that the offence may be committed by others, and not only by the mother.

ABDUCTION.

Abduction.

On account of the woman's fortune.

By force, with intent to marry.

We may distinguish three classes of cases :

i. Of a woman on account of her fortune.

Where a woman of any age has any interest (legal or equitable, present or future, absolute, conditional, or contingent) in any real or personal estate, or is a presumptive heiress or co-heiress, or presumptive next of kin to any one having such interest (a) whosoever, from motives of lucre, takes away or detains such woman against her will, with intent himself, or to cause some other person, to marry her, or have carnal knowledge of her or (b) whosoever fraudulently allures, takes away, or detains such woman, being under the age of twenty-one, out of the possession or against the will of her father or mother, or other person having the lawful care or charge of her, with like intent, is guilty of a felony, punishable by penal servitude to the extent of fourteen years. The convicted person is also rendered incapable of taking any interest in her property; and if he is married to her, the property will be settled as the Chancery Division, upon an information at the suit of the Attorney-General, appoints (q). The intent to marry or have carnal knowledge need only be proved, not the carrying out of that intent. The wife is a competent witness either for or against the prisoner.

ii. By force, with intent to marry.

The same punishment attends the forcible taking away or detaining against her will a woman of any age, with intent to marry or carnally know her, or cause

(g) 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, s. 53.

her to be married or carnally known by any other person (r).

iii. Of a girl under sixteen years of age.

sixteen.

To unlawfully take or cause to be taken any unmarried of girl under girl under the age of sixteen out of the possession and against the will of her father or mother, or of any other person having the lawful care or charge of her, is a misdemeanor, punishable by imprisonment not exceeding two years (s).

If the girl leaves her father, &c., without any induce- Who are within this proviment on the part of the defendant, and then goes to him, sion." he is not within the statute (t). Nor is he, if he did not know, and had no reason to know, that she was under the lawful charge of the father or other person (u). Of course mere absence for a temporary purpose and with intention of returning does not interrupt the possession of the father, &c. It is no defence that the defendant did not know her to be under sixteen, or might suppose from her appearance that she was older, or even that he believed that he knew she was over that age (v). A taking by force is not necessary to constitute the offence. It is immaterial whether there be any corrupt motive, whether the girl consent, and whether the defendant be a male or female (w).

CHILD-STEALING, ABANDONING, ETC.

To unlawfully, either by force or fraud, lead or take Child-stealing. away, or decoy or entice away, or detain a child under the age of fourteen years, with intent to deprive the parent, or other person having lawful care or charge, of the possession of the child, or with intent to steal.

(t) R. v. Olifier, 10 Cox, 402.

(u) R. v. Hibbert, L. R. 1 C. C. R. 184; 38 L. J. (M.C.) 61. (v) R. v. Prince, L. R. 2 C. C., R. 154; 44 L. J. (M.C.) 122. (w) R. v. Handley, 1 F. & F. 648.

Child-abandoning, or exposing.

any article upon or about the child, or, with any such intent, to receive or harbour any such child, knowing the same to have been so led away, &c., is a felony, punishable by penal servitude to the extent of seven years. But persons claiming any right to the possession of the child do not fall within the statute (x).

To unlawfully abandon or expose any child under the age of two years in such manner that its life is endangered or its health is, or is likely to be, permanently injured, is a misdemeanor, punishable by penal servitude to the extent of five years (y).

(x) 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, s. 56.

(y) Ibid. s. 27; v. R. v. Falkingham, L. R. 1 C. C. R. 222; 39 L. J. (M. C.) 47, shewing how little will warrant a conviction.

CHAPTER III.

ASSAULTS, ETC.

UNDER this head we shall consider all the remaining offences against the person.

COMMON ASSAULT.

An assault is an attempt or offer to commit a forcible Assault. crime against the person of another; for example, presenting a loaded gun at a person. It will be noticed that there need not be an actual touching of the person assaulted. But mere words never amount to

an assault (*).

The combatants at a prize fight and all persons aiding and abetting therein are guilty of an assault for which an indictment will lie. But (Lord Coleridge, C. J., Pollock, B., and Matthew, J., dissenting) the mere voluntary presence of persons at a prize fight does not necessarily make them guilty of an assault, as aiding and abetting (a).

The unlimited character of this crime makes it a Comprehensiveness of the convenient means of punishing a variety of crimes crime. which do not at first sight seem to be assaults, at least not in the popular signification of the term; for example, putting a child into a bag, hanging it on some palings, and there leaving it (b).

(2) 1 Hawk. c. 62, s. I.

(a) R. v. Coney, 8 Q. B. D. 534; 51 L. J. (M.C.) 66; 46 L. T. N. S. 307; 30 W. R. 678.

(b) R. v. March, 1 C. & K. 496.

Battery.

Effect of consent.

Assault the

subject also of

ings.

A battery is not necessarily a forcible striking with the hand or stick or the like, but includes every touching or laying hold (however trifling) of another person, or his clothes, in an angry, revengeful, rude, insolent, or hostile manner; for example, jostling another out of the way. Thus, if a man strikes at another with a cane or fist, or throws a bottle at him, if he miss, it is an assault; if he hit, it is a battery.

As a rule, consent on the part of the complainant deprives the act of the character of an assault, unless, indeed, non-resistance has been brought about by fraud. But the fact of consent will in general be immaterial when an actual battery or breach of the peace has been committed (c).

A common assault is also the subject of a civil action civil proceed for damages; and the party injured may either prosecute or bring his action first. The court will not, however, pass judgment during the pendency of a civil action for the same assault (d), the reason obviously being that otherwise the issue of the civil action might be prejudiced.

Punishment,

tion.

A common assault, that is, a mere assault which may or compensa- or may not have proceeded to a battery, is a misdemeanor, punishable by imprisonment not exceeding one year (e). But the justice of the case is often more adequately met by compensation to the person injured. Therefore, with the assent of the prosecution, if the circumstances appear to warrant that course, the court may allow the defendant to plead guilty, and inflict upon him a merely nominal fine, on the understanding that he shall make a compensation to the prosecutor (f).