1

NOTE S,

&c.

I

NOTE [A], page 4.

AM happy in being able to confirm this doctrine by the authority of Mr. Turgot and of Mr. Condorcet.

"Puifque l'existence des corps n'eft pour nous que la permanence "d'etres dont les propriétés répondent à un certain ordre de nos sensa<tions, il en résulte qu'elle n'a rien de plus certain que celle d'autres "etres qui fe manifestent également par leurs effets fur nous; & puif" que nos obfervations fur nos propres facultés, confirmées par celles "que nous faifons fur les etres penfants qui animent auffi des corps, "ne nous montrent aucune analogie entre l'etre qui fent ou qui pense " & l'etre qui nous offre le phénomene de l'étendue ou de l'impéné"trabilité, il n'y a aucune raison de croire ces etres de la même nature. "Ainfi la spiritualité de l'ame n'est pas une opinion qui ait besoin de "preuves, mais le résultat fimple & natural d'une analyse exacte de "nos idées, & de nos facultés."

Vie de M. TURGOT, par M. CONDORCET. Des Cartes was the first philofopher who stated, in a clear and satisfactory manner, the diftinction between mind and matter, and who pointed out the proper plan for ftudying the intellectual phenomena. It is chiefly in confequence of his precise ideas with respect to this distinction, that we may remark, in all his metaphyfical writings, a perfpicuity which is not obfervable in those of any of his predeceffors.

Dr. Reid has remarked, that although Des Cartes infers the existence of mind, from the operations of which we are confcious, yet he could not reconcile himself to the notion of an unknown fubftance, or fubftratum, to which these operations belonged. And it was on this account, he conjectures, that he made the effence of the foul to confift in thought; as, for a fimilar reason, he had made the effence of matter to confist in extenfion. But I am afraid, that this fuppofition is not perfectly reconcileable with Des Cartes' writings; for he repeatedly fpeaks with the utmost confidence of the existence of substances of which we have only a relative idea; and, even in attempting to fhew that thought is the effential attribute of mind, and extension of matter, he confiders them as nothing more than attributes or qualities belonging to these substances.

"Per fubftantiam nihil aliud intelligere poffumus, quam rem quæ "ita exiftit, ut nulla alia re indigeat ad existendum. Et quidem sub"ftantia quæ nulla plane re indigeat, unica tantum poteft intelligi,

nempe Deus. Alias vero omnes, non nifi ope concurfus Dei exiftere poffe percipimus. Atque ideo nomen fubftantiæ non convenit Deo "et illis univoce ut dici folet in fcholis; hoc eft, nulla ejus nominis fignificatio, poteft diftincte intelligi, quæ Deo, et creaturis fit com

"munis.

cr

"Poffunt autem fubftantia corporea, et mens, five fubftantia cogitans, creata, fub hoc communi conceptu intelligi; quod fint res, quæ folo Dei concurfu agent ad exiftendum. Verumtamen non poteft "fubftantia primum animadverti ex hoc folo, quod fit res exiftens, "quia hoc folum per fe nos non afficit: fed facile ipfam agnofcimus ex "quolibet ejus attributo, per communem illam notionem, quod nihili "nulla funt attributa, nullævæ proprietates aut qualitates. Ex hoc "enim, quod aliquod attributum adeffe percipiamus, concludimus aliquam rem exiftentem, five fubftantiam cui illud tribui poffit, ne"ceffario etiam adeffe.

"Et

Et quidem ex quolibet attributo substantia cognofcitur: fed una "tamen eft cujufque fubftantiæ præcipua proprietas, quæ ipfius na"turam effentiamque conftituit, et ad quam aliæ omnes referuntur. "Nempe extenfio in longum, latum et profundum fubftantiæ corporeæ naturam conftituit; et cogitatio conftituit naturam fubftantiæ cogitantis." Princip. Philofoph. pars i. cap. 51, 52, 53.

In stating the relative notions which we have of mind and of body, I have avoided the use of the word fubftance, as I am unwilling to furnish the slightest occasion for controverfy; and have contented myself with defining mind to be that which feels, thinks, wills, hopes, fears, defires, &c. That my consciousness of these and other operations is neceffarily accompanied with a conviction of my own existence, and with a conviction that all of them belong to one and the fame being, is not an hypothefis, but a fact; of which it is no more poffible for me to doubt, than of the reality of my own fenfations or volitions.

NOTE [B], page 68.

DOCTOR OCTOR REID remarks, that Des Cartes rejected a part only of the antient theory of perception, and adopted the other part. "That theory," fays he, " may be divided into two parts: the first, "that images, fpecies, or forms of external objects, come from the

object, and enter by the avenues of the fenfes to the mind: the fe"cond part is, that the external object itself is not perceived, but "only the fpecies or image of it in the mind. The first part, Des "Cartes and his followers rejected and refuted by folid arguments; "but the second part, neither he nor his followers have thought of "calling in queftion; being perfuaded that it is only a representative "image in the mind of the external object that we perceive, and not "the object itself. And this image, which the peripatetics called a 3 Y 2 " fpecies,

"species, he calls an idea, changing the name only, while he admits "the thing."

The account which this paffage contains of Des Cartes' doctrine concerning perception, is, I believe, agreeable to his prevailing opinion, as it may be collected from the general tenor of his writings; and the obfervation with which it concludes is undoubtedly true, that neither he nor any of his followers ever called in question the existence of ideas, as the immediate objects of our perception. With respect, however, to the first part of the antient theory, as here ftated, it may be proper to remark, that Des Cartes, although evidently by no means fatisfied with it, fometimes expreffes himself as if he rather doubted of it, than expressly denied it; and at other times, when preffed with objections to his own particular system, he admits, at least in part, the truth of it. The following paffage is one of the most explicit I recollect, in oppofition to the antient doctrine.

"Obfervandum præterea, animam, nullis imaginibus ab objectis ad "cerebrum miffis egere ut fentiat, (contra quam communiter philofophi noftri ftatuunt,) aut ad minimum, longe aliter illarum ima"ginum naturam concipiendam effe quam vulgo fit. Quum enim circa eas nil confiderent, præter fimilitudinem earum cum objectis quæ repræsentant, non poffunt explicare, qua ratione ab objectis "formari queant, et recipi ab organis fenfuum exteriorum, et demum ́ "nervis ad cerebrum tranfvehi. Nec alia caufa imagines iftas fingere' "eos impulit, nifi quod viderent mentem noftram efficaciter pictura "excitari ad apprehendendum objectum illud, quod exhibet: ex hoc "enim judicarunt, illam eodem modo excitandam, ad apprehendenda "ea quæ fenfus movent, per exiguas quafdam imagines, in capite "noftro delineatas. Sed nobis contra eft advertendum, multa præter imagines effe, quæ cogitationes excitant, ut exempli gratia, verba et figna, nullo modo fimilia iis quæ fignificant."

Dioptric. cap. 4. § 6.