the love of truth, will reft affured that their refult will be equally Introduction. favourable to his own comfort, and to the best interests of mankind. What, indeed, will be the particular effects in the firft inftance, of that general diffufion of knowledge, which the art of printing must sooner or later produce; and of that spirit of reformation with which it cannot fail to be accompanied, it is beyond the reach of human fagacity to conjecture; but unless we chufe to abandon ourselves entirely to a defponding fcepticism, we must hope and believe, that the progress of human reason can never be a fource of permanent disorder to the world; and that they alone have cause to apprehend the confequences, who are led by the imperfection of our present inftitutions, to feel themselves interested in perpetuating the prejudices, and follies, of their species. FROM the obfervations which have been made, it fufficiently appears, that in order to fecure the mind, on the one hand, from the influence of prejudice; and on the other, from a tendency to unlimited fcepticism; it is neceffary that it should be able to distinguish the original and univerfal principles and laws of human nature, from the adventitious effects of local fituation. But if, in the cafe of an individual, who has received an imperfect or erroneous education, fuch a knowledge puts it in his power to correct, to a certain degree, his own bad habits, and to furmount his own speculative errors; it enables him to be useful, in a much higher degree, to those whose education he has an opportunity of fuperintending from early infancy. Such, and fo permanent, is the effect of first impres fions, on the character, that although a philosopher may succeed, by perfeverance, in freeing his reason from the prejudices with which 3 Introduction. which he was entangled, they will ftill retain fome hold of his imagination, and his affections: and, therefore, however enlightened his understanding may be in his hours of fpeculation, his philofophical opinions will frequently lofe their influence over his mind, in those very fituations in which their practical affistance is most required :—when his temper is foured by miffortune; or when he engages in the purfuits of life, and exposes himself to the contagion of popular errors. His opinions are supported merely by fpeculative arguments; and, instead of being connected with any of the active principles of his nature, are counteracted and thwarted by fome of the most powerful of them. How different would the cafe be, if education were conducted from the beginning with attention and judgment? Were the fame pains taken, to imprefs truth on the mind in early infancy, that is often taken to inculcate error, the great principles of our conduct would not only be juster than they are; but, in confequence of the aid which they would receive from the imagination and the heart, trained to confpire with them in the fame direction, they would render us happier in ourfelves, and would influence our practice more powerfully and more habitually. There is furely nothing in error, which is more congenial to the mind than truth. On the contrary, when exhibited feparately, and alone to the understanding, it fhocks our reason, and provokes our ridicule; and it is only, (as I had occafion already to remark) by an alliance with truths, which we find it difficult to renounce, that it can obtain our affent, or command our reverence. What advantages, then, might be derived from a proper attention to early impreffions and affociations, in giving support to those principles which are connected with human happiness? The long reign of error in the the world, and the influence it maintains, even in an age of Introduction. liberal inquiry; far from being favourable to the supposition, that human reafon is deftined to be for ever the fport of prejudice and abfurdity, demonftrates the tendency which there is to permanence in eftablished opinions, and in established inftitutions; and promises an eternal ftability to true philofophy, when it fhall once have acquired the afcendant; and when proper means fhall be employed to fupport it, by a more perfect fyftem of education. LET us fuppofe, for a moment, that this happy æra were arrived, and that all the prepoffeffions of childhood and youth were directed to fupport the pure and fublime truths of an enlightened morality. With what ardour, and with what tranfport, would the understanding, when arrived at maturity, proceed in the fearch of truth; when, instead of being obliged to ftruggle, at every step, with early prejudices, its office was merely to add the force of philofophical conviction, to impresfions, which are equally delightful to the imagination, and dear to the heart! The prepoffeffions of childhood would, through the whole of life, be gradually acquiring ftrength from the enlargement of our knowledge; and, in their turn, would fortify the conclufions of our reafon, against the sceptical suggestions of difappointment or melancholy.. OUR daily experience may convince us, how fufceptible the tender mind is of deep impreffions; and what important and permanent effects are produced on the characters, and the happinefs of individuals, by the cafual affociations formed in childhood among the various ideas, feelings, and affections, Introduction. with which they were habitually occupied. It is the business of education not to counteract this conftitution of nature, but to give it a proper direction: and the miferable confequences to which it leads, when under an improper regulation, only fhew, what an important inftrument of human improvement it might be rendered, in more skilful hands. If it be poffible to intereft the imagination and the heart in favour of error, it is, at least, no lefs poffible to intereft them in favour of truth. If it be poffible to extinguish all the moft generous and heroic feelings of our nature, by teaching us to connect the idea of them with those of guilt and impiety; it is furely equally poffible to cherish and strengthen them, by establishing the natural alliance between our duty and our happiness. If it be poffible for the influence of fashion to veil the native deformity of vice, and to give to low and criminal indulgences the appearance of spirit, of elegance, and of gaiety; can we doubt of the poffibility of connecting, in the tender mind, thofe pleafing affociations, with pursuits that are truly worthy and honourable?—There are few men to be found, among those who have received the advantages of a liberal education, who do not retain, through life, that admiration of the heroic ages of Greece and Rome, with which the claffical authors once inspired them. It is, in truth, a fortunate prepoffeffion, on the whole, and one, of which I should be forry to counteract the influence. But are there not others of equal importance to morality and to happiness, with which the mind might, at the fame period of life, be infpired? If the first conceptions, for example, which an infant formed of the Deity, and its firft moral perceptions, were affociated with the early impreffions produced on the heart by the beauties of nature, or the charms of poetical description, those serious thoughts thoughts which are reforted to, by moft men, merely as a source of confolation in adverfity; and which, on that very account, are frequently tinctured with, fome degree of gloom, would recur spontaneously to the mind, in its beft and happiest hours; and would infenfibly blend themselves with all its pureft and moft refined enjoyments. IN thofe parts of Europe, where the prevailing opinions involve the greateft variety of errors and corruptions, it is, I believe, a common idea with many respectable and enlightened men, that, in every country, it is moft prudent to conduct the religious inftruction of youth upon the plan which is prescribed by the national establishment; in order that the pupil, according to the vigour or feebleness of his mind, may either shake off, in future life, the prejudices of the nursery, or die in the popular perfuafion. This idea, I own, appears to me to be equally ill-founded and dangerous. If religious opinions have, as will not be disputed, a powerful influence on the happiness, and on the conduct, of mankind, does not humanity require of us, to rescue as many victims as poffible from the hands of bigotry; and to fave them from the cruel alternative, of remaining under the gloom of a depreffing fuperftition, or of being diftracted by a perpetual conflict between the heart and the underftanding?—It is an enlightened education alone, that, in moft countries of Europe, can fave the young philofopher from that anxiety and defpondence, which every man of sensibility, who, in his childhood, has imbibed the popular opinions, must neceffarily experience, when he firft begins to examine their foundation; and, what is of ftill greater importance, which can Introduction: |