwise the prisoner must be discharged. The applicant is entitled to be discharged under art. 9, on the ground that the requisition has not been made "in manner directed" by the treaty, and as the police magistrate had not before him within the specified time of fourteen days of the arrest, a requisition as so prescribed by the treaty he was bound to order the discharge. RIDLEY, J.-We think that the rule in this case should be discharged. It is a rule to show cause why Ernest Edward Thompson should not be K.B. Div.] REX v. GOVERNOR OF BRIXTON PRISON; Ex parte THOMPSON. discharged from custody by virtue of art. 9 of the Treaty with France 1876, because no requisition had been made in the manner directed by the treaty within fourteen days of his arrest. The point taken by counsel on his behalf is that the requisition, which is to be made in the first place to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and then upon receiving the documents by the Secretary of State for the Home Department, has not been made in compliance with art. 7 of the Treaty with France. Under art. 7 it is required that the requisition is to be "accompanied by a warrant of arrest, or other equivalent judicial document issued by a judge or magistrate duly authorised to take cognizance of the acts charged against the accused in France, together with duly authenticated depositions or statements taken on oath before such judge or magistrate, clearly setting forth the said acts and containing a description of the person claimed and any particulars that may serve to identify him." Those documents being transmitted to the Secretary of State for the Home Department, he is then to signify to some police magistrate in London that such requisition has been made, “and require him, if there is due cause, to issue his warrant for the apprehension of the fugitive." In the present case the documents which were transmitted by the Secretary of State were not depositions or statements taken on oath before the judge or magistrate in France who issued the warrant, but they were depositions or documents which had been taken before the authorities in Brussels, and the point taken on behalf of the applicant is, that therefore the requisition which was sent by the Secretary of State did not properly authorise the magistrate to issue his warrant under the terms of the Extradition Act. The matter might have been important if it had not been already judicially dealt with. It certainly raises one important question which was dealt with by Blackburn, J. in the case of Ke Counhaye (ubi sup.). The question which we have to consider is whether or not the proceedings taken by the Secretary of State are such that we can inquire into the materials upon which his order was made. There is the treaty between the two States which arranges certain terms; there is an Order in Council which applies the treaty, and which cannot, in the nature of things, go beyond the treaty which has been arranged, and then in addition to that there is the Extradition Act, which brings into operation, so far as the police magistrates of the metropolis are concerned, the terms that have been arrived at between the States. In Re Counhaye (ubi sup.), which is more or less in point are, the case was decided upon a question which we need not deal with-namely, whether the crime alleged came within the Extradition Act, and tre court held that it did not, and the prisoner was discharged upon that ground. But there was another objection taken in that case, and it is certainly very similar to the objection now taken, that the depositions produced before the chief magistrate were not taken before the magistrate who issued the warrant of arrest, and that art. 2 of the treaty-the treaty with Belgium -required that they should have been taken "before such judge or magistrate," as in the treaty now in question. That objection having been taken, that the terms of the treaty had not been complied with, Blackburn, J. said that could [K.B. DIV. not be taken into account. He said (L. Rep. 8 Q. B. at p. 416): "As to the objection that the terms of the treaty have not been complied with, and the order of the Secretary of State ought therefore not to have been made, I do not think that affects the magistrate's jurisdiction; if the conditions of the treaty have not been complied with the Secretary of State might have refused to order a magistrate to proceed; but these conditions are not in the Act of Parliament; and the Secretary of State having made an order, and the magistrate having acted under it, all we have to do is to look at the Act to see whether he had jurisdiction under it." That is the passage which seems to me to be clearly in point in the present case; and I think that would be admitted by counsel for the applicant to be almost conclusive unless he had the case of Re Wilson (ubi sup.) to rely upon, which he treats as overruling that expression of opinion in Re Counhaye (ubi sup.). I do not think that it overrules it. He contended that in Re Counhaye (ubi sup.) the proceedings were held by the Court of Queen's Bench to be void as against that fugitive criminal, which is certainly the case, but in the case of Re Wilson (ubi sup.) the question appears to me to have been a different one. There the treaty, which was with Switzerland, contained this exception: "No Swiss shall be delivered up by the Swiss Government to the Government of the United Kingdom, and no subject of the United Kingdom shall be delivered up by the Government of the United Kingdom"; and on proof that the prisoner was a British subject, the court ordered him to be discharged from custody. The Order in Council, which is to apply the Extradition Act of 1870 to an arrangement made with a foreign State, can only be made under the powers given in sect. 2 of the Act, and without the terms of the Act of Parliament it would necessarily follow that no Order in Council made in this country could extend the application of an extradion treaty, not in the matter of procedure, but as to the class of people whom it was to include. And so in that case, when the court was asked to release a person who was a British subject, and who had been retained in custody for the purpose of being surrendered to the Swiss Government, the answer was that on the terms of the treaty there could be no doubt that the prisoner was entitled to be discharged from custody. Where an order has been made under the Extradition Act applying the Act in the case of the foreign State mentioned in the order with whom an arrangement has been made, then the Act is to apply and His Majesty is required by the Act to surrender fugitive criminals to that State so long as the order remains in force, but, as provided in sect. 5 of the Act, "subject to the limitations, restrictions, conditions, exceptions, and qualifications, if any, contained in the order" and made by the treaty with that foreign State. I think it was from that section that Cockburn, C.J. must have been quoting in his judgment in Re Wilson (ubi snp.), when he said that he must take it that the Order in Council had embodied the terms of the treaty and that the Act of Parliament was only applicable so far as it could be applied consistently with the terms and conditions therein contained. Then he said that the treaty with Switzerland in that case con. tained a provision that no British subject should be delivered up under the terms of the Extradition K.B. Div.] Rex v. Governor of Brixton PRISON; Ex parte THOMPSON. The Act, and that the Act could only have application in so far as it was consistent with the treaty. That seems to me to be a very different point from that which we have now before us. treaty in that case in its terms excluded from its operation a British subject who has been arrested for an offence committed in Switzerland, and the result of that was that the Act had no application whatever to the case. That was the basis of the whole decision in that case. It is, however, a different thing when we have to consider whether the Secretary of State has fully and properly administered the powers given to him by the article in the treaty which does apply to the fugitive whose surrender is required by the foreign Government. In this case Thompson might have been arrested without the requisition or the requirement of the Secretary of State at all. That would seem to follow from the requirements and provisions of the Act of Parliament, and certainly from the words in art. 9 of the treaty, though those words are inexplicable if we have to construe with them arts. 2 and 4 of the treaty, which have no application to the matter. But that in itself shows that the requisition by the Secretary of State ought to be treated rather as a matter of procedure, as a matter of machinery for carrying into force the main object of the Act of Parliament-namely, the apprehension of the fugitive criminal. Upon that ground I think a very great distinction can be made between this case and the case of Re Wilson (ubi sup.), and it is enough to say that in Wilson's case the fact that the treaty, however carried out, did not apply to him in any way whatever was a sufficient reason for his being discharged from custody. There is no such reason here, for Thompson is a person to whom the Extradition Act would apply if it were properly carried out. It seems to me that this requirement by the Secretary of State and the proceedings before the magistrate taken in consequence of it, are to be judged of by us according to the Act of Parliament. Therefore if, on the receipt by the police magistrate of this requirement he has issued the warrant according to the powers given by the Act, we cannot interfere. It might be that different considera. tions would have arisen if he had acted without the requirement of the Home Secretary, but that is not the case bere. Here he has had that requirement, and sect. 8 of the Act says that the warrant for the apprehension of a fugitive criminal may be issued by a police magistrate on receipt of the order of the Secretary of State, and on such evidence as would in his opinion justify the issue of the warrant if the crime had been committed in England. We are not now inquiring into the sufficiency of the evidence which was put before the magistrate, and what he has done was to issue the warrant for the apprehension of the fugitive criminal upon such evidence as in his opinion justified the issue of that warrant. Sect. 14 may also be referred to, because by that section he has power to read depositions or statements on oath taken in a foreign State, and copies of such original depositions or statements may be received in evidence under the Act. That is a necessary provision unless the witnesses were to be conveyed from different parts of the world to give evidence for the purpose of carrying out the Act. Without endeavouring to construe more accurately art 9, [K.B. Div. which has certainly a mistake in it, I am clearly of opinion that this rule ought to be discharged. DARLING, J.-I am of the same opinion. I think that the case of Re Wilson (ubi sup.), especially the judgment of Field, J., where he deals with the argument of Mr. Bowen, shows that the language attributed to Blackburn, J. in the case of Re Counhaye (ubi sup.) is too large and indefinite. The treaty is incorporated in the Extradition Act, but it seems to me that everything in the treaty is not therefore essential to the legality of the arrest and detention of the fugitive. It is essential to the legality of the arrest and detention that the treaty should name the kind of offence for which fugitive criminals are arrested under the Act, but I do not think that a mere defect in the procedure, let us say, of France before the requisition was made to the Foreign Secretary, or the order was made upon that requisition by the Home Secretary, necessarily invalidates the arrest and detention. Assuming here that there is the kind of defect indicated by Mr. Clarke. that the magistrate in France ought to have said that he had not got before him a deposition made in France, that he had only got a deposition taken in Belgium, and that he must have the deposition made in France or the equivalent of it made in France, before he considered the matter assuming that to be established-it does not seem to me to be enough to enable us to hold that everything that has been done since the magistrate in France issued the warrant, the requisition of the Foreign Secretary, the order of the Home Secretary and the warrant of the magistrate in London, are all of them bad because of that defect in the procedure of which the magistrate in France might have taken notice. In order to come to that conclusion Mr. Clarke relies, and he must rely, upon certain words in art. 9 of the treaty. He assumes that the fugitive criminal has been arrested and detained for a certain time. Then, says art. 9: "He shall be discharged as well in the United Kingdom as in France if within fourteen days requisition shall not have been made for his surrender by the diplomatic agent of his country in the manner directed by arts. 2 and 4 of this treaty." Now, first of all, arts. 2 and 4 do not appear to have anything to do with the matter, and we must look at another article. I think we may decide that there is no defect shown here by reason of the articles which it is said in art. 9 must be complied with. But suppose we look at art. 7, which is the one we are told should stand for arts. 2 and 4, then that provides that there shall be a requisition made to Her Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs by the Ambassador of the French Republic. The requisition is in perfect order here, but that requisition, says art. 7, shall be " accompanied by a warrant of arrest or other equivalent judicial document issued by a judge or magistrate duly authorised to take cognisance of the acts charged against the accused in France." That has been done also, and there is no fault to be found with that. Then the article says: Together with duly authenticated depositions or statements taken on oath before such judge or magistrate, clearly setting forth the said acts," and so on. That is where the fault is, that the depositions 66 K.B. Div.] REX v. GOVERNOR OF BRIXTON PRISON; Ex parte THOMPSON. which were sent were not taken before the magistrate who issued the judicial document for the arrest, and so on, of the accused upon which the magistrate in France took action, upon which the Foreign Secretary took action, and upon which the Home Secretary in turn took action; but art. 7 concludes-and here I think we are shown that this is procedure, which is not essential to the validity of the arrest and detention-that the Home Secretary shall issue an order under his hand and seal signifying to some police magistrate in London that such requisition has been made and requiring him, if there be due cause, to issue his warrant for the apprehension of the fugitive. Now the magistrate when he got this order of the Home Secretary, might have looked into this matter and have said that he did not think there was due cause, that he had this requisition to the Foreign Secretary, the Foreign Secretary sending the papers such as he had got to the Home Secretary, the Home Secretary issuing to him his order that if there be due cause he should order this man's arrest, but that he did not think there was due cause; that he must look into all these matters and the documents sent to him and take evidence before himself, and that if he came to the conclusion that there was no evidence on oath before him he ought not to issue the warrant. Supposing the magistrate came to this conclusion he might say that the due procedure had not been observed, that there was not enough before him to show that there is due cause for issuing the warrant, and that in those circumstances he should not issue it. In my opinion, there is a great distinction between such defects as those pointed out by Field, J., in the case of Re Wilson (ubi sup.)—such defects as those where the treaty and the Act are at variance-and such a defect as this which is merely a defect upon one point of procedure, and one which the magistrate has power to deal with himself. CHANNELL, J.-I am of the same opinion. This rule was granted solely on the ground that the prisoner is entitled to be discharged from custody by virtue of art. 9 of the treaty with France, because no requisition has been made in the manner directed by the treaty within fourteen days of his arrest. There is no complaint therefore, of the arrest of the prisoner. The complaint is that he has not been discharged within fourteen days, because within fourteen days a requisition had not been received in the manner directed by the treaty. Art. 9 was interpreted by counsel who obtained the rule in that form, as meaning that you might leave out the words "by arts. 2 and 4," and read it as though it was "if within fourteen days a requisition shall not have been made for his surrender by the diplomatic agent of his country in the manner directed by this treaty." It may be that the expression "arts. 2 and 4" is quite insensible, and that that may be the proper mode of reading it; but inasmuch as the applicant has to make out affirmatively his right to be discharged, I agree that that alone might be a sufficient reason for discharging this rule. But suppose we do read it as suggested-namely, "if within fourteen days a requisition shall not have been made in manner directed by this treaty," then, reading it in that way, we have to consider the whole matter by reason not only of the decision in Re Wilson, (ubi sup.), but of the clear words of the Act of [K.B. DIV. Parliament and the order. The machinery of extradition is carried out by a general Act, the Extradition Act 1870, an Act of Parliament of this country, but which, if nothing further had been done, would have had no operation at all, because it only applies to cases where a treaty has been made with some foreign State. Then when the treaty has been made the Act of Parliament is brought into operation by an Order in Council of this country, and that Order in Council by sect. 2 of the Act must recite or embody the terms of the arrangement. Then by sect. 5, when an order applying the Act has been published in the London Gazette, the Act shall, so long as the order remains in force, but subject to the limitations, restrictions, conditions, exceptions and qualifications, if any, contained in the order, apply in the case of such foreign State. So that machinery brings the Act into operation, and for certain purposes quite clearly the treaty made with the particular foreign State which is recited in full and verbatim in the order, is incorporated into the Act; and the whole terms of this treaty with France, including, therefore, art. 9, are for certain purposes incorporated into the Act. We must read the whole Act and treaty together. I think the decision in the case of Re Wilson (ubi sup.), probably goes that length, although it proceeds upon a very different matter to this. If we do read the whole thing in that way, how are we to deal with such a point as this, that the Secretary of State, although possibly he need not have done so, did in point of fact give notice to the magistrate that a requisition had come to him, although in fact it had not been accompanied with the exact material that is contemplated in art. 7. I cannot think that that gives the accused a right to be discharged, because it is quite obvious that the requirement that the document shall come together with the depositions is to enable the Secretary of State to act upon it, and to enable the Government of this country to do the things that by the treaty they have in fact undertaken with the foreign State to do-namely, to find the accused for them and ultimately to surrender him. If the Secretary of State thinks that he has got information without having got those depositions, and sends that information on to the magistrate, that cannot be a ground for discharging the prisoner from custody. Another reason why it cannot be a ground is this: The Act distinctly contemplates that the fugitive criminal may be arrested on a warrant in this country before there is any requisition, and without the order of the Secretary of State. That is distinctly contemplated by sect. 8 of the Act, and the whole machinery is set out at considerable length. Then, under that section, if the fugitive criminal is apprehended on a warrant without the order of a Secretary of State, he "shall be discharged by the police magistrate, unless the police magistrate, within such reasonable time as, with reference to the circumstances of the case, he may fix, receives from a Secretary of State an order signifying that a requisition has been made for the surrender of such criminal." So that if the applicant had been arrested without a previous order from the Secretary of State, but under a warrant granted by the magistrate upon evidence which satisfied him, then, provided that the requisition was made though not made in that manner, that is to say, K.B. Div.] HILL (app.) v. PHENIX VETERINARY SUPPLIES LIMITED (resps.). [K.B. Div. that there was a requisition without its accompanying document, the prisoner would not have been entitled to be discharged. It is imposible to read the Act and treaty together without holding that these requirements in art. 7 are mere machinery and are not matters which go to the jurisdiction either to arrest or to detain the fugitive criminal. That is substantially the ground upon which my brothers have put their judgments, and it seems to me that that is the real ground on which this rule ought to be discharged. Rule discharged. Solicitor for the applicant, in support of the rule, John Barrington Matthews. Solicitor for the respondent, Director of Public Prosecutions. Tuesday, March 21, 1911. (Before Lord ALVERSTONE, C.J., RIDLEY and CHANNELL, JJ.) HILL (on behalf of the Department of Agri- A prosecution cannot, except with the consent of the Board of Agriculture and Fisheries, be instituted in England by the Department of Agriculture and Technical Instruction for Ireland, for an offence alleged to have been committed in England under sect. 6, sub-sect. 1, of the Fertilisers and Feeding Stuffs Act 1906, even where, in the case of an article sold in England and sent to a purchaser in Ireland, a sample has been taken and an analysis made in Ireland on behalf of the Irish department, and that department has directed a prosecution. The respondents, who were a company dealing in cattle foods in Birmingham, sold and consigned to a purchaser in Ireland for use as food for cattle a quantity of calf meal which had been artificially prepared, but failed to give to the purchaser an invoice, as required by sect. 1 of the Fertilisers and Feedings Stuffs Act 1906. A sample was taken in Ireland on behalf of the Department of Agriculture and Technical Instruction for Ireland, and was analysed there, and the Irish department, without the consent of the Board of Agriculture and Fisheries, instituted a prosecution in England. Held, that the consent of the department in Ireland was not sufficient for the institution of the prosecution in England, and that, as the consent of the English board had not been obtained, the prosecution failed upon that ground. CASE stated by the acting stipendiary magistrate for the city of Birmingham. On the 4th Aug. 1910, the appellant, on behalf of the Department of Agriculture and Technical Instruction for Ireland, laid an information, and thereupon a summons was issued against the (a) Reported by W. W. ORR, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. Phoenix Veterinary Supplies Limited, the respondents, who were a limited company dealing in cattle foods, at Farm-street, in the city of Birmingham, for that they (the respondents) on or about the 10th March 1910, at the city aforesaid, having sold and delivered to one Honora Hannan, of Kilfree, Gurteen, Ballymote, in the county of Sligo, Ireland, for use as food for cattle an article, to wit, one and a half hundred weights of calf meal which had been artificially prepared, did unlawfully fail without reasonable excuse to give to the said Honora Hannan, the purchaser, on or before or as soon as possible after the delivery of the said article, an invoice, as required by the Fertilisers and Feeding Stuffs Act 1906, stating the name of the article and whether it had been prepared from one substance or seed or from more than one substance or seed, and what were the percentages of oil and albuminoids contained in the said article, contrary to the said Act. This summons, which was issued under sect. 6, sub-sect. 1 (a), of the Act, was heard before the magistrate, sitting as a court of summary jurisdiction in Birmingham, on the 30th Aug. 1910. Counsel on behalf of the respondents raised a preliminary objection to the jurisdiction of the magistrate on the ground that the consent of the Board of Agriculture and Fisheries to the prosecution had not been obtained, as required by the Fertilisers and Feeding Stuffs Act 1906 (6 Edw. 7, c. 27), s. 6 (3). It was admitted on the part of the appellant that this consent had not been obtained, and on behalf of the respondents, in the course of the argument of counsel, it was admitted that the calf meal had been consigned by them in the city of Birmingham to the purchaser in Ireland. It was contended on behalf of the respondents that if the offence had been committed in Ireland the proceedings could have been commenced there by the Department of Agriculture and Technical Instruction for Ireland, but that the last-mentioned department before taking out a summons for an offence alleged to have been committed in England were bound by the provisions of the Fertilisers and Feeding Stuffs Act 1996, above mentioned, to obtain the consent of the Board of Agriculture and Fisheries to the institution of such proceedings. This contention was opposed by the appellant, but the magistrate was of opinion that the argument on behalf of the respondents was sound. He pointed out that by the Act (sect. 12) the Department of Agriculture and Technical Instruction for Ireland was substituted for the Board of Agriculture and Fisheries only for the purposes of the execution of the Act in Ireland, and he beld that the proceedings before him amounted to a prosecution of the Act in England, and dismissed the summons accordingly for want of jurisdiction. During the argument it was stated by counsel, and taken to be admitted, that a sample of the article was taken in Ireland by and on behalf of the Department of Agriculture and Technical Instruction for Ireland, and that this sample was analysed in Ireland. The Fertilisers and Feeding Stuffs Act 1906 (6 Edw. 7, c. 27) provides : |