it is defirable only, in fo far as it is compatible with these more Introduction. valuable qualities. I already hinted, that there are fome purfuits, in which, as they require the exertion only of a small number of our faculties, an individual, who has a natural turn for them, will be more likely to distinguish himself, by being fuffered to follow his original bias, than if his attention were distracted by a more liberal course of study. But wherever fuch men are to be found, they must be confidered, on the most favourable fuppofition, as having facrificed, to a certain degree, the perfection and the happiness of their nature, to the amusement or inftruction of others. It is too, in times of general darkness and barbarism, that what is commonly called originality of genius moft frequently appears: and surely the great aim of an enlightened and benevolent philosophy, is not to rear a small number of individuals, who may be regarded as prodigies in an ignorant and admiring age, but to diffuse, as widely as poffible, that degree of cultivation which may enable the bulk of a people to poffefs all the intellectual and moral improvement of which their nature is fufceptible. " Original "genius" (fays Voltaire) occurs but feldom in a nation "where the literary taste is formed. The number of cultivated "minds which there abound, like the trees in a thick and "flourishing foreft, prevent any single individual from rearing "his head far above the reft. Where trade is in few hands, we meet with a small number of over-grown fortunes in the "midst of a general poverty: in proportion as it extends, opu"lence becomes general, and great fortunes rare. It is, pre

cifely, because there is at prefent much light, and much "cultivation,

E 2

Introduction.

"cultivation, in France, that we are led to complain of the want of fuperior genius."

To what purpose, indeed, it may be faid, all this labour? Is not the importance of every thing to man, to be ultimately eftimated by its tendency to promote his happiness? And is not our daily experience fufficient to convince us, that this is, in general, by no means proportioned to the culture which his nature has received?-Nay, is there not fome ground for suspecting, that the lower orders of men enjoy, on the whole, a more enviable condition, than their more enlightened and refined fuperiors?

THE truth, I apprehend, is, that happiness, in fo far as it arifes from the mind itself, will be always proportioned to the degree of perfection which its powers have attained; but that, in cultivating these powers, with a view to this most important of all objects, it is effentially neceffary that fuch a degree of attention be bestowed on all of them, as may preferve them in that state of relative ftrength, which appears to be agreeable to the intentions of nature. In confequence of an exclufive attention to the culture of the imagination, the taste, the reasoning faculty, or any of the active principles, it is poffible that the pleasures of human life may be diminished, or its pains increafed but the inconveniences which are experienced in fuch cafes, are not to be afcribed to education, but to a partial and injudicious education. In fuch cases, it is poffible, that the poet, the metaphyfician, or the man of tafte and refinement, may appear to disadvantage, when compared with the vulgar;

for

for fuch is the benevolent appointment of Providence with re- Introduction. fpect to the lower orders, that, although not one principle of their nature be completely unfolded, the whole of these principles preserve among themselves, that balance which is favourable to the tranquillity of their minds, and to a prudent and fteady conduct in the limited fphere which is affigned to them, far more completely, than in those of their fuperiors, whose education has been conducted on an erroneous or imperfect fyftem but all this, far from weakening the force of the foregoing obfervations, only ferves to demonstrate how impoffible it always will be, to form a rational plan for the improvement of the mind, without an accurate and comprehenfive knowledge of the principles of the human conftitution.

THE remarks which have been already made, are, I flatter myself, fufficient to illuftrate the dangerous confequences which are likely to result from a partial and injudicious cultivation of the mind; and, at the fame time, to point out the utility of the intellectual philofophy, in enabling us to preferve a proper balance among all its various faculties, principles of action, and capacities of enjoyment. Many additional obfervations might be offered, on the tendency which an accurate analysis of its powers might probably have, to suggest rules for their farther improvement, and for a more fuccefsful application of them to their proper purpofes: but this fubject I fhall not profecute at prefent, as the illuftration of it is one of the leading objects of the following work. That the memory, the imagination, or the reasoning faculty, are to be inftantly ftrengthened in confequence of our fpeculations concerning their nature, it would be abfurd

13

Introduction. abfurd to fuppofe; but it is furely far from being unreasonable

to think, that an acquaintance with the laws which regulate these powers, may suggest some useful rules for their gradual cultivation; for remedying their defects, in the cafe of individuals, and even for extending those limits, which nature feems, at first view, to have affigned them.

To how great a degree of perfection the intellectual and moral nature of man is capable of being raised by cultivation, it is difficult to conceive. The effects of early, continued, and fyftematical education, in the cafe of thofe children who are trained, for the fake of gain, to feats of ftrength and agility, justify, perhaps, the most fanguine views which it is poffible for a philofopher to form, with respect to the improvement of the species.

I Now proceed to confider, how far the philosophy of mind may be useful in accomplishing the second object of education; by affifting us in the management of early impreffions and affociations.

By far the greater part of the opinions on which we act in life, are not the refult of our own investigations; but are adopted implicitly, in infancy and youth, upon the authority of others. Even the great principles of morality, although implanted in every heart, are commonly aided and cherished, at least to a certain degree, by the care of our inftructors. -All this is undoubtedly agreeable to the intentions of nature; and, indeed, were the cafe otherwife, fociety could not fubfift;

for nothing can be more evident, than that the bulk of man- Introduction. kind, condemned as they are to laborious occupations, which are incompatible with intellectual improvement, are perfectly incapable of forming their own opinions on fome of the most important fubjects that can employ the human mind. It is. evident, at the fame time, that as no fyftem of education is perfect, a variety of prejudices muft, in this way, take an early hold of our belief; fo as to acquire over it an influence not inferior to that of the most incontrovertible truths. When a child hears, either a fpeculative abfurdity, or an erroneous principle of action, recommended and enforced daily, by the fame voice which first conveyed to it thofe fimple and fublime leffons of morality and religion which are congenial to its nature, is it. to be wondered at, that, in future life, it should find it fo difficult to eradicate prejudices which have twined their roots with all the effential principles of the human frame?—If fuch, however, be the obvious intentions of nature, with refpect to thofe orders of men who are employed in bodily labour, it is equally clear, that she meant to impofe it as a double obligation on those who receive the advantages of a liberal education, to examine, with the moft fcrupulous care, the foundation of all those received opinions, which have any connexion with morality, or with human happiness. If the multitude must be led, it is of confequence, furely, that it should be led by enlightened conductors; by men who are able to diftinguish truth from error; and to draw the line between those prejudices which are innocent or falutary, (if indeed there are any prejudices which are really falutary,) and those which are hoftile to the interefts of virtue and of mankind.