CHAPTER THIR D.

On Conception.

CHAP. BY Conception, I mean that power of the mind, which

enables it to form a notion of an absent object of percep

tion; or of a sensation which it has formerly felt. I do not contend that this is exclufively the proper meaning of the word, but I think that the faculty which I have now defined, deserves to be distinguished by an appropriated name.

CONCEPTION is often confounded with other powers. When a painter makes a picture of a friend, who is absent or dead, he is commonly said to paint from memory: and the expreffion is fufficiently correct for common converfation. But in an analysis of the mind, there is ground for a distinction. The power of conception enables him to make the features of his friend an object of thought, so as to copy the resemblance; the power of memory recognises these features as a former object of perception. Every act of memory includes an idea of the past; conception implies no idea of time whatever *.

Shakespeare calls this power" the mind's eye."

Hamlet." My father! Methinks I fee my father.
Horatio." Where, my Lord;

Hamlet." In my mind's eye, Horatio."

Act 1. Scene 4.

ACCORDING

III.

ACCORDING to this view of the matter, the word conception CHA P. corresponds to what was called by the school-men fimple apprebenfion; with this difference only, that they included, under this name, our apprehenfion of general propofitions; whereas I should wish to limit the application of the word conception to our fenfations, and the objects of our perceptions. Dr. Reid, in his Inquiry, fubftitutes the word conception instead of the fimple apprehenfion of the schools, and employs it in the fame extenfive fignification. I think it may contribute to make our ideas more distinct, to reftrict its meaning:-and for such a restriction, we have the authority of philofophers in a case perfectly analogous.-In ordinary language, we apply the fame word perception, to the knowledge which we have by our fenses of external objects, and to our knowledge of speculative truth: and yet an author would be justly cenfured, who fhould treat of these two operations of the mind under the fame article of perception. I apprehend there is as wide a difference between the conception of a truth, and the conception of an abfent object of fenfe, as between the perception of a tree, and the perception of a mathematical theorem.I have therefore taken the liberty to distinguish also the two former operations of the mind: and under the article of conception, fhall confine myself to that faculty whofe province it is to enable us to form a notion of our paft fenfations, or of the objects of fenfe that we have formerly perceived.

CONCEPTION is frequently ufed as fynonymous with imagination. Dr. Reid fays, that, "imagination, in its proper "fense, fignifies a lively conception of objects of fight." "This

III.

CHAP." is a talent" (he remarks) "of importance to poets and orators; and deserves a proper name, on account of its con"nexion with their arts." He adds, that" imagination is diftinguished from conception, as a part from a whole."

I SHALL not inquire, at present, into the proper English meaning of the words conception and imagination. In a study fuch as this, fo far removed from the common purposes of fpeech, fome latitude may perhaps be allowed in the use of words; provided only we define accurately those we employ, and adhere to our own definitions.

THE business of conception, according to the account I have given of it, is to present us with an exact tranfcript of what we have felt or perceived. But we have, moreover, a power of modifying our conceptions, by combining the parts of different ones together, fo as to form new wholes of our own creation. I fhall employ the word imagination to exprefs this power: and, I apprehend, that this is the proper fenfe of the word; if imagination be the power which gives birth to the productions of the poet and the painter. This is not a fimple faculty of the mind. It presupposes abstraction, to separate from each other qualities and circumstances which have been perceived in conjunction; and alfo judgment and tafte to direct us in forming the combinations. If they are made wholly at random, they are proofs of infanity *.

THE

* In common discourse, we often use the phrase of thinking upon an object, to express what I here call, the conception of it. In the following paffage, Shakespeare

III.

THE first remarkable fact which ftrikes us with refpect to CHA P. conception is, that we can conceive the objects of fome fenfes much more easily than those of others. Thus we can conceive an absent visible object, such as a building that is familiar to us, much more easily than a particular found, a particular taste, or a particular pain, which we have formerly felt. It is probable, however, that this power might be improved in the case of some of our fenfes. Few people, I believe, are able to form a very diftinct conception of founds; and yet it is certain, that, by practice, a perfon may acquire a power of amusing himself with reading written mufic. And in the case of poetical numbers, it is univerfally known, that a reader may enjoy the harmony of the verfe, without articulating the words, even in a whisper. In fuch cafes, I take for granted, that our pleasure arifes from a very strong conception of the founds which we have been accuftomed to affociate with particular written characters.

THE peculiarity in the cafe of visible objects, feems to arife from this; that when we think of a found or of a taste, the object

Shakespeare uses the former of these phrafes, and the words imagination and apprehenfion as fynonymous with each other.

-Who can hold a fire in his hand,

By thinking on the frofty Caucafus ?
Or cloy the hungry edge of appetite,
By bare imagination of a feast?

Or wallow naked in December's fnow,
By thinking on fantastic fummer's heat?
Oh no! the apprehenfion of the good
Gives but the greater feeling to the worse.

K. RICHARD II. A& 1. Scene 6.

of

III.

CHA P. of our conception is one fingle detached sensation; whereas every visible object is complex; and the conception which we form of it as a whole, is aided by the affociation of ideas. To perceive the force of this obfervation, it is neceffary to recollect what was formerly said on the subject of attention. As we cannot at one inftant attend to every point of the picture of an object on the retina, fo, I apprehend, we cannot at one inftant form a conception of the whole of any vifible object; but that our conception of the object as a whole, is the result of many conceptions. The affociation of ideas connects the different parts together, and prefents them to the mind in their proper arrangement; and the various relations which these parts bear to one another in point of fituation, contribute greatly to ftrengthen the affociations. It is fome confirmation of this theory, that it is more easy to remember a fucceffion of founds, than any particular found which we have heard detached and unconnected.

THE Powers of conceiving visible objects, like all other powers that depend on the affociation of ideas, may be wonderfully improved by habit. A person accustomed to drawing, retains a much more perfect notion of a building or of a landscape which he has feen, than one who has never practifed that art. A portrait-painter traces the form of the human body from memory, with as little exertion of attention, as he employs in writing the letters which compofe his name.

In the power of conceiving colours, too, there are striking differences among individuals: and, indeed, I am inclined to

suspect,